KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant avers that Department Counsel made statements which could be viewed as
advice that he did not need nota lawyer and he relied upon this in electing to appear pro se.  The
Board cannot consider new evidence.  Still, the Board considered Applicant’s argument.  Prior to
the hearing, he received written guidance from DOHA that he had the right to employ counsel, or
have another person represent him; that he had the right to present evidence and witnesses; that
he had the right to cross-examine witnesses against him; and that he had the right to object to
evidence.  At the hearing, the Judge told him of his right to employ counsel. He said he decided
to represent himself.  He presented documentary evidence, called witnesses, and testified in his
own behalf.  He points to nothing which he would have done differently had he had counsel, or
anything likely to have produced a different result.  Under the facts of this case, there is no basis
to conclude that Applicant was denied due process.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 08-07352.a1
DATE: 07/28/2009
DATE: July 28, 2009
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-07352
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
The debts which the Judge found against Applicant total $48,945.1
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Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On January 23, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On May 14, 2009, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Paul J. Mason denied
Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28
and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether Applicant was denied due process
insofar as he represented himself.  Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Judge.
The Judge found that Applicant had numerous delinquent debts, mostly for credit card
accounts.   Acknowledging that these debts may have been affected by Applicant’s former wife’s1
problems with drugs, the Judge nevertheless concluded that Applicant had not mitigated the security
concerns which his financial problems raised.  “[Applicant] acted irresponsibly . . . in not handling
the past due debts in a prudent manner.  His enrollment in [a] debt plan in early March 2009, and his
payment of four small debts . . . four days after the hearing do not provide me with sufficient
confidence to believe he is truly committed to paying the remaining debts.”  Decision at 8-9.    
Applicant offers new evidence in the form of a contention that, at some point prior to the
hearing, Department Counsel made statements which could be construed as advice that he need not
hire an attorney to represent him.  He states that he relied upon this purported advice in electing to
conduct his case pro se and that he was overwhelmed at the hearing.  The Board cannot consider new
evidence on appeal.  Directive ¶ E3.1.29.  Nonetheless, the Board has considered Applicant’s
argument, but only for the limited purpose of addressing Applicant’s due process claim.  The record
demonstrates that, prior to the hearing, he received written guidance from the Chief Administrative
Judge that he had the right to employ counsel, or to have some other person represent him at the
hearing; that he had the right to present evidence and witnesses; that he had the right to cross-
examine witnesses against him; and that he had the right to object to evidence.  At the beginning of
the hearing, the Judge further advised him of his right to employ counsel.  Applicant stated that he
had given thought to doing so but had decided to represent himself.  Tr. at 4.  During the hearing,
Applicant presented documentary evidence, called three witnesses, and testified in his own behalf.
He points to nothing in the record which he likely would have done differently had he been
represented by counsel, or anything likely to have produced a different result.  Under the facts of this
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case, there is no basis to conclude that Applicant was denied the due process afforded by the
Directive.  See  ISCR Case No. 08-03110 at 2 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 2009).   
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  The Judge’s decision that “it is not clearly consistent with national
interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance” is sustainable on this record.  Decision
at 9.  See also Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) (“The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”).  
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan         
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: Wiliiam S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board