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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-08236
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
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MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted for consideration a Security Clearance Application, Standard
Form SF-86 (SF-86), dated March 4, 2008. On March 18, 2009, the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security
concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
as amended, Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and
the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December
29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after
September 1, 2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 5, 2009, and, on May 12,
2009, answered the SOR by admitting all five allegations raised (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.e).
Applicant requested a decision be made without a hearing. On July 2, 2009,
Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material (FORM) supported by six
attached items. It set forth the government’s case based on the SOR. In his argument,
Department Counsel also moved that administrative notice be taken with respect to the
 Absent objection by Applicant, Department Counsel’s motion is granted.1
 Applicant surrendered his expired Lebanese passport in 2007 and now travels on his U.S. passport.2
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country of Lebanon, as presented by counsel’s submission of 14 additional documents
issued by the United States (U.S.) government.  Applicant received the FORM on July1
23, 2009. He declined to submit any additional information in opposition to the FORM.
The case was assigned to me on September 17, 2009, for administrative determination.
Based upon a review of the limited case file and exhibits presented, Applicant failed to
carry his burden and mitigate security concerns. Clearance is denied.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 49-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has been
employed as a linguist by the same company since March 2008. Prior to his present
employment, he worked for a defense contractor providing linguistic support to the U.S.
military. His transition to this field followed a career in the private sector retail industry.
Applicant was born in Lebanon, but became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2001. He is
divorced and no children are noted. He has a diploma in bookkeeping. 
Although Applicant chose an administrative determination, he offered few facts
regarding his life, background, immigration, or family. His SF-86 notes that he married a
U.S. citizen in the U.S. in 1995 and that he was widowed the following year. His work
history in the U.S. is noted as dating back to 1999. The SF-86 cites to his 2001
naturalization and his second marriage in 2003, to a foreign national, which ended in
divorce in 2007. He remarried in April or June 2008, after completing his SF-86.
Applicant did not designate himself on the security application as a dual citizen.2
Applicant’s mother and sister are citizens and residents of Lebanon. His 69-year-
old mother is a widow. A long-term housewife, she has no affiliation with the
government of Lebanon. She and Applicant speak by telephone every two to three
weeks. His sister is 51 years of age. She used to own a clothing store, but is presently
not employed. While Applicant notes she has no affiliation with the government of
Lebanon, there is no indication as to her marital status or her associates. He speaks
with her by telephone monthly. Applicant’s 46-year-old brother is a dual citizen of
Lebanon and Canada, currently residing in Saudi Arabia. He has no affiliation with any
foreign government. Applicant speaks with his brother every two to three weeks and
also communicates with him via the internet. Applicant visited his brother’s daughter,
who lives in Canada, in 2008. They speak once a month by telephone. Her husband is
a Lebanese citizen. He works for a hotel and is not affiliated with a foreign government.
Applicant’s contact with him is minimal.
Applicant’s current wife is 42 years of age. She is a citizen of Lebanon who
resides in Canada and works as a restaurant cashier. Currently seeking refugee status,
she is prohibited from leaving Canada until all of her papers are processed. She is not
affiliated with a foreign government. Applicant speaks with her by telephone two to
three times a day. They vacationed together in the late spring or summer of 2008,
 Letter, Applicant’s SOR Answer, dated May 10, 2009.3
 FORM at 7 and appendix (U.S. Department of State, Travel Warning: Lebanon, Sep. 10, 2008, at 1,4
concerning non-government sanctioned activities within Lebanon and efforts to undermine both Lebanon’s
sovereignty and security. Such facts are hereby incorporated into this decisions as findings of fact.
 FORM Appendix (U.S. Department of State, Travel Warning: Lebanon, Apr. 24, 2009, at 1).5
 Id.6
 Department of Justice Press Release, News Release, dated Feb. 13, 2006.7
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around the time they married in Canada. The record does not indicate any other contact
between the two. His wife has a large family and many cousins who are Lebanese, but
Applicant does not know anything about them. His wife’s sister is a Lebanese citizen
awaiting dual-citizenship with Canada. She is a housewife residing in Canada with her
husband, a security guard. Applicant has no idea whether his sister-in-law or her
husband have any affiliations with a foreign government.
Lacking health insurance in the U.S., Applicant visited Lebanon from October
2001 through January 2002 for knee surgery. He recuperated under his mother’s care.
He returned the favor by visiting his mother between August 2004 and January 2005,
when she was recovering from an illness. He neither initiated nor maintained any other
social or business contacts while abroad. He was not questioned about his work. He
has had no adverse contacts with law enforcement or customs on any foreign trip.
There is no evidence that he was harassed, threatened, or approached by either
government affiliates or members of anti-government factions while abroad. He does
not believe that he is vulnerable to duress due to his foreign contacts or relations, nor
does he believe his family would ever place him in a position in which he would be
forced to choose between the U.S. and any faction or individuals. He is “proud to be a
United States citizen . . . willing to serve this great country for the cause of freedom.”3
In September 2008, a travel warning was issued by the U.S. Department of State
concerning Lebanon, a parliamentary republic with which the U.S. seeks to maintain its
traditionally close ties and whose independence, sovereignty, national unity, and
territorial integrity the U.S. seeks to support. Lebanon has a constitution that affords its
citizens many rights. The warning, however, alerts American citizens to “security threats
and ongoing political violence in Lebanon” and “the threat of anti-Western terrorist
activity” that exists in Lebanon.  An April 2009 travel warning urges Americans to avoid4
all travel to Lebanon due to on-going political violence.  U.S. government personnel5
working in Lebanon are required to live and work under strict security restrictions.  That6
same advisory warns of terrorist activity threats due to the presence of Al-Qaeda and
June al-Sham, as well as recent exercises of violence by Hizballah, a Lebanon-based
terrorist group with an international presence. Finally, there is evidence that terrorists
based in Lebanon have attempted to acquire sensitive U.S. industrial products. In
February 2006, a dual citizen of Lebanon and Canada, who supported Hizballah, was
found guilty of conspiring to export sensitive military equipment from the U.S. to
Hizballah factions through a Canadian import/export shipping company.  A similar7
 Department of Justice News Release, Michigan Man Pleads Guilty to Supporting Hizballah, dated Nov. 29,8
2007.
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).9
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).10
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).11
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attempt was uncovered in 2007 when a U.S. citizen attempted to transfer products
manufactured by a U.S. defense contractor to an agent of Hizbollah in Lebanon.8
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Recognizing the complexities of
human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in
the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a
fair, impartial and commonsense decision. Under to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a9
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable10
clearance decision is on the applicant.  11
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
 Id.12
 Id.13
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.14
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safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access12
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily13
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the14
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
Based upon consideration of the evidence, the following guideline from
AG ¶ 6 is the most pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
Guideline B – Foreign Influence. The Concern: The concern under this
adjudicative guideline is that foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is
not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
The adjudication can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the
foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain
protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Conditions pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security
concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those that would mitigate security
concerns, are set forth and discussed in the analysis below.
Analysis
Applicant is seeking a security clearance as part of his employment with a U.S.
defense contractor, where he works as a linguist and cultural advisor. Applicant’s
mother and sister are citizens and residents of Lebanon, a foreign country posing
security concerns due to on-going political violence, the presence of terrorist forces
whose interests are antithetical to those of the U.S., and recent activity by terrorist
forces within that country to gain access to sensitive industrial materials. Additionally,
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his brother is a dual-national of Lebanon and Canada, currently residing in Saudi
Arabia. Applicant’s wife is a Lebanese citizen currently seeking refugee status in
Canada. Further, his niece and Applicant’s sister-in-law maintain connections with
Lebanon. Such facts give rise to Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG
¶ 7(b) (“connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information”). With disqualifying conditions thus raised, the
burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns. 
Here, Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition (FI MC) AG ¶ 8(a) requires that
circumstances make it unlikely that an applicant will be required to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, groups, organizations, or government and the interests
of the U.S. In his materials, Applicant states that this is the case. In choosing an
administrative determination, however, he limited his input to his written submissions.
Those documents fail to describe what circumstances would make such a choice
unlikely. Consequently, this FI MC cannot apply. 
Applicant described the frequency of his contact with his family members. No
facts were offered to help depict the depth of his relationships with his family members.
The lone exceptions are the fact he recently remarried and the fact he and his mother
helped each other recuperate during periods of medical need. Moreover, although
Applicant does note his pride in being a U.S. citizen and his willingness to serve this
nation, he offered no information regarding his ties to his community or his commitment
to his current residence and situation. While there are no allegations questioning
Applicant’s loyalty or his sincerity in wishing to serve the U.S., he presented insufficient
evidence upon which to judge whether AG ¶ 8(b) (“there is no conflict of interest either
because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest”) or AG ¶ 8(c) (“contact or communication
with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation”) applies. No other FI MC applies.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.” Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility
 Id.15
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for a public trust position must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole person”
factors noted above. Here, little is known about the Applicant’s life before his 2001
naturalization. Today, he is a mature, educated man with linguistic skills that are unique
and highly sought within the defense community. While there is no evidence his family
members are affiliated with a foreign government, there is similarly no evidence that
they are immune from the sway of terrorist forces based in or around Lebanon. The
scant evidence introduced by Applicant attempts to refute the foreign influence security
concerns raised, but it is insufficient to mitigate those concerns. 
In choosing an administrative determination, an applicant binds the
administrative judge exclusively to the information introduced into the official record.
Questions cannot be posed that might resolve lingering concerns. Consequently, an
applicant’s submissions must anticipate all the information needed for a full
consideration of whether any mitigating conditions apply. Otherwise, an applicant risks
failing to meet the burden placed squarely on those seeking access to privileged
information. 
Here, Applicant’s statements may paint a picture of his family members and his
interaction with them. That picture, however, lacks depth and detail. While there is no
basis to doubt Applicant’s honesty or sincerity, the ultimate burden remains on
Applicant to mitigate foreign influence security concerns. His submissions failed to carry
that burden. As noted above, any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should
be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such
information.  Consequently, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with national15
security to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is denied. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance is denied.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge