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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-02019
SSN: ------------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: 
Jeff A. Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant:
Kenneth M. Roberts, Esquire
November 10, 2009
______________
DECISION
______________
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
The Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing on May 23, 2006 (Government Exhibit 1). On October 14, 2008, the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
to the Applicant detailing the security concerns under Guidelines K (handling protected
information), E (personal conduct), and M (misuse of information technology). The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG)
promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
The transcript of the March 27, 2009, hearing will be identified as “Transcript I at xx.” The transcript of the1
October 2, 2009, hearing will be identified as “Transcript II at xx.”
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Applicant submitted an Answer to the SOR on November 5, 2008, and requested
a hearing before an Administrative Judge. I received the case assignment on December
12, 2008. DOHA issued an original notice of hearing on December 16, 2008, and
hearings were held on March 27, 2009, and October 2, 2009. The Government offered
Government Exhibits 1 through 10, which were received without objection. Applicant
testified on his own behalf, called three additional witnesses, and submitted Applicant’s
Exhibits A through V, and X, without objection. The post-hearing brief of the Applicant
was marked Applicant’s Exhibits W for identification only. DOHA received the final
transcript of the hearing on October 13, 2009. The record closed on that date. Based
upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to
classified information is denied.
Findings of Fact
The Applicant is 55, married, and has a master’s degree. He is employed by a
defense contractor and seeks to obtain a security clearance in connection with his
employment. The Applicant has worked for his current employer since 2006. All of the
incidents alleged in the SOR occurred during his employment with another defense
contractor [Company]. He was employed by the Company for 27 years, until December
2005.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline K - Handling Protected Information)
The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is not eligible for a
security clearance because he has committed security violations.
Subparagraph 1.a. The Applicant’s first security violation occurred on November
3, 2003. This violation was for misplacing the key to a classified storage area and
departing the area before resolution of the incident. The key was found in the
Applicant’s office. The Applicant had to leave the area in order to pick up his six-year
old son at a bus stop. (Government Exhibit 5, Exhibit 7 at 4; Transcript II at 11-14, 58-
60.)1
 Subparagraph 1.b. The Applicant’s second security violation occurred in June
2004. The Applicant had a camera pass, which allowed him to take photographs at a
Company facility. Areas in this facility contained classified material. On this occasion, he
took a photograph of a part of a device, which he believed to be unclassified. However,
he also knew that documentation showed the part to be classified, even though it was
not. The facility security officer stated that the Applicant was advised “when in doubt do
not take the picture.” The part the Applicant took the picture of was later determined to
be unclassified. (Government Exhibit 7 at 4, Exhibit 9; Transcript I at 101-104, 181-185;
Transcript II at 14-19, 60-62; 100-107.)
See also Transcript I at 235-238, 257-260.2
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Subparagraph 1.c. The Applicant’s third security violation occurred in March
2005.  This violation also involved the Applicant taking a photograph of a different part
of the same device. Once again the Applicant thought, but did not know, that the part
was unclassified. As before, this part was also shown in documentation to be classified.
The incident report submitted by the facility security officer states that the Applicant was
told “if he had any doubts an item was classified he was to have it authorized by a
classifier before taking the picture.” The part was subsequently determined to be
unclassified. (Government Exhibit 4 at 1, Exhibit 7 at 4; Transcript I at 185-188;
Transcript II at 18-22, 62-65, 107-109.)
The Applicant’s Team Lead at the time of the events set forth under 1.b. and 1.c.,
above, testified that he was “shocked” and “aghast” that these events resulted in
security violations being lodged against the Applicant. The witness explained in detail
why he felt that these were not true violations and that the facility security officer did not
understand how the camera pass system worked. (Transcript I at 182-185.)2
Paragraph 2 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct)
The Government alleges in this paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has engaged in conduct which shows questionable judgment,
lack of candor, dishonesty, or an unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations.
2.a. The Applicant’s conduct, as set forth under Paragraph 1, above, will also be
examined under Guideline E.
2.b. The Applicant admits that he installed personally-owned software on his
company supplied computer sometime in 2005. He further stated that the software was
Adobe Acrobat, and he removed it after being informed by the company IT (Information
Technology) manager that unapproved software was not allowed on his computer.
(Government Exhibit 3 at 1, and Exhibit 10; Transcript I at 111-112, 188-191; Transcript
II at 22-28, 65-71.)
The Applicant did not admit at any time that he had installed other personally-
owned software on his company computer. Specifically, software that would allow him
to remove personal emails from his account and therefore “scrub” it. However, as
further described under subparagraph 2.f., below, he did admit to deleting emails from
his account, but through another method. In addition, no evidence was submitted by
either side identifying any computer software program that would act in this fashion.
Based on the state of the record, I find that this allegation is not proven as alleged.
Accordingly, subparagraph 2.b. is found for the Applicant.
2.c., 2.d., 2.e., and 2.f. These four subparagraphs refer to a course of events,
involving the Applicant’s termination from the Company, and the aftermath. In order to
provide continuity, they will be discussed together.
See Exhibit Y at 2.3
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The Applicant was in charge of a building for the Company. Classified hardware
was worked on in this building. On June 2, 2005, a piece of classified hardware came
into the building. A particular part of this hardware contained an explosive charge. The
building could only work on inert components. In other words, while explosive material
could be in the building, it could not be worked on. The normal course of events for this
piece of hardware was to return it to the vendor, which was not the Company, when
work had to be done on the part containing the explosive charge. (Transcript I at 112-
116, 151-152, 192-193, 201-202, 260-264.)
The Applicant gave instructions regarding the handling of the part containing the
explosive charge that were, evidently, incorrect. In fact, the Applicant admitted at the
hearing that his instructions had been “a mistake.” (Transcript at 112.) These
instructions were recorded in a computer generated report (Report). (Applicant’s Exhibit
Y.) Written copies of this Report, including the Applicant’s instructions, were printed up
for the file. The Applicant then left for the evening after giving his instructions. Later that
day, the Applicant’s instructions were superseded by his Team Lead and the situation
was reported as a possible ordnance incident. It was emphasized by the Applicant, and
two witnesses who worked with him at the Company at the time, that an unsafe situation
never developed. (Government Exhibit 7 at 1-3; Transcript I at 122, 193-200, 264-267;
Transcript II at 28-37, 72-74, 109-114.) 
The next day, the Applicant was informed that his instructions resulted in a
possible ordnance incident. In his own words, “And I at that point became very scared.”
(Transcript II at 35.) 
At this time, the Applicant’s Lead instructed the Applicant to update the Report to
show what had happened concerning the work on the part after the Applicant had gone
home. (Transcript I at 203-206, 255; Transcript II at 37-40.) In doing this, according to
the Applicant, he noticed that the Report still had his instructions from the previous
evening. As stated earlier, those instructions were superseded. The Applicant testified
concerning his conduct at that time:
All I did was delete that paragraph. Those four lines on the [Report]
Screen to show the true course of events because that’s what we always
did was we dispositioned all our failures to show exactly what happened in
the time sequence that they did happen. And that did not happen.  You3
know, in hindsight, I probably would have just put a parenthesis line below
that, stating that the specific paragraph was not performed. But it was like
drawing lines through a written Disposition and initialling (sic) it, except in
this system, you couldn’t draw lines through text. (Transcript II at 39-40.)
The Applicant further stated, “There would have been any number of ways to
handle it other than the way I did. At the time, I thought I was just stating the true course
of events. . . . At the time, I felt I wasn’t - - there was no intent to defraud is the best I
See Transcript at 74-79.4
See also Transcript I at 238-241.5
Government Exhibit 2 is the Adverse Information Report submitted by the Company to the Government.6
Applicant’s Exhibit V consists of  the Applicant’s copies of termination documents. The record does not contain
any of the internal reports of the Company concerning any of the incidents involving the Applicant. It is noted
that the documents in the record contain different dates of term ination for the Applicant: January 2, 2006;
January 3, 2006; and January 6, 2006. (See Transcript I at 5-9.)
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can say.” (Transcript II at 79.)  Finally, the Applicant printed up the new Report and4
replaced the ones from the prior night. He threw the old ones away. (Transcript II at
111-119.)5
Shortly afterwards, an investigation commenced into the Applicant’s conduct with
regards to the ordnance incident. This investigation continued until December 2005. On
December 22, 2005, the Applicant was terminated from his employment with the
Company, allegedly because of his conduct with regards to the ordnance incident. This
termination had an effective date of January 2, 2006.  (Government Exhibit 2;
Applicant’s Exhibit V; Transcript II at 80-88.)6
The Applicant was escorted from the Company’s facility on December 22, 2005,
and did not return there again. (Transcript at 88.) The Adverse Information Report
states that the Applicant “was instructed to return company credit card and Secure ID
for [remote computer access] since those items were at his home. He was instructed to
have his spouse return them on 23 Dec 05, however, they were not returned until 3 Jan
06.” (Government Exhibit 2.) 
The Applicant disputes this version of events. He testified that he informed the
Company that his wife, who also worked for the Company, would return the items on
January 3, 2006. According to the Applicant, they were returned on that day. (Transcript
II at 42-45, 86-87, 119-120.)
The Applicant admits that, during the period from December 22, 2005, to January
3, 2006, he obtained remote access to the Company’s internal network. This was
through the use of the Secure ID he was supposed to return. He further stated that,
during this time, he sent personal email to co-workers and deleted what he describes as
personal emails. He did not have authorization from anyone to access the system
remotely. (Transcript II at 45-46, 69-71, 88-90, 121-122.)
The Company’s IT Manager was authorized to access the Applicant’s email
account to capture any email sent or received after the date of his termination,
December 22, 2005. In an email report, dated January 3, 2006, he states that “No e-
mail messages were found in [the Applicant’s Company] Exchange Sent, Deleted, Junk
E-mail, Journal, Notes, Outbox, Sync, Search or Draft folders.” (Government Exhibit 3 at
10.)
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The Applicant further admitted that, late on the afternoon of January 3, 2006, he
accessed the Company’s virtual private network for another reason. That is when he
downloaded a copy of Applicant’s Exhibit Y, the Report. He had no authorization from
anybody to do this last event. In fact, the Applicant admitted that he did it in expectation
of filing a law suit against the Company for wrongful termination. (Transcript at 90-93.)
Paragraph 3 (Guideline M - Misuse of Information Technology)
The Government alleges in this Paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has used information technology in an inappropriate manner,
thereby showing poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness.
3.a.  The Applicant’s conduct as set forth in subparagraphs 2.b., 2.d., and 2.f.,
above, will be examined under this Guideline as well.
Mitigation
The Applicant is a highly educated, respected professional in his field. He has
many years of experience in the defense industry, which is reflected in the many awards
he has received for his work. (Applicant’s Exhibit H.)
The current supervisor of the Applicant testified at the hearing. He has
knowledge of the incidents concerning the Applicant at the Company. With that
knowledge, he states, “I would recommend that the Security Clearance be granted. I
have seen no indications of any issue at all in [the Applicant’s] performance and ability
to follow the rules and maintain the requirements for a Clearance.” (Transcript I at 72.)
As stated earlier, the Applicant’s Team Lead and his Manager from his time at
the Company also testified on his behalf. They both testified that the Applicant is
qualified to hold a security clearance. (Transcript I at 132, 210.)
The Applicant also submitted laudatory letters of reference from co-workers at his
current employer (Applicant’s Exhibits M and N), co-workers from his years at the
Company (Applicant’s Exhibits J, K, L, N, O, Q and U), as well as relatives and friends
(Applicant’s Exhibits R, S and T). He is described as someone with “personal integrity,”
who “always took his responsibilities seriously.” One co-worker described the Applicant
as “dependable, reliable, hard-working and conscientious.” (Applicant’s Exhibit L.) All of
the letters are in this vein.
Policies
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum.  When evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider
the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for
each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
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mitigating conditions, which are to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility
for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.  In addition, the administrative judge may also rely on his own
common sense, as well as his knowledge of the law, human nature, and the ways of the
world, in making a reasoned decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Security clearance decisions include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk
of compromise of classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Section 7 of Executive Order
10865, “Any determination under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
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Analysis
Paragraph 1 (Guideline K - Handling Protected Information)
The security concern relating to the guideline for Handling Protected Information
is set out in AG & 33:      
Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations
for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about
an individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and
ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Applicant has three security violations over a period of three years, 2003,
2004 and 2005.  I find that the following disqualifying conditions apply under Guideline
K: ¶ 34(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other
sensitive information; and ¶ 34(h) negligence or lax security habits that persist despite
counseling by management.
There are three mitigating conditions that arguably apply to the Applicant’s
conduct under Guideline K.  They are ¶ 35(a) so much time has elapsed since the
behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment; ¶ 35(b) the individual responded favorably to
counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude
toward the discharge of security responsibilities; and ¶ 35(c) the security violations were
due to improper or inadequate training.
Concerning cases such as this, the DOHA Appeal Board has stated, “A person
who has committed security violations has a very heavy burden of demonstrating that
they should be entrusted with classified information. Because security violations strike
at the heart of the industrial security program, an Administrative Judge must give any
claims of reform and rehabilitation strict scrutiny.”  (ISCR Case No. 00-0030 (Appeal
Board, September 20, 2001).)  In the same case, the Appeal Board further says that the
Government has a compelling interest in protecting classified information from
disclosure to unauthorized persons, regardless of whether the disclosure is the result of
deliberate or negligent conduct
The Applicant’s conduct with the missing key can be put down to a parent’s
concern for a child. It obviously was an aberration from his normal procedure with
regards to the key. Based on the state of the record, it has little if any security
significance.
Concerning the classified photography, the evidence is mixed. Clearly, the
procedures set out by the facility security officer in the reports of the Applicant’s conduct
do not comport with what his supervisors state the facts are. In addition, there was
confusion about whether he actually did take any pictures of classified material. Based
As stated above, Subparagraphs 2.a. and 2.b. are found for the Applicant.7
For purposes of this Decision, I am viewing the term “offense” as including all of the actions of the Applicant.8
No criminal or dishonest conduct is implied to the Applicant in the use of this term.
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on the state of the record, and acknowledging the Applicant’s burden under this
Guideline, I find that he has mitigated the security significance of his conduct.
Paragraph 1 is found for the Applicant, as is subparagraph 2.a.
Paragraph 2 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct)
The security concern relating to Personal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty or unwillingness to comply with rules or regulations can raise
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information.
The entirety of the Applicant’s conduct at the Company, as set forth under
Paragraph 2, arguably brings into play disqualifying condition ¶ 16(c) under Guideline E:
credible adverse information in several adjudicative areas that is not sufficient for an
adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as
a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly
safeguard protected information.  7
The following mitigating condition under Guideline E arguably applies to his
conduct: 17(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment.8
The Applicant made serious errors in judgment with regards to the piece of
classified hardware, how he worked on it, and what he did after he was terminated.
Despite his protestations, and those of his witnesses, his employer of 27 years felt that
his conduct was of a sufficient seriousness to justify termination. I need not decide
whether his instructions with regards to the classified piece of hardware were correct or
not. Rather, I find that his entire course of conduct, including after that event, shows
extremely poor judgement, unreliability and untrustworthiness.
First, the Applicant changed the Report in an inappropriate manner. He states
that nothing of importance was deleted, but I do not have his prior Report in the record
and do not find him credible on this point. In reviewing the evidence, he knew that he
was in trouble and I find that he amended the report to portray his conduct in the best
possible light.
The facts set out under Subparagraph 2.b. do not have application under this Guideline.9
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Second, his post-termination conduct was completely inappropriate. He knew
that he had been terminated and that he was no longer employed at the Company. The
Applicant argues that the effective date was January 2, 2006. That is a thin reed to
justify his conduct in remotely accessing the Company’s computer system to clean up
his email accounts and download Applicant’s Exhibit Y. The Applicant admits that he
had not asked permission from anyone to engage in this conduct.  
I have considered the span of time that has passed since these events. While
normally it would be mitigating, the Applicant continues to attempt to justify his conduct.
I am not convinced that he would not act in the same way again if he felt that he was in
the right. I must be convinced that the Applicant has truly changed his ways and will
show good judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness with regards to all of his security
responsibilities in the future. I am not so convinced. I find against the Applicant with
regards to Guideline E. 
Paragraph 3 (Guideline M - Misuse of Information Technology)
The security concern with regards to the Misuse of Information Technology is set
out in AG ¶ 39:
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations
pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns
about an individual’s reliability or trustworthiness, calling into question the
willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and
information. Information Technology Systems include all related computer
hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication,
transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of
information.
The Applicant’s admitted conduct with regards to the Company’s computer
system provides support for the application of the following disqualifying conditions
under Guideline M: ¶ 40(a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology
system or component thereof; ¶ 40(b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction,
manipulation or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an
information technology system; ¶ 40(c) use of any information technology system to
gain unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area within the
same system; and ¶ 40(e) unauthorized use of a government or other information
technology system.
The Applicant’s conduct, as set forth above under subparagraphs 2.b. and 2.f.,
are cognizable under this paragraph as well.  I have examined the Applicant’s9
explanations and find them wanting. Even though it has been several years since he
engaged in this inappropriate conduct, I find that it continues to cast doubt on the
Applicant’s reliability, trustworthiness and good judgment. Accordingly, the mitigating
condition set forth under ¶ 41(a) is not applicable.
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Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances.  Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person
concept. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.  The Applicant is a hard-working,
highly respected, and valuable member of the defense industry.  I have carefully
considered all the potential mitigating evidence in this case, including the laudatory
personal opinions of his superiors and co-workers at the Company, and his current
employer.  
The Applicant, before and after his termination from the Company, acted
inappropriately. In particular, he changed a report to lessen his culpability in a serious
incident, and after his termination at least twice gained remote access to the Company’s
computer system for his own purposes. This is obviously serious conduct that he
engaged in knowingly and voluntarily. Based on the current state of the record, I find
that there is insufficient evidence of rehabilitation or other permanent behavioral
changes. I also find that there is the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude the Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from his
inappropriate personal conduct and misuse of information systems.
On balance, it is concluded that the Applicant has not successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing his request for a DoD security clearance.  Accordingly, the
evidence supports a finding against the Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary
allegations expressed in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Government's Statement of
Reasons. As stated above, Paragraph 1 is found for the Applicant.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline K: FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: For the Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a.: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b.: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c.: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d.: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.e.: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.f.: Against the Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline M: AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a.: Against the Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge