DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
-------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-04124
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: 
Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: 
Pro Se
June 10, 2009
______________
Decision
______________
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted her Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing
(eQIP), on February 15, 2007 (Government Exhibit 1). On November 6, 2008, the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
to the Applicant, which detailed security concerns under Guidelines C and B stating why
DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
the Applicant, and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine
whether a clearance should be denied or revoked. The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by President Bush
At several places in the SOR and the Transcript, “Colombia” is misspelled “Columbia.”  1
2
on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on November 20, 2008. She
answered the SOR in writing on December 1, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
Administrative Judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on January 27,
2009, and I received the case assignment on January 30, 2009. DOHA issued a notice
of hearing on February 17, 2009, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on March
24, 2009. The Government offered Government Exhibits 1 through 3, which were
received without objection. Applicant testified on her own behalf, and submitted
Applicant’s Exhibits A through I, without objection. Pursuant to her request, the record
remained open for the Applicant to submit additional information. The Applicant
subsequently submitted Applicant’s Exhibit J, which was also received without objection.
DOHA received the transcript of the hearing, and the record closed, on April 14, 2009.
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for
access to classified information is granted.
Procedural Ruling
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the Republic of Colombia.  (Transcript at 10-12.) The request1
and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the
record. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
The Applicant was 36 at the time of the hearing and single.  She is employed by
a Defense contractor and seeks a Department of Defense security clearance in
connection with her employment in the defense industry.  In her Answer to the SOR, the
Applicant admitted all of the allegations of the SOR with the exception of subparagraph
1.d.  Those admissions are hereby deemed findings of fact.  
Paragraph 1 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because she has acted in a way that shows a preference for another country
ahead of the United States. 
The Applicant’s American passport also shows travel to the Phillippines and to Costa Rica.2
See Administrative Notice Document II at 1.3
3
The Applicant was born in Colombia in 1972.  At the age of five, the Applicant’s
parents divorced.  She lived with her grandmother after that time until 1993.  By 1993,
the Applicant’s stepmother had moved to the United States and had become a citizen.
She sponsored the Applicant’s move to this country at that time.
The Applicant became a naturalized American citizen on February 24, 2000.
(Government Exhibit 1 at Section 8.)  She holds a current American passport issued in
May 2004.  The passport shows that it was properly used by the Applicant to travel
outside the United States, including entry and exit from Colombia in July and August
2006.  (Government Exhibit 3 at 14.)2
The Applicant had an active Colombian passport that she acquired on August 1,
2006.  This passport is valid through 2016.  The only stamp in this passport is the one
showing her exit from Colombia in August 2006.  (Government Exhibit 2 at 20-37.)  The
Applicant was required by Colombian authorities to obtain this passport, after she
entered the country, in order to leave Colombia after her last visit.  This is in accordance
with Colombian law, which does not recognize revocation of Colombian citizenship.  The
Applicant submitted documentation from the Department of State and the Colombian
government stating this fact. (Government Exhibit 3 at 4-5; Transcript at 26, 34-36.)3
The Applicant has several times stated her intent and desire to renounce her
Colombian citizenship.  She has said this, with full knowledge that the Colombian
government will not allow such an event to occur.  (Transcript at 28-29, 41-42.)
  
When she was informed of the Government’s concerns about her having a
Colombian passport, the Applicant took steps to resolve this situation.  Applicant’s
Exhibit A is a Memorandum from the Installation Personnel Security Manager at the
military base where she works.  This person confirms in writing that he shredded the
Applicant’s Colombian passport on March 20, 2009.  (Transcript at 59-60.)  
The Applicant had the passport destroyed, knowing it would effect her ability to
travel to Colombia. Specifically, the Applicant understands that, if her father or brother,
who both still live in Colombia, pass away, she will not be able to travel there for their
funerals.  (Transcript at 41-42, 59-62.)
Paragraph 2 (Guideline B - Foreign Preference) 
The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because she has foreign contacts and interests that could lead to the
exercise of poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness on the part of the Applicant.
All of the following statements are supported by the documents submitted by the Department Counsel in4
support of his request for administrative notice and its attachments. 
4
The Applicant’s father and brother are citizens and residents of Colombia.  As
stated earlier, the Applicant’s parents divorced when she was quite young.  She has
never had a deep relationship with her father, and it has not improved with the years.
She last saw her father when she visited Colombia in 2006.  While they did
communicate by telephone after her return, she has not spoken to her father in over a
year.  (Transcript at 45-48.)
The Applicant also does not have much contact with her brother.  It has also
been more than a year since she spoke to him, and she has not seen him in many
years.  (Transcript at 48-49.)
The other members of the Applicant’s immediate family live in the United States.
The includes the Applicant’s stepmother, two half-brothers and two half-sisters.  One
half-sister was living in Colombia, but she moved to the United States in January 2009.
The Applicant presented supporting documentary evidence.  (Applicant’s Exhibit J;
Transcript at 49-50.)
The Applicant has lived in the United States since 1993.  In the 16 years since,
she has visited Colombia three times.  Two of those visits, 1998 and 1999, occurred
before she was an American citizen.  She only visited Colombia in 2006 because a
close relative was seriously ill.  This relative has since passed away.  (Transcript at 40,
51-52.)
Due to the Applicant’s connections with Colombia, it is appropriate to discuss the
current situation in Colombia.   Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy and4
the second most populous country in South America.  The country is a close ally of the
United States with the current president, Alvaro Uribe, receiving the Presidential Medal
of Freedom from President George W. Bush.  Colombia is a country that has a severe
problem with narco-terrorism, which has been lessened in recent years, but is still
potent.  Kidnappings of Americans can, and has, occurred.  Although the government’s
respect for human rights continued to improve, many problems remain.  
Mitigation
The Applicant is a successful, respected member of the defense industry.  Her
connections to the United States are many and varied.  In addition to owning a house,
she is engaged to a member of the United States military and she has worked for her
current employer for over six years.
The Applicant made the point that, in Colombia, there are many barriers to a
woman succeeding outside the home.  For example, the Applicant owns a house in the
United States, but would not be able to do that in Colombia.  She is proud of her
5
success in the United States, in the large part made possible by her being a citizen.
(Transcript at 28-32; Administrative Notice Document I at 21-22.)
The Applicant is highly respected at her work.  Her supervisor describes the
Applicant as “a steadfast dedicated employee whose work has always been and
continues to be exceptional.”  (Applicant’s Exhibit B at 1.)  She is knowledgeable about
her responsibilities if she were to be granted a security clearance.  (Transcript at 56-58.)
The Applicant’s most recent performance evaluation from her company, dated
December 15, 2008, is exceptional.  She rates a “10" (highest ranking) from her
supervisor, who states, “Her [Applicant’s] dedication and incredible attitude to the tasks
she is given can not be matched.”  (Applicant’ Exhibit B at 2.)
Additional exhibits submitted by the Applicant have current and retired members
of the United States military speaking in very laudatory terms about her.  She is
described as a person whose “integrity and loyalty are genuine.”  (Applicant’s Exhibit C.)
The Deputy Fire Chief at her base states that she “consistently displays good moral
judgment, trustworthiness, and reliability.”  (Applicant’s Exhibit D.)  The Deputy
Commander of a unit she works closely with states, “She [Applicant] has continually
proven herself to be a person of exemplary character and outstanding ability.”
(Applicant’s Exhibit E.) 
She received a Notable Achievement Award in 2003.  (Applicant’s Exhibit F.)
The Applicant also submitted documentary evidence showing her involvement with the
local community.  (Applicant’s Exhibits G and H.)   
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.  In addition, the Administrative Judge may also rely on his own
common sense, as well as his knowledge of the law, human nature, and the ways of the
world, in making a reasoned decision.
6
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Section 7 of Executive Order
10865, “Any determination under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
Analysis
It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support
the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the Applicant's conduct and the
granting of a security clearance.  If such a case has been established, the burden then
shifts to the Applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation or mitigation
which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case.  The Applicant
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.
In this case the Government has met its initial burden of proving by substantial
evidence that the Applicant was a dual citizen of Colombia and the United States, and
had a valid Colombian passport in the recent past (Guideline C); and that the Applicant
has family members in Colombia (Guideline B).  The Applicant, on the other hand, has
successfully mitigated the Government's case.
7
Paragraph 1 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference) 
Turning first to Guideline C, the Applicant has mitigated the Government’s
concerns about her possible dual citizenship with Colombia, and her possession of a
Colombian passport after becoming an American citizen.  The concern is stated thus
under this Guideline, When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference
for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
The Applicant obtained a valid Colombian passport after becoming an American
citizen.  Accordingly, Disqualifying Condition 10(a)(1) applies to the facts of this case:
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: (a)
exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S.
citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member.  This includes but is not
limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport. 
The Applicant’s Colombian passport was shredded by her installation Personnel
Security Manager.  Accordingly, it has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated as required by Mitigating Condition 11(e).
The Applicant is a Colombian citizen by birth.  Colombia does not allow its
citizens to renounce their citizenship.  In such a case, it is the intent of the Applicant that
must be evaluated.  Here, the Applicant has expressed a credible intent to renounce her
Colombian citizenship.  Mitigating Condition 11(b) applies to this case: the individual has
expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.  In addition, Mitigating Condition
11(a) also applies as her dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth
in a foreign country.  Guideline C is found for the Applicant.
Paragraph 2 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence) 
The concern under Guideline B is styled as follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to
target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
The Applicant has family connections to Colombia.  Her father and brother
continue to live there, though her relationship with them is not close at all.  In fact, she
has not spoken to either of them in over a year and has no desire to return to Colombia.
8
It became obvious during the hearing that the Applicant has deep and long-standing
roots in the United States.  In particular, she drew attention to the fact that she is a
successful professional woman in the United States, and that this path would not be
available to her in Colombia.  She has made friends and connections in this country,
has purchased a house and is engaged to be married to a member of the United States
military.
The following Disqualifying Condition arguably applies to this case based solely
on the fact that the Applicant has family in Colombia: 7.(a) Contact with a foreign family
member . . . who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person . . . that create a potential conflict of interest
between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person . . . by providing that information. 
The Applicant has provided compelling evidence to show that the following
Mitigating Conditions also apply to this particular case, given her particular background:
7(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the
interests of the U.S.; and (b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest. 
Based on my analysis of the available information, the Applicant has overcome
the adverse inference of her family members present in Colombia.  Guideline B is found
for the Applicant.
 Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole person concept.       
9
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.  The evidence shows that the
Applicant is a patriotic American citizen.  The Applicant eloquently testified about her
pride in being an American citizen, and a member of the defense industry.  She is
knowledgeable about security and understands her responsibility.  I find that there is
little or no “potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress” as set forth in AG ¶
2(a)(8).  Using the whole person standard, the Applicant has mitigated the security
significance of her foreign connections and alleged foreign preference and is eligible for
a security clearance. 
On balance, it is concluded that the Applicant has successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing her request for a DoD security clearance.  Accordingly,
the evidence supports a finding for the Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary
allegations expressed in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Government's Statement of
Reasons.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.d.: For the Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a. through 2.c.: For the Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge