KEYWORD: Guideline J; Guideline M
DIGEST: The Judge’s controverted findings are supported by substantial evidence.  Adverse
decision affirmed.
CASENO: 06-09643.a1
DATE: 06/22/2009
DATE: June 22, 2009
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-09643
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On November 20, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
See, e.g., Item 9 at 2, Letter to Applicant terminating his employment.  The letter states that Applicant was1
warned twice, in writing, about his conduct.  Despite those warnings, “[m]anagement recently had cause to believe that
you were again engaging in conduct that was in violation of [employer’s] Internet and E-Mail Policies.  Therefore . . .
an audit of your recent internet and e-mail activities was conducted.  As a result, it was determined that you had installed
a ‘track eraser’ program on your computer without authorization, having continued to misuse the internet to access
inappropriate sites and have stored additional inappropriate materials on your company computer.”  
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of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline J (Criminal Conduct),
Guideline M (Use of Information Technology Systems), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested decision on the written record.  On April 30, 2009, after considering the record,
Administrative Judge Robert J. Tuider denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant
appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether certain of the Judge’s findings of
fact are supported by substantial record evidence; and whether the Judge’s adverse security clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Finding no error, we affirm.
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant is a 33-year-old employee
of a defense contractor.  He served in the Navy from 1993 to 2002, holding a security clearance
during his service.  Applicant has four criminal offenses on his record, two of them DUIs.  The first
DUI occurred in 1996 and the second in 1998.  In February 2003, Applicant was convicted of
providing alcohol to a minor, the result of his teenage stepchildren and their friends consuming
alcohol at his house.  In 2004 he was convicted of misdemeanor assault for slapping his teenage
stepdaughter.  From 2003 to 2005 Applicant was employed by a defense contractor.  The contractor
terminated his employment, due to Applicant having violated company policy concerning internet
and e-mail usage.  The company had given Applicant two prior written warnings that he risked losing
his job unless he changed his behavior.  Applicant’s security clearance application inquired about
drug- or alcohol-related convictions.  Applicant listed his 1996 DUI but omitted the one in 1998.
The Judge stated, “Applicant does not dispute that he deliberately failed to list his 1998 DUI.
Applicant offered no mitigating evidence.”  In the Analysis portion of his decision, the Judge stated
that “Applicant presented little or no evidence to explain, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns
raised.  Applicant did not meet his ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance
decision.”  Decision at 3, 7.  
Applicant contends that his prior employer warned him only once about his improper use of
e-mail and the internet.  However, the record demonstrates that the Judge’s finding of two warnings
is supported by substantial evidence.   See  Directive  ¶ E3.1.32.1.  (Substantial evidence is “such1
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of
all the contrary evidence in the same record.”) The Judge’s finding that Applicant deliberately
omitted his 1998 DUI is also supported by substantial evidence.  
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the  decision, “including a ‘rational connection between
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the facts found and the choice made.’”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  The Judge’s decision that “it is not clearly consistent with national
security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance” is sustainable on this record.  Decision
at 8.  See also Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) (“The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”). 
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jean E. Smallin             
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                      
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board