1 
 
 
                                                              
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
                                                            )  ISCR Case No. 08-07766 
                                                            )                                                            
                                                            )                                                                                           
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Fahryn E. Hoffman, Esquire,  Department  Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro Se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
ANTHONY, Joan Caton, Administrative Judge: 
 
 After a thorough review of the hearing transcript, pleadings, and exhibits, I 
conclude that Applicant failed to mitigate security concerns under Guideline J, Criminal 
Conduct, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct. His eligibility for a security clearance is 
denied. 
 
Applicant executed an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on January 29, 2008. On March 17, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security 
concerns under Guideline J, Criminal Conduct, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct. The 
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information 
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) 
promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the 
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 
2 
 
 
 On April 8, 2009, Applicant answered the SOR in writing and elected to have a 
hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on June 9, 2009. 
I convened a hearing on July 6, 2009, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with 
the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The 
Government called no witnesses and introduced five exhibits, which were marked Ex. 1 
through 5 and admitted to the record without objection.  Applicant testified on his own 
behalf. He called one witness and offered seven exhibits, which were marked Ex. A 
through G, and admitted to the record without objection. Because Applicant’s Ex. B, a 
letter of character reference, was undated and unsigned, I kept the record open for one 
week, until close of business on July 13, 2009, so that he could provide a signed and 
dated version of Ex. B if he wished to do so. Applicant also asked to include in the 
record a copy of a handwritten employment application he filed in about October 2007, 
and I granted his request to do so. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on 
July 15, 2009. By memorandum dated July 23, 2009, Department Counsel reported that 
Applicant failed to submit any post-hearing documents.   
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 The SOR contains six allegations of disqualifying conduct under AG J, Criminal 
Conduct (SOR ¶¶ 1.a. through 1.f.), and three allegations of disqualifying conduct under 
AG E, Personal Conduct (SOR ¶¶ 2.a. through 2.g.). In his Answer to the SOR,   
Applicant admitted five Guideline J allegations (SOR ¶¶ 1.a. through 1.e.) and provided 
additional information. He denied the three Guideline E allegations (¶¶ 2.a. through 
2.c.), and he did not address SOR ¶ 1.f., which alleged that the information set forth in 
¶¶ 2.a. through 2.c. violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and was felonious criminal conduct. 
Applicant’s admissions are admitted herein as findings of fact. (Answer to SOR; Tr. 21, 
35; Ex. D.)  
 
 Applicant, who is 39 years old and employed in telecommunications by a federal 
contractor, seeks a security clearance. He attended college for about 2 ½ years, but did 
not complete a degree. He married in 1998. His wife is a citizen of Japan. His three 
children, ages 10, 8, and 5, are dual citizens of the United States and Japan. (Ex. 1; Tr. 
140-141.) 
 
 At the time of his hearing, Applicant had been unemployed for approximately 
three months. His employer had suspended him from duty pending the adjudication of 
his eligibility for a security clearance. (Tr. 35-38, 76.) 
 
 The SOR alleged that Applicant was responsible for criminal conduct occurring 
between 1990 and 2008. In March 1990, when he was 19 years old, Applicant’s 
vehicle1 was broken into.  For protection, he purchased a sawed-off shotgun from a 
                                            
1 In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant stated that he purchased the gun for protection after his apartment 
was broken into. In his response to DOHA interrogatories, he stated that he purchased the gun for 
otection after his truck was broken into. (Answer to SOR at 2; Ex. 2 at 2.) pr
 
 
3 
 
 
3-90, 93.)   
                                 
friend.2 He and a friend took the weapon to a sporting goods store at a mall, where he 
attempted to purchase ammunition for the gun. An employee of the store notified police. 
Applicant was arrested and charged with Possession/Manufacturing/Selling a 
Dangerous Weapon, a felony. Applicant pled guilty to the charge and was given 36 
months of summary probation. In December 1991, he violated his probation and was 
sentenced to 90 days in jail. He served 31 of the 90 days in jail.  (SOR ¶ 1.a.; Answer to 
SOR; Ex. 2 at 2; Ex. 3 at 3; Tr. 46-47, 8
 
 In May 1990, Applicant allowed a young woman to reside in his apartment for 
about two months. Applicant thought she would pay him rent, but she did not do so. He 
was behind in his rent and he pressured her to pay her share of the rent. Applicant 
knew she did not have enough money in her account to write a valid check, and if she 
wrote a check to him and he cashed it, it would be returned for insufficient funds. 
Nevertheless, he drove her to a bank, she made out a check to him, and he cashed it. 
The check the woman gave to Applicant was drawn on a third person’s account.  
Applicant was arrested and charged with Forgery. He admitted in open court that he 
was guilty of the crime, but, on the advice of his court-appointed attorney, he pled no 
contest to conspiracy to commit Forgery. He was found guilty of the crime and 
sentenced to three days in jail and 24 months of probation.  (SOR ¶ 1.d.; Answer to 
SOR; Ex. 2 at 2; Ex. 3; Ex. 4; Tr. 47-48, 90-93.) 
 
 In 1997, Applicant was pulled over by police in City A of State X and given a 
ticket for speeding. His automobile insurance had expired. He was ordered to appear in 
court and provide evidence of valid automobile insurance. Applicant did not appear in 
court as ordered, his license was suspended by operation of law, and a warrant was 
issued for his arrest. He was subsequently arrested in July 1997, charged with Failure 
to Appear, fined, and detained in jail for 24 hours. His father provided money to pay his 
fine and secure his release, and he also gave Applicant money to purchase automobile 
insurance. (SOR ¶ 1.c.; Answer to SOR; Ex. 2 at 3; Ex. 3; Ex. 4; Tr. 48-50, 99-103.)   
 
 One year later, in July 1998, Applicant was arrested in City B of State X and 
charged with (1) Failure to Appear, (2) Possession of Stolen Property, and (3) Traffic 
Offense. Charge (1) was dropped when City B learned that Applicant had appeared and 
answered that charge in City A one year earlier. Charge (2) was also dropped when 
Applicant provided evidence of a valid driver’s license, valid automobile insurance, and 
valid license plates. Applicant pled guilty to the traffic offense charge and paid a fine of 
$270. (SOR ¶ 1.b.;Answer to SOR at 1; Ex. 3; Ex. 4; Tr. 50-52, 103-107.)  
 
 Applicant played poker regularly with a group of about two dozen people. 
Applicant believed that one of the individuals in his poker group, Mr. X, spoke with some 
of the other players and accused Applicant of cheating. This made Applicant angry. In 
February of March 2007, the poker group met at Mr. X’s house to play poker. Applicant 
confronted Mr. X and asked him why he had told other players that he was cheating. Mr. 
           
 The sawed-off shotgun, an illegal weapon, was confiscated by the police and destroyed. (Tr. 89.)  2
 
4 
 
 
0 more on Mr. X’s credit card account, 
ringing the total charges to about $1,100. Applicant denied that he was responsible for 
d he was fired by his employer for committing the crime, and he 
sserted that he had resigned voluntarily. In light of his previous statements, Applicant’s 
 
therwise stricken from the record.  The single exception to this requirement is for 
ufacture/Selling a Dangerous 
eapon. However, he deliberately failed to disclose his arrest and conviction in 2007 
X denied talking about Applicant and telling others that he cheated. (Ex. 2 at 7; Tr. 113-
114.) 
 
 During a break in the game, Applicant took Mr. X’s credit card, which was sitting 
on a rack in his kitchen. He considered taking the card as a “practical revenge joke.” 
Applicant used the credit card to purchase snacks and beer for the poker game, and he 
told the other players that he had purchased the food. Two or three days later, Applicant 
again used the credit card to purchase snacks for another poker game. He estimated he 
charged approximately $150 to $200 on the stolen card. After he used Mr. X’s credit 
card for the second time, Applicant reflected on his actions and decided he had made a 
mistake. He estimated he had possession of the credit card for about one week. Then, 
he threw Mr. X’s credit card in a trash can at a gas station. Some unknown person then 
acquired the card and charged approximately $90
b
the additional charges, but he paid all of the unauthorized charges made to the credit 
card account. (Ex. 2 at 7-8; Tr. 42-46, 113-119.) 
 
 Mr. X learned that the card had been taken and he reported the theft to the 
police. He accused Applicant of stealing the card. In April 2007, Applicant was arrested 
and charged with (1) Credit Card Theft, a felony, and (2) Identify Fraud, a felony.  As the 
result of a plea bargain, he pled guilty to credit card larceny, a felony offense that did 
not require jail time. He received a sentence of six months in jail, suspended, and was 
sentenced to one year of probation. His year of probation ran from November 2007 to 
November 2008. An unknown individual informed Applicant’s employer of his arrest. 
Applicant told an authorized investigator from the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) that he thought Mr. X was the person who reported this information to his 
employer. As a result, Applicant told the authorized investigator and the police detective 
who arrested him that his employer fired him for committing the crime. At his hearing, 
Applicant denie
a
denial was not credible. (SOR ¶ 1.a.; Ex. 2 at 7-9; Ex. 3; Ex. 4; Ex. 5; Ex. A; Tr. 107-
111, 120-124.) 
 
 On January 29, 2008, Applicant executed an e-QIP. Section 23 of the e-QIP asks 
about an Applicant’s police record.  Section 23a asks: “Have you ever been charged 
with or convicted of any felony offense? (Include those under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.)” Section 23b asks: “Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a 
firearms or explosives offense?”  An individual responding to these questions is advised 
to “report information regardless of whether the record in your case has been ‘sealed’ or
o
certain convictions under the Federal Controlled Substances Act for which the court 
issued an expungement order under the authority of 21 U.S.C. 844 or 18 U.S.C. 3607.” 
 
 Applicant answered “yes” to the questions posed in Sections 23a and 23b of the 
e-QIP. He listed his 1990 conviction of Possession/Man
W
 
5 
 
 
x. 5; Tr. 126-127.) 
ant’s employment 
cord.  Specifically, section 22 asks: 
Has any of the following happened to you in the last 7 years?   
1. Fired from a job. 
2. Quit a job after being told you’d be fired. 
utual agreement following allegations of misconduct. 
atisfactory          
             performance. 
5. Left a job for other reasons under unfavorable conditions. 
orrect to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good 
ith. I understand that a knowing and willful false statement on this form can be 
s fully cooperative during the 
mainder of the investigation and court proceedings. [Applicant] offered to repay the 
09-112.)  
                                           
for the felony crime of Credit Card Theft, as alleged in SOR ¶1.a. (SOR ¶ 2.a.; Ex.1; Ex. 
2; Ex. 3; Ex. 4; Ex. 5; Ex. A 3; Ex. 4; E
 
 Section 22 of the e-QIP requests information on an applic
re
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. Left a job by m
 
 4. Left a job by mutual agreement following allegations of uns
  
 
 
 
Applicant responded “No” to all five questions in Section 22.3 (SOR ¶ 2.b.; Ex. 1.) 
 
 After executing the e-QIP on January 29, 2008, Applicant signed a certification 
which reads as follows: “My statements on this form, and any attachments to it, are true, 
complete, and c
fa
punished by fine or imprisonment or both. (See section 1001 of title 18, United States 
Code.)” (Ex. 1.) 
 
 The SOR also alleged that Applicant deliberately falsified material facts in an 
interview with an OPM authorized investigator by telling the investigator that he used 
the stolen credit card two times to purchase items totaling $150 to $200, when, in fact, 
he knew and sought to conceal that he had used the credit card at least six times and 
had spent about $1,200. (SOR ¶ 2.c.)  Applicant denied the allegation. The OPM 
investigative report relies on information provided by Applicant. The OPM report states 
that the stolen credit card had been used multiple times at multiple locations, and that 
Applicant was either working or on travel when some of the charges were made. 
Additionally, Applicant provided a letter from the detective whose investigation resulted 
in his arrest for felony credit card theft. In his letter the detective stated that Applicant 
initially denied involvement in the theft of the credit card but then admitted taking and 
fraudulently using Mr. X’s credit card. The detective reported that Applicant 
“acknowledged the severity of his mistake and wa
re
$1071.84 in fraudulent charges, despite believing several of the charges were not made 
by him.”  (Answer to SOR; Ex. A; Ex. 2; Tr. 1
 
3 Applicant’s witness was unable to corroborate that Applicant was not fired from the job. (Tr. 157-158.) 
 
6 
 
 
nt belonged wrote a letter of 
haracter reference on his behalf and stated that he believed Applicant to dedicated, 
 Applicant also provided letters of appreciation from customers he served as a 
is “can-do” approach and dedication to 
mission. (Ex. D; Ex. E.) 
t 
pplicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is 
clearly
 (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potent
 a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
availab
or of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
 
 The SOR alleged that the Guideline E allegations constituted felonious conduct 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. (SOR ¶ 1.f.) 
 Applicant provided information on his community service activities. The president 
of a community service organization to which Applica
c
civic-minded, and reliable. He stated that he considered Applicant to be “a friend and 
valued member of our club and the community.” (Ex. C.) 
 
federal contractor. Two customers praised h
 
                                                           Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, and 
it has emphasized that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the 
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine 
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. 
at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to gran
A
 consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.    
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an   
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines
ially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, the administrative judge applies these guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is
le, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in fav
 
7 
 
 
the ev
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or miti
applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permis
es that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
Analysis 
 
 
 er the Criminal Conduct guideline “[c]riminal activity creates doubt about a 
person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.  By its very nature, it calls into 
 
 
ession/Manufacturing/Selling a Dangerous Weapon, a 
felony offense for which he was sentenced to 36 months of summary probation. In 
 
 
tolen Property offenses were 
idence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
gate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in seeking a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the 
sible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provid
 
 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 Und
question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.”  
AG ¶ 30. 
 Applicant admits a criminal history that spans 17 years. In 1990, he was arrested, 
charged, and convicted of Poss
December 1991, he violated his probation and was sentenced to 90 days in jail. He 
served 31 of the 90 days in jail. 
  In 1990, he was also arrested, charged, and found guilty of Forgery. He was 
sentenced to three days in jail and 24 months of probation. In 1997, Applicant did not 
appear in court on another matter as ordered, his license was suspended by operation 
of law, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was subsequently arrested in July 
1997, charged with Failure to Appear, fined, and detained in jail for 24 hours. In 1998, 
Applicant was arrested for Failure to Appear, Possession of Stolen Property, and Traffic 
Offense. The Failure to Appear and Possession of S
 
8 
 
 
dismissed when it was determined that Applicant had satisfied them in a municipal 
 
 ith Credit Card Theft. He was 
found guilty of the charge, sentenced to six months in jail, suspended, and one year of 
 
 
 had revealed 
that information to two investigators, raises concerns about his truthfulness and 
liabil
 
   
onally repaid all fraudulent charges on 
the account. I conclude that the record evidence is insufficient to establish that 
  
under AG ¶ 31(a) and AG ¶ 31(c).
G ¶ 31(a) reads: “a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.” AG ¶ 31(c) reads: 
 
nce of successful rehabilitation, including but not limited to the passage of 
jurisdiction that, through administrative oversight, then failed to convey this information 
to a second municipal jurisdiction within the same state. 
 In 2007, Applicant was arrested and charged w
probation. After learning of his arrest, his employer fired him. Applicant’s year of 
probation ran from November 2007 to November 2008. 
 Applicant completed and certified an e-QIP on January 29, 2008, while he was 
serving his probation for the felony crime of Credit Card Theft. He failed to report this 
crime, as required, in response to Section 23 on the e-QIP. Additionally, he failed to 
report in response to Section 22 on the e-QIP that he had been fired by his employer as 
the result of his arrest. While Applicant denied at his hearing that he was fired, two 
sources, the OPM investigation report and the letter from the detective who investigated 
the charges of credit card theft, corroborated Applicant’s earlier statements that he had 
been fired after he was arrested. These facts, and the record as a whole, suggest that 
Applicant deliberately failed to disclose his conviction for credit card theft and his 
termination from his employment because of that conviction. He had reason to know 
that, if he listed these facts on his e-QIP, he might not be awarded access to classified 
information. His denial at his hearing that he had not been fired, after he
re ity.  I conclude that Applicant’s falsification of his answers to Sections 22 and 23 
was willful, deliberately false, and a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001.  
 Applicant also told the OPM investigator that he used the stolen credit card two 
times to purchase snacks totaling between $150 to $250. He denied using the credit 
card several more times to charge items totaling about $1,200 and concealing this 
information from an authorized investigator. The record reflects that Applicant provided 
this same information to the detective who arrested him for credit card theft, and the 
detective’s letter corroborates that Applicant pers
Applicant’s statements to the OPM investigator on this issue were willful, deliberately 
false, and a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. 
           Applicant’s 17-year criminal history and his deliberate falsification of that history 
on his security clearance application raise concerns  
A
”allegation or admission or criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was 
formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted.” 
 
 Two Criminal Conduct mitigating conditions might apply to Applicant’s case.  If 
“so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under 
such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the 
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” AG ¶ 32(a) might apply.  If 
“there is evide
 
9 
 
 
time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher 
 
 
supervisors and colleagues praised his personal attributes and his 
professional skills. He demonstrated constructive involvement in his community. 
owev
 
 
st a failure in rehabilitation. I conclude that while AG ¶ 
d AG ¶ 32(d) apply in part to mitigate Applicant’s criminal conduct between 
recent criminal conduct and his deliberate 
lsification of his e-QIP in 2008. 
 
ersonal Conduct 
  
 
 
ability to protect 
lassified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
 
 When Applicant completed and certified his e-QIP in 2008, he failed to report his 
past cr
          
education, good employment record, or constructive involvement,” then AG ¶ 32(d) 
might apply. 
 The record demonstrates that Applicant’s criminal behavior began in 1990, 19 
years ago. From 1998 until 2007, Applicant was not involved in criminal behavior. 
However, his criminal behavior resumed in 2007, and it was serious and substantial.  
Applicant’s past 
H er, the record does not provide assurances that Applicant’s criminal behavior is 
unlikely to recur. 
 In 2008, Applicant deliberately falsified his e-QIP by concealing and failing to 
report his criminal behavior in 2007 and his termination from his job in 2007.  His 
unwillingness or inability to inform the government about this past criminal behavior 
raises concerns about his reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. Additionally, 
his deliberate falsifications sugge
32(a) an
1990 and 1998, they do not apply to his more 
fa
 
Guideline E, P
AG ¶ 15 explains why personal conduct is a security concern: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and 
c
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. 
iminal behavior4 involving a felony conviction for credit card theft and the fact that 
                                  
4 The Appeal Board has cogently explained the process for analyzing falsification cases, s
(a) when a falsification allegation is controverted, Department Counsel has the burden of 
proving falsification; (b) proof of an omission, standing alone, does not establish or prove 
an applicant’s intent or state of mind when the omission occurred; and (c) a Judge must 
consider the record evidence as a whole to determine whether there is direct or 
circumstant
tating:
 
ial evidence concerning the applicant’s intent or state of mind at the time the 
mission occurred. [Moreover], it was legally permissible for the Judge to conclude 
urden of persuasion had shifted to the applicant to present evidence to explain the 
omission.  
 
o
Department Counsel had established a prima facie case under Guideline E and the 
b
 
10 
 
 
he had been fired from his job in 2007 when his employer learned of his felony 
conviction. In his answer to the SOR, he denied that his failure to disclose this 
information was deliberate falsification of material facts. The OPM report and the 
detective’s report state that Applicant stated he had been fired from his job in 2007. At 
his hearing, he denied telling the OPM investigator and the detective that he had been 
fired from his job after his employer learned of his arrest for credit card theft. The record 
as a whole reflects Applicant’s lack of candor on these issues and suggests he 
deliberately concealed information that he feared would cause the government to deny 
him access to classified information.  
  
The allegations in the SOR raise a security concern under AG ¶ 16(a), which 
reads: “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any 
personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to 
conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, 
determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary 
responsibilities.” 
 
  Several Guideline mitigating conditions might apply to the facts of this case. 
Applicant’s disqualifying personal conduct might be mitigated under AG ¶ 17(a) if “the 
individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or 
falsification before being confronted with the facts.” If “the refusal or failure to cooperate, 
omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or 
inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the 
individual specifically concerning the security process” and “[u]pon being made aware of 
the requirement to cooperate or provide information, the individual cooperated fully and 
completely,” then AG ¶ 17(b) might apply.  If “the offense is so minor, or so much time 
has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not case doubt on the individual’s 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” then AG ¶ 17(c) might apply. 
 
  AG ¶ 17(d) might apply if “the individual has acknowledged the behavior and 
obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the 
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other 
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.” AG ¶ 17(e) might apply if 
“the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to 
exploitation, manipulation, or duress.”   
 
I closely observed Applicant at his hearing and I listened to his testimony 
carefully.  I conclude that Applicant deliberately falsified material facts on the e-QIP that 
he executed and certified as true in January 2008. Nothing in the record suggests that 
he took prompt good-faith action to correct the omissions, concealments or falsifications 
before he was confronted with the facts. (AG ¶ 17(a).) Nothing in the record suggests 
                                                                                                                                             
ISCR Case No. 03-10380 at 5 (App. Bd. Jan. 6, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-23133 (App. Bd. June 9, 
2004)).  
 
 
 
11 
 
 
y to recur. (AG ¶ 17(d).) Nothing in the record suggests that Applicant took 
positive steps to reduce or eliminate the vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
caused. (AG ¶ 17(e).) I conclude, therefore, that none of the 
pplicable personal conduct mitigating conditions applies to the facts of Applicant’s 
ase. 
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applica nt’s 
conduc nine 
adjudic
 
) the extent to 
hich participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
e. 
 
 
 of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a mature adult who has 
been r
a situation that could seriously mislead the government about his honesty, reliability, 
that his failure to report his criminal behavior was caused or significantly contributed to 
by improper or inadequate advice specifically about the security clearance process from 
authorized individuals or legal counsel. (AG ¶ 17(b).) When he executed his security 
clearance application, Applicant knew he had been convicted of felony credit card theft 
and was, at that time, serving a term of probation for the crime. As a mature adult, he 
knew that his criminal behavior was not minor, so remote in time, so infrequent, or had 
occurred under such unique circumstances that it would not seriously impact his 
eligibility for a security clearance. (AG 17(c).) Applicant failed to provide documentation 
that he obtained counseling or had taken other positive steps that might alleviate the 
circumstances that caused his unreliable conduct and, as a result, such behavior was 
unlikel
duress that his behavior 
a
c
 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 
nt’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applica
t and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
ative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5
w
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrenc
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
        
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light
ecognized by his supervisors and co-workers as dedicated and responsible. He is 
appreciated by others in his community as a valued volunteer. He is married and the 
father of three young children. These actions suggested successful rehabilitation. 
 
However, after nine years of no reported criminal behavior, he became involved 
in serious criminal behavior in 2007. In 2008, he completed an e-QIP and deliberately 
failed to report his past criminal behavior and termination from his job, thereby creating 
 
12 
 
 
l qualification for one who would hold a security 
clearance. Applicant’s failure to be truthful was deliberate. He made no effort to correct 
his fal
me with questions and doubts at the present 
me as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For these 
reasons, I conclude Applicant faile ecurity concerns arising from his 
riminal conduct and personal conduct.  
the SOR, 
s required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
Paragraph 1, Guideline J:   AGAINST  APPLICANT 
 Subparagraph 1.a.:   Against Applicant 
 Subparagraph 1.b.:   For Applicant 
 Subparagraph 1.c.:   For Applicant 
 Subparagraph 1.d.:   For Applicant 
 Subparagraph 1.e.:   For Applicant 
 Subparagraph 1.f.:   Against Applicant 
Paragraph 2, Guideline E:             AGAINST APPLICANT 
 Subparagraph 2.a.:   Against Applicant 
 Subparagraph 2.b.:   Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.c.:   For Applicant 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
learly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
. 
 
 
                            ________________________________ 
and trustworthiness. His falsifications were not minor: they went to the heart of his 
capacity for truthfulness, a critica
sifications before the government confronted him with his lack of candor. His 
deliberate falsifications are recent. 
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves 
ti
d to mitigate the s
c
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in 
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Conclusion 
 
 
c
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied
 
13 
 
 
Joan Caton Anthony 
Administrative Judge