1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 08-02331
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Emilio Jaksetic, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Kathleen E. Voelker, Esquire
                            
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony,  I
conclude that Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86) on August 20,
2006. On December 8, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guidelines G
and J. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG)
promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on December 20, 2008. He
answered the SOR in writing on December 22, 2008, and requested a hearing before
Tr. 114.1
GE 1 (Applicant’s security clearance application) at 6, 10, 25-26; Tr. 25, 68-69.2
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an administrative judge. DOHA received the request on December 29, 2008.
Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on February 25, 2009, and I received the
case assignment on March 25, 2009. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on April 6, 2009,
and I convened the hearing as scheduled on April 30, 2009. The government offered 12
exhibits (GE) 1 through 12, which were received and admitted into evidence without
objection. Applicant and three witnesses testified on his behalf. He submitted three
exhibits (AE) A through C, which were received and admitted into evidence without
objection.  The record closed on April 30, 2009. DOHA received the transcript of the
hearing (Tr.) on May 18, 2009.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Notice
Applicant received the hearing notice on April 17, 2009. (Tr. 8.) I advised
Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the Directive to 15 days notice before the
hearing. After consulting with counsel, Applicant affirmatively waived his right to 15 days
notice. (Tr. 8.) 
Motion to Amend SOR
Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR at the end of the hearing to
correct the amount of the fine in SOR ¶ 1.e. from $2,000 to $200. This request conforms
with Applicant’s hearing testimony. Applicant’s counsel did not object to the motion,
which I granted. SOR allegation ¶ 1.e is amended as proposed.1
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a
through 1.g of the SOR, with explanations. He neither admitted nor denied the factual
allegation in ¶ 2.a of the SOR.  
Applicant, who is 52 years old, works as a senior field engineer for a Department
of State contractor. He began working for his employer in December 1985. He has held
a security clearance since 1986, without any violations of security procedures. He
attended college, but has not completed his bachelor’s degree.2
Applicant began drinking alcohol at age 19. Initially, he drank socially, but later
his alcohol consumption increased. The police arrested Applicant for his first driving
while intoxicated (DWI) offense in December 1979. He pled guilty and paid a fine
between $100 and $200. In February 1981, the police arrested Applicant for his second
DWI. He pled guilty, paid a $500 fine and the court suspended his driver’s license for
GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 69-70.3
GE 2; GE 3.4
GE 5; Tr. 72-75. 5
Id.6
Tr. 42, 76. 7
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one year. The court also recommended he attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), which
he did for about one year. The police again arrested Applicant for DWI in September
1982. He pled not guilty and the court appointed a lawyer to represent him. Shortly
thereafter, he received a letter from the lawyer, advising that his case had been
dismissed.3
As part of the security clearance process, Applicant completed two written
statements in March 1986, outlining the above arrests. He twice stated that he did not
believe he had an alcohol problem.  4
In February 1987, the police arrested Applicant a fourth time for DWI. The court
ordered alcohol treatment at an inpatient facility to begin in May 1988. However, before
treatment began, Applicant broke his neck in an automobile accident and his treatment
was deferred. He experienced significant pain during his long recovery. He refused to
take pain medication; instead, he dramatically increased his use of alcohol to manage
his pain. The court outcome of this fourth arrest is unknown.  5
In February 1988, Applicant did seek alcohol treatment at a residential facility
because he realized he was drinking much more than socially. He spent 28-30 days as
an inpatient. He did not drink during his stay. Upon his discharge, this facility diagnosed
Applicant with alcoholism, alcohol withdrawal and incomplete healed fracture - second
cervical vertebrae. The treatment facility recommended total abstinence from “all mood-
changing, mind-altering, psycho-active substances”; attend 90 AA meetings in 90 days,
followed by a minimum of four AA meetings a week; obtain an AA sponsor; and attend a
22-week continuing recovery group. Applicant acknowledges that he did not comply with
all these recommendations. He did participate in the recovery group for a number of
months and attended AA one to two times a week for a period of time.6
Applicant remained sober for about two years. Eventually, he started drinking
alcohol, at first casually. However, his alcohol consumption progressed. Because he did
not believe he had a drinking problem, he did not stop drinking. He believed his alcohol
consumption was under control.7
In January 1998, the police again arrested Applicant and charged him with
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Pursuant to a plea bargain, Applicant pled
GE 7; Tr. 76-77.8
GE 1, supra note 2, at 12-14; Tr. 77-79, 103-104.9
GE 12; Tr. 79-81, 97, 100-101, 112-113.10
GE 11; Tr. 81-83, 98-99, 102.11
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guilty to this charge. The court fined him $1,500, suspending $1,000; sentenced him to
60 days, suspending all but 48 hours; and suspended his driver’s license for one year.  8
 Applicant married in 1998. During his marriage, Applicant decreased his alcohol
consumption. Although he did not stop drinking entirely, at times he abstained from
alcohol consumption for one or more months. His wife did not drink. He and his wife
separated in 2004 and divorced in 2005. When his marriage ended, he saw no reason
to limit his alcohol consumption.9
Again, in December 2005, the police arrested and charged Applicant with DWI
and DUI. Applicant pled guilty to DWI in June 2006 and the court dismissed the DUI
charge. The court fined him $300 and gave him probation before judgment. As a result
of this conviction and at his own expense, the court restricted his driving by placing an
alcohol interlock device (blow and go) on his car. This device prevented him from
driving his car if he consumed alcohol and his breath alcohol registered .02 on the
device. Applicant continued to drink after his sentence. He acknowledged that in the first
months, he learned how much he could drink and when he needed to stop drinking
before he drove his car with this device. Applicant has not been arrested for any
criminal matter since this date.10
In December 2006, Applicant decided to check himself into an alcohol treatment
facility because he believed that he would not live long if he continued to drink alcohol.
His inpatient stay lasted 14 days. He actively participated in his treatment as shown by
his treatment record. The facility diagnosed Applicant as alcohol dependent, but offered
no opinion about his prognosis. Upon his discharge, Applicant enrolled in an intensive
outpatient treatment program and returned to AA. He completed the 90 AA meetings in
90 days, obtained a temporary sponsor, and found a home group, which is a meeting he
would attend regularly and participate in running.11
Applicant consumed his last alcoholic drink on December 14, 2006. He
acknowledges he is an alcoholic and understands that alcoholism is a progressive
disease. He believes that his sanity and spiritual condition depend upon him maintaining
sobriety. He has not had any alcohol since December 2006 and has no intent to drink
alcohol in the future. He is convinced that if he ever drinks again he will die. He
continues to attend and participate in his home AA group and a second home AA group,
each at least once a week. He lives one day at a time. He has changed his friends and
his activities. He participates in more family activities. He boats, fishes, and listens to
GE 10; Tr. 84-96.12
AE A; AE B; AE C; Tr. 22-30.13
Tr. 57-66.14
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live music. His drink of choice is cranberry juice, tea or water. He keeps alcohol in his
house for friends. He does not crave alcohol and has not since December 2006.12
Applicant’s program manager testified on his behalf. He has known Applicant
since 1986 when they began working together. Applicant has held a security clearance
since 1986 and has never been involved in any security breaches. Applicant’s alcohol
consumption never interfered with his work performance. His program manager never
observed Applicant consuming alcohol at work or arriving at work intoxicated. Since he
stopped drinking, his manager has observed an improvement in Applicant’s attitude and
work performance. His performance evaluations for the last three years support his
improvement. Applicant has taken more responsibility for managing the work site.
Applicant told him about his alcohol problems and arrests. Applicant has never lied to
him or co-workers. He trusts Applicant and recommends him for a security clearance.13
Applicant’s fiancee testified. They met at work in February 2008. Since then, she
has not observed Applicant drink alcohol and does not believe he drinks. She knows
about his past alcohol problems. He attends AA at least twice a week. She
acknowledges Applicant keeps alcohol in his house and states that he is comfortable
with alcohol in the house. He drinks cranberry juice or unsweetened tea. She describes
him as honest, trustworthy, social, gregarious, outgoing, and reliable.14
Applicant’s sister also testified. Like the other witnesses, she confirmed that
Applicant is not drinking. She last saw Applicant consume alcohol in July 2006, although
she believes he continued to consume alcohol after this time. They lived together from
October 1993 until March 1998, when she moved into her own house. They visit with
each other every weekend or every other weekend, usually at Applicant’s house near
the beach. She knows Applicant entered an alcohol treatment facility 20 years ago
because she visited him. He remained sober for about two years after treatment. In
1990, she observed him drinking at their other sister's wedding, which concerned her.
When he entered treatment in 2006, she visited him while he was an inpatient and she
participated in family treatment sessions. She noticed a significant difference between
his first and second treatment. In 2006, she knew he was absolutely serious about his
treatment. He told her “it was his belief that if he did not stop drinking, he was going to
die.” Since completing his latest treatment, Applicant is more reliable. He makes plans
for the future, has a life and has a relationship. He attends AA, even when on vacation.
He has permanently changed his lifestyle. He is a much different person than when he
is drinking alcohol. When he drinks alcohol, she notices a change in his personality:
Applicant is not a very likable person, he acts like a know-it-all and she sees physical
signs of his drinking alcohol, such as shaking, weight gain, slurred speech, and
significant sweating. When he is sober, he is friendly, personable, an interesting
Id. at 40-50; GE 11, supra note 11.15
After any decision, the losing party has a right to appeal the case to the Defense Office of Hearings and16
Appeals  Appeal Board. The Appeal Board’s review authority is limited to determining whether three tests are
met:
E3.1.32.1. The Administrative Judge’s findings of fact are supported by such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of
all the contrary evidence in the same record. In making this review, the Appeal Board shall
give deference to the credibility determinations of the Administrative Judge:
E3.a.32.2. The Administrative Judge adhered to the procedures required by E.O. 10865
(enclosure 1) and this Directive: or
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conversationalist, and very intelligent. She considers him trustworthy and recommends
him for a security clearance.15
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.  16
E3.1.32.3. The Administrative Judge’s rulings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law.
The Appeal Board does not conduct a “de novo determination”, recognizing that its members have
no opportunity to observe witnesses and make credibility determinations. The Supreme Court in United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 690 (1980) succinctly defined the phrase “de novo determination”:
[This legal term] has an accepted meaning in the law. It means an independent determination
of a controversy that accords no deference to any prior resolution of the same controversy.
Thus, in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 [(1974)], the Court
had occasion to define “de novo proceeding” as a review that was “unfettered by any
prejudice from the [prior] agency proceeding and free from any claim that the [agency’s]
determination is supported by substantial evidence.” In United States v. First City National
Bank, 386 U.S. 361,368 [(1967)], this Court observed that “review de novo” means “that the
court should make an independent determination of the issues” and should not give any
special weight to the [prior] determination of the administrative agency.
(Internal footnotes omitted). See ISCR Case No. 07-10396 (App. Bd., Oct. 2, 2008) and ISCR Case No. 07-
07144 (App. Bd., Oct. 7, 2008). In ISCR Case No. 05-01820 (App. Bd. Dec 14, 2006), the Appeal Board
criticized the administrative judge’s analysis, supporting grant of a clearance for a PRC-related Applicant, and
then decided the case itself. Judge W hite’s dissenting opinion cogently explains why credibility determinations
and ultimately the decision whether to grant or deny a clearance should be left to the judge who makes
witness credibility determinations. Id. at 5-7. See also ISCR Case No. 04-06386 at 10-11 (App. Bd. Aug. 25,
2006)(Harvey, J., dissenting) (discussing limitations on Appeal Board’s authority to reverse hearing-level
judicial decisions and recommending remand of cases to resolve material, prejudicial error) and ISCR Case
No. 07-03307 (App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2008). Compliance with the Agency’s rules and regulations is required. See
United States ex. rel. Acardi  v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 247-
248 (D.C. Cir 2003); Nickelson  v. United States, 284 F. Supp.2d 387, 390 (E.D. Va. 2003)(explaining standard
of review).
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A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
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Analysis
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
AG ¶ 21 expresses the security concern pertaining to alcohol consumption,
“Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or
the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability
and trustworthiness.”
AG ¶ 22 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and the
following conditions may be disqualifying in this case:
(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under
the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or
other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual is
diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol
abuser or alcohol dependent;
(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol
dependence; and
(f) relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and completion
of an alcohol rehabilitation program.
Applicant began consuming alcohol at age 19. His alcohol consumption led to
arrest for DWI as early as 1979. Between 1979 and 1987, the police arrested him four
times for DWI. In 1988, he received inpatient treatment at a substance abuse facility,
which diagnosed alcoholism. For two years after his treatment, he remained sober. He
began drinking again in 1990. His alcohol consumption increased and resulted in
another arrest, this time for DUI. During his marriage, he controlled his alcohol
consumption. When he marriage ended, his alcohol consumption resumed and
increased. The police arrested him again for DUI in December 2005. Based on
Applicant’s pattern of alcohol consumption, DWI or DUI arrests, 1988 diagnosis, and
relapse following treatment in 1988, the above disqualifying conditions apply.     
AG ¶ 23 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns and the
following may be applicable in this case:
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol
abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and
has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or
responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
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(d) the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Applicant acknowledges he is an alcoholic. He understands the dangers to him if
he drinks again. He accepts responsibility for his alcohol problem. In 2006,  on his own
initiative, he sought treatment for his alcohol use. He actively participated in his
treatment at the facility and continued with intensive followup treatment after his
discharge. He still actively participates in AA on a regular basis. He has changed his
lifestyle, his friends and his attitude. He enjoys his life as he realizes it is much better
since he stopped drinking alcohol. His fiancee, program manager and sister confirm that
he no longer drinks. He does not intend to drink in the future and works each day to
achieve that goal. His treatment facility made no prognosis about his long-term sobriety,
but he has remained sober for two and one-half years. He has mitigated the
government’s security concerns about his alcohol consumption.
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct
AG ¶ 30 expresses the security concern pertaining to criminal conduct, “Criminal
activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its
very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws,
rules and regulations.”
AG ¶ 31 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and the
following may be disqualifying in this case:
(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;
Applicant’s criminal conduct directly relates to his alcohol consumption. Because
of his alcohol use, the police arrested him six times for either DWI or DUI. The court
convicted him in all but one case. These disqualifying conditions apply.
AG ¶ 32 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
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and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited
to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or
restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or
constructive community involvement; and,
Applicant’s last arrest occurred in three and one-half years ago. His arrests did
not occur under unusual circumstances, thus, mitigating condition AG ¶ 32(a) does not
apply.  However, Applicant has stopped drinking alcohol, the reason for his arrests. He
has successfully completed treatment for alcohol dependency. He continues to
participate in AA programs as he desires not to drink again. He changed his lifestyle
and his friends. His work performance and attitude at work improved. He has assumed
more responsibility at work. Because he is so committed to remaining sober, there is
little likelihood that his criminal conduct will reoccur. He has mitigated the government’s
security concerns about his criminal conduct.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
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In reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant
began drinking alcohol as a young adult, initially at social functions. His alcohol
consumption steadily increased and resulted in four arrests for DWI in eight years. He
sought alcohol treatment in 1988, but did not fully commit to total abstinence and the
idea he was an alcoholic. Without this commitment, he resumed his alcohol
consumption about two years after his treatment. Although he believed he controlled his
alcohol consumption, he did not and was again arrested for a DUI in 1998. During his
marriage, he limited his alcohol consumption, sometimes not drinking any alcohol for
two or three months, but never totally abstaining. When his marriage ended, he stopped
attempting to control his alcohol consumption and another DUI arrest occurred in 2005.
His conduct reflects a serious, long-term problem with alcohol.
A year after his 2005 arrest, Applicant decided to seek treatment for his alcohol
addiction and committed himself to conquering his abusive use of alcohol. He entered a
substance abuse treatment facility and actively participated in its programs. Upon his
discharge, he immediately enrolled in followup treatment programs and actively
participated in these programs as he wanted to stop drinking. He acknowledges he is an
alcoholic and admits he must work each day on his goal of never consuming alcohol
again. He provided substantial information at the hearing indicating that he understands
his alcohol use and the resulting problems. He appreciates alcohol’s negative effects on
his life, and is committed to remaining sober. He incorporates the tenets of AA and lives
by this philosophy. He knows he must remain sober because his sanity and spirituality
depend upon it. I find his testimony about his present attitude and approach to alcohol
credible.
While I recognize that Applicant relapsed within two years after his first treatment
and he has been sober about two and one-half years, I give great weight to his sister’s
highly credible testimony about his alcohol use and his current sobriety. She has known
him all her life. She knows when he is drinking because she notices his personality
changes to a person she does not like. She visited him during his first treatment
program in 1988 and his second treatment program in 2006. She recognized a
difference in his attitude towards treatment the second time, stating that he was
“absolutely serious about this”. She clearly discussed her observations about his
behavior before and after he stopped drinking. She sees a change and a commitment
by him to remain sober that did not exist in 1988. 
Applicant’s fiancee and program manager affirmed his current sobriety. Based on
his sister’s highly persuasive testimony about his sobriety and change in attitude
towards alcohol, I find that Applicant has mitigated the government’s security concerns
about his alcohol consumption. Since he is not drinking, his criminal conduct is not a
security concern.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
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conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his alcohol consumption
and criminal conduct.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline G: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline J: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge