Item 6.1
Item 4.2
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
           DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
-----------, ---------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-07613
SSN: ------ ---- -------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Tom Coale, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant conducted a clandestine extramarital affair with an Ecuadoran woman
he met while serving there in 2002, returning to see her about twice a year and
providing regular financial support. He concealed this information from his family and
professional associates, and omitted any mention of her on his application to upgrade
his clearance. Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for
access to classified information is revoked and denied. 
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on March 2,
2006, while employed as a civilian Government employee.  On March 22, 2007, the Air1
Force Central Adjudication Facility granted him a Secret clearance. On January 25,
2008, after being hired by a Government contractor, he submitted his Electronic
Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP), seeking to upgrade his clearance
to Top Secret.  On January 15, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals2
Item 1.3
Item 3.4
The Government submitted six items in support of the allegations, and five Government publications to5
support an administrative notice request concerning Ecuador.
Item 4.6
Item 3.7
2
(DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns
under Guidelines E, B, and D.  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,3
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on February 13, 2009, and requested that
his case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record without a hearing.4
Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on March 11, 2009. A
complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM)  was provided to Applicant, and5
he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation,
extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. 
Applicant signed the document acknowledging receipt of his copy of the FORM
on March 26, 2009, and returned it to DOHA. On April 19, 2009, he submitted a sworn
letter with additional “explanations” in response to the SOR allegations, but no other
evidence in refutation, extenuation or mitigation, and made no objection to consideration
of any evidence submitted by Department Counsel. On April 23, 2009, Department
Counsel initialed a memorandum to indicate that he objected to the admissibility into
evidence of the materials submitted by Applicant. No basis for this objection was noted,
and no further documentation was submitted to substantiate any reason for it.
Accordingly, the objection is overruled and Applicant’s April 19, 2009 letter is admitted
into evidence and the record. I received the case assignment on May 1, 2009.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He is married, with
four children, ages 25, 24, 21, and 15. He moved away from his family when he
changed jobs in February 2006, and has lived separately since then. He retired in 2005
after 24 years of enlisted service in the Air Force, and was granted a security clearance
in 1995.  In his response to the SOR, he admitted the truth of SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1d, 1.e,6
1.f, and 1.h, was “not sure” about ¶ 1.b, and denied ¶¶ 1.g and 1.i.  He did not directly7
respond to SOR ¶¶ 2.a or 3.a, but those two paragraphs incorporated allegations from
Item 5.8
Item 5 at 4-6.9
Item 5 at 4-6, 8-9.10
3
SOR ¶ 1, to which he admitted, by reference. Applicant’s admissions, including those
contained in his response to interrogatories,  are incorporated in the following findings.8
Applicant’s wife told him in 2001 or early 2002 that she had recently engaged in
an extra-marital affair. From June to October 2002, he was assigned to perform
temporary duties (TDY) at an Air Force facility in Ecuador. While there he met a local
23-year-old woman and began an intimate affair with her. She told him she had been a
nursing student, but could no longer afford school after her father recently died so she
was working various unidentified jobs to support herself. Since 2002, he has returned to
Ecuador approximately twice a year. He explained to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) investigator that the purpose of these visits was to pursue and
continue his affair with the Ecuadoran woman, for whom he continued to have strong
feelings,  although he attempted to downplay this motivation for his trips in his response9
to the FORM, after being confronted with the security implications. He has sent the
woman payments of $100 per month and additional payments of $300 twice per year,
purportedly to help her with nursing school expenses. He did not explain why she has
not completed school after more than seven years. He also purchased a lot of cell
phones (about 15) on E-Bay in 2003, and sent them to her so she could resell them for
a profit. This was also purportedly to help her generate funds for school. Applicant
explained that all his contributions to her financial well being were gifts for which he
expected nothing in return that he made due to his generous nature. He also claimed
that his means of contacting her by telephone were stolen from him, but has never
disavowed his ongoing feelings for her, nor declared any intention to end the
relationship.
Applicant told the OPM investigator, under oath on April 2, 2008, that the only
person except the Ecuadoran woman who knew of their affair was an Air Force friend
with whom he had been TDY at the time it began. He said he had met her mother,
brothers and sisters, but did not describe their understanding of the relationship. Neither
the woman nor any of her family members have any connection to the government of
Ecuador. He specifically said that he had not previously disclosed the affair to anyone
except the friend, including his spouse. He affirmed the accuracy of these statements,
again under oath, on September 5, 2008.  Applicant responded to the SOR ¶ 1.b10
allegation that his spouse is unaware of the relationship by stating, “Not sure I admit
(she suspects).” In his response to the FORM, he further explained that his brother and
sister-in-law told him recently that his wife had told them that Applicant had told her
about the woman and she knew of his trips to Ecuador. He submitted no evidence to
corroborate this claim. He also admitted that he never told his Air Force supervisors
about the relationship nor did he disclose it during security debriefs after his visits,
explaining that he didn’t think he was required to. He also failed to list her as an
associate on his 2006 and 2008 security clearance applications, although he did list his
Item 4 at 26; Item 6 at 6.11
4
“many short trips” to Ecuador from 2003 to present, for “pleasure” and “to see different
aspects of the Country.”11
Applicant says he has consulted an attorney about obtaining a divorce, but is
waiting for his wife to move to the state where he resides to make the process easier.
He also said his wife wants a divorce, but keeps delaying her move. Accordingly, no
actual progress has occurred in that matter. Applicant offered no other evidence
concerning his character, trustworthiness or responsibility. I was unable to evaluate his
credibility, demeanor or character in person since he elected to have his case decided
without a hearing. 
Applicant made no objection to Department Counsel’s request that I take
administrative notice of the facts set forth at pages 3 through 6 of the FORM, and
supported by exhibits I through V. Accordingly, administrative notice of those facts is
taken, and they are incorporated into these findings by reference. Of note, Ecuador is
an ally of the U.S., with some corruption and human rights problems and issues with
narco-terrorists along the Columbian border, but no particularly heightened risk of
espionage against U.S. interests based on the nature of the country itself vis-a-vis other
foreign nations.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶¶
2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in
the context of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
5
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “Any determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” 
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
6
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;
(c) counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that
the individual's access to protected information may involve unacceptable
risk to national security;
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation;
(f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national;
(g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate,
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are
acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make
the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign
person, group, government, or country.
Applicant admitted the truth of each of the factual allegations incorporated by
reference in SOR ¶ 2.a. These are his maintenance of an extramarital affair with a
citizen and resident of Ecuador from 2002 to at least September 2008, his biannual trips
to Ecuador to visit her, his monthly and biannual payments to her totaling about $1,800
per year since 2002, and purchasing the cell phones for her to resell. Department
Counsel argues persuasively that these facts raise and support security concerns under
AG ¶¶ 17(a) and (i) above. Having a secret mistress in any foreign country, with regular
visits to maintain the affair and regularly providing financial support, inherently involves
both contact with a resident national of a foreign country and conduct while visiting that
country that create heightened risk of, and vulnerability to, exploitation, manipulation,
pressure and coercion. The ongoing and intentionally clandestine nature of the
relationship exacerbates such risk. Department Counsel’s assertion of security
concerns under AG ¶ 17(f), due to Applicant’s failure to disclose the relationship as an
“associate” on his security clearance applications, is without merit since those
omissions were not alleged as disqualifying information under this guideline in the SOR.
None of the remaining disqualifying conditions apply.
7
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security
concerns:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation;
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or
are approved by the cognizant security authority;
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons,
groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
 
Applicant’s admission of the foregoing facts supporting disqualifying security
concerns under AG ¶¶ 7 (a) and (i) shift the burden of proof to him to rebut, explain,
extenuate or mitigate those facts sufficiently to establish that it is clearly in the interest
of national security to grant him a security clearance. His subsequent, uncorroborated
assertions seeking to minimize the nature and extent of his clandestine extramarital
affair, conducted in a foreign country with a foreign citizen, and financial investment of
both direct payments and travel expenses is unpersuasive and falls short of meeting
this burden. The nature of this relationship does not make it unlikely that he would be
put in a position of having to choose between the woman’s interests and those of the
U.S., regardless of the country involved. He proved nothing about Ecuador, his
mistress, or her family that would lessen this risk. AG ¶ 8(a) does not apply.  No conflict
of interest scenario was alleged or asserted by Department Counsel, so AG ¶ 8(b) is not
pertinent. Applicant’s contact and communication with his Ecuadoran mistress has been
regular, intimate, and ongoing for more than seven years, with no real evidence that it
will not continue. AG ¶ 8(c) was not established. These foreign contacts were neither
8
part of Applicant’s official duties, nor reported to appropriate authority, precluding any
mitigation under AG ¶¶ 8(d) or (e). Security concerns were not asserted under AG ¶ 7
(e), so AG ¶ 8(f) does not apply either. 
Guideline D, Sexual Behavior
AG ¶ 12 expresses the security concern under this guideline:
Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or
emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may
subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or
duress can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness
and ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference
concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the
basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.
AG ¶ 13 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has
been prosecuted;
(b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behavior
that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a
personality disorder;
(c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and
(d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion
or judgment.
AG ¶ 14 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no
evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under
such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment; 
(c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and 
(d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet.
9
As discussed above, maintaining a long-term clandestine extramarital affair with
a foreign national subjects an individual to significant vulnerability to coercion,
exploitation or duress. Applicant’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of this conduct
highlight his recognition of this problem, but he chose to continue the conduct due to his
ongoing strong feelings toward his mistress. The evidence supports security concerns
under AG ¶ 13(c). No other disqualifying condition was asserted by Department
Counsel. 
Applicant’s affair began when he was 41 years old. The behavior occurred
regularly for some seven years, and he did not provide any convincing evidence that it
is unlikely to continue, casting ongoing doubt on his trustworthiness and judgment. The
behavior remains unknown to important people in his life, providing a continuing basis
for coercion or exploitation whether it does, in fact, continue or not. The fact that the
sexual behavior may have been private, consensual, and discreet does not mitigate
concerns under AG ¶ 13(c). Accordingly, none of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶
14 are supported by this record.
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying under this guideline. Department Counsel asserts that three of them apply:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information; and
Item 4 at 16.12
10
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence
service or other group.
Applicant admits that he did not list his mistress as an “associate” in response to
the questions asking him to list his “relatives and associates” on either his 2006 or his
2008 security clearance applications. He explained that he didn’t realize his mistress
should be revealed in response to this question. His 2006 SF 86 application does not
contain any definition of “associate,” so his explanation for this omission is accepted.
However, his 2008 e-QIP contains the instruction for “Associate” to “include only foreign
national associates with whom you or your spouse are bound by affection, obligation, or
close and continuing contact.”  Applicant admitted that he was bound by affection to his12
mistress at the time he completed this application, and continued to be so bound as late
as September 2008. His assertion in response to the FORM that he did not consider her
significant enough to list because their meetings were infrequent, casual, and easily
severable is inconsistent with his previous sworn statements describing their
relationship, and with the admitted facts concerning its nature and extent. Accordingly, I
find that he deliberately falsified material facts on his 2008 application by omitting any
mention of her. As discussed above, his conduct in connection with this affair and his
concealment of information about it from family members and professional associates
created significant vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation and duress. The evidence
of record thus establishes security concerns under AG ¶¶ 16(a) and (e).
My whole person analysis will be set forth below, and will incorporate concerns
under all three alleged guidelines. Should my foregoing analysis finding significant
unmitigated security concerns under both Guideline B and Guideline D be incorrect, I
would then find AG ¶ 16(c) to be applicable on these facts. Despite his claim that his
wife told him she had an extramarital affair before he began his, he persistently
concealed his conduct from her, his children and his supervisors. He knew it was
wrongful, but could not resist the ongoing temptation to violate his family obligations. His
admitted conduct alone supports findings of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, and unwillingness to comply with rules. 
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
11
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the
individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules
and regulations.
 
Applicant did not reveal his affair until questioned by an OPM investigator about
the real motivations behind his “many short trips” to Ecuador from 2003 to 2008 several
months after omitting that information from his January 2008 e-QIP. He did reveal the
nature and extent of his conduct during that interview after being confronted, and
reaffirmed those statements in September 2008. He made no claim that he was advised
he need not reveal this information, and did not establish that either intimate relations
with his mistress or attempts to conceal the affair were unlikely to recur. He did not
demonstrate any positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation or
manipulation, and admitted the allegations on which all but the falsification concerns
were based. Accordingly, he failed to establish mitigation of personal conduct security
concerns under any AG ¶ 17 provision.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
12
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a mature individual who
is responsible for his entirely voluntary choices and conduct that underlie security
concerns expressed in the SOR. He engaged in a clandestine extramarital affair with a
foreign woman he met in 2002 while TDY that continued at least into late 2008. This
included biannual visits for sexual liaisons as well as regular financial payments to her.
He provided no convincing evidence that this behavior has ended, or would end anytime
soon, or that he regrets having done so to the point that he would not repeat the
behavior. His motivation for the conduct was purely his personal gratification and to
maintain the affections of his mistress to that end. He did not disclose this activity to
significant people in his life or on his most recent security clearance application, and
continues to remain subject to duress should it be revealed. The record contains
insufficient other evidence about his character or responsibility to mitigate these
concerns, or tending to make their continuation less likely. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign influence, sexual
behavior, and personal conduct considerations. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
13
Subparagraph 1.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline D: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue Applicant’s
eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is
revoked and denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge