.                                                              
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ADP Case No. 08-08347 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Public Trust Position ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Jr., Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro Se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
CREAN, THOMAS M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for Public Trust Position (SF 85P), on 
December 3, 2007. On March 27, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(DOHA) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing trustworthiness 
concerns for foreign influence under Guideline B, and foreign preference under 
Guideline C. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of 
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); Department of Defense (DoD) 
Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program, dated January 1987, as amended 
(Regulation); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President 
on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs 
issued after September 1, 2006.  
 
 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on April 4, 2009. He admitted all of the 
factual allegations under both Guideline B and Guideline C. Applicant requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed 
on June 5, 2009. The case was initially assigned to another administrative judge. DOHA 
issued a Notice of Hearing for that administrative judge on July 21, 2009, for a hearing 
on August 26, 2009. Applicant was not available for the hearing, and the case was 
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reassigned to me on July 24, 2009. DOHA issued a second Notice of Hearing on 
August 13, 2009, for a hearing on August 31, 2009. I convened the hearing as 
scheduled. The government offered three exhibits, marked Government Exhibits (Gov. 
Ex.) 1 through 3, which were received without objection. Applicant did not submit any 
exhibits at the hearing. Applicant testified on his behalf. The record was held open for 
Applicant to submit documents. Applicant timely submitted three documents admitted as 
App. Ex. A through C. The Government had no objections to the documents and they 
were admitted as exhibits (Gov. Ex. 4, Letter, dated September 25, 2009). DOHA 
received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on September 8, 2009. Based on a review of 
the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to sensitive 
information is granted. 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 Applicant did not receive the August 13, 2009 Notice of Hearing since he was on 
travel out of the country. However, he knew of the hearing since the original hearing had 
been postponed at his request from August 26, 2009. Applicant is entitled to 15 days 
notice of hearing (Directive E3.1.8). Applicant discussed with Department Counsel the 
setting of a hearing date after August 30, 2009, when he would be returning from a trip. 
Applicant never signed for the Notice of Hearing for August 31, 2009, but he stated he 
had sufficient notice of the hearing date and he waived the requirement for the 15 day 
notice requirement (Tr. 6-7). 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The requests and attached 
supporting documents were not admitted into evidence but are included in the record as 
Hearing Exhibits. Applicant had no objection to the requests for administrative notice or 
the attached documents. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of 
Fact, below (Tr. 28-30, Hearing Exhibit I and II).  
 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following essential findings of fact. Applicant admitted all of the factual allegations raised 
in the SOR.  
 
 Applicant is a 36-year-old senior computer programmer and analyst for a defense 
contractor. He was born in Sudan. His family still resides in Sudan. Their home is in the 
middle of the country near the capital. He was educated in Sudan. He received his first 
college degree in petroleum engineering from a Sudanese university in 1998. He 
received another college degree in computer science from a United States university in 
2002. He is married with one child (Tr. 21-25). 
 
 Applicant immigrated to the United States in 1999, and became a United States 
citizen in December 2006. When Applicant immigrated to the United States, he 
possessed and used a Sudanese passport which expired in 2006. He used this 
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passport for travel until he received his United States passport. He received a United 
States passport in 2006 shortly after becoming a United States citizen. After becoming a 
United States citizen and receiving a United States passport, he used his Sudanese 
passport only to establish for Sudanese authorities that he was originally from Sudan. 
He sends a copy of the first two pages of his expired Sudan passport to Sudanese 
authorities to establish he originally came from Sudan, which entitles him to a 50% 
discount on the Sudan entry visa fee. He has the expired passport only because he has 
a habit of maintaining all of his important documents and records, and to obtain the visa 
discount. The passport cannot be used as a basis to have a current passport issued by 
Sudan (Tr. 21-22). 
 
 Applicant comes from a large family. His parents, five sisters, and two brothers 
are citizens and residents of Sudan. His father is a retired school teacher and his 
mother is a homemaker. Since all schools were public schools run by the government 
when his father taught, he is considered to have worked for the government. Three of 
his sisters are married and are homemakers. Their husbands are a civil engineer and 
small business owners. One brother is a college student, and the other has graduated 
from college but is still seeking employment. He has another brother who is a citizen of 
Sudan, but a resident of Saudi Arabia, employed as an electrical engineer by an 
American company. Applicant has a close relationship with his family and they are all on 
good terms. Applicant talks to his parents by telephone at least weekly, and sends them 
$300 monthly to assist with living expenses. He would call them more often if the 
telephone calls were not so expensive (Tr. 33-36).  
 
 Applicant's wife was also born in Sudan. Applicant and his wife have known each 
other since childhood since they grew up together. They married in Sudan before 
immigrating to the United States. Her parents and four brothers are citizens and 
residents of Sudan. Applicant's wife talks to her family weekly. Applicant talks to them 
often. The families are close and on good terms (Tr. 36-37). 
 
 Applicant traveled to Sudan in 2002, 2004, and 2006 to visit his family. He used 
his Sudanese passport on the first two trips because he was not yet a United States 
citizen in possession of a United States passport. After he became a United States 
citizen in December 2005 and received a United States passport in early 2006, he 
traveled solely on his United States passport. He and his family visited his family in 
Sudan in the summer of 2009 for six weeks. He used his United States passport to 
enter and leave the United States and Sudan. He sent a copy of his expired Sudanese 
passport to the Sudanese authorities to receive a discount on his visa application. He 
visited his family and in-laws and stayed with his parents during his visit (Tr. 35-36).  
 
 While a college student, Applicant did not join societies or organizations that 
were campus organizations affiliated with the government. Membership and activities in 
these organizations is a key element in finding employment in your chosen field after 
college. Applicant graduated as a petroleum engineer and all petroleum engineer jobs in 
Sudan are government positions. Since Applicant had not joined the societies, he could 
not find employment as a petroleum engineer. He and his wife decided to immigrate to 
the United States for more freedom and better opportunity. He does not like the 
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government of Sudan and does not support it. His family is not political or aligned with 
the government (Tr. 24-29, 42). 
 
 Applicant noted on his SF 85P, Application for a Position of Public Trust, that he 
was a dual citizen of the United States and Sudan. In response to questions asked by 
security adjudicators in Interrogatories, Applicant noted that he has an allegiance both 
to the United States and Sudan. Applicant stated at the hearing that he can do nothing 
about his dual citizenship with Sudan. He was born and raised in Sudan and spent the 
first 26 years of his life there. However, his chosen country for citizenship is the United 
States. As to his statement of allegiance to Sudan, he stated at the hearing that he was 
talking not about the government of Sudan but his family and friends in Sudan. Like any 
immigrant to the United States, he has a degree of affection for the land and people 
where he came from (Tr. 24-26). 
 
 Applicant presented letters from friends and co-workers attesting to his work 
ethic and character. The manager at his present employment states Applicant always 
displays excellent commitment to his work and is well regarded by his fellow employees 
(App. Ex. A, Letter, dated September 10, 2009). A fellow worker, who has known 
Applicant at two different companies, stated Applicant is always positive and up-beat. 
He keeps projects on track and is known as the person who is honest and truthful about 
the status of the projects. Applicant can always be counted on to exhibit a positive and 
happy attitude (App. Ex. B, Letter, undated). Another co-worker notes that Applicant 
displays a high degree of integrity, responsibility, and determination. He is always 
respectful to management and his co-workers. He is known as a dependable team 
player who uses sound judgment to arrive at logical and practical solutions to problems 
(App. Ex. C, Letter, dated September 7, 2009). Applicant is recommended by all three 
for a position of public trust. 
 
 Sudan was administered jointly by Egypt and Britain for a number of years, with 
Britain assuming management control and policy formulation in the late 1880s. In 
February 1953, Britain and Egypt concluded an agreement that assured self 
government and self determination for Sudan. Since gaining its independence, Sudan 
has endured continuous wars within its borders. Most of its civil strife is rooted in deep 
cultural and religious differences that have stunted the economic and political 
development of its non-Muslim peoples in the south and west of Sudan. Northerners 
who have controlled the country since independence have pursued uniting policies 
based on Arabism and Islam over the opposition of southerners and marginalized 
peoples in the south, east and west regions. Sudan has one of the most diverse 
populations in all of Africa, comprised mainly of two groups designated as Arabs and 
Black Africans/Christians, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and 
languages. This diverse population mix presents major challenges to collaborative 
efforts of government.  
 
 The Islam Army Faction group in Sudan mounted a military coup and installed 
the National Islamic Front. The commitment of this government to Islamism intensified 
regional conflicts. Sudan became less responsive to the grievances of populations 
outside of their northern political base. The government continued its internal political 
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repression against non-Muslim groups and added its support to Islamist groups in 
Algeria, and to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
 
 Regional efforts to broker a cessation of the Sudanese civil war between the 
north and south/west provinces of the country were numerous throughout the 1990s. 
Implementation of key provisions of the peace agreement failed to materialize. With the 
collapse of the peace agreement, rebellion in the Darfur region of Sudan ensued, 
resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Darfur's inhabitants and mass internal 
displacement of two million persons in Sudan. The Sudanese government is complicit 
and bears principal responsibility in the bombing, murder, and rape of innocent civilians 
in the Darfur region. 
 
 Sudan was designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. State Department 
in August 1983, and remains on the State Department’s list of State sponsors of 
terrorism. Sudan is under a broad U.S. embargo, and is subject to the Treasury 
Department’s extensive trade restrictions on exports and re-exports to this country. 
These restrictions were eased, but not removed. Sudan’s human rights abuses are cited 
as proof that the country poses an unusual continued threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States.  
 
 Sudan today is governed under a power-sharing arrangement established in 
January 2005. This arrangement established an interim government of national unity, 
dominated by Islamists from the north. Human rights abuses continue to be a serious 
problem in Sudan. The State Department’s report on human rights in the Sudan paints a 
grim picture. Sporadic violence continues to occur in the south. The government bears 
ultimate responsibility for extraordinary human rights abuses that have exploded on all 
fronts: rape, violence, hunger, displacement and looting. Human rights abuses include 
harsh prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, including incommunicado 
detention of suspected government opponents and prolonged pre-trial detention, 
executive interference with the judiciary, denial of due process, widespread prostitution, 
trafficking in persons, and harassment of journalists and religious groups. 
 
 In recent years, Sudan became a cooperative partner in global counterterrorism 
efforts with the United Stated and other countries. In the past year, the Sudanese 
government continued to pursue terrorist operations directly involving threats to United 
States interests and personnel in Sudan. Sudanese officials have indicated that they 
view their continued cooperation with the United States as important and recognize the 
benefits of United States training and information sharing. Though the counterterrorism 
relationship remains solid, some hard-line Sudanese officials continued to express 
resentment and distrust over actions by the United States and questioned the benefits 
of the bilateral cooperation. Their assessment reflected disappointment that Sudan's 
counterterrorism cooperation has not resulted in its removal from the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list. Nonetheless, there was no indication that the Sudanese government will 
curtail its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States (See, Hearing Exhibit 1, 
United States State Department Document on Sudan). 
 
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Saudi Arabia is a monarchy-ruled Middle East country. There are no political 
parties or elections. There are significant human rights problems. The religious police 
harass and abuse individuals to comply with religious actions and customs. However, 
Saudi Arabia and the United States share a common concern over regional security. 
The United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia was strained after September 11, 
2001, because the overwhelming majority of terrorists were from Saudi Arabia. There 
have been other terrorist attacks against United States citizens since 2001. This 
required the State Department to issue a travel warning for Saudi Arabia because of the 
terrorist activities targeted against American citizens and interests. Saudi Arabia 
believes in fighting terrorism in its own country, and has taken steps to curtail terrorist 
and terror plans within its borders. It has had some successes (See Hearing Exhibit II. 
Background notes, Saudi Arabia, dated June 2007 and Saudi Arabia Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices, 2006). 
 
Policies 
 
Positions designated as ADP I and ADP II are classified as “sensitive positions.”  
(See Regulation ¶¶ C3.1.2.1.1.7 and C3.1.2.1.2.3.) “The standard that must be met for 
assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the person’s 
loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that . . " assigning the person to 
sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” (See 
Regulation ¶ C6.1.1.1.) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence 
and Security) Memorandum, dated November 19, 2004, indicates trustworthiness 
adjudications will apply to cases forwarded to DOHA by the Defense Security Service 
and Office of Personnel Management. Department of Defense contractor personnel are 
afforded the right to the procedures contained in the Directive before any final 
unfavorable access determination may be made. (See Regulation ¶ C8.2.1.)   
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a public trust position, the 
administrative judge must consider the disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the AG. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of 
human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the 
adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, 
impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a 
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” 
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the 
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
[sensitive] information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is 
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responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant 
has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable trustworthiness 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard sensitive 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of sensitive information. 
 
Analysis 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties of foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such 
consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism (AG ¶ 6).  
 
 Applicant has frequent and extensive contact with his parents and siblings in 
Sudan. He talks to his parents weekly, and tries to visit Sudan every few years. He 
sends his parents funds monthly to assist them. He admits he and his family have a 
close relationship. He also admits to a close relationship with his brother, who is a 
citizen of Sudan but resides in Saudi Arabia. His contact with his family is extensive and 
raises security concerns under Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 
7(a) (Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, 
or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates 
a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion); and FI DC AG ¶ 7(b) (Connections to a foreign person, group, government, 
or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign 
person, group, or country by providing that information).  
 
 The mere existence of a foreign family member is not sufficient to raise the 
above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Applicant’s contact with his family in 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia must be examined to determine whether it creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
“Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased risk compared to some normally 
existing risk that can be inherent anytime a family member lives subject to a foreign 
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government. One factor that heightens the risk in Applicant's case is the extensive 
human rights abuses, terrorist activity, and on-going tribal conflict in Sudan.  
 
 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns for his family in Sudan 
and Saudi Arabia. I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) 
AG ¶ 8(a) (The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country 
are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the 
interests of the U.S.); FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) (There is no conflict of interest, either because 
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, 
or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest); and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) (Contact or communication 
with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could 
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation). 
 
 Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign 
family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the 
family members were not “in a position to be exploited.” The underlying premise was 
that an applicant should not be placed in a position where he or she is forced to make a 
choice between the interest of the family member and the interest of the United States. 
There was no balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk. Under the new 
guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to determine if 
an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the United States 
interest.  
 
 The nature of the human rights abuses, terrorist threats, and conflicts in Sudan 
places a heavy burden on Applicant in mitigating the disqualifying conditions and the 
security concerns. Applicant's relationship with his family is close. He talks to his 
parents weekly and sends them funds to assist in their support. He tries to visit the 
family in Sudan every few years. His wife talks to her family frequently, and he talks to 
them when he can. His relationships with his family in Sudan is close and not casual so 
there could be a circumstance where Applicant is placed in a position of having to 
choose between his family members and the interests of the United States because of 
the nature of the conflict and threat of terrorism in Sudan. Accordingly, FI MC AG ¶ 8(a) 
and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) do not apply.  
 
 Applicant has little, if any, sense of loyalty to Sudan and none to Saudi Arabia. 
His only contact with Saudi Arabia is his brother's presence in that country working for a 
United State company. He spent his early years in Sudan until he graduated from 
college. He came to this country because he could not find meaningful employment in 
his chosen field in Sudan. He refused to join certain organizations in college that were 
affiliated with the government that would ensure him government employment in his 
chosen field. He came to this country with his wife for freedom and an opportunity to 
better his life. He became a United States citizen as soon as he could, and has been 
successful as a computer programmer. He sees the United States as offering him 
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freedom, justice, and tolerance with an opportunity to reach his potential. While he 
provided funds to assist his parents, he sent the funds as a dutiful son and not to assist 
the government of Sudan or any terrorist element in the country. His visits back to 
Sudan were in the ordinary course of visiting family. Applicant's sense of loyalty or 
obligation is not to Sudan or terrorists but to the United States. A conflict of interest in 
this case is extremely unlikely. In balancing all of the factors mentioned and considered 
above, I am satisfied Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is such that he can be 
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States interest. FI MC 
AG ¶ 8(b) applies. Applicant has met his heavy burden to show that his contact with his 
family in Sudan and Saudi Arabia does not cause a security concern. I conclude 
Applicant has mitigated security concerns rising from his contact with his family in 
Sudan and his brother in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
 When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States, then he may be prone to provide information or make 
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States (AG ¶ 9). The principal 
goal of the Foreign Preference assessment is to determine the risk, based on foreign 
associations, that information may be compromised if access to sensitive information is 
approved. It is not a measure of Applicant's loyalty to the United States. 
 
 Sudan considers Applicant to be a Sudanese citizen because he was born and 
raised in Sudan. Applicant came to the United States as a Sudanese citizen on a 
Sudanese passport to find employment and better his life. When he became a United 
States citizen in 2005, he retained his Sudanese passport, which expired in 2006. He 
kept it because it was his habit to keep old documents and he could use the passport to 
establish he was from Sudan and receive a discount when he applied for a visa to enter 
Sudan. He did send to Sudanese officials a copy of the passport this year to receive a 
discount on a visa for his most recent visit to Sudan. His possession of the Sudanese 
passport raises Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) AG ¶ 10(a) 
(Exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a 
United States citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This 
includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport). 
 
 In response to this disqualifying condition, Applicant raised Foreign Preference 
Mitigating Conditions (FP MC) AG ¶ 11(b) (The individual has expressed a willingness 
to renounce dual citizenship), and FP MC AG ¶ 11(e) (The passport has been 
destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated). 
Applicant has denounced his citizenship with Sudan and his only citizenship is with the 
United States. He still possesses his old passport but it is not current or valid. It cannot 
be used as a document to receive a current Sudanese passport. The Sudanese 
passport is invalid, and not held by Applicant to enable him to enter or leave any 
country. Applicant has, therefore, mitigated security concerns for access to classified 
information raised by possession of a Sudanese passport. 
 
 
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Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for access to 
sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I carefully considered all of the 
circumstances discussed above in regard to disqualifying and mitigating conditions as 
well as the following factors in light of the whole person concept. The whole person 
concept requires consideration of all available information about Applicant, not a single 
item in isolation, to reach a determination concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to 
sensitive information. Applicant has a close relationship with his family in Sudan. There 
is extensive terrorist activity in Sudan and it is an area in which major terrorist 
organizations operate. These simple facts alone might be sufficient to raise security 
concerns over Applicant’s vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. However, 
mere family ties with people in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law, 
disqualifying under Guideline B. Whether an applicant’s family ties in a foreign country 
pose a security risk depends on an evaluation of the overall facts and circumstances of 
the family ties.   
 
Applicant has established his strong loyalties to the United States. He also 
established he has no real loyalty to Sudan or to any terrorist organization or activity 
operating in Sudan. His loyalty to the United States counters the fact his family 
members are citizens and residents of Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Overall, on balance, 
the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility 
and suitability for a trustworthiness position. Applicant's connections to Sudan or Saudi 
Arabia do not create a heightened risk related to national security. For all these 
reasons, I conclude Applicant has met the heavy burden of mitigating all potential 
security concerns arising from his family in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, as well as his 
possession of his expired Sudanese passport. Accordingly, I find that Applicant has 
mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign influence and foreign preference. 
He should be granted access to sensitive information. 
11 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraph 1.a:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.b:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.c:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.d:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.e:     For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraph 2.a:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 2.b:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 2.c:     For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 2.d:     For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a position of 
public trust. Eligibility for access to sensitive information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge