DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
  DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
  
  
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 08-08724 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Candance Le'i, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro Se 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HEINY, Claude R., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant engaged in questionable conduct and judgment, and failed to comply 
with security rules and regulations that raise questions about his reliability, 
trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. Applicant was told by his 
company’s security officials to cease his contact with a foreign national and to stop 
sending her money. He would comply for a period of time and then contact would 
resume and additional funds would be sent. Applicant currently sees the woman three 
times a week and provides her approximately $2,700 per month in support. Applicant 
has failed to rebut or mitigate the government’s personal conduct security concerns. 
Clearance is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
 Applicant contests the Defense Department’s intent to deny or revoke his 
eligibility for an industrial security clearance. Acting under the relevant Executive Order 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
                                                          
and DoD Directive,1 the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) on March 24, 2009, detailing security concerns under 
personal conduct. 
  
 On April 20, 2009, DOHA received Applicant’s answer to the SOR in which he 
requested a hearing. On May 27, 2009, I was assigned the case. On June 4, 2009, 
DOHA issued a notice of hearing scheduling the hearing which was held on June 22, 
2009. The government offered Exhibits (Ex.) 1 through 7, which were admitted into 
evidence. Applicant testified on his own behalf.  
 
The record was held open to allow Applicant the opportunity to submit additional 
information. On June 22, 2009 and June 29, 2009, additional material was submitted. 
Department Counsel had no objection to the material, which was admitted into the 
record as Ex. A through Ex. F. On June 29, 2009, the transcript (Tr.) was received. On 
June 30, 2009, the record closed. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In Applicant’s Answer to the SOR, he denied the factual allegations in SOR ¶ 1.f 
and ¶ 1.m. He admitted the remaining factual allegations, with explanations. Applicant’s 
admissions to the SOR allegations are incorporated herein. After a thorough review of 
the record, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact: 
 
 Applicant is a 42-year-old senior systems engineer who has worked for a 
defense contractor since June 2008, and is seeking to obtain a security clearance. 
Applicant first received a clearance in 1986. (Tr. 63, 103) In April 2009, Applicant was 
promoted to supervisor. (Ex. E) Applicant took on more and more work responsibility 
and was favorably received by his company’s customers. Applicant’s supervisor is very 
pleased with Applicant’s professionalism. (Ex. F) 
 
Applicant had an affair with a woman, which he acknowledges “in and of itself is 
a dishonest act, a deceitful act.” (Tr. 23) Applicant fell in love with the woman and he 
had a difficult time breaking off his ties with her. He describes their relationship as a six-
year nightmare, which would have ended if they did not have a child together. (Tr. 24) 
He acknowledged he violated ethical rules and moral values during the relationship, a 
relationship that has cost him close friends. (Tr. 24, 25)  
 
His wife, daughters, parents, mother-in-law, and pastor are aware of the details. 
(Tr. 102) It was a year after the sexual affair started in 2005, before he told his wife. It 
was not until this year, that Applicant has been able to talk to his children about the 
matter. (Tr. 26)  
1 Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 
1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative 
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the 
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
3 
 
                                                          
 
In May 2003, Applicant’s company sent him to Korea for temporary duty (TDY). 
While there, he met a Kyrgyzstani female from Kyrgyzstan who was working at a bar2 
outside the military base where he was TDY.  
 
 During the first three weeks of this four-week TDY in-country, Applicant spent his 
free time at the bar talking with the Kyrgyzstani woman. Although he was married at the 
time, Applicant and the woman became close. They talked about contrasting world 
views, politics, faith, and other topics. (Tr. 48) They had lunches and dinners together a 
few times. (Tr. 49) Nothing sexual occurred. A week before Applicant’s TDY ended, the 
woman returned to Kyrgyzstan. Under her contract with the bar, she worked 11 months 
and was entitled to a one month vacation. The woman had a sick father, a mother, and 
her 2-year-old son born in 2000, living in Kyrgyzstan. When Applicant returned to the 
U.S., at the conclusion of his TDY, he sent the woman $400. At the time, Applicant was 
simply trying to assist someone he just met. The relation was merely platonic. It was 
only later that he fell in love with her. (Ex. 4)  
  
 His first day back at work, Applicant informed his security office he had met the 
woman and sent her money. Security told him to have no further contact with the 
woman and not to send any additional money until security got back with him. (Tr. 51, 
60, Ex. 4, page 5 of 8) Weeks passed with no additional contact from the security office. 
Applicant received many, many calls from the woman that he did not answer. (Tr. 51) In 
July 2003, he answered a call from her and resumed his contact with the woman. She 
was upset that he had not answered her calls and had not contacted her. (Tr. 52)  
 
 Applicant learned the woman was going to return to Korea. Applicant provided 
the woman sufficient funds, $2,000 to $3,000, to buy out her contract with the bar. (Tr. 
52, 62) In January 2004, Applicant reported to security officials that between July 2003 
and December 2003, Applicant sent her approximately $10,000. She used part of the 
money to purchase an apartment in Kyrgyzstan for her parents and son to live in. (Tr. 
62) In the fall of 2003, Applicant had a strong desire to visit the woman. In January 
2004, he informed the government of the money transfers and requested permission to 
visit the woman. Applicant was again directed to have no further contact with the 
woman and to stop sending her money. His travel request was denied. 
 
Applicant was given an appropriate amount of time to end the relationship. (Tr. 
55, 65) Applicant stopped sending money, but continued making telephone calls. It was 
initially suggested or recommended that he change his telephone number. He was later 
told he could keep his cell phone number. (Tr. 71) In May 2006, he did change his 
number. (Tr. 73) 
 
2 At some point, his security officials gave Applicant a copy of an article from the Army Times about 
women working in Korean bars who would obtain or extort money from military members and contractors 
and provide it to the bar owners. (Tr. 60) 
 
 
4 
 
In February 2004, Applicant was going to fly to Kyrgyzstan to see the woman. 
The purpose of the trip was to visit her to determine if his feelings for her were valid. (Tr. 
64) He knew his foreign travel request had been disapproved, but he still went to the 
airport and went through security. However, he did not get on the plane. (Tr. 69) 
Applicant understood if he traveled to her his career would be ended. (Tr. 53) He 
thought if got on the plane there was a 99.9 percent chance his career would be over. 
(Tr. 70) 
 
In March 2004, Applicant underwent a psychiatric evaluation showing no 
psychotic disorder, but that he was going through a deeply personal and emotional 
situation. (Ex. 4, page 6 of 8) At that time, marriage counseling was recommended. 
Applicant moved on with his life. As of April 2004, all contact between the two had 
ended. (Tr. 55) Applicant had no contact with the woman until he accidently met her a 
year later, in March 2005. (Tr. 36) 
 
In May or June 2004, Applicant purchased a new home. After closing on the 
house, he discovered his wife was pregnant with their third child who was born in 
January 2005. (Tr. 36, Ex. 4, page 5 of 8) During this time, Applicant turned down a job 
offer in Denver, because he had just purchased a new home and he did not want to 
move or move his family. (Tr. 73) Applicant had just “gone through a year of hell over 
this, and I felt like my life was finally getting back on track.” (Tr. 73) At this time, he was 
unconcerned whether the woman called or not.  
 
Although Applicant was unaware of it, the woman had returned to Korea on a 
visitor’s visa and started working in the same bar as before. While working there, she 
met someone new. In June 2004, a USAF master sergeant (E-7) made application to 
marry the woman and in August 2004, they married. (Tr. 56, Ex. B) 
 
From April 2004 through March 2005, Applicant’s foreign travel was restricted. 
He was authorized to travel to Korea on mission-related business. (Tr. 37) In March 
2005, Applicant was again TDY to Korea. While there, he unexpectedly met the woman, 
who was again working at the same bar. Up to that point, Applicant had no idea where 
the woman was or what she was doing. He was surprised at seeing her, because the 
last he knew he had helped her end her bar employment contract and she had returned 
to Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Applicant knew his running into the woman would be of concern to his employer. 
(Tr. 75) Applicant and the woman discussed the fact that they had moved on with their 
lives. The woman told him she had married an active duty enlisted member and her son 
was living with her in Korea. Applicant met the woman’s son. The woman initially had 
hoped Applicant would return and marry her. (Ex. 4, page 5 of 8) They were still in love 
with each other, but Applicant had no intention of continuing a relationship with her. (Tr. 
39) 
 
Following his TDY, Applicant returned to the U.S. and reported seeing the 
woman to his security office. (Tr. 38) A restriction was placed on his travel permissions. 
 
5 
 
(Tr. 39) He was to return to Korea in August for additional temporary duty. In August 
2005, the woman would not be in Korea because she was scheduled to accompany her 
husband to his new assignment. Late in May 2005, Applicant had a meeting with the 
security officials about his August trip. During that meeting, Applicant informed the 
security officials the woman was living with him in the U.S. and the relationship was not 
going to end. (Tr. 40) On June 1, 2005, his accesses were suspended pending further 
investigation. (Tr. 40, 66)  
 
Applicant had discussed obtaining a waiver from the security officials. He was 
informed it would take at least one year to process because it involved an adulterous 
relationship. (Tr. 65) He was told he would have to be separated from his wife before 
the waiver was considered. (Tr. 65) In May 2005, he asked that the waiver be 
processed because he had separated from his wife and was living with the woman. (Tr. 
66) Applicant submitted a group of documents, more than one inch thick, to security 
supporting his waiver request. (Tr. 123) Applicant was separated from his wife from May 
2005 through October 2005. (Tr. 81) It was not until January 2006, that he learned the 
waiver would not be granted. (Tr. 68) 
 
In May 2005, Applicant was again away from home performing temporary duty in 
the U.S. For seven days the woman came to CONUS because of visa issues. Her 
husband was being transferred from Korea to Iceland and she needed to get her 
Kyrgyzstani visa in order. She flew to Applicant’s location and they spent the period of 
his TDY and several days before and after the TDY together. (Tr. 80) The woman 
returned to Hawaii to be with her husband while transiting to Iceland. This was the first 
time Applicant and the woman had sexual relations. (Tr. 85) During this time, the 
woman became pregnant. All were unsure if the father was the woman’s husband or the 
Applicant.  
 
When the woman returned to Hawaii, Applicant believed the affair was over, 
there would be no relationship and she would shortly be living in Iceland. He thought he 
would never see her again. (Try, 121) 
 
At the end of May 2005, the woman returned to CONUS and again lived with 
Applicant. The following day, Applicant reported to his security office that he was again 
living with the Kyrgyzstani woman. (Tr. 82) Applicant provided information that he knew 
was detrimental to him professionally as well as personally in his marriage and in his 
relationship with coworkers. (Tr. 24) 
 
There were problems with her visa. Her husband wanted her to stay in Hawaii 
while the problems were fixed, she wanted to stay with friends in the U.S. (Tr. 121) 
Instead of staying with friends, the woman lived with Applicant until July 2005, when she 
received approval of her visa and left for Iceland to be with her husband. (Tr. 82) The 
woman got on the plane to Iceland and the affair was over. A week later, he told 
security she had left and the relationship was over. (Tr. 123)  
 
 
6 
 
The woman said she was going to Iceland to set the record straight with her 
husband and would be back. (Tr. 83) Applicant was uncertain if the woman would be 
returning, but did lease an apartment for her and her son in the local area. (Tr. 84) The 
record fails to indicate how long he maintained the apartment. From September 2005 
through December 2005, he was working temporarily in Denver. (Tr. 83) After some 
time, her husband was transferred to England and then to an Air Force base on the 
west coast of the U.S.  
 
In January 2006, Applicant met with security officials and disclosed what had 
occurred. In March 2006, Applicant’s access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 
(SCI) was revoked. Applicant appealed the decision. (Tr. 42) In February 2007, that 
revocation was upheld. In March 2006, Applicant informed his wife of the affair and that 
his SCI access had been revoked. He also told her of the pregnancy. (Tr. 88) They 
started marriage counseling, which ended in November 2006. (Tr. 42, Ex. 5, page 4 of 
6)  
 
During her pregnancy, Applicant sent the woman $300. (Tr. 43) Following the 
birth of the child in February 2006, Applicant began a $750 direct deposit for child 
support to the woman’s account. (Tr. 90, 132) Applicant had sent the woman a state 
Affidavit of Paternity and asked her to sign it. (Tr. 44) The woman refused to sign so 
long as Applicant remained with his wife and children. Having been denied paternity of 
his daughter, Applicant was upset with the woman and wanted to get on with his life. 
(Tr. 74) They both agreed their relationship was over, and for the good of the child, for 
both of them, and their families, it was best to terminate the relationship. (Tr. 44)  
 
On May 3, 2006, contact stopped and there was no contact for a year. (Tr. 44, 
Ex. 4, page 6 of 8) Applicant did not respond to a September 2006 email from the 
woman. In May 2008, Applicant completed a sworn affidavit. (Ex. 5) At that time, 
Applicant was no longer in contact with the woman and did not know where she lived. 
The last he knew, she was still in Iceland.  
 
 In March 2008, Applicant’s security clearance was suspended because another 
government agency had revoked his SCI access. (Ex. 6) In June 2008, Applicant was 
contacted by the woman and several weeks later she asked if he wanted to see his 
daughter. Applicant was unsure if the woman was separated, divorced, or living with her 
husband. In August 2008, they resumed communications. Applicant’s wife was aware 
Applicant was communicating with the woman. (Tr. 45)  
 
In September 2008, Applicant completed an affidavit of parentage listing himself 
as the father of the child. (Ex. 4, page 2 of 8) A name change request for the child has 
been submitted to the state court. (Tr. 45) Applicant is taking full responsibility and 
financially responsibility for his daughter. (Tr. 46) His daughter is covered by his 
insurance. He is actively seeking to contact the Iceland Registry Bureau so that his 
name properly appears on the US Report of Foreign Birth. When the documents are in 
order, his daughter’s name will reflect his last name. (Ex. E)  
 
 
7 
 
Also in September 2008, he started six months of weekly counseling talking 
about his wife, his children, and the other woman. (T. 141) He was trying to resolve his 
feelings. Applicant and his wife also resumed marriage counseling and seeing a clinical 
psychologist. (Ex. B) In March 2009, Applicant stopped attending marital counseling 
when the woman moved to his location. (Tr. 46) Also in March 2009, Applicant and his 
wife shared with their children information about all the events occurring since May 
2003. His wife and children have shared that information with their closest friends. (Ex. 
3) His relationship with his children, ages 4, 15, and 20, is on the mend. (Tr. 93)  
 
In a March 2009 letter (Ex. 3), Applicant said he was contemplating divorcing his 
wife. His wife has agreed that should the woman be forced to return to Kyrgyzstan, the 
daughter could remain with them in the U.S. (Tr. 97) Applicant sees his future with his 
wife. (Tr. 144) Applicant and his wife have known each other since he was 5 years old. 
They started dating when he was a high school freshman and they became serious as 
high school seniors. (Tr. 142) 
 
In February 2009, Applicant went to the west coast to see his daughter on her 
third birthday. (Tr. 132) Also in February 2009, the woman completed a medical 
assistant course. (Ex. 3) In March 2009, the woman separated from her husband and 
moved to Applicant’s location and has since filed for divorce. (Tr. 97) Applicant asked 
her not move to his location, but she came anyway. Applicant leased a home for her 
and her children. (Tr. 45, 91, Ex. 3) He pays $2,050 per month rent, the utilities, 
telephone bill, internet bill, and for groceries. (Tr. 45, 92) All together he pays 
approximately $2,700 per month for the care of the woman and her children. Applicant’s 
wife knows he is providing this support to the woman and her family. (Tr. 92) Since 
March 2009, Applicant sees his daughter and the woman three or four times a week. 
(Tr. 143)  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
 
8 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Personal Conduct  
 
The Directive sets out various factors relevant to an applicant=s personal conduct 
that may be potentially disqualifying. Paragraph 15 of the Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) 
states a concern where there is conduct “involving questionable judgment, lack of 
candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise 
questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified 
information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers 
during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security 
clearance process.” 
 
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying: 
 
 (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from 
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or 
 
9 
 
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance 
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; 
 
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning 
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent 
medical authority, or other official government representative; 
 
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is 
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single 
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; 
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any 
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse 
determination, but which, when combined with all available information 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply 
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the 
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes 
but is not limited to consideration of: 
 
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client 
confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of 
sensitive corporate or other government protected information: 
 
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the 
workplace;  
 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and, 
 
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other 
employer's time or resources. 
 
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, 
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such 
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's 
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another 
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is 
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a 
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence 
service or other group; 
 
 
10 
 
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to 
the employer as a condition of employment; and, 
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.  
 
Starting in 2003, when Applicant was 36 years old, he engaged in questionable 
conduct and judgment, and failed to comply with security rules and regulations which 
raised questions about his reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified 
information. In June 2003, Applicant was told by security officials to cease his contact 
with the woman and stop sending her money. For a time, Applicant complied, but then 
resumed his contact. This pattern would repeat itself over the next six years. Between 
July and December 2003, he sent her $10,000 and currently provides her support of 
$2,700 per month. He currently sees her three times a week. His contact with her 
relates primarily to their three-year-old daughter. 
 
In February 2004, Applicant was going to fly to see the woman to validate his 
feelings for her. His foreign travel request had been disapproved and he was again told 
to cease contact with the woman. Contacted ended for a while. In June 2004, the 
woman married an Air Force master sergeant. In March 2005, they unexpectedly met in 
Korea. During May 2005 through early July 2005, they lived together in the U.S. In July 
2005, she accompanied her husband on his PCS to Iceland. In January 2006, he told 
security what had occurred and his SCI was revoked. He acknowledged he delayed 
reporting facts to security. To his credit, he did eventually report the information, which 
he knew would be detrimental. In February 2006, Applicant started sending the woman 
$750 per month following the birth of their daughter.  
 
In May 2006, contact ended. In March 2008, Applicant’s security clearance is 
suspended. In May 2008, contact with the woman resumes. In March 2009, Applicant 
contemplated divorce; the woman separated from her husband, and moved into a 
residence at the Applicant’s location paid for by Applicant.  
 
Applicant realizes his conduct was inappropriate. He was fully aware of the 
government’s concerns. He stated he knew if he got on the plane in February 2004, he 
would have no job when he returned. He acknowledged the affair was a dishonest act, a 
deceitful act, and acknowledged he violated ethical rules and moral values during the 
relationship. He describes his relationship with the woman as a six-year nightmare, 
which would have ended if they did not have a child together. His judgment and 
reliability are questionable.  
 
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, 
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; 
 
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was 
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of 
 
11 
 
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual 
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made 
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the 
individual cooperated fully and truthfully. 
 
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is 
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling 
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the 
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, 
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; 
 
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; 
 
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable 
reliability; and, 
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or 
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's 
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules 
and regulations. 
  
 Much of the adverse information was supplied by Applicant. AG ¶ 17(a) does not 
apply because he often delayed reporting the information and then failed to follow what 
he was told by the security officers. AG ¶ 17(b) does not apply because there was no 
improper or inadequate advice leading to the conduct. Applicant has held a clearance 
since 1986 and knew the ramifications of his actions. 
 
AG ¶ 17(c) does not apply because the conduct was not minor. Applicant met the 
woman six years ago, but continues to see her and his daughter. Since Applicant and 
the woman have a daughter, their contact with one another is likely to continue. The 
conduct casts doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. 
 
Even though Applicant has received marriage counseling, AG ¶ 17(d) does not 
apply because the counseling has not changed the behavior. Additionally, there have 
been no positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused 
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior. The conduct is likely to 
continue. AG ¶ 17(e) only partially applies because Applicant has revealed the affair 
and his daughter’s existence to his security officials, his wife, children, parents, pastor, 
and mother-in-law, which reduces or eliminates vulnerability to exploitation, 
manipulation, or duress.  
 
 
12 
 
AG ¶ 17 (f) does not apply because the information was substantiated and AG ¶ 
17 (g) does not apply because Applicant was not associated with persons involved in 
criminal activity.  
 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is 42 years old, sufficiently 
mature to understand the inappropriateness of his conduct. He understood the security 
ramifications of his actions. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or 
doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these 
reasons, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from his 
personal conduct. 
 
This decision should not be construed as a determination that Applicant cannot 
or will not attain the state of true reform and rehabilitation necessary to justify the award 
of a security clearance. The awarding of a security clearance is not a once in a lifetime 
occurrence, but is based on applying the factors, both disqualifying and mitigating, to 
the evidence presented. For six years, Applicant has been involved in an on-again off-
again relationship with this woman. He has contemplated divorce, but is staying with his 
wife. However, the woman and his daughter live a short distance away.  
 
Under Applicant=s current circumstances, a clearance is not recommended. At 
some future time, he may well demonstrate persuasive evidence of his security 
worthiness.  
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Personal Conduct:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a—1.m:  Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.  
 
 
________________________ 
CLAUDE R. HEINY II 
Administrative Judge