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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 08-06721
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his latest Security Clearance Application (SF-86) on
December 7, 2007. On March 12, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary
decision to deny his application, citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG)
promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on April 6, 2009, and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA assigned the case to me on July 28,
2009. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on August 14, 2009. I convened the hearing as
scheduled on September 9, 2009. Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 were admitted
in evidence without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted five
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documents (AE A-E), which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the
transcript of the hearing (Tr.) On October 17, 2009. Eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to Iraq (Tr.16). The request and the attached documents are included in the
record as Hearing Exhibit I. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings
of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶ 1.a and
1.b. He denied the other allegation (¶ 1.c) based on the fact that he did not agree with
the amount of money he sends to his family in Iraq. His admissions are incorporated in
my findings of fact. I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 42-year-old man who was born and educated in Iraq. He graduated
from a technical institute. Applicant was drafted into the Iraqi military and served from
1987 until 1992 (GE 1). He fled Iraq in 1992, and lived in a refugee camp. Applicant
requested to come to the U.S. (Tr. 27). He has lived in the United States since August
1992 (Tr. 27). He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in November 2000. In 2004,
Applicant visited his mother and father in Iraq because they were ill (SOR ¶ 1.b). He has
been employed with his current employer since October 2006 as a translator (GE 1).
Applicant held an interim security clearance for almost three years. He is currently
working in Iraq for the U.S. Government.
Applicant never married and has no children (GE 1). His mother died in 2005. His
father died in August 2008 (Tr. 45). Applicant visited his father in Iraq before his death
(Tr. 45). He spent two weeks in Iraq for the funeral. Applicant has three sisters and three
brothers who are citizens and residents of Iraq (SOR ¶ 1.a). Applicant saw them at his
father’s funeral.
Applicant contacted his parents before they passed away approximately once or
twice a year by telephone. He does not send emails. He had some contact with his
siblings. They do not work and they have never had any affiliation with the government in
Iraq. They support the U.S. efforts. They would like to live in the United States. Applicant
acknowledged that he wants to obtain the necessary money to sponsor his family to
immigrate to the United States.
Applicant’s oldest sister is married. She does not work. His middle sister is
married and her husband is a teacher in a public school (Tr. 59). His youngest sister is
also married. Her husband is a teacher also. He does not email them. He does not send
them money (Tr. 61). 
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Applicant’s family does not know that he is a translator for the United States.
Applicant told them he works for a plastics company in the United States. (Tr. 47). None
of his family members have been the victims of violence or have been threatened due to
Applicant’s work for the United States.  
Before his father died, Applicant sent him money for his health expenses (Tr. 50).
He acknowledged that every three or four months he sent his parents $200 or $300 to
aid in their health care expenses (SOR 1.c). Applicant has not sent any money to Iraq
since his father died in 2008 (Tr. 51).
In 2006, Applicant served as an interpreter for the U.S. Army in Iraq. He remained
in his position until he returned to the U.S. in 2009. He resides on U.S. military
installations. He does not leave the compound. He is not permitted to visit his family
while working as a translator (GE 3).
Applicant has no financial interests in Iraq. He has no desire to permanently return
to the country. Applicant owns a home in the United States. He has no contact or
affiliation with any former colleagues in Iraq.
Applicant asserted his pride of U.S. citizenship and love for his work with the Army
(AE A). He worked in a war zone in Iraq. He worked long hours for six days a week. He
went on missions with the U.S. Army. He has willingly put himself in danger every day for
almost three years in order to help the United States. Applicant emphasized that he
would never betray the United States. 
There is no evidence in the record that Applicant breached any security policies or
procedures while holding a security clearance in Iraq. He has letters of appreciation for
his work in Iraq (AE C-D).
Applicant presented a 2009 recommendation from a sergeant major who serves
with the U.S. Army in Iraq. Applicant has worked closely with his team since March 2006
for the Joint Special Operations Task Force. Applicant has provided total commitment to
the mission. He has devoted thousands of man-hours to the ongoing war on terrorism
and stability and support operations inside Iraq. His support has far exceeded the scope
of his normal duties. He has played an intricate role in protecting U.S. soldiers from
terrorist attacks, and his analytical input and understanding of the culture, history and
geography of the country has contributed to the capture of those responsible for attacks
(AE C).
Applicant has several recommendations from other personnel with the U.S. Army.
He is lauded for his preparation and motivation. He is described as professional, reliable,
and honest. He has consistently excelled under demanding conditions at risk to his
personal safety (AE A). He is mature, which serves as an advantage. He works long
hours at a tireless pace in an often thankless environment. He is a man of great courage
and conviction.
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An Army interrogator who has worked with Applicant and sees him on a daily
basis does not doubt his competence or dedication. He believes Applicant is a true U.S.
patriot. Applicant is the type of person that can be trusted with information (AE D). 
Applicant’s current employer vouches for Applicant’s professionalism and work
ethic. His skill set is second to none. He has the highest recommendation and his skills
are greatly needed. 
Applicant received several coins while serving as a translator in Iraq. He brought
the two coins to the hearing. Applicant received them for his great work in Iraq (Tr. 24).
He is noted for his outstanding support of a unit in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was
praised for his expert linguistic skill and professionalism in his duties from 2006 until
2009 (AE A-E).   
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Iraq set forth in the Hearing
Exhibits, including the fact that in 2003, the United States led a coalition to remove
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. After free elections, Iraq’s new government took
office. Despite the elections and new government, Iraq remains engulfed in violence,
perpetrated by Al Qaeda terrorists and other insurgents. Numerous attacks and
kidnappings have targeted the United States Armed Forces, contractors, and other
civilians, as well as Iraqis. Even with aggressive governmental action against terrorists,
the threat of terrorism in Iraq remains. Terrorist groups can conduct intelligence activities
as effectively as state intelligence services.
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
. control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon an applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these
guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and
commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
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endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify an applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to an applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b). 
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant has a father, three brothers, and three sisters who are
citizens and residents of Iraq. (SOR ¶ 1.a). It also alleges Applicant traveled to Iraq in
January 2004 (SOR ¶ 1.b), and that he sends about $200 to $500 monthly to his family
in Iraq (SOR ¶ 1.c). The security concern relating to Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as
follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
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consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b). Applicant’s father died in
2008. Applicant sent his father money to help him with his medical expenses. Applicant’s
brothers and three sisters are citizens and residents of Iraq. Applicant maintains some
contact with them. He visited Iraq in 2004 before he was translator because his mother
was ill. He returned to Iraq in 2008 for his father’s funeral. He took an assignment in Iraq
as a translator, but he acknowledged that his family does not know about his work.
Applicant’s connections to his family in Iraq could create a potential conflict of interest
between his security obligations and his desire to help them, only in a situation wherein
they were taken hostage or otherwise threatened with harm if he did not cooperate.
None of them have any government connection or other position in which they could
otherwise benefit from his access to sensitive information or technology. However, under
either disqualifying condition, security concerns could arise in connection with the
potential that hostile forces might seek protected information from Applicant by
threatening harm to his family members in Iraq. Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and
(b) are raised.
Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the
government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
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a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(c) “contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.” In 2004, Applicant visited his mother who was ill. At that time,
he was not employed as an interpreter with his current employer. Applicant had
telephone contact with his father approximately twice a year. Applicant attended his
father’s funeral in Iraq when his father died in 2008. The positions and activities of
Applicant’s siblings in Iraq do not involve the government or military and they would have
no interest in acquiring protected information. Only their physical presence creates the
potential that their interest could be threatened to the point that Applicant would confront
a choice between their interest and those of the United States. Because they are
opposed to terrorism in Iraq, the likelihood of such a situation is substantially reduced.
The Iraqi government is a U.S. ally that does not pose an intelligence risk through
Applicant’s family members, who support the Iraqi and coalition efforts to defeat terrorists
and establish a working democracy. Thus, this mitigating condition has partial application
in this case.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”  AG ¶
8(b).  Applicant spoke to his undivided loyalty to the United States. Based on his
relationship and loyalty to the United States, he can be expected to resolve any conflict
of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. He has lived in the United States since 1992, after
fleeing Iraq, and did not return to Iraq until his mother’s illness and his father’s funeral.
He owns property in the United States. He has worked in the United States for many
years. He hopes to bring his siblings to the United States when he can support them
financially. He has endured dangerous conditions in Iraq on behalf of the U.S. Army.
There is no evidence that he has connections or contact with any people other than his
brothers and sisters in Iraq. He has established application of AG 8(b). 
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Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
The Appeal Board requires the whole person analysis address “evidence of an
applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family ties to the
U.S. relative to his or her ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.;
and ,many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7
(App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Certain circumstances weigh against
Applicant in the whole person analysis. First, there is a significant risk of terrorism in Iraq.
More importantly for security purposes, terrorists are hostile to the U.S. and actively seek
classified information. Terrorists, and even friendly governments, could attempt to use
Applicant’s sisters and brothers to obtain such information. Second, he was educated in
Iraq and subsequently conscripted into Iraq’s army. Third, his sisters and brothers
remain citizens of Iraq. Fourth, he has some contact with his siblings. 
Substantial mitigating evidence weighs in favor of granting Applicant a security
clearance. Applicant fled Iraq and lived in refugee camps for two years. Applicant wanted
to come to the United States. He is a mature person, who has lived in the United States
since 1992, and has been a naturalized citizen for nine years. He has a strong sense of
patriotism toward the United States, as witnessed by his dedication and work with the
U.S. Army. There is no evidence that he has ever taken any action that could cause
potential harm to the United States. His military supervisors, who work with him daily in a
war zone, praised his work in the cause of freedom in Iraq. After fleeing Iraq in 1992, he
never returned until his mother and father were gravely ill. He has established his life in
the United States. He now owns property in the U.S.
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I conclude that the whole person analysis weighs heavily toward approval of his security clearance. Assuming
a higher authority reviewing this decision determines the mitigating conditions articulated under AG 8 do not
apply and severs any consideration of them, I conclude the whole person analysis standing alone is sufficient
to support approval of a security clearance in this case.
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Applicant held an interim security clearance during his tenure with the U.S. Army
without indication that he breached security policies or procedures. He served the United
States in a dangerous, high-risk situation and his character references establish his
significant contributions to U.S. national security. While that fact is not normally to be
considered a factor in granting a clearance, the Appeal Board noted in ISCR Case. No.
05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14, 2006) as follows:
As a general rule, Judges are not required to assign an applicant’s
prior history of complying with security procedures and
regulations significant probative value for purposes of
refuting, mitigating, or extenuating the security concerns
raised by applicant’s more immediate disqualifying conduct
or circumstances. See, e.g. ISCR  Case. No. 01-03357 at 4
(App. Bd. Dec. 13, 2005); ISCR Case No 02-10113 at 4
(App. Bd. Mr. 25, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-10955 at 2-3
(App. Bd. May 30, 2006). However, the Board has
recognized an exception to that general rule in Guideline B
cases, where the applicant has established by credible,
independent evidence that his compliance with security
procedures and regulations occurred in the context of
dangerous, high-risk circumstances in which the applicant
made a significant contribution to the nation’s security. See.
e.g. ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July 14, 2006).
The presence of such circumstances can give credibility to
an applicant’s assertion that he can be relied upon to
recognize, resist, and report to a foreign power’s attempts at
coercion or exploitation.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence.  Overall, the record evidence leaves1
me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security
clearance. 
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
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Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge