1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 08-05351
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Francisco Mendez, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I
conclude that Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86) on March 22,
2007. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline M (Use of
Information Technology Systems), Guideline D (Sexual Conduct), and Guideline E
(Personal Conduct) on April 27, 2009. The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29,
2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September
1, 2006. 
 
GE 1; GE 4; AE A; AE B; AE C.1
2
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 6, 2009. He answered the
SOR in writing on May 22, 2009, and requested a hearing before an administrative
judge. DOHA received the request on May 27, 2009. Department Counsel was
prepared to proceed on July 30, 2009, and I received the case assignment on August 5,
2009. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on August 7, 2009, and I convened the hearing
as scheduled on August 28, 2009. The government offered six exhibits (GE) 1 through
6. GE 1, GE 2, and GE 4 to GE 6 were received and admitted into evidence without
objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf. He submitted five exhibits (AE) A
through E, which were received and admitted into evidence without objection. DOHA
received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on September 4, 2009. I held the record open
until September 11, 2009, for Applicant to submit additional matters. He timely
submitted two exhibits, AE F and AE G, without objection. The record closed on
September 11, 2009.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Notice
Applicant received the hearing notice on August 17, 2009. (Tr. 9.) I advised
Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the Directive to 15 days notice before the
hearing. Applicant affirmatively waived his right to 15 days notice. (Tr. 9-10.) 
Evidentiary Ruling
At the hearing, Applicant did not specifically object to GE 3, which is a page from
the Report of Investigation (ROI) containing information on an interview.  Applicant was
advised that this evidence may not be admissible and then asked if he objected to its
admissibility. After a discussion, Applicant agreed to the admission of GE 3.  (Tr. 15-16.)
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a,
2.a, 3.a, and 3.b of the SOR, with explanations. He also provided additional information
to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.  
Applicant, who is 52 years old, works as an senior engineer for a Department of
Defense contractor. He began his employment with this company in February 2006.
Applicant’s performance evaluations reflect that he generally meets his performance
objectives and occasionally exceeds his performance objectives. In his 2008
performance evaluation, he received  favorable comments about his high-quality work
and ability to “hit the ground running.” He successfully completed his tasks and
successfully aided a program in its critical phase. He has not had any disciplinary issues
at this job.  1
GE 1; GE 4; AE G; Tr. 34.2
Response to SOR; GE 4; Tr. 27-28.3
Tr. 28-29.4
Id. at 30, 49.5
3
Applicant enlisted in the United States Army in 1975 and served on active duty
until 1983. Following his discharge from the Army, Applicant worked in private industry,
including other federal contractor positions. He has held a security clearance for most of
the last 34 years, without any violations or accusations of mishandling classified
information. He also returned to school. He received a bachelor’s degree in 1997 and a
master’s degree in March 2003. He completed the course work for his Ph.D, but he has
not written his dissertation and is not presently working on it or enrolled in school.
Applicant has three hobbies: motorcycling, amateur radio operating, and scuba diving.
He worked with his state to develop a program which improves motorcycle safety and is
a certified motorcycle safety trainer. He trains other amateur radio enthusiasts, and he
is training to become a search, rescue, and recovery diver.2
Applicant and his wife married in 1980 and had two sons. His older son, who is
28 years old, is a member of the United States Navy and works as a youth pastor in a
church where he lives. Applicant’s younger son joined the United States Marine Corps,
where he worked as a military policeman. On November 15, 2002, his younger son, at
age 20, was killed performing his duties in the Marine Corps. To the best of Applicant’s
knowledge, his son’s death is still under investigation.3
His 20-year-old son’s death devastated him, his wife, and his older son.
Following his son’s death, his wife received medical care for depression for a period of
time. She also attended grief counseling. Applicant briefly attended a grief counseling
program to support his wife, but refused any other form of counseling. Instead, he
internalized all his grief. He began suffering from insomnia, which affected his ability to
do his job.                                   4
Applicant completed his master’s degree in March 2003, about four months after
his son died. He expected some type of recognition from his employer for this
accomplishment. He did not get any recognition or a promotion.5
Just before the first anniversary of his son’s death, Applicant conducted an
internet search for “porcelain dolls” on his computer. He wanted to buy his wife a doll for
her collection and as gift. He hoped this gift would help her feel better. His internet
search led to an innocuous link, which he opened and learned that it was actually a
pornographic site. He closed the link immediately. However, about a month later, in late
2003, he searched for the site again. Thereafter, he began accessing pornographic
sites and chat rooms on his computer. At first, he accessed the sites once a month,
then twice a month, then weekly, and sometimes daily. He would break off his internet
Tr. 30, 46-47. 6
Id. at 37, 39, 53.7
Id. at 39-40.8
Id. at 25, 32, 48-49.9
Id. at 55, 52. 10
4
pornographic activities for weeks or months, but then he would return to the sites and
chat rooms, even though he felt ”absolutely horrid” when he did so.6
Applicant described his pornography activities in two ways. He viewed
pornography sites and spent a lot of time in pornography chat rooms. He denies
deliberately accessing or seeking out child pornography sites or receiving such sites by
e-mail. He remembers seeing pictures of young women, who he believed were in their
twenties.7
Applicant worked daily with six co-workers. His work area had a back room,
where four computers were installed in cubicles with low partitions. Staff could view
what he was doing on the computer. Applicant’s job required him to have computer
access. He and three other co-workers had computers. The two remaining co-workers
and the three co-workers who worked the evening and night shift also used these four
computers.8
Applicant’s supervisor told him, informally, to “stop what he was doing” without
specifically mentioning his pornographic activity. He knew what she meant when she
made this statement to him. When he did not end his conduct, his employer fired him for
misuse of its computer equipment in November 2005. Applicant described his
termination as “hitting rock bottom.” He decided to cease his pornographic activities. He
quit accessing pornographic computer sites “cold turkey” and successfully achieved his
goal because he did not have access to an office computer for three months. He never
accessed pornography sites on his home computer, which he kept in plain view of his
wife.9
To his knowledge, Applicant is the only individual who was fired for misuse of a
computer. He acknowledged that his pornography viewing violated company policy and
that he knew he violated company policy when he accessed these sites.10
In February 2006, Applicant interviewed for his present position. During his
interview, he advised the manager interviewing him that his prior employer fired him for
misuse of company equipment. He did not tell the interviewer that his misuse related to
pornography. During his intake interview, which occurred within two or three days after
he began his job, he told the security officer the full reason for his termination by his
previous employer. Because of his disclosure, his current employer monitored his
computer use for two years. His first two performance evaluations contain a
performance objective related to compliance with computer and network use policies.
AE A; AE B; AE C; Tr. 23-25.11
GE 6; AE F; Tr. 26, 31, 33.12
Id. at 59.13
GE 3; Tr. 35-37.14
5
Both times his employer evaluated his performance on these goals as “meets
objectives.”  His employer removed this performance goal from his 2008 performance
plan.11
Applicant acknowledged that he did not tell his wife the true reason for his
termination in 2005. He explained that he decided not to tell her because he was
concerned for her welfare and ashamed of what he had done. He recently told his wife
the true reason for his termination. At first, she was very angry. They talked. At her
suggestion, he started counseling in August 2009 to understand the reasons for his
conduct. Since he had no past history of this conduct and his only vice is smoking, he
believed the change in his behavior began with his son’s death in 2002 and the ensuing
problems of insomnia and anger. He never actively participated in grief counseling and
still feels responsible for his son’s death because he encouraged him to join the
Marines.  12
Applicant indicated that for a long period of time, he was concerned that his wife
would learn about the real reason for his termination. Since telling her, he is no longer
concerned that someone else would tell her or hold this information over him as a
threat.13
The record does not contain Applicant’s personnel records related to his
termination. The security investigator interviewed the records custodian for his prior
employer and prepared a one-paragraph summary of the interview. According to the
records custodian, Applicant’s personnel file reflects that co-workers noticed Applicant
viewing inappropriate internet sites and reported his conduct. His employer confiscated
his computer and examined his hard drive, which revealed multiple visits to
pornographic sites, including child pornography. Applicant raised a concern about this
report because he was never told that he was fired for child pornography. He
acknowledged that child pornography may have been found on his computer, but he
denies he sought it out or placed child pornography on his computer. He does not
believe he viewed child pornography, but he could not be certain.14
Applicant’s former employer forwarded his computer to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for review. The FBI conducted a CART review of Applicant’s
computer hard drive. The CART review located a number of images of suspected child
pornography and forwarded the drive and other collected or derivative evidence to
another office. Neither the FBI nor the United States Attorney took any further action.
GE 5.15
Tr. 36-37, 57.16
6
The CART review is not explained. The record contains no evidence explaining the
extent of the search of Applicant’s computer filed.15
Applicant could look at his internet explorer file history, a software program,
which showed the sites he had visited. He did not know how to access his hard drive. At
times, he encountered problems shutting down the pornographic web sites he visited.
Sometimes when he attempted to close the web site, the web site would cascade to
multiple sites and open new web sites. To stop this cascading, he shut down his
computer.16
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
7
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline M, Use of Information Technology Systems
AG ¶ 39 expresses the security concern pertaining to use of information
technology systems:
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining
to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an
individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the
willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and
information. Information Technology Systems include all related computer
hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication,
transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of
information.
Under AG ¶ 40, the following disqualifying condition raises a security concern in
this case:
(e) unauthorized use of a government or other information technology
system.
Applicant accessed pornography web sites on his work computer on many
occasions over a period of two years. He knew that this conduct violated his company’s
polices on computer use, but he did it anyway. The government has established a prima
facie case under AG ¶ 40(e).
Applicant may mitigate the government’s security concerns under AG ¶ 41. The
following mitigating conditions may apply in this case:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment.
8
Applicant’s conduct occurred during a specific period in his life. His 20-year-old
son died in 2002 under tragic circumstances. Four months after his son’s death, he
received his master’s degree. His employer failed to acknowledge his accomplishment
in any way. Although devastated by his son’s death, Applicant never participated in grief
counseling. Instead, over time, his grief began to surface in other ways, such as
insomnia and an inability to focus on work and many activities. Just over a year after his
son’s death, Applicant started viewing pornography sites on his work computer,
something he had not done in the past. Department Counsel argues that Applicant
accessed the pornography sites to get back at his employer for not recognizing his
accomplishments a few months earlier. The time between Applicant’s son’s death and
the failure to recognize Applicant’s educational accomplishment is only four months, an
insufficient length of time for anyone to overcome the unexpected and tragic death of a
child.
Applicant lost his job in November 2005 because of his conduct. His termination
made him realize that he needed to change his behavior and he did. In the last four
years, he has not accessed pornography sites or misused his work computer. He told
his current employer the reason for his dismissal. Because of his disclosure, his
employer monitored his computer usage for two years. His performance standard
reflected that he followed company policy and did not view pornography or misuse his
work computer. Applicant’s inappropriate conduct occurred four years ago and has
stopped. There is little likelihood that it will occur again because the tragic death of his
son is an unusual event and such an event is highly unlikely to occur again. Because he
otherwise acted appropriately and has changed his attitude and behavior, his past
conduct does not cast doubt on his reliability and trustworthiness. Applicant has
mitigated the government’s security concerns under Guideline M.
Guideline D, Sexual Behavior
AG ¶ 12 expresses the security concern as:
Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or
emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may
subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or
duress can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness
and ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference
concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the
basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.
AG ¶ 13 describes conditions that could raise a security concern. The following
conditions may be disqualifying in this case:
(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has
been prosecuted;
(c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and,
9
(d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion
or judgment.
Applicant admitted that he had a concern that his wife would learn about his
pornographic activities. This concern could make him vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation or duress. In addition, Applicant viewed pornography on his work computer,
which was by his co-workers. The government has established its prima facie case
under AG ¶ 13(c) and 13(d).
Viewing pornography is not illegal, although possession of child pornography is
illegal under federal and state law. Applicant denies he sought out child pornography or
received any child pornography by e-mail. The custodian of the records for Applicant’s
former employer stated that security found pornography, including child pornography,
on his computer, but the custodian provided no information which explains how the
security staff determined that Applicant had actually viewed child pornography. The FBI
conducted a review of Applicant’s computer hard drive and found suspect child
pornography. The FBI referred its findings to another office and the United States
Attorney. No action was taken. Like the personnel records, the FBI report fails to
provide concrete details about the findings on Applicant’s computer hard drive. The
existence of possible child pornography on his computer hard drive by itself is
insufficient to establish that Applicant actually viewed child pornography. The FBI has
sophisticated computer software programs capable of developing hard evidence which
would show when and how long Applicant viewed child pornography, if he did. The
record contains none of this information. Accordingly, I conclude that he did not actually
access any child pornography sites. Disqualify condition AG ¶ 13(a) is not established.
Applicant may mitigate the government’s security concerns about his sexual
conduct under AG ¶ 14. The following conditions may be applicable in this case:
(b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under
such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment; and
(c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or
duress.
As previously stated, Applicant’s sexual conduct stopped four years ago when he
lost his job. The death of his 20-year-old son devastated him. He failed to address his
grief openly and in a positive way. Rather, he buried his grief. This decision and a
feeling that his employer did not appreciate him eventually led to inappropriate use of
his work computer. His son’s tragic and unexpected death is a highly unusual event and
is unlikely to happen again. He has changed jobs and his evaluations reflect he is
appreciated at his job. His past conduct does not case doubt upon his current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment. Applicant has mitigated the government’s security
concerns under Guideline D.
10
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and the
following condition disqualifying in this case:
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence
service or other group.
Because of his inappropriate conduct in his work place for two years, Applicant
placed himself in a position of vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. Not
only did his conduct place him in a position of vulnerability, his decision to lie to his wife
about the reason for his job termination also put him in a position of vulnerability. For
nearly four years, he feared that his wife would find out about his conduct. The
government has established its prima facie case under AG ¶ 16(e).
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
Applicant stopped viewing pornography four years ago after he lost his job. From
the beginning, he has acknowledged the reason for his termination to those who
11
needed to know, except his wife whom he has told. He has taken responsibility for his
conduct and acknowledged it was wrong. Since 2005, he has a new job and lives in a
new location. He is doing well in his job, as shown by his performance appraisals. His
son’s tragic death created the initial stressor, followed by his disappointment with his
employer. He finally started counseling to understand why he viewed pornography, an
action previously out of character for him, and to help with his loss of his son. He is a
reliable employee and has always protected government information and materials.
With his counseling, he is taking steps to assure that he will continue to protect
government classified information and materials and not to place himself in a position
where he is vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, duress, or pressure. Applicant has
mitigated the government’s security concerns under Guideline E.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of a denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. His decision
to lie to his wife about the reasons for his termination also showed poor judgment.
Applicant has otherwise exercised good judgment in his life.
12
Seven years ago, Applicant and his wife received the most devastating news any
parent can receive. Their 20-year-old son’s death under tragic circumstances set in
motion a chain of events unfathomable by either. His wife, understandably, developed
severe depression, for which she received treatment. Applicant handled his grief
differently. He internalized much of his grief. His method of grieving caused other
problems, including insomnia and loss of focus. Shortly after his son’s death, his
employer disappointed him by not recognizing his educational accomplishments.
Eventally, Applicant engaged in behavior uncommon to him. He deliberately violated his
employer’s policy about computer use by viewing pornography on his work computer off
and on for two years, conduct which he has acknowledged was wrong. 
After his termination, Applicant decided he needed to correct his behavior and he
did. He told his new employer the reasons for his termination in November 2005, and
agreed to have his work computer monitored. After two years of monitoring his
computer usage, his employer stopped monitoring when Applicant demonstrated that he
could be trusted. The relationship of a husband and wife is personal and should not be
scrutinized for decisions made. Knowing his wife and understanding how she was
coping with their son’s death, Applicant made a decision personal to them. He worried
for a long time that she would find out the actual reason for his termination. Had he not
told her the truth about his termination, this worry could be a source of vulnerability for
coercion, exploitation, duress, or pressure for him to compromise classified information.
Since she now knows about his inappropriate conduct, this security concern has been
mitigated.
Applicant’s problems started after his son’s death. Although the initial devastation
has passed, the loss he feels remains. He recognizes that he needed to explore all the
issues related to his son’s death and his subsequent conduct. With his wife’s support,
he started counseling. Applicant’s outside activities as a scuba diver, motorcyclist, and
amateur radio operator can provide different outlets for his feelings. Applicant has taken
the appropriate steps to assure that his inappropriate conduct will not occur in the
future.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his sexual conduct,
personal conduct, and misuse of information technology systems.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline M: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
13
Paragraph 2, Guideline D: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge