DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
-------------------------  )       ISCR Case No. 08-05517
SSN: -----------------  )
 )
Applicant for Security Clearance  )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Joseph Testan, Esquire
______________
 Decision
______________
WESLEY, Roger C., Administrative Judge:
History of Case
On June 8, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), under
Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated
January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, which detailed
reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the
Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to
determine whether clearance should be granted, continued, denied or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR on July 6, 2009, and requested a hearing.  The
case was assigned to me on August 4, 2009, and was scheduled for hearing on
September 16, 2009. A hearing was held on the scheduled date for the purpose of
considering whether it would be clearly consistent with the national interest to grant,
continue, deny, or revoke Applicant’s security clearance.  At hearing, the Government's
case consisted of two exhibits; Applicant relied on three witnesses (including himself)
and eight exhibits. The transcript (Tr.) was received on September 22, 2009.  Based
2
upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility to access
classified information is granted.
Rulings on Proecedure
Besides its two exhibits, the Government requested administrative notice of nine
documents: Background Note: Taiwan, U.S. Department of State (September 2008);
Taiwan: Taiwan, Specific Information, U.S. Department of State (November 2009);
Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress (August 5, 2008); Intelligence Threat Handbook (Unclassified/For
Official Use Only), Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) (June 2004); Annual Report
to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage 2000, National
Counterintelligence Center: Annual Report to Congress on foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage 2005, National Counterintelligence Executive-2007 (September
2008); Press Release, California Exporter Fined in connection with Attempted Taiwan
Export (September 1999); Press Release, Commerce Department Imposes Civil Penalty
on Minnesota Firm in Settlement of Export Violations, U.S. Department of Commerce
(December 2001); Press Release, Connecticut Company Settles Charges Concerning
Pump Exports to China, U.S. Department of Commerce ((July 2003); Press Release,
Emcore Corporation Settles Charges of Export Control Violations, U.S. Department of
Commerce (January 2004); Press Release, Parker Hannafin Corp. Settles Charges
Pertaining to Illegal Exports to Taiwan and China, U.S. Department of Commerce
(November 2005); Press Release, Defendants Indicted on Charges of Conspiracy to
Export Controlled Items, U.S. Department of Commerce (August 2005); Superceding
Indictment, United States v. Ching Kan Wang and Robin Chang (SD. FL October 2005);
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney (ED VA January 2007);
Statement of Facts [stipulated], United States v. Keyser, Crim. Case No.1:05CR543, (ED
VA December 2005).  
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings.  See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. April 12, 2007);
ISCR Case No. 02-24875 (App. Bd. October 12, 2006). Administrative notice is
appropriate for noticing facts or government reports that are well known.   See Stein,
Administrative Law, Sec. 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006). For good cause shown,
administrative notice was granted with respect to the above-named background reports
addressing the geopolitical situation in Taiwan.  Administrative notice was extended to
the documents themselves, consistent  with the provisions of Rule 201 of Fed. R. Evi.
This notice did not foreclose Applicant from challenging the accuracy and reliability of the
information contained in the reports addressing Taiwan’s current state.  
Summary of Pleadings
Under Guideline B, the allegations against Applicant, are as follows: (a) he has a
girlfriend who is a citizen and resident of Taiwan; (b) his girlfriend has a brother and a
sister-in-law who are citizens and residents of Taiwan: (c) he met his girlfriend on the
Internet in November 2005; (d) his girlfriend visited him in the U.S. in December 2005, in
3
May 2006, in February 2007, and in July 2007; and (e) he visited his girlfriend in Taiwan
January 2007, April 2007, and December 2007. 
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted each of the allegations. He provided
no explanations. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 51-year-old manufacturing engineer for a defense contractor who
seeks a security clearance.  The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by
Applicant are adopted as relevant and material findings.  Additional findings follow.
Applicant’s background
Applicant married in February 1981, and divorced his wife in December 2000 over
irreconcilable differences (see xs. 1 and 2). He has two adult children from this marriage:
ages 27 and 23 (exs. 1 and 2; Tr. 53-54).  He has been employed by his current defense
contractor for over 30 years and has held a clearance since 1983 (Tr. 54).  
In November 2005, Applicant made Internet contact with a woman who is a citizen
and resident of Taiwan (Tr. 55, 58-59). They subsequently established a romantic
relationship and exchanged visits (Tr. 55-56). Her parents are citizens and residents of
Taiwan.  So, too, her brother and sister-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan.
None of her family members ever worked for Taiwan government, and none have any
working or social relationships with any members of the Taiwan military or intelligence
establishments (Tr. 58).  
When asked, Applicant acknowledged that his girlfriend visited him in December
2005, in May 2006, and in February 2007 (Tr. 59-60).  In turn, Applicant made visits to
Taiwan to see her in January 2007, April 2007, December 2007, and finally in J (see ex.
1; Tr. 56-57, 61). 
By June 2009, Applicant had become increasingly concerned that relationship
could cause a security problem for him (Tr. 62-63). He insisted that she come to his
home in the U.S. to discuss terminating their relationship (Tr. 70-71).  His girlfriend came
to see him in July 2009, as agreed.  When she arrived, they talked for some time and
agreed to end their relationship (Tr.71). Applicant shared his decision to terminate his
relationship with his Taiwanese girlfriend with his supervisor (Tr. 14-15). Applicant’s
assurances that he has terminated his relationship with his Taiwanese girlfriend and
severed all ties with her are credible and accepted. 
Since ending his relationship with his Taiwanese girlfriend, Applicant has
exchanged several e-mails with her and talked with her a couple of times by telephone
(Tr. 64, 69-70). After she returned to Taiwan in July 2009, she telephoned him to let him
know she was ok (Tr. 65-67).  And in August 2009, Applicant called his ex-girlfriend to
check on her safety following reports of a typhoon striking Taiwan (Tr. 66).  Applicant has
4
no current relationship with her and no residual feelings of affection for her (Tr. 66-68).
Applicant has no reason to believe he will ever resume his relationship with his ex-
girlfriend (Tr. 71).
Taiwan’s country status
Taiwan has a rich history that dates back 12 to 15 thousand years.  Dutch and
Spanish colonists claimed the island in the 16  and 17  centuries (see Background Note:th th
Taiwan, U.S. Department of State (April 2007)).  Migration from the Chinese mainland
over time supplanted the  aborigines peoples of Taiwan. Japan exerted considerable
influence over Taiwan following China’s ceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 (see
Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 3).
Following the end of World War II in 1945, Taiwan reverted to Chinese rule.  Civil
war erupted soon after the reversion between Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT government and
the increasingly influential Chinese Communist Party guided by Mao Zedong.  When the
civil war ended in 1949, two million refugees (predominantly nationalists) fled to Taiwan,
where Chiang Kai-Shek established a separate provisional KMT capital in Taipei (see
Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 3). Mao’s victorious Communist party, in turn,
established the People’ s Republic of China (PRC).
For the past one-half century, Taiwan has demonstrated steady economic
development and today is a major international trading power.  Its accession to the WTO
in 2002 represented a significant achievement and strengthened its standing in the
expanding global economy. 
Taiwan has exhibited steady political development as well since its establishment
as an island government. Changes reflect a continuing liberalizing process that
culminated in the tightly contested election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000 (see Background
Note: Taiwan, supra, at 6).   Chen’s DPP party won major parliamentary victories in 2000
and again in 2004, enabling Chen to become the first opposition party candidate to win
the presidency.  Chen was re-elected in 2004 on a platform that included a “defensive
referendum” (Background Note: Taiwan, supra). Such referenda have been historically
perceived to be closely linked to the question of Taiwan’s independence.
Taiwan’s political system is now a multi-party democracy under a Constitutional
umbrella comprising five branches: executive, legislative, judicial, control, and
examination.  By all accounts, Taiwan has a good human rights record and has
demonstrated respect for the rule of contract in its commercial relations.
Taiwan’s PRC relations
The PRC does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, and insists that there is
only “one China” (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 7).  Despite differences over
the PRC’s one China policy, Taiwan and the PRC have enjoyed increased contacts over
the past decade. With Taiwan’s continued relaxation of its PRC policy regarding
5
unofficial contacts, cross-Strait interactions have grown significantly.  Efforts by the PRC,
however, to resume cross-Strait dialogue without any preconditions have been
hampered by the PRC’s insistence that the two sides first reach consensus that there is
only “one China” before restarting talks (see id. 9-10).
 During  his two terms, Chen has recognized the PRC’s “one China” insistence,
but to date has declined to condone the concept.  With both sides unwilling to
compromise on this obstacle, they have cautiously progressed with smaller intermediary
steps like cross-Strait cargo and passenger charter flights, sale of Taiwan agricultural
products in the PRC, and PRC tourists visiting Taiwan (see Background Note: Taiwan,
supra, at 7).  
The PRC operates a large and sophisticated intelligence bureau, entitled the MSS
(see Intelligence Threat Handbook [Unclassified/For Official Use Only], Interagency
OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS), at 71 (June 2004)). The MSS maintains active intelligence
gathering operations in Taiwan (see id., at 72). These operations use clandestine agents
to collect intelligence on Western consortia investing in the PRC. These consortia are
suspected of involvement in attempts to democratize the PRC, as well as other pro-
democracy groups thought to be engaging in anti-communist activities (see Intelligence
Threat Handbook, supra, at 72). 
In the current political environment, it is still too early to predict the direction of
cross-Strait negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC. Because of the PRC’s long
insistence on Taiwan’s acceptance of the “one China” principle as a requisite to any jump-
starting of negotiations over practical agreements in trade, cultural exchanges, and other
areas of mutual interest, future relations between the two sides remain cloudy at best.
U.S.-Taiwan relations
In a joint communique with the PRC in January 1979, the U.S. announced its
recognition of the government of the PRC as the sole government of China and that there
is but one China, of which Taiwan is a part (see Background Note, Taiwan, supra, at 9).
The Joint Communique stated that within this context the people of the U.S. will maintain
cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
To implement the Joint Communique, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) in April 1979.  President Carter, in turn, signed the legislation into law on April 10,
1979.  Besides providing the legal basis for maintaining the U.S. unofficial relationship
with Taiwan, the TRA reinforced the U.S. commitment to providing defense assistance to
Taiwan. The TRA expressly provides for the continued sale of appropriate defensive
military equipment to Taiwan and declares that peace and stability in the area are in U.S.
interests (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 10). And even though the U.S.
terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan following its de-recognition of the latter,
it has continued its sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan (see id.).
6
While ambiguously written, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security against
cross-Strait aggression by the PRC’s military forces is implicit in the TRA’s coverage of
U.S. responsibilities towards Taiwan. This implicit construction is oft-used to support
proponents of a “two China” policy.  To be sure, initial actions of the Bush Administration
in 2001 provided cause to conclude the new President had abandoned longstanding U.S.
policy of “strategic ambiguity” in favor of a policy that placed a clearer emphasis on
Taiwan’s interests at the expense of the PRC (see Taiwan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Policy Choices, supra, at 11-12). More recent developments, though, reflect the
smoothing of U.S.-PRC relations as a part of the broader war on terrorism.  
Currently, the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral
steps by either side to alter the status quo (see Background Note; Taiwan, supra, at 10).
For so long as Taiwan’s national security remains under threat (both veiled and unveiled)
from the PRC, Taiwan can be expected to pursue the development of its military amidst
expectations of military assistance from the U.S.
Stressing self-reliance, Taiwan maintains a large military establishment
(accounting for 15.3 per cent of its central budget).  Its principal mission is to defend itself
against the PRC, which has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan (see
Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 9).  With its unchanged public policy of maintaining
“strategic ambiguity” in its official relations with Taiwan, the U.S. can be expected to
continue its support of Taiwan’s island security with the sale of defensive military
equipment.
Taiwan’s economic collection practices
Based on past reports to Congress, Taiwan is considered one of the most active
collectors of U.S. economic and proprietary information.  In its most recent reports to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, the preparers list
Taiwan as well as the PRC among the most active collectors based on cited surveys (see
2000 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage, supra, at 4-6; Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage-2007, supra, at 5). Specific incidents are cited in the NACIC
Report that identify offenders of proprietary information thefts and attempts to acquire
export-restricted products (see 2000 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic
Collection and Industrial Espionage, supra, at 2-6).
Recent espionage convictions document ongoing collection activities covering theft
of sensitive and proprietary information by and for Taiwan companies (see, e.g., Press
Release, California Exporter Fined in Connection with Attempted Taiwan Export, supra;
Press Release, Commerce Department Imposes Civil Penalty on Minnesota Firm in
Settlement of Export Violations, supra; Press Release, Connecticut Company Settles
Charges Concerning Pump Exports to China, supra; Press Release, Emcore Corporation
Settles Charges of Export Control Violations, supra; Press Release, Parker Hannafin
Corp. Settles Charges Pertaining to Illegal Exports to Taiwan and China, supra; Press
Release, Defendants Indicted on Charges of Conspiracy to Export Controlled Items,
7
supra; Superceding Indictment, United States v. Ching Kan Wang and Robin Chang,
supra; Press Release, Statement of Facts (stipulated), United States v. Keyser, Crim.
Case No.1:05CR543, (ED VA December 2005), supra). Multilateral export control
regimes in place are voluntary and not universally adhered to by member nations.
Stress points between Taiwan, the PRC and the U.S.
In its annual report to Congress in 2008, the NCC described the PRC as a country
intent on acquiring and exploiting the knowledge developed by multiples of collection
agents: legally, if possible, and otherwise illegally by espionage (see Annual Report to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2007, supra, at 5).
The PRC’s concerted efforts to acquire sensitive technology poses a considerable
challenge to U.S. counterintelligence measures.
 Recent indictments of Chinese citizens for espionage have served to highlight the
PRC’s spying activities in the U.S. Violating its own 2004 U.S.-China agreement, the PRC
oft-fails to schedule timely end-use inspection visits of dual-use items licensed for export
to the PRC.  Better export controls can be effective only if they are multilateral in scope
(see Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage-2007, supra, at 4-6). Multilateral export controls and arms embargoes,
however, do  provide additional insurance against altering the cross-Strait military balance
that has been long maintained (see id.).
Without effective dual use export controls in place, the PRC can be expected to
acquire dual use technologies with military potential from the U.S. and Taiwan through the
U.S. and other source countries.  Reported intelligence, though, is lacking on any Taiwan
use of its collection resources in the U.S. to supply the PRC with needed military
technology (alone or through technology with known dual use capabilities).
Other stress points between the PRC and Taiwan are reflected in periodic PRC
military exercises in the Taiwan Straits (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 9).  More
frequent U.S.-PRC high-level exchanges have the potential to reduce cross-Strait military
tensions (id.).  
Cross-Straight dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan remained suspended during
Chen’s two terms.  Still, economic and social ties continued to develop during Chen’s
presidency (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 7).  Following his election in 2008,
Ma Ying-jeou has moved earnestly to resume cross-Straight dialogue, expand charter
flights, and initiate new efforts to improve cross-Straight relations (id.). The U.S. officially
welcomes these initiatives as a process that can hopefully contribute to the reduction of
tensions in the region and creation of environmental conditions conducive to the peaceful
resolution of differences between Taiwan and the PRC.  For U.S. policy, Ma’s election
offers opportunities for improved cross-Strait relations, but also policy challenges to the
durability, and efficacy of the Taiwan Relations Act in light of projected changes in the
cross-Strait relationship between Taiwan and the PRC (see Taiwan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, supra, at 4-5, 13).
8
For the foreseeable future, Ma’s effectiveness in reducing cross-Straight tensions
is likely to be tested by the recent corruption conviction of Chen. What implications this
conviction has for Taiwan’s domestic and cross-Straight relations is unclear at this point
(Tr. 72-74). Any fundamental changes in cross-Straight relations can, of course, be
expected to affect Taiwan’s relations with the U.S. 
Endorsements
Applicant’s coworkers, daughter, and friends who have known Applicant for a
number of years attest to his honesty and trustworthiness (see ex. A; Tr. 14-16).  Two of
his co-workers express awareness of his past relationship with a Taiwanese citizen; both
consider him to be reliable and trustworthy and worthy of holding a security clearance
(see ex. A; Tr. 15).
Applicant’s daughter finds her father to be completely trustworthy (Tr. 44).  She
described his judgment to be good at all times (Tr. 44).  His daughter acknowledged her
awareness of Applicant’s relationship with his Taiwanese girlfriend and accepted her
father’s assurances that he had terminated the relationship (Tr. 45).
Applicant’s performance evaluations for the past three years rate him as a
successful contributor who meets the objectives and expectations of his position (see ex.
B).  He is characterized as a valued team player who has the necessary abilities and
motivational skills to effectively carry out his assigned responsibilities (ex. B). 
Policies
The AGs list guidelines to be used by administrative judges in the decision-making
process covering DOHA cases. These guidelines take into account factors that could
create a potential conflict of interest for the individual applicant, as well as considerations
that could affect the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified
information. These guidelines include "[c]onditions that could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying” (disqualifying conditions), if any, and many of the "[c]onditions that
could mitigate security concerns.” These guidelines must be considered before deciding
whether or not a security clearance should be granted, continued, or denied. The
guidelines do not require administrative judges to place exclusive reliance on the
enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the guidelines in arriving at a
decision. Each of the guidelines is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person in
accordance with AG ¶ 2(c).
In addition to the relevant AGs, administrative judges must take into account the
pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation set forth in AG ¶ 2(a) of
the revised AGs, which are intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial
commonsense decision based upon a careful consideration of the pertinent guidelines
within the context of the whole person. The adjudicative process is designed to examine a
sufficient period of an applicant’s life to enable predictive judgments to be made about
whether the applicant is an acceptable security risk. 
9
When evaluating an applicant’s conduct, the relevant guidelines are to be
considered together with the following AG ¶ 2(a) factors: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral chances; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication
guideline is pertinent herein:
Foreign Influence
The Concern: “Foreign contacts and interests may be a security
concern if the individual has divided  loyalties or foreign financial interests,
may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.  Adjudication
under the this Guideline can and should considered the identity of the
foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located,
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign
country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected
information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”
Burden of Proof
Under the Directive, a decision to grant or continue an Applicant's request for
security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding that to do so is clearly
consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive requires administrative judges
to make a commonsense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record, the ultimate
determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in large part, on
the relevance and materiality of that evidence. As with all adversarial proceedings, the
judge may draw only those inferences which have a reasonable and logical basis from the
evidence of record. Conversely, the judge cannot draw factual inferences that are
grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) It must prove by substantial evidence
any controverted facts alleged in the SOR; and (2) it must demonstrate that the facts
proven have a material bearing to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a security
clearance.  The required showing of material bearing, however, does not require the
Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the applicant has actually mishandled or
abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a security clearance. Rather,
10
consideration must take account of cognizable risks that an applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or
controverted facts, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for the purpose of
establishing his or his security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation or
mitigation of the Government's case.  Because Executive Order 10865 requires that all
security clearances be clearly consistent with the national interest, “security-clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” See Department of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).
Analysis
Applicant is a U.S. citizen by birth.  Security issues of concern to the Government
focus on a former girlfriend of Applicant’s who, along with her parents, brother, and sister-
in-law, are citizens and residents of Taiwan. Taiwan is a country that has been historically
friendly to the U.S., albeit, one with a reported history of economic collection activities in
the U.S.
Because of the status of Applicant’s ex-girlfriend and family members in Taiwan,
concerns were raised that his ex-girlfriend and her family members residing in Taiwan
might be subject to undue foreign influence by Taiwanese government authorities to
access classified information in Applicant’s possession or control.  Due to their relationship
with Taiwan, his ex-girlfriend and her immediate and extended family members presented
some potential heightened security risks covered by disqualifying condition (DC) ¶ 7(a),
“contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other
person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,”
of the AGs for foreign influence apply to Applicant’s situation.
None of the family members connected to Applicant’s ex-girlfriend have any prior
military service. As a result, no consideration of DC ¶ 7(b), “connection to a foreign person,
group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information,” is
warranted.
Further, from what is known from the presented evidence, none of Applicant’s  ex-
girlfriend’s family residing in Taiwan have any political affiliations with Taiwan’s
government, have any known history to date of being subjected to any coercion or
influence, or appear to be vulnerable to the same.  Upon fully considering Applicant’s
explanations about his discontinued relationship with his Taiwanese girlfriend, and
indirectly her family members, any risk of undue foreign influence on Applicant and his ex-
girlfriend and her family members would appear to be insubstantial, and clearly not of the
11
magnitude that could make them subject to a heightened security risk of pressure or
compromise under Guideline B.
Taiwan, although a country reported to have targeted U.S. economic and
proprietary interests in the past, enjoys a special relationship with the U.S. through the
TRA, and is a democratic government with a history of respect for human rights and the
rule of law.  While Taiwan has been a reported active collector of economic intelligence in
the U.S., it has not been known to use acquired information to harm U.S. strategic
interests.  Taiwan remains a member in good standing with the WTO, and a constructive
trading partner with the U.S., who at times has itself been targeted by agents of the PRC
for intelligence collection on Western groups thought to be promoting democracy and
engaging in anti-communist activities directed at the PRC.
The AGs governing collateral clearances do not dictate per se results or mandate
particular outcomes for applicants with relatives who are citizens/residents of foreign
countries in general.  What is considered to be an acceptable risk in one foreign country
may not be in another. While foreign influence cases must by practical necessity be
weighed on a case-by-case basis, applicable guidelines are available to evaluate
Applicant’s situation in light of the supplied materials and country information about
Taiwan. 
The special relationship that has existed between the U.S. and Taiwan over the
past half-century has been one marked by mutually reconcilable political and economic
interests. Reports of Taiwan intelligence gathering against U.S. companies are
counterbalanced by Taiwan’s history of friendship and partnership in a defense pact
formalized in 1979.  The mutually supportive bonds that have linked Taiwan’s special
relationship with the U.S. have not been weakened by either the TRA, or the  geopolitical
forces that have shaped the U.S.’s evolving relationship with the PRC.  Whatever potential
heightened security risks arise as the result of Applicant's having family members with
citizenship and residency in Taiwan are by every reasonable measure mitigated.  
Taiwan remains a friend of the U.S. and is a country whose democratic institutions
are not incompatible with our own traditions and respect for human rights and the rule of
law.  Unlike the old Adjudicative Guidelines, the new ones do take account of the covered
country’s demonstrated relations with the U.S. as an important consideration in gauging
whether the particular relatives with citizenship and residency elsewhere create a
heightened security risk.  The geopolitical aims and policies of the particular foreign regime
involved do matter. Taiwan, while reported to target the U.S. and its companies in the past
for economic and proprietary information, is still a country with no known recent history of
hostage taking or disposition for exerting undue influence against family members to
obtain either classified information, or unclassified economic and proprietary data. 
As for security concerns associated with the presence of Applicant's ex-girlfriend
and her family members in Taiwan, any potential heightened risk of a hostage situation or
undue foreign influence brought in the hopes of eliciting either classified information or
12
economic or proprietary data out of Applicant through his ex-girlfriend and her family
members residing in Taiwan is an acceptable one.  Applicant, accordingly, may take
advantage of one important mitigating condition: MC 8(a), “the nature of the relationships
with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the persons or
activities of these persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.” 
MC ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or
the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest” has direct application, too, to Applicant’s situation.  Both at home and in his work,
Applicant has demonstrated loyalty, patriotism, and professional commitments to the U.S.
for his entire life. 
Whatever potential conflicts Applicant may have had while in a romantic relationship
with his ex-girlfriend (a Taiwanese citizen with family in Taiwan) have since been abated
by the severance of their relationship.  Moreover, any heightened risk that might have
been imputed to Applicant due to his Taiwanese relationship have been more than
counterbalanced by his demonstrated U.S. citizenship commitments and responsibilities.  
Evaluating Applicant’s security worthiness in the context of a whole person
assessment also serves to minimize Applicant’s exposure to any hypothetical conflict of
interests with his ex-girlfriend and her family who still reside in Taiwan. Applicant is highly
regarded and trusted by his daughter, his supervisors, and his co-workers, and is not
aware of any risks of coercion, pressure, or influence that any of her family members
might be exposed to. 
Under the recounted circumstances presented, any likelihood of any coercion,
pressure, or influence being brought to bear on him as the result of his prior relationship
with a Taiwanese citizen and resident, and her family members, would appear to be
minimal at this time. Put another way, Applicant has no visible conflicts of interest with
Taiwan citizen/residents or property interests in Taiwan that could be at risk to exploitation
or compromise by Taiwan military or intelligence officials.  
Overall, any potential security concerns attributable to Applicant's family members
in Taiwan are sufficiently mitigated to permit safe predictive judgments about Applicant's
ability to withstand risks of undue influence attributable to his ex-girlfriend’s familial
relationships in Taiwan. Favorable conclusions warrant with respect to the allegations
covered by Guideline B.
In reaching my decision, I have considered the evidence as a whole, including each
of the factors and conditions enumerated in the ¶ 2(a) factors of the AGs.
13
Formal Findings
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the findings of fact,
conclusions, and the factors and conditions listed above, I make the following separate
formal findings with respect to Applicant's eligibility for a security clearance.
GUIDELINE B: (FOREIGN INFLUENCE): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs. 1.a through 1.e: FOR APPLICANT
Conclusions
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's security clearance. 
                                  
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge