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  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
       DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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------------------------ )       ADP Case No. 08-03474
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Public Trust Position )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
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Decision
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ABLARD, Charles D., Administrative Judge:
Applicant failed to mitigate security concerns regarding Financial Considerations
(Guideline F) because of her failure to sufficiently provide evidence of resolution of
delinquent debts. Clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case
Applicant submitted her Questionnaires for Public Trust Position (SF 85P) on
August 18, 2007. On November 19, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to her detailing the trustworthiness
concerns under Guideline F for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960,
as amended and modified; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as
amended (Directive); Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel
Security Program, dated January, 1987, as amended (Regulation), and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.
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The SOR detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative
finding under the Regulation that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue access to sensitive information for her, and recommended referral to an
administrative judge to determine whether such access should be granted, continued,
denied, or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations in a sworn statement, and elected to
have her case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. A complete copy of the
file of relevant material (FORM), dated January 26, 2009, was provided to her, and she
was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation,
extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days. Applicant provided no additional material but
only returned the FORM to DOHA. The case was assigned to me on March 19, 2009.
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted all of the factual allegations of the SOR in her answer. After a
complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings of
fact:
Applicant is a 35-year-old employee of a defense contractor who seeks to occupy
an Automatic Data Processing Position, designated ADP I/II/III. In her answer to the
SOR she admits ten allegations involving delinquent debts that total over $9,500. The
largest was over $5,000. In her answer to interrogatories (Item 6) concerning 14 debts,
she indicates that one debt for $33 has been paid and another for $756 is being paid in
installments. Neither were alleged in the SOR. 
In her responses to interrogatories, she answered each of the remaining
allegations in the identical way stating that are caused by health issues relating to her
pregnancy in 2005, her husband’s unemployment, and ,more recently, separation from
her husband. She also states that she will resolve each account on a monthly basis but
offers no plan or agreement to do so. She is now a single parent with three daughters.
Policies
Positions designated as ADP I and ADP II are classified as “sensitive positions.”
(See Regulation ¶¶ C3.1.2.1.1.7 and C3.1.2.1.2.3.)  “The standard that must be met for
. . . assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the
person’s loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that . . . assigning the person to
sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” (See
Regulation ¶ C6.1.1.1.) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence
and Security) Memorandum, dated November 19, 2004, indicates trustworthiness
adjudications will apply to cases forwarded to DOHA by the Defense Security Service
and Office of Personnel Management. Department of Defense contractor personnel are
afforded the right to the procedures contained in the Directive before any final
unfavorable access determination may be made. (See Regulation ¶ C8.2.1.)  
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When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a public trust position, the
Administrative Judge must consider the disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the
AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
[sensitive] information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable
trustworthiness decision. 
A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard sensitive information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
sensitive information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), Section 3.
Analysis
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all
appropriate legal precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described briefly
above, I conclude that the following Adjudicative Guidelines provide the standard for
resolution of the allegations set forth in the SOR. 
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Guideline F Financial Considerations
The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set
out in AG ¶ 18: 
Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended
is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns. Under
AG ¶ 19(a), an "inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts” is potentially disqualifying.
Similarly under AG ¶ 19(c), "a history of not meeting financial obligations may raise
security concerns.”
Applicant did incur substantial delinquent debts that are unresolved, but offered
no plan to consolidate them or pay in installments. Thus, the conditions required were
established by the government sufficient to raise a security concern. 
The guideline also includes examples of mitigating conditions (MC) that could
mitigate security concerns arising from financial considerations. Under AG ¶ 20(b), the
security concern may be mitigated where the conditions that resulted in the financial
problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the
individual acted responsibly under the circumstances. Applicant may have had medical
expenses, family unemployment, and marital problems that were the proximate cause of
her debts, but no supporting documentary evidence was offered to establish facts to
prove those assertions, or to establish that responsible action was taken after the debts
were incurred. The burden is on Applicant to do so since she has admitted the alleged
delinquent debts are hers in her answer.
Under AG ¶ 20(d) the security concern may be mitigated when the individual
initiated a good faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. No
such evidence was presented, so this mitigating condition is not applicable. 
Under AG ¶ 20(e) the security concern may be mitigated when the individual has
a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt that is the cause of the
problem, and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or
provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue. She has provided no supporting
documentary evidence to dispute the debts, or of actions to resolve the debts. This
mitigating condition also is not applicable. 
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Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all the facts and
circumstances, in the context of the whole person, I conclude she has not mitigated the
security concerns. Although she stated the problems that led to her delinquent debts,
she failed to provide sufficient information about future plans to resolve her delinquent
debts that would support application of mitigation under the whole person concept. 
I take this position based on the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518 (1988), a careful consideration of the whole person factors and supporting
evidence, application of the pertinent factors under the adjudicative process, and
interpretation of my responsibilities under the guidelines. Applicant has not mitigated or
overcome the government’s case. For the reasons stated, I conclude he is not eligible
for access to classified information.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a.-j.: Against Applicant 
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Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue eligibility for a public trust
position for Applicant. Eligibility for access to sensitive information is denied.
Charles D. Ablard
Administrative Judge