DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 08-06974 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Richard Stevens, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Timothy Clay Kulp, Esquire 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant submitted a periodic update for his security clearance on April 3, 2007.  
On November 19, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns for Applicant under Guideline 
B, Foreign Influence, and Guideline C, Foreign Preference.  The action was taken under 
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended 
(Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President 
on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs 
issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on November 25, 2008. He 
answered the SOR in writing on the same day, admitting the factual allegations with 
explanation.  He requested a hearing before an administrative judge.  Department 
Counsel was prepared to proceed on December 23, 2008.  The case was assigned to 
me on January 2, 2009.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on January 8, 2009, for a 
hearing on February 6, 2009.  I convened the hearing as scheduled.  The government 
offered three exhibits, marked Government Exhibits (Gov. Ex.) 1 through 3, which were 
 
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received without objection.  Applicant submitted one exhibit, marked Applicant Exhibit 
(App. Ex.) A, which was received without objection.  Applicant and two other witnesses 
testified on Applicant’s behalf.  DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on 
February 23, 2009.  Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and 
testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Iran. (Tr. 28-30, Court Exhibit I)  The request and the attached 
supporting documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the record 
as a Court Exhibit.  Applicant had no objection to the request for administrative notice or 
the attached documents.  The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings 
of Fact, below.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following essential findings of fact.  Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the 
SOR with explanation.  He also provided additional information to support his request 
for eligibility for a security clearance.   
 
Applicant is 54 years old and employed as a communications electronic engineer 
for a defense contractor.  Applicant was born in Iran and received his elementary and 
high school education in Iran.  He came to the United States in April 1978 on a student 
visa to pursue his education.  At the time, the Shah was the ruler of Iran.  The United 
States and Iran enjoyed friendly relations and were allies.  Life in Iran at the time was 
very nice.  The Shah was overthrown in 1979. 
 
Applicant received a bachelor's degree in electronic engineering in 1984 from a 
United States university.  He became a United States citizen on November 19, 1984.  
Applicant desired to continue his education but did not have the financial resources to 
fund his continued education.  He enlisted in the United States Navy in March 1986.  
After extensive training and schooling, he served on two ships as an electronics 
technician.  He served six years on active duty and received an honorable discharge 
upon completion of his enlistment in March 1992.  He held a top secret clearance while 
in the Navy.  He never informed his family in Iran that he was serving in the Navy or 
held a security clearance.  He lived on the ship and only communicated with his family 
by telephone and not by mail (Tr. 30-34, 65-66; Gov. Ex. 1, Security Clearance 
Application, e-QIP, dated April 3, 2007).    
 
Applicant sought positions in the private sector after his discharge from the Navy.  
He was offered a position as a communications engineer for a defense contractor.  He 
 
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worked for this company from 1992 until 1995, and held a top secret security clearance.  
He only told his family that he was an engineer for a company (Tr. 35-36). 
 
Applicant started working as an electronics engineer for a different defense 
contractor in 1995.  He worked for this company until 2000 when he started working as 
a communications electronic engineer for the predecessor company of his present 
defense contractor employer.  He held a top secret security clearance for all of his 
employers (Tr. 37-39). 
 
Applicant has never traveled outside the United States, except for deployments 
on Navy ships since his arrival in the United States in 1978.  When his mother died a 
few years ago, he did not return to Iran for her funeral.  He did not trust the Iranian 
government and did not want to take chances because of their human rights record.  
Applicant admits his father, two brothers, and a sister are citizens and residents of Iran.  
His father is 87 years old and a former college professor.  One brother sells construction 
equipment, and the other is not employed.  His sister is a housewife.  None of them 
have any political connections or work for the Iranian government.  He used to talk to 
his father by telephone about every six months.  After his father had a heart attack, he 
talked to him more frequently, about once a month.  Since his father's health is now 
good, even though he has a heart condition, he again only talks to him about every six 
months.  His last contact with his family was over a month ago when his brother in Iran 
called him with an update on his father's health.  In 2006, his wanted to assist with his 
father's medical bills.  He withdrew funds from his 401K account and wire transferred 
$12,800 to his younger brother in Iran to help with his father's medical bills (Tr. 44-46; 
66-67; Gov. Ex. 2, Statement, dated march 12, 1993; Gov. Ex. 3, Testimonies, dated 
August 15, 2007). 
 
Applicant married a United States citizen who was a fellow student in 1981 while 
he attended college.  The marriage ended in divorce in 1992.  He married again in 
March 2004 to a woman who was born in Iran and is a dual citizen of Iran and Sweden.  
They had been high school sweethearts in Iran but lost touch when Applicant came to 
the United States.  She was able to contact him in 2003.  She has two daughters from a 
prior marriage who are citizens and residents of Sweden.  One is a student in Sweden 
and the other a student in the United States.  He has never spoken to his wife's mother 
who is a citizen and resident of Iran.  His wife is a permanent resident and is seeking 
United States citizenship.  She hopes her application for citizenship can be processed 
through the system and granted in two or three years.  Applicant admits his wife's 
parents are citizens and residence of Iran (Tr. 63-66; Gov. Ex. 1, Security clearance 
application, e-QIP, dated April 3, 2007; Gov. Ex. 3, Testimonies, dated August 15, 2007, 
at 3). 
 
Applicant talked to his production manager about visiting his family in Iran after 
his father had a heart attack.  The production manager said he thought a trip would be 
fine and raised no issue with Applicant about travelling to Iran.  Since there did not 
seem to be any issue with his travel to Iran, Applicant did not conceal the fact he 
intended to apply for an Iranian passport.  His managers knew he anticipated applying 
 
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for an Iranian passport.  He applied for an Iranian passport through the Pakistan 
Embassy.  He received the Iranian passport on December 19, 2006.  Afterward, he 
talked to others in his company to facilitate work schedules if he made a trip to Iran.  
While he talked about a trip, he did not make any travel plans.  He asked his program 
manager if he was permitted to travel overseas since he possessed a security 
clearance.  The program manager told him that he did not see any problem.  Applicant 
also had discussed potential overseas travel with an acquaintance from Iran who was 
an engineer for another government agency.  He was told that there did not seem to be 
a problem with traveling overseas.  The individual had traveled to Iran and told 
Applicant that was permissible (Tr. 46-48).   
 
Applicant advised his facility security officer (FSO) he had applied for and 
received an Iranian passport, and inquired if this was a security problem.  The FSO 
inquired of the company's contact with the Defense Security Service about the 
possession of the Iranian passport.  He suggested that she file a formal report.  Since 
Applicant's five year periodic update for access to classified information was due, the 
FSO requested that Applicant submit a security clearance application in March 2007.  
Applicant disclosed on the application that he possessed an Iranian passport.  Applicant 
was interviewed about the passport by a number of government investigation agencies 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Naval Criminal Investigation 
Service (NCIS).  Applicant answered all questions and cooperated with the 
investigators.  No changes were made at the time to his access to classified information 
(Tr. 45-54).   
 
Applicant turned his Iranian passport over to his FSO after she was advised in 
November 2008 by DSS to have Applicant give her the passport.  He does not intend to 
ask for it back and stated she could destroy it if she wanted.  He has no intent to travel 
to Iran even upon the death of his father.  Applicant does not own property in Iran and 
does not have a bank account there.  All of his finances are in the United States.  His 
only house is one he purchased in the United States in 1996.  He is not Muslin, and in 
fact is not religious.  He does not consider himself an Iranian citizen.  He decided never 
to return to Iran after he learned of their poor human rights record.  He was not sure that 
if he went to Iran he would be allowed to leave.  When he became a United States 
citizen in 1984, he cut all of his ties to Iran (Tr. 54-58, 66-68). 
 
The FSO for Applicant's company testified that she has been the FSO for almost 
ten years, and has known Applicant for this entire time.  She never had any reason to 
doubt his allegiance to the United States or his protection of national security 
information.  Her employees receive annual training on their obligations and 
responsibilities for protecting classified information.  As the FSO, she maintains liaison 
with the Defense Security Service.  She was aware that Applicant had applied for and 
received an Iranian passport.  Applicant informed her because he said he may decide to 
travel to Iran to visit his sick father.  She informed DSS and was asked to initiate a full 
report.  She initiated Applicant's five year periodic update of his security clearance.  She 
filed a formal report with Applicant's security clearance application which started an 
investigation from various government investigative agencies.  Applicant had sensitive 
 
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compartmented information (SCI) access in addition to his top secret clearance.  After 
completion of the investigation, Applicant's security clearance status was not changed 
and he continued to have access to classified information.  She expected that if there 
was any issue, the investigators would confiscate Applicant's Iranian passport, but they 
did not.  Applicant voluntarily gave her his Iranian passport in November 2008.  It is 
locked in a safe in her office.  He has never requested return of the Iranian passport (Tr. 
77-96) 
 
The group senior vice-president for Applicant's company testified that he is a 
retired Navy Master Chief with degrees in electronics and physics, and engineering 
management.  In the Navy, he served as a cryptologist and was the technical adviser 
for cryptology to the Chief of Naval Operations.  He has held top level security 
clearances since 1969.  He is aware of the security clearance requirements concerning 
foreign family members and spouses since he had family members that were citizens 
and residents of foreign countries when he first entered active duty, and he later married 
a foreign national.  He retired from the Navy in 1991 and started working for the 
predecessor company of his present employer.  As the business manager, he is 
responsible for the largest division in his company which includes Applicant's area.  He 
has known Applicant since 1995 and had almost daily contact with him at the start of 
their relationship.  As the company grew and Applicant worked in various positions in 
the general geographic area for the company, their contact has not been daily.  He sees 
Applicant often and hears about his performance from Applicant's supervisors.  
Applicant's work product is excellent and he is known for the quality of his work 
performance.  His technical skills are held in very high regard.  He has been a valuable 
asset to the company.   
 
The witness stated he has been interviewed a number of times for updates for 
Applicant's security clearance.  He knows of Applicant's anger at the events of 9/11 and 
also knows about indignities he suffered because of his ancestry.  The witness has 
been associated with people with very high security clearances and does not know of a 
more dedicated individual to the United States than Applicant.  The witness received 
significant training in his career to detect those that might have issues of loyalty and 
allegiance to the United States.  He has no questions about Applicant and would gladly 
serve with him in the most sensitive positions.  It is possible for Applicant to be subject 
to foreign influence because he has family members in Iran.  However, he is convinced 
Applicant would react only in ways favourable to the United States.  Applicant would 
immediately report any problems.  He is certain that Applicant has no preference or 
allegiance for Iran.  He endorses Applicant for access to classified information (Tr. 98-
110) 
 
Applicant presented fourteen letters of recommendation.  The letters were from 
supervisors and co-workers.  All of these letters attested to Applicants excellent work 
performance.  They all noted that he is a proud and valued United States citizen.  They 
considered him trustworthy and reliable (App. Ex. A, Letters, various dates). 
 
 
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Iran is a country that has been hostile to the United States since the 1979 
revolution that overthrew the former pro-western government.  Iran’s support for terrorist 
groups has long concerned the United States.  Iran’s human rights practices are also a 
concern for the United States.  The Iranian theocratic government has repressed its 
people, pursued weapons of mass destruction, initiated a nuclear program that may 
include nuclear weapons, and continues to support terrorism in Iraq and around the 
world.  Iran is known to conduct intelligence operations and economic espionage 
against the United States.  There is no direct evidence in the record concerning Iranian 
espionage activity towards or within the United States, but this hostile relationship 
supports the inference that Iran would seek to damage or counter United States military 
capabilities by seeking to obtain classified or sensitive information when possible.  The 
United States Department of State warns United States citizens, particularly United 
States citizens of Iranian origin, to consider carefully the risks of travel to Iran.  Iran 
does not recognize renunciation of citizenship by those born there, and has detained 
and harassed naturalized United States citizens traveling there.  Applicant is aware of 
the dangerous nature of the regime and intentionally has not returned to Iran.  The 
continued support for terrorism and human rights violations contributed to President 
Bush’s strong criticism of Iran in his 2002 State of the Union message and his 
designation of Iran as one of the “Axis of Evil.”  Iran is a nation whose interests are 
inimical to the United States.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
 
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Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, 
organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interests.  Adjudication under this guideline can and 
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is location, including but not limited to, such consideration as whether 
the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected 
information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism (AG ¶ 6).  Applicant's family 
members and his relationship with them has been known for the over twenty years he 
has been granted access to classified information.  Even though this relationship has 
been known and has not been considered a factor in denial of access to classified 
information, it does not mean it should not be considered now.  However, his access to 
classified information in the past under these circumstances is a positive factor to 
consider in determining if access should be continued.  The only factors that have 
changed from the previous granting of access to classified information is that Applicant 
applied for, received, and possesses an Iranian passport, and that he sent funds to Iran 
to help with his father's medical expenses. 
 
 Applicant has infrequent contact with his father and siblings who are citizens and 
residents of Iran.  He has not visited Iran or seen his family members since he left Iran 
 
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in 1978.  They have never visited the United States.  He talks by telephone with his 
family members about every six months.  The last contact he had with a family member 
in Iran was a telephone call from a brother about six weeks ago telling him of his father's 
medical condition.  He sent his brother significant funds to assist with his father's 
medical expenses in June 2006.  Even though his contact with his family in Iran has 
been minimal, it raises security concerns under Foreign Influence Disqualifying 
Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 79(a) "Contact with a foreign family member, business or 
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign 
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, 
manipulation, pressure, or coercion"; and FI DC AG ¶ 7(b) "Connections to a foreign 
person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest 
between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the 
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information".   
 
 The mere existence of a foreign family member is not sufficient.  The nature of 
Applicant’s contact with the family member must be examined to determine whether it 
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion.  “Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased risk over some normally 
existing risk that can be said to be inherent anytime a family member lives subject to a 
foreign government.  One factor that heightens the risk in Applicant’s case is the nature 
of the Iranian government and its hostility towards the United States. 
 
 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns for his family in Iran.  I 
have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) AG ¶ 8(a) "the nature 
of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are 
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is 
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the 
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interest of 
the U.S."; FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) "there is no conflict of interest, either because the 
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or 
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest"; and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) "Contact or communication 
with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could 
created a risk for foreign influence or exploitation". 
 
 Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign 
family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the 
family members were not “in a position to be exploited.”  The Appeal Board consistently 
applied this mitigating condition narrowly, holding that its underlying premise was that 
an applicant should not be placed in a position where he or she is forced to make a 
choice between the interest of the family member and the interest of the United States.  
(See, ISCR Case No. 03-17620, App. Bd, Apr. 17, 2006; ISCR Case No. 03-24933, 
App. Bd. Jul. 28, 2005; ISCR Case No. 03-02382, App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2005; and ISCR 
Case No. 03-15205, App. Bd. Jan. 21. 2005).  Thus, an administrative judge was not 
 
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permitted to apply a balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk.  Under the 
new guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to 
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S. 
interest. 
 
 The nature of the government of Iran, its disregard for human rights, and its 
intent to seek information on United States technology places a heavy burden on 
Applicant in mitigating the disqualifying conditions and the security concerns.  There is a 
rebuttable presumption that Applicant's relationship with his father and siblings in Iran is 
close.  His father is a retired 87 year old professor who has no contact or relationship 
with the Iranian government.  His siblings have no position or relationship with the 
Iranian government.  While the circumstances of his relationship with his family in Iran 
and their position in Iran may make it unlikely Applicant can be placed in a position to 
choose between them and his loyalty to the United States, there could be a 
circumstance where Applicant is placed in a position of having to choose between his 
family members and the interests of the United States because of the nature 0f the 
Iranian government.  Accordingly, FI MC AG ¶ 8(a) does not apply.  
 
 It is clear from Applicant’s testimony that he has a relationship with his family in 
Iran.  Applicant realizes that there is a risk for him to go to Iran.  Because of this 
realization, he has not returned to Iran since leaving in 1978, even when his mother 
died.  Since Applicant is concerned about a visiting Iran, there is likelihood that his 
family in Iran could create the risk for him of foreign influence or exploitation.  Even 
though the relationship is infrequent but more than casual, FI DC AG ¶ 8 (c) does not 
apply.   
 
 Applicant has little, if any, sense of loyalty to Iran.  He spent only his early years 
in Iran.  The revolutionary government of Iran came into being after he left Iran.  The 
testimony of those that have known him for many years establishes that he has a deep 
sense of loyalty and admiration for the United States and its way of life.  There was 
testimony from a retired military member who understands a sense of loyalty and 
obligation.  There are letters recommending his continued access to classified 
information from colleagues and friends working in the defense industry who hold 
security clearances and understand the requirements to receive access to classified 
information.  Applicant came to the United States as a teenager and received his 
professional education here.  He became a United States citizen as soon as he could, 
and has been successful working in the defense industries.  He served honorably in the 
United States Navy for six years and held a security clearance while on active duty.  He 
sees the United States as offering him freedom, justice, and tolerance with an 
opportunity to reach his potential.  He served in the defense industry for over 17 years 
with a top level security clearance the entire time.  While he provided funds to assist 
with the medical care of his father, he sent the funds as a son and not to assist the 
government of Iran.  He left it to the discretion of his family members as to how the 
funds should be used.  Applicant's sense of loyalty or obligation is not to Iran but to the 
United States.  A conflict of interest in this case is extremely unlikely.  In balancing all of 
the factors mentioned and considered above, I am satisfied Applicant’s loyalty to the 
 
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United States is such that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor 
of the United States interest.  FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) applies.  Applicant has met his heavy 
burden to show that his contacts with his family in Iran do not cause a security concern.  
I conclude Applicant has mitigated security concerns rising from his contact with his 
family in Iran.  
 
Guideline B, Foreign Preference 
 
 When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States, then he may be prone to provide information or make 
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States (AG ¶ 9).  Iran considers 
him an Iranian citizen because he was born in Iran.  Applicant applied for an Iranian 
passport after obtaining United States citizenship.  He applied for the passport to ease 
his entry into Iran should he travel to Iran upon the death of his father.  He has never 
used the passport.  He told the authorities in his company of his intent to obtain the 
passport and sought advice.  He told his supervisors and FSO of the possession of the 
passport.  He cooperated with security investigators concerning the passport.  Even 
under these circumstances, his possession of the Iranian passport raises Foreign 
Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) AG ¶ 10(a) "Exercise of any right, privilege, 
or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a United States citizen or through the 
foreign citizenship of a family member.  This includes but is not limited to: (1) 
possession of a current foreign passport."   
 
Applicant raised Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MC) AG ¶ 11(b) 
"The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship", and FP MC 
AG ¶ 11(e) "The passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security 
authority, or otherwise invalidated."  Applicant does not know of any procedure 
accepted by the Iranian government to renounce his Iranian citizenship.  He thought he 
renounced his Iranian citizenship when he became a United States citizen in 1984.  He 
does not consider himself an Iranian citizen.  The Iranian passport is a current passport 
but has been turned over to his Facility Security Officer, a cognizant security official.  He 
has told her and others that the passport can be destroyed.  He has no intention of 
asking for it to be returned to him.  Applicant has mitigated security concerns for foreign 
preference raised by his current Iranian passport. 
 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
 
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which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.  I carefully considered all of the 
circumstances discussed above in regard to disqualifying and mitigating conditions as 
well as the following factors in light of the “whole person” concept.  The “whole person” 
concept requires consideration of all available information about Applicant, not a single 
item in isolation, to reach a common sense determination concerning Applicant’s 
security worthiness.  Applicant has a relationship with his family members in Iran 
because he occasionally talks to them by telephone and has sent funds for his father's 
medical care.  These simple facts alone might be sufficient to raise security concerns 
over Applicant’s vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.  However, mere 
family ties with people in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law, disqualifying 
under Guideline B.  Whether an applicant’s family ties in a foreign country pose a 
security risk depends on a common sense evaluation of the overall facts and 
circumstances of the family ties.   
 
Applicant has strong loyalties to the United States and a strong lack of loyalty for 
Iran.  He has been granted access to classified information for over 23 years even 
though his relationship with his family members was a known factor.  He is regarded as 
loyal, trustworthy, and reliable by those that work with and know him.  Many are former 
military and government officials.  They know and understand the qualifications for 
access to classified information and have themselves made judgments on people for 
access to classified information.  Applicant has established his deep loyalty to the 
United States.  He established that he has no loyalty to Iran or its government.  He 
relinquished control of his Iranian passport and turned it over to his FSO.  He has 
informed her and all of his company officials that the passport can be destroyed and he 
does not want it back.  Overall, on balance, the record evidence leaves me without 
questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. 
For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has met the particularly heavy burden of 
mitigating all potential security concerns arising from his family member in Iran as well 
as his applying for and receiving a current Iranian passport.  Accordingly I find that 
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign influence and foreign 
preference.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
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Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.c:   For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.d:   For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge