KEYWORD: Guideline G; Guideline J; Guideline E
DIGEST: The Judge found that Applicant has a 29-year history of alcohol abuse and criminal
conduct.  Adverse decision affirmed 
CASENO: 08-04232.a1
DATE: 10/09/2009
DATE: October 9, 2009
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-04232
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On December 31, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption),
Guideline J (Criminal Conduct), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense
The Judge found in Applicant’s favor regarding the three allegations brought under Guideline E.  Those1
favorable findings are not at issue on appeal.
2
Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On August
4, 2009, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Darlene D. Lokey Anderson denied Applicant’s
request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and
E3.1.30.
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious or contrary to law.  For the following reasons, the Board affirms the Judge’s unfavorable
decision.  1
The Judge found, inter alia, that Applicant had a 29-year history of alcohol abuse and
criminal conduct that included at least six arrests and convictions for DWI.  The Judge also found
that while his most recent arrest was more than six years old, Applicant continues to drink alcohol,
which has been at the root of his criminal problems.  She found that Applicant has tried on numerous
occasions to abstain from the use of alcohol, but has always returned to it.  Also, the Judge found
that, while his recent alcohol assessment did not diagnose him with alcohol dependence, Applicant’s
overall history of alcohol abuse clearly demonstrates that he has had a serious problem.  The Judge
concluded that, given his continued consumption of alcohol after numerous program
recommendations that he abstain from the use of alcohol, it is not clear from his past record that
Applicant will not return to his old ways.  The Judge concluded that the various mitigating
conditions listed under Guidelines G and J were not applicable.
Applicant argues that his alcohol abuse is in full remission and that the record indicates that
he has provided adequate evidence of mitigation.  He stresses the passage of over six years and
positive changes in his lifestyle.  Applicant’s assertions do not demonstrate error on the part of the
Judge.
The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a
whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.
See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  A party’s disagreement with the
Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence,
is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner
that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd.
Oct. 12, 2007).  
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors.  The Judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence to mitigate the
lengthy history of alcohol abuse and alcohol-related incidents with the police, given Applicant’s
decision to continue to consume alcohol.  These conclusions are reasonably supported by the record.
3
The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board
concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
her decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general
standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the
Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett           
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields            
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody               
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board