KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant’s response to the File of Relevant Material contained documentary evidence
that Applicant had settled only one of 18 debts alleged in the Statement of Reasons.  Adverse
decision affirmed.
CASENO: 08-08713.a1
DATE: 06/08/2009
DATE: June 8, 2009
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-08713
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On January 26, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
Applicant argues that the Judge erred in finding that she had not pursued charges against her ex-husband for1
opening accounts without her knowledge, that she had not sought credit counseling, and that she had not paid off five
of 18 debts listed in the SOR.  To the extent that the Judge relied on his finding that Applicant had not pursued criminal
charges against the ex-husband, such reliance was misplaced because the Directive has no such requirement.
The Board has previously noted that it is reasonable for a Judge to expect applicants to present documentation2
about the satisfaction of individual debts.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 07-10310 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 30, 2008).
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the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested that the case be decided on the written record.  On April 30, 2009, after considering the
record, Administrative Judge John Grattan Metz, Jr. denied Applicant’s request for a security
clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision under Guideline F is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
erred with respect to several of his findings of fact.   For the reasons that follow, the Board affirms1
the Judge’s decision.
Applicant’s response to the government’s file of relevant material (FORM) only contained
documentary evidence establishing that she had settled one of the 18 debts listed in the SOR.  There
was no other independent evidence to corroborate assertions she had made in her answer to the
SOR.   On appeal she submits four documents which indicate that she has met with a credit2
counselor and has paid off three of her 18 debts.  Two of these documents are dated after the close
of the record.  The Board cannot consider this new evidence on appeal. See Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
The Board’s review of a Judge’s findings is limited to determining if they are supported by
substantial evidence—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support such a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.  Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1.
“This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620,
(1966).  
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge’s material findings are based
on substantial evidence, or constitute reasonable characterizations or inferences that could be drawn
from the record.  Applicant has not identified any harmful error likely to change the outcome of the
case.  Considering the record evidence as a whole, the Judge’s material findings of security concern
are sustainable.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-21025 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 9, 2007).
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Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact,
the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7,
2007).  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for
a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a serious history of not meeting financial
obligations.  At the time the case was submitted for decision, Applicant still had significant
outstanding debts and was still trying to resolve her financial problems.  In light of the foregoing,
the Judge could reasonably conclude that those problems were still ongoing.   See, e.g., ISCR Case
No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The Judge weighed the limited mitigating evidence
offered by Applicant against the seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible
application of relevant conditions and factors.  The Judge found in favor of Applicant as to two of
the SOR factual allegations, but he reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was
insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns.  The Board does not review a case de
novo. The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep.
4, 2007).  
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  Therefore, the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision
is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan      
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
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William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody        
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board