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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-00081
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Francisco Mendez, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Greg McCormick, Esquire
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s wife and in-laws are citizens and residents of South Korea. Also,
Applicant has a history of delinquent debt which he failed to disclose in its entirety on
his 2005 security clearance application. These facts generate security concerns under
Guidelines B, foreign influence, F, financial considerations, and E, personal conduct.
After evaluating Applicant’s background and family relationships, together with the
nature of his ties to the country, and the country’s relationship with the U.S., I conclude
he has mitigated the foreign influence security concern. As for the financial
considerations security concern, Applicant satisfied all of the delinquencies, and
provided evidence demonstrating that his finances are currently organized and stable.
His explanation for failing to disclose all of his delinquencies on his security clearance
application was credible. He has mitigated the financial considerations and personal
conduct security concerns. Clearance is granted. 
On September 24, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns, as
described above. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
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Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.
Applicant answered the SOR on November 12, 2008, admitting Paragraph 1,
subparagraphs 2.a through 2.b, 2.d through 2.f, 2.j through 2.k, 2.o, 2.t, 2.v, 3.a through
3.c, and 4.d and 4.f. He denied the others and requested a hearing. The case was
assigned to me on February 10, 2009. On March 10, 2009 a Notice of Hearing was
issued  scheduling the case for April 7, 2009. 
At the hearing, I received six government exhibits, and 25 Applicant exhibits
marked A1 through A7, B1 through B10, C1 through C6, and D1 through D2. Also, I
received Applicant’s testimony. At the end of the hearing, I left the record open at
Applicant’s request to allow him to submit additional exhibits. Within the time allotted,
Applicant submitted 14 additional exhibits that I incorporated into the record as
Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) E through R. The transcript was received on April 10, 2009.
Rulings of Procedure
I granted department counsel’s motion to withdraw SOR subparagraphs 2.c, 2.p
through 2.r, 2.u, 2.v, Paragraph 3, and SOR subparagraphs 4.e and 4.f. Also, upon a
motion of department counsel, I amended SOR subparagraphs 2.s and 4.d,
respectively, to read as follows:
2.s. As of May 27, 2008, you had approximately $3,835.00 per month in
discretionary income, yet you have not paid the debts set forth in
subparagraphs 2.a, 2.b, and 2.d - 2.o.
4.d. On or about May 2005, you were arrested in State X for writing,
making and/or presenting a worthless check. You were subsequently
found guilty and were ordered to pay a fine of $208.00.
Request for Administrative Notice
Department counsel, in a motion filed January 7, 2009, requested that I take
administrative notice of facts about South Korea set forth in 15 documents that I marked
as Government Exhibits (GE) I through XV. At the close of the hearing, I took
administrative notice of the facts set forth in all of the exhibits except GE XII through XV.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 36-year-old married man with three children, ages eight, six, and
two. The two oldest children are from his first marriage, which lasted from 2000 through
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2006 (Tr. 29). He was not married to the mother of the youngest child (Tr. 30). The
children’s respective mothers have physical custody of them. 
Applicant attended college for approximately a year immediately after finishing
high school in 1992, then left to pursue a job with a professional sports franchise. In
1995, he quit his job with the sports franchise, and joined the U.S. Air Force where he
served until 2002. He was honorably discharged. During his Air Force stint, he earned
the Air Force Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Armed
Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Air Force Overseas Service Ribbon, the Air Force
Longetivity Ribbon, and the Air Force Training Ribbon (AE D1). 
While in the Air Force, Applicant worked as an avionics technician (Tr. 15). He
held a security clearance throughout his time in the Air Force (Tr. 33). For the past three
years, Applicant has worked for a defense contractor that manufactures fighter jets. For
the first year on the job, he worked as an aircraft weapons manager (Tr. 34). Since
then, he has worked as an aircraft logistics support manager.
Applicant is highly respected on the job. According to his supervisor, his integrity
and dedication are unwavering (AE C3). A senior manager, who has been with the
company for 25 years, characterizes Applicant as “the eyes and ears” of the program
where he works (AE C5). Another senior manager says that he works at a level far
above his peers (AE C1).
Applicant has spent the past two and a half years living in the Republic of Korea.
The aircraft parts that he services are used on jets in the South Korean air force (AE C
6).
While living in Korea, Applicant met and married his current wife, a Korean
citizen and resident. She manages a fast food restaurant (Tr. 36). Her father is an
apartment security guard (Tr. 57). He served two years in the Korean military in his
youth as part of their compulsory service requirement (Tr. 38). Her mother is a
homemaker. Neither parent receives a government pension.
Applicant’s wife has three sisters who are Korean citizens and residents. One is
a Buddhist monk, another is an x-ray technician, the third is a nurse (Tr. 69). None work
for the Korean government. Both the x-ray technician and the nurse are married (Tr.
39). The brothers-in-law’s occupations are unknown from the record.
Applicant’s wife is the only member of her family who speaks fluent English.
Applicant has a minimal understanding of the Korean language. Applicant and his wife
speak with her parents about once per month, and her sisters about once every other
month (Tr. 84). All of Applicant’s in-laws live in the same city as he does.
Applicant and his wife maintain separate bank accounts (Tr. 41). None of
Applicant’s accounts are in Korea, nor does he have any other Korean property
interests.
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The Republic of Korea is a stable democratic republic with powers shared among
the president, the legislature, and the judiciary (AE I at 3; AE III at 3). It has an
independent press, and generally respects civil liberties (Id.). 
Korea’s economic growth has been spectacular over the past 20 years (Id. at 4).
It is the United States’ (U.S.) seventh largest trading partner (Id. at 6). In 2007, Korean
and U.S. trade ministers negotiated the U.S. - Korea Free Trade Agreement (Id. at 6). It
is awaiting ratification by both countries’ legislatures. 
The U.S. and Korea have been close allies since 1950, and have fought
communism on the Korean peninsula and in Vietnam (Id. at 8; AE IV at 3; AE V at 1).
The U.S. and Korea signed a mutual defense treaty in 1953 (AE I at 6). Since then, the
U.S. has maintained a military presence in Korea including the Army’s Second Infantry
Division and several Air Force tactical squadrons (Id.). A Combined Forces Command
was established in 1978 to coordinate operations between U.S. and Korean forces (Id.).
In recent years, the U.S. and Korea have differed in their diplomatic approaches
toward North Korea. The U.S. position is more assertive in its attempts to curtail North
Korea’s development of advanced military technology such as ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons. South Korea has emphasized steps toward unification with North
Korea (AE IV at 2).
South Korea has a history of collecting protected U.S. information. It has targeted
the U.S. with intelligence gathering programs, and has focused its collection efforts on
computer systems, aerospace and nuclear technologies (Exhibit VIII at 7). In May 1997,
a civilian employee of the U.S. Department of Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence,
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obtain national defense information (see generally, AE
IX). Among other things, between 1994 and 1996, he mailed several classified
documents containing information about the national defense of the U.S. to an officer in
the South Korean navy (Id.).
Applicant’s credit reports list approximately $32,000 of delinquent debt (GE 2
through 4). SOR subparagraph 2.a is the deficiency remaining from a repossessed
automobile. When Applicant and his first wife separated, she kept their automobiles (Tr.
45). Shortly before Applicant moved to South Korea, he instructed his estranged wife to
sell them. She told him that she had sold them. Applicant did not know this was not true
until meeting with an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) investigative agent nearly
two years later (Tr. 46). With the help of a credit counseling agency he retained in June
2007, Applicant contacted the creditor, negotiated a settlement, and satisfied it by
March 2009 (AE A2; AE E).
SOR subparagraph 2.b is a credit card account that Applicant and his wife
shared. He inadvertently did not cancel it when they separated, and she continued to
use it without his knowledge (Tr. 47). After his credit counselor informed him of this
debt, he contacted his ex-wife who wrote a check to satisfy it. The check bounced (Tr.
47). Applicant then satisfied this debt on March 10, 2009 (AE F). 
SOR subparagraphs 2.d and 2.i are duplicates.1
Applicant asserted that the late fees were excessive.2
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SOR subparagraphs 2.d,  2.e, and 2.l, are phone accounts Applicant had opened1
for his ex-wife over the years (Tr. 49). Unbeknownst to him, she failed to pay them. He
satisfied them by June 2008 (AE H, J)
SOR subparagraph 2.f is a medical bill incurred in 2004 to treat his son (Tr. 52).
Applicant thought his then-wife had paid the deductible when she took their son to the
doctor. Shortly after discovering it was still outstanding, Applicant satisfied it (AE L).
Neither Applicant nor his credit counseling agency could identify the creditor
listed in SOR subparagraph 2.g. Subsequently, the agency contacted the credit
reporting agencies, and had it removed from his credit reports (Tr. 53).
SOR subparagraph 2.h is a debt allegedly owed to a video store. Applicant
contacted the store, and it could not confirm it. He then contacted the credit counseling
agency, who had it removed from his credit reports (Tr. 54).
SOR subparagraph 2.j, a duplicate of SOR subparagraph 2.k, is another bill
owed to the same bank that issued Applicant the credit card listed in SOR
subparagraph 2.b. The bank consolidated these debts, and Applicant’s payment in
March 2009 satisfied both.
Applicant contacted the creditor listed in SOR subparagraph 2.m to confirm the
debt (Tr. 57). The creditor then referred him to a collection agent. The collection agency
researched the debt, and told him that it had no record of it, and that the only other
account in his name that a creditor had assigned to them had been satisfied (Tr. 58).
SOR subparagraph 2.n is a credit card Applicant’s ex-wife used when he was in
the military. He disputed the account with the creditor (Tr. 72).  His dispute was2
rejected, and he subsequently satisfied the account (AE O).
SOR subparagraph 2.o is the automobile loan that the divorce court transferred
to Applicant’s ex-wife through their divorce decree (Tr. 60). He was unaware either that
she was not making monthly payments timely after their divorce, or that it had been
repossessed (Id.). Applicant satisfied it entirely by March 16, 2009 (AE Q, AE R).
In May 2005, Applicant was arrested and charged with writing, making and/or
presenting a worthless check. He was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine of $208.00.
He paid the fine, as ordered (AE 1 at 36). 
Applicant earns $80,000 per year (Tr. 83). His employer pays for his mortgage,
car, utilities, and all of his insurance (AE A1). He has $3,840 of monthly after-expense
income. He has $13,000 in his company’s 401k, $1,700 in a personal savings account,
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$600 in a personal savings account, and $500 in a joint account owned with his mother
(AE A1). He satisfied the delinquencies through savings accrued while working in South
Korea (Tr. 73, 81). He maintains a budget, has no debt, and does not have any credit
cards. He earned approximately $52,000 on his previous job (Tr. 83).
Applicant completed a security clearance application in September 2005. He did
not disclose an automobile repossession, as required in response to Question 27b. He
listed the account as delinquent on Section 28 of the security clearance application (GE
1 at 40). He was unaware of the repossession because his ex-wife kept the automobile
after their divorce, and told him that she had sold it.
Applicant answered “yes” to Questions 28a, (Your Financial Delinquencies In
the last 7 years, have you been over 180 days delinquent on any debt(s)?), and 28b,
(Are you currently over 90 days delinquent on any debt(s)?). He listed the account with
the car dealer, as mentioned above, and noted that earlier in 2005, he had “fallen
behind on [his] responsibilities” (Id.). He did not list any of the other SOR delinquencies.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by department counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.
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Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest” (AG ¶
6). The Republic of Korea is a staunch ally of the U.S. It has a stable, democratic
system of governance, a highly developed economy, and an independent judiciary.
Conversely, Korea has a history of spying on the U.S., collecting classified
military information, and sensitive, economic and industrial information. Consequently,
Applicant’s relationship with his wife and in-laws, all South Korean citizens and
residents, triggers the application of AG ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family member,
business, or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” and AG ¶ 7(d), “sharing living
quarters with a person or persons . . . if that relationship creates a heightened risk of
foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”
Although Applicant lives in the same city as his sisters-in-law, he only sees them
approximately once every two months. None of them work for the government or in
professions where the targeting of U.S. technology would be reasonably conceivable.
The mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships with
foreign persons . . . or the position or activities of those persons in that country are such
that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between
the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government, and the
interests of the U.S.,” and 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so
casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation,” apply to his sisters-in-law.
Applicant’s wife and parents-in-laws’ positions and activities in South Korea are
similarly innocuous. However, Applicant lives with his wife in South Korea, and there is
a presumption that relationships with parent-in-laws are not casual. AG ¶ 8(a), “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the position or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government, and the interests of
the U.S.,” does not apply. 
Applicant is a U.S. citizen by birth. His parents are both U.S. citizens, and he was
raised in the U.S. He served in the U.S. Air Force for seven years, earning several
medals and ribbons. He does not speak the Korean language, and has difficulty
communicating with his parents-in-law. All of his children live in the U.S., and all of his
property interests are located in the U.S. He did not begin developing these South
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Korean contacts until after he relocated there to take a job with a U.S. defense
contractor that builds planes for the Korean air force. Given the extensive U.S. military
presence in South Korea, and the volume of U.S./South Korea trade, it is axiomatic that
some U.S. citizens who are either stationed there, or employed there with defense
contractors will develop relationships with South Korean citizens that could trigger
foreign influence security concerns. Upon evaluating Applicant’s U.S. ties, the reason
Applicant is living in South Korea, and his relationship with his South Korean family
members, and their respective occupations, I conclude AG ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of
interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep
and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest,” applies.
Applicant has mitigated the foreign influence security concern.
Guideline F, Financial Considerations
Under this guideline, “failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts,
and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information”
(AG ¶ 18). Applicant’s delinquencies trigger the application of AG ¶¶ 19(a), “inability or
unwillingness to satisfy debts,” and 19(c), “a history of not meeting financial obligations.”
Applicant’s separation and subsequent divorce in 2005 significantly contributed to
his financial problems. His ex-wife accrued nearly all of the debts. She either lied to him
about their status, or continued using joint credit cards without his knowledge. Because
Applicant was working abroad, he was unable to confirm what she was telling him.
After meeting with an OPM agent in 2007, Applicant retained a credit counseling
agency that helped him identify creditors, and negotiate settlement arrangements. By
March 2009, he had satisfied them. The only delinquencies Applicant did not pay were
the ones whose creditors were unable to verify were his responsibility. In these cases,
he notified the credit counseling agency who then had the disputed debts removed from
his credit reports. In the one instance when Applicant’s dispute of a debt was rejected
(SOR subparagraph 2.n), he paid it, as required. 
Applicant maintains a budget. He has no debt, and does not use credit cards. He
has ample income to meet his current responsibilities. AG ¶¶ 20(b), “the conditions that
resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of
employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce,
or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances,” 20(c),
“the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are
clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control,” 20(d), “the
individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve
debts,” and 20(e), “the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the
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past-due debt which is the cause of the problem, and provides documented proof to
substantiate the basis of the dispute, or provides evidence of actions to resolve the
issue,” apply.
Applicant has mitigated the financial considerations security concern.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
Under this guideline, “conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified
information” (AG ¶ 15). Applicant’s omission of pertinent financial information from his
security clearance application raises the issue of whether AG ¶ 16(a), “deliberate
omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security
questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct
investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status,
determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities,” applies.
Applicant did not totally omit his financial delinquencies from the security
clearance application. Instead, he disclosed that he had delinquent debts, listed one
example, and provided an explanation. He also listed the prosecution for writing a
bounced check in response to another security clearance application question. Under
these circumstances, his explanation that he did not know his ex-wife was still accruing
debts on joint accounts after their divorce was credible. Applicant did not falsify his
security clearance application, and his answers do not trigger any personal conduct
security concerns.
Applicant’s 2005 prosecution for a bounced check is more indicative of the
financial struggles he underwent during the marital breakdown rather than any
deficiency in judgment or propensity to disobey rules and regulations. As discussed
above, Applicant’s finances are now stable, and his past problems are unlikely to recur.
SOR subparagraph 4.d does not trigger a personal conduct security concern.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
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Applicant performed with distinction in the U.S. Air Force, and continues to
perform his job exceptionally as a civilian employee of a major defense contractor. He
experienced a financial setback after his divorce, but responded in a disciplined
manner, methodically satisfying each delinquency as he discovered them. Upon
considering Applicant’s application for a security clearance in light of the whole person
concept, I conclude he has mitigated the security concerns. Clearance is granted.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a - 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: WITHDRAWN
Subparagraphs 2.d - 2.o: For Applicant
Subparagraphs 2.p - 2.r: WITHDRAWN
Subparagraph 2.s - 2.t: For Applicant
Subparagraphs 2.u - 2.v: WITHDRAWN
Paragraph 3, Guideline J: WITHDRAWN
Paragraph 4, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 4.a - 4.d: For Applicant
Subparagraphs 4.e - 4.f: WITHDRAWN
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge