Authorized by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), Section E3.1.2.2.1
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.2
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------------------------- )
SSN: ------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-08379
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits and testimony, Applicant’s
request for eligibility for a security clearance is granted.
On April 22, 2008, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to obtain a security clearance required for his work on
a contract with the Department of Defense. After reviewing the results of the ensuing
background investigation, adjudicators for the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued to Applicant a set of interrogatories  to obtain clarification of information1
in his background. After reviewing the results of the background investigation together
with his response to the interrogatories, DOHA adjudicators were unable to make a
preliminary affirmative finding  that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to2
 Adjudication of this case is controlled by the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, approved by the President on3
December 29, 2005,which were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. Pending
official revision of the Directive, the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines supercede the guidelines listed in
Enclosure 2 to the Directive.
2
allow Applicant access to classified information. On November 25, 2008, DOHA issued
to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts which raise security concerns
addressed in the revised Adjudicative Guidelines  under Guideline B (foreign influence).3
On December 9, 2008, Applicant responded to the SOR and requested a
hearing. On January 15, 2009, Department Counsel made a pre-hearing submission
through which the government asked that administrative notice be taken of certain facts
germane to the issues presented by the pleadings. The submission consisted of a ten-
page memorandum supported by 24 enclosed documents (Attachments I - XXIV).
The case was assigned to me on February 23, 2009, and I convened a hearing
on April 2, 2009. DOHA received the transcript of hearing (Tr.) on April 10, 2009. The
parties appeared at the hearing as scheduled. The government presented two exhibits –
Applicant’s e-QIP (Gx. 1) and his response to interrogatories (Gx. 2). They were
admitted without objection. Applicant testified in his own behalf, presented three
witnesses, and proffered six exhibits (Ax. A - F). I admitted into the record Ax. A - E;
however, for reasons discussed at the hearing (Tr. 48 - 53) Ax. F was not admitted. 
I also granted, in part, and denied, in part, the government’s pre-hearing
administrative notice request. The entire administrative notice request is included in the
record as Judicial Exhibit (Jx. 1); however, for reasons discussed at the hearing (Tr. 21 -
25), I have not considered the information contained in Jx. 1, Attachments V - IX and
XXVI - XXIV.
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline B, the government alleged that Applicant’s four brothers, one of
whom is a city government employee, are citizens of and reside in the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC) (SOR ¶ 1.a); that his in-laws are citizens of and reside in Taiwan (SOR
¶ 1.b); that, while traveling in the PRC for conferences in 2008 (SOR ¶ 1.c) and 2006
(SOR ¶ 1.d) he visited family members there; that he traveled to Taiwan in 2003 to visit
family members there (SOR ¶ 1.e); that he traveled to Taiwan in 2001 to get married
and visit family there (SOR ¶ 1.f); that he also traveled to Taiwan in 2001 to attend a
Rotary Club conference 2001 (SOR ¶ 1.g); that he traveled to the PRC in 1998 to see
his family (SOR ¶ 1.h); that he worked for the PRC government between 1985 and 1987
(SOR ¶ 1.I); and that he worked for the PRC government on a collective farm between
1972 and 1978 (SOR ¶ 1.j).
Applicant admitted with explanation the factual allegations, but he has vigorously
denied that the facts established through his admissions make him unsuitable for
access to classified information. (Tr., 11 - 12) In addition to the facts established by
Applicant’s answer to the SOR, I make the following findings of relevant fact.
 As to the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.j, that he “worked for the Chinese Government Collective Farms,” Applicant4
wryly observed that this is almost like accusing the Jews in the Nazi concentration camps of being working
(sic) for the Nazi government.” (Tr. 97) 
 The trip alleged in SOR ¶ 1.g was funded by Applicant’s chapter of the Rotary Club.5
3
Applicant is 54 years old. He was born and raised in the PRC before coming to
live in the United States in 1987. He and his wife, who was born and raised in Taiwan,
were married in October 2001. They have two children, ages 3 and 7, who were both
born in the United States. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September
1999. His wife was naturalized in April 2008. (Gx. 1)
Applicant was educated through high school in state-run Chinese schools. In
1972, at age 17, he was sent against his will to work on a collective farm away from his
family. He lived and worked there for six years, communicating only sporadically with
his family.  In 1978, he applied and was accepted to attend the University of Beijing,4
where he studied archaeology. After receiving his degree in that field in 1978, he then
attended China’s Central University for Nationalities, where he earned a post-graduate
degree in anthropology in 1985. From 1985 until 1987, Applicant worked for the state-
run Commission for Ethnic and Minority Affairs. His work involved preserving and
researching the artifacts and ethnic heritage of China’s several minorities. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2;
Ax. A; Tr., 103 - 105)
Applicant immigrated to the United States on a student visa in 1987 after he was
accepted to a university here. He graduated in 1991 with a master’s degree in
linguistics. Although he completed his doctoral studies in archaeology, he never
completed his dissertation. Instead, in 1992, he accepted a job as an archaeological
consultant near where he currently lives. Around this time, he also started working as a
translator. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Ax. A; Tr., 106 - 112) 
Applicant now owns his own translation company that does business in several
countries. His company does business internationally and has been certified for work
with the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, and the state court
system where he lives. Applicant is also head of the Chinese language division of an
international translators’ association. In 2008, he traveled to the PRC for an
international translators’ conference when it was held there, and visited his family while
there. In 2004, he traveled through the PRC and visited family members en route to a
job as a translator in Bali. He does not stay with family members in either the PRC or
Taiwan when he travels to those countries. He first returned to the PRC to see his
family in 1998, before he became a U.S. citizen. Applicant’s wife has also traveled to
the PRC with him and has been back to Taiwan three times since 2003. While some of
Applicant’s travel has been incidental to business travel, with one exception,  all of his5
and his wife’s travel has been self-funded. (Gx. 2; Ax. A; Tr., 133 - 144)
Since about 1995, Applicant has been active in his local chapter of the Rotary
Club. The Rotary is a volunteer organization of businessmen dedicated to community
service. Among their efforts are participation in the Habitat for Humanity, raising funds
for polio treatment and education, and international student exchange programs aimed
4
at improving cultural understanding and promoting world peace through service to
others. Applicant has been active in the student exchange program and was selected as
the leader for an exchange trip to Taiwan in 2001. It was on this trip that he met his wife,
herself a former Rotary exchange student between Taiwan and Sweden. He returned
later in 2001 to get married. (Tr., 83 - 84 ) 
Applicant has an excellent reputation in his community for service, family values,
and integrity. In addition to his own business, Applicant has worked to improve
opportunities for and exposure of Asian-American business development in the U.S. In
1997, as part of a U.S. Department of Commerce delegation and trade mission, he
accompanied the Secretary of Commerce to Canada. Witnesses from his neighborhood
and from his Rotary Club chapter provided information about his active participation in a
variety of charitable endeavors. In September 2005, Applicant organized a relief effort
for victims of Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf of Mexico coast. A couple who benefitted
from Applicant’s efforts also have vouched for his character and civic leadership. (Tr.,
116 - 177; Ax. D) A physician who has known Applicant for at least 15 years, spoke
highly of Applicant’s patriotism and commitment to his interests in the U.S. He also
opined, as did Applicant’s other witnesses, that Applicant is apolitical in most matters,
particularly when it comes to Sino-U.S. relations. (Tr., 54 - 60) An attorney, who has
known Applicant through the Rotary Club for more than seven years, asserted that
Applicant exemplifies the Rotarian principles of hard work and character. (Tr., 61 - 74)
Another fellow Rotarian, a retired Army officer with over 20 years of service, who has
belonged to the Rotary Club for more than 25 years, testified that Applicant has been
recognized several times for his high level of personal monetary contributions. He also
testified that Applicant exemplifies the Rotary Club’s main values of truth, fairness,
goodwill and benefit for all. (Tr., 75 - 92)
Applicant is the oldest of five children, all boys, in his family. Their parents are
both deceased. Applicant’s brothers are citizens of and still reside in the PRC in a city
located approximately 800 miles from Beijing. They have not visited Applicant in the
U.S., but Applicant tries to visit them if possible when he is in the PRC. Applicant
communicates with his brothers by phone about five or six times each year. Aside from
one brother, who is a municipal government employee working as a driver providing
transportation to retired city employees, none of his brothers or extended family in
China is employed by or has any official ties to the PRC government. 
Applicant’s wife’s parents are retired. Her father is a retired Taiwanese military
officer on whose pension they rely for subsistence. Applicant thinks he was a major, but
there is no information available about when he retired or what his duties in the military
were. She speaks to her parents each month by phone, and Applicant’s only contact
with them is by phone incidental to his wife’s contact with them. None of Applicant’s or
his wife’s family knows of his application for a security clearance. (Tr., 120 - 132)
Applicant has no financial or other interests in the PRC or Taiwan. While his
business has grown significantly in the past three years, less than 1% of his total
business revenues result from work in either country. (Tr., 146 - 152) Applicant is
financially secure in the U.S. through his business income, ownership of two houses,
and through a variety of retirement and savings accounts. Applicant receives no income
 The PRC does not recognize Taiwan, and insists there is only “one China.” In 1949, Taiwan was populated6
by refugees fleeing a civil war in China. That same year, Communists in mainland China established the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and a separate, independent government was established in Taiwan. (Jx.
I, Attachment XII)
5
from anyone in the PRC or Taiwan and he receives no benefits from either government.
He estimates his net worth to be about $350,000. (Gx. 2; Ax. C; Ax. E)
Having reviewed the documents received through Department Counsel’s
Request for Administrative Notice (Jx. I), I make the following findings of fact regarding
the PRC and Taiwan.
The PRC is an increasingly industrialized world economic and military power.
The country has a population in excess of one billion people who are governed by an
authoritarian, Communist regime. Geographically vast and demographically diverse, the
country has significant natural resources to help support its growing economy. The PRC
devotes most of its industry and domestic production to its military forces, and it has a
strategic nuclear arsenal. (Jx. I, Attachments I, XI) The PRC is in direct competition with
the United States in many geopolitical and economic areas, and it is known to actively
collect military, economic and industrial information about the United States. (Jx. I,
Attachments II, IV) In 2007, it was reported to Congress that the PRC was the leading
threat to the security of U.S. technology. (Jx. I, Attachment III) 
However, the PRC and the U.S. also are major trading partners and share other
common interests. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the two countries
worked closely in counter-terrorism efforts. The PRC and the U.S. also have worked
closely on regional issues, especially those involving North Korea. However, U.S.-PRC
relations are sometimes complicated by events in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The PRC is
one of the most active collectors of U.S. defense information and technology.
The PRC government has an abysmal human rights record. Officials continue to
engage in suppression of personal and electronic expressions of political dissent,
arbitrary arrest and detention, forced confessions, torture, and other prisoner
mistreatment. Government and law enforcement practices are largely unchecked by any
independent judicial review. (Jx. I, Attachment X)
Taiwan is an island nation governed through a multi-part democracy. Since its
separation from the mainland Chinese government 60 years ago,  Taiwan has become6
an industrialized economic entity and a leading producer of high-technology goods. In
1979, the U.S. formally recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China.
However, the U.S. has maintained cultural, commercial, and military relations with
Taiwan. Maintaining strong relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal. The U.S. does
not officially support Taiwanese independence, but it does support Taiwan’s
membership in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Asian
Development Bank. (Jx. I, Attachment XIII) The U.S. is also committed to help Taiwan
maintain its defensive capabilities, and has sold the Taiwanese defensive military
 Directive. 6.3.7
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).8
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.9
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equipment and weapons, including destroyers, anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel
submarines. (Jx. I, Attachment XIV) Notwithstanding these close ties with the U.S.,
Taiwan continues to target the U.S., among others, as part of its long-standing use of
aggressive economic and information espionage activities. (Jx. I, Attachment XV)
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,7
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the revised
Adjudicative Guidelines (AG). Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors
listed in ¶ 2(a) of the new guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole person”
concept, those factors are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information. In this case, the pleadings and the information presented by the parties
require consideration of the security concerns and adjudicative factors addressed under
AG ¶ 6, Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to8
have access to classified information. The government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the government meets its burden, it
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government’s case.
Because no one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy
burden of persuasion.  9
 See Egan; Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).10
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A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government based on trust and confidence. Thus, the government
has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests as his or her
own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of
any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the
government.10
Analysis
Foreign Influence. 
The facts established by the government’s information and by Applicant’s
admissions raise security concerns about Applicant’s personal relationships and other
interests in the PRC and Taiwan. Specifically, as stated in AG ¶ 6, 
[f]oreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
As to the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.j, that Applicant was employed by the PRC when
he was forced to leave home and work on a collective farm from 1972 until 1978, I find
for the Applicant. It is absurd to characterize Applicant has having entered into an
employee-employer relationship with the PRC at that time. This is in stark contrast to
the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.i, that he was a government employee in the PRC’s Ethnic
and Minority Affairs ministry after he graduated from college in the mid-1980s. However,
it is unlikely that an official tie to the PRC government that ended more than 20 years
ago may now form the basis for undue pressure or coercion in furtherance of the PRC’s
efforts against U.S. interests. I find for the Applicant as to SOR ¶ 1.i.
As alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b, Applicant has close family ties to his brothers
in the PRC and, by virtue of his close relationship with his wife, to her family in Taiwan.
As to those family members in Taiwan, that country’s known targeting of U.S. economic,
technical and military information presents a risk of exploitation; however, the risk may
be countered, or at least diminished by the fact that Taiwan is an open society governed
by democratically-elected officials. Nor does the Taiwanese government present human
rights abuse issues that might suggest unchecked government pressure or influence on
its citizens. The concerns about Applicant’s brothers in the PRC are a different matter.
 The travel to Taiwan alleged in SOR ¶ 1.g occurred before Applicant had any ties to that country. Moreover,11
Applicant made that trip as part of an international service and student exchange mission with the Rotary Club.
As such, it is not evidence of any foreign ties or influence. SOR ¶ 1.g is concluded for the Applicant.
8
The PRC is in direct geopolitical competition with the U.S., and is known to conduct
economic, military and technical espionage in the U.S. Combined with its repressive
form of government and unhindered abuse of human rights within its borders, the
concerns about the presence of an applicant’s family in the PRC are well-founded.
While the government’s information about Applicant’s foreign travel (SOR ¶¶ 1.c - 1.f,
and 1.h)  is not by itself disqualifying, it is evidence of the influence of his relationship11
with his family in China and Taiwan. The foregoing requires application of the
disqualifying condition at AG ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion). 
Of the mitigating conditions listed under AG ¶ 8, only AG ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign  individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.), AG
¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest), and AG ¶ 8(c) (contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation) are potentially applicable to these facts. 
As to ¶ AG 8(a), the presence in the PRC of Applicant’s brothers, to whom
Applicant is undoubtedly close, precludes use of this mitigating condition. There is also
a rebuttable presumption that, because Applicant is close to his wife he is also close to
her family. Nor is application of AG ¶ 8(c) supported by these facts. Applicant’s close
relationship with his brothers and his in-laws, combined with his regular phone contact
with at least one of his brothers and his wife’s regular phone contact with her parents do
not allow a conclusion that the contact with family is casual or infrequent.
However, as to AG ¶ 8(b), Applicant has presented sufficient information to show
that his interests, relationships and loyalties in the U.S. are so well-entrenched that he is
likely to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. Since the time he arrived in
the U.S. as a graduate student more than 20 years ago, Applicant has not just
assimilated into the fabric of U.S. society, he has done so in a high profile and all-
encompassing way. The information contained in Ax. A reflects a complete
“Americanization” of this immigrant. All of his interests – his wife and children, his
business, his finances and property, and his identity as a citizen – are inextricably
rooted in the United States and its society. The cross-section of information that
supports application of AG ¶ 8(b) and reflects well on his character and integrity, also
 See footnote 7, supra.12
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outweighs the security concerns about his family ties in the PRC and Taiwan. I conclude
Guideline B for the Applicant.
Whole Person Concept. 
I have evaluated the facts presented and have applied the appropriate
adjudicative factors under Guideline B. I have also reviewed the record before me in the
context of the whole person factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant is a mature,
responsible, and highly accomplished 55-year-old businessman who, since arriving in
the U.S. in 1987, has worked diligently to succeed in business and to better the
community in which he lives. The circumstances of his family ties in the PRC and
Taiwan are not likely to change. However, the ties he has established in the U.S.
through the Rotary Club, and through his myriad other business-related and civic
activities make it highly unlikely that he would act contrary to U.S. interests in response
to pressure by any foreign government. Certainly, there has been no misconduct here
and there is nothing inappropriate or illegal about Applicant’s contacts overseas. A fair
and commonsense assessment  of all available information shows Applicant has12
overcome the doubts about his suitability under these circumstances.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a - 2.j: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is granted.
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge