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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 08-08521
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Emilio Jaksetic, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his most recent Security Clearance Application (SF 86) on
January 16, 2008. He submitted an earlier SF 86 on October 17, 1997. On April 9, 2009,
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued to Applicant a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny his application,
citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the
President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for
SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 3, 2009, and elected to have
his case decided on the record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the
The Government submitted eight items in support of its contention.1
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Government’s written case on July 13, 2009.  Applicant received a complete file of1
relevant material (FORM) on July 21, 2009, and was provided the opportunity to file
objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Applicant submitted a packet (AE A). The case was assigned to me on September 2,
2009. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Syria. The request and the attached documents are included in
the record as Item 8. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of
Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a-1.f
with a partial denial of 1.b. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. I make
the following findings:
Applicant is a 63-year-old man who was born and educated in Syria. He taught
English in a secondary school for the Ministry of Education in Syria from 1971 until 1986.
Applicant was drafted and served in the Syrian military from 1974 until 1977. He has
lived in the United States since 1986 (Item 6). He became a naturalized U.S. Citizen in
May 1991. Applicant attended an American college from 1988 until 1991 (Item 3). He
has been employed with his current employer since October 2003 as a translator
(linguist) (Item 1). Before that time, Applicant served as a translator for other federal
contractors. He lived on Air Force installations in the Middle East. He has held a security
clearance since 2002 (Item 1). He is currently working in the Middle East for the U.S.
Government.
Applicant married his wife in 1980 in Syria (Item 5). She is a naturalized U.S.
citizen and resides with Applicant in the U.S. They have three children. The two
youngest, ages 20 and 18, acquired U.S. citizenship by birth in the United States. The
eldest child, age 26, was born in Syria, but she became a naturalized American citizen in
1993 (Item 1). Applicant’s father and mother are deceased. 
Applicant has a brother and sister who are citizens and residents of Syria (SOR ¶
1.a). His brother, who is single, works as a televison technician. His sister is a retired
teacher and had no connection with the Syrian government. In 1991, when Applicant
became a U.S. citizen, he filed a petition for immigration to the United States to sponsor
his brother and sister. The petitions are in accordance with the U.S. Immigration Act. His
youngest brother entered the U.S. in 2006 and has an alien registration. He lived with
Applicant for an undisclosed short period but does not live with Applicant now.
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Applicant’s brother is a permanent resident in the U.S. His brother is retired from the
Syrian Army (SOR ¶ 1.b). 
Applicant traveled to Syria in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 to visit his family
(SOR ¶ 1.c). He used his U.S. passport and obtained permission of his squadron
commander for the trips (Item 7). He completed the foreign travel questionnaire for the
vacation in the foreign country. He also completed a pre-travel and post-travel
questionnaire. While in Syria, he stayed at the home of his brother and sister. During an
earlier time, there was no policy against a translator visiting his or her family.  
Applicant’s immediate family knows that he is a translator for the United States
but they do not know the details of his work. His family is supportive of the efforts of the
United States. None of his family members have been the victims of violence. None have
been threatened due to Applicant’s work for the United States. His entire family are
Christians. 
Applicant emphasized that “he loves his siblings but he has no obligation to them.”
His immediate family has lived in the United States for many years. His commitment is to
his American family. He loves the United States. He has deeper and more substantial
ties to the United States. Applicant is willing to bear arms for the United States and will
resolve any conflict in favor of the United States interest (AE A).
Applicant has property in Syria. He purchased an apartment in 2005 for $30,000.
He uses the apartment when he visits Syria (SOR ¶ 1.f; Item 6). Applicant gave his
brother a general power of attorney in 1986. His brother manages the apartment, and
rents it for approximately $100 a month. Applicant does not receive the financial benefit
from the apartment. He does not have any other assets in Syria. He is not eligible for any
educational or retirement benefits from Syria (Item 6).The majority of Applicant’s assets,
including his home, are in the United States.
Applicant sends money to his siblings in Syria in the amount of $1,000 to $1,500
once every three months (SOR ¶ 1.e). He maintains monthly contact with them by
telephone (Item 6).
Applicant asserted his pride of U.S. citizenship and love for his work with the Air
Force. He lives on military installations. He worked in combat zones for almost 11 years.
He worked long hours for six days a week. He is one of the longest serving linguists in
the area of responsibility (AOR). He has willingly put himself in danger every day in order
to help the U.S.  
Applicant emphasized that he would never betray the United States. His 2009
affidavit, submitted in response to the FORM, emphasizes his allegiance to the United
States. He has lived in the U.S. with his wife and children. He owns a home in the United
States, which has substantially more value than his apartment in Syria.
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The evidence shows Applicant has not breached security policies or procedures
while holding a security clearance. He has 11 certificates of appreciation for his work in
the Middle East and Iraq (AE A). Applicant has complied with rules and existing agency
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts or threats from persons, groups, or
organizations from a foreign country. He affirmed in 2009 sworn statement that he has
never been approached by any foreign intelligence or security service, or terrorist
organization (AE A).
Applicant presented a recommendation from his commander, Chief, Security
Forces, who serves with the U.S. Air Force. Applicant has worked closely with his team
since October 2003. Applicant has provided total commitment to the mission. He is a
competent and experienced professional. His loyalty to the unit has never been
questioned. Applicant has been trusted with team-critical responsibilities. He is an honest
worker. He has always been an asset to his team. 
Applicant received several certificates of appreciation while serving as a translator
from 2001 until the present. He is noted for his outstanding support of a unit in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. He was praised for his expert linguistic skill and professionalism in his
duties.
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Syria. Since March 1963,
the Syrian Arab Republic has been ruled by an authoritarian regime. Syria is currently
included on the Department of State’s List of State Sponsors of Terrorism due to the
presence of several terrorist groups in Syria. According to the Department of State, the
Syrian Government continues to provide political and material support to Hizballah and
Palestinian terrorist groups. Several terrorist groups base their external leadership within
Syria’s borders, and maintain offices in Syria. Syria is “one of the primary transit points
for foreign fighters entering Iraq.”
On February 13, 2008, President Bush expanded a 2004 Executive Order
implementing sanctions against Syria for its support of terrorism in the Middle East. In
May 2009, President Obama continued the declaration of a national emergency,
“[b]ecause the actions and policies of the Government of Syria continue to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States.”
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
. control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
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Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these
guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common
sense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information. The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b). 
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Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant has a sister and brother who are citizens of and
residents of Syria (SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b). His youngest brother is a retired officer in the
Syrian armed forces, and lived with Applicant for an undisclosed period in 2006. It also
alleges Applicant traveled to Syria in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 (SOR ¶ 1.c).
SOR ¶ 1.d alleges that SOR ¶ 1.e alleges Applicant sends money to his siblings in Syria
to help with their living expenses, and SOR ¶ 1.f alleges that Applicant owns property in
Syria. The security concern relating to Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b). Applicant’s sister and brother
are citizens and residents of Syria. Applicant maintains monthly contact with them. He
works as a translator for the U. S. Air Force and has visited his siblings in Syria on five
separate occasions. He acknowledged that his wife knows about his work. Based on this
evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a), and (b) are raised.
Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the
government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
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regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). Nevertheless, the nature of a
nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(c) “contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.” Applicant has monthly phone contact with his brother and
sister. He has visited his siblings in Syria. Thus, this mitigating condition has only partial
application in this case.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”  AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant spoke to his undivided loyalty to the U.S. Based on his relationship and loyalty
to the U.S., he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest. He has lived in the U.S. since 1986. His wife and three children are citizens of
the U.S. He owns property in the U.S. He has worked in the U.S. for many years. He has
endured dangerous conditions in the Middle East and Iraq on behalf of the U.S. Air
Force. There is no evidence that he has connections or contact with any people other
than his sister and brothers. He has established application of AG ¶ 8(b). 
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
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conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
The Appeal Board requires the whole person analysis address “evidence of an
applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family ties to the
U.S. relative to his or her ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.;
and ,many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7
(App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Four circumstances weigh against
Applicant in the whole person analysis. First, there is a risk of terrorism and various
human rights abuses in Syria. More importantly for security purposes, terrorists are
hostile to the U.S. and actively seek classified information. Terrorists, and the Syrian
government, could attempt to use Applicant’s sister and brother to obtain such
information. Second, he had numerous connections to Syria before he immigrated to the
U.S. Following his birth, he spent his formative years there, along with his family. He was
educated in Syria and subsequently conscripted into army. Third, his sister, and brother
remain citizens of Syria. Fourth, he has contact with his siblings and has visited them in
Syria. One of his brothers is a retired officer in the Syrian armed forces.
Substantial mitigating evidence weighs in favor of granting Applicant a security
clearance. He is a mature person who has lived in the U.S. since 1986 , and has been a
naturalized citizen for 18 years. His spouse is a naturalized citizen and resides with him,
as do his three children. He has a strong sense of patriotism toward the U.S., as
witnessed by his dedication and work with the U.S. There is no evidence that he has
ever taken any action that could cause potential harm to the U.S. His military
supervisors, who work with him daily in a war zone, praised his work in the cause of
freedom in the Middle East and Iraq.
Applicant held a security clearance without indication that he breached security
policies or procedures during his tenure with the U.S. Air Force. He served the U.S. in a
dangerous, high-risk situation and his certificates of commendation establish his
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I conclude that the whole person analysis weighs heavily toward approval of his security clearance. Assuming
a higher authority reviewing this decision determines the mitigating conditions articulated under AG 8 do not
apply and severs any consideration of them, I conclude the whole person analysis standing alone is sufficient
to warrant approval of a security clearance in this case.
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significant contributions to U.S. national security. While that fact is not normally to be
considered a factor in granting a clearance, the Appeal Board noted in ISCR Case. No.
05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14, 2006) as follows:
As a general rule, Judges are not required to assign an applicant’s
prior history of complying with security procedures and
regulations significant probative value for purposes of
refuting, mitigating, or extenuating the security concerns
raised by applicant’s more immediate disqualifying conduct
or circumstances. See, e.g. ISCR  Case. No. 01-03357 at 4
(App. Bd. Dec. 13, 2005); ISCR Case No 02-10113 at 4
(App. Bd. Mr. 25, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-10955 at 2-3
(App. Bd. May 30, 2006). However, the Board has
recognized an exception to that general rule in Guideline B
cases, where the applicant has established by credible,
independent evidence that his compliance with security
procedures and regulations occurred in the context of
dangerous, high-risk circumstances in which the applicant
made a significant contribution to the nation’s security. See.
e.g. ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July 14, 2006).
The presence of such circumstances can give credibility to
an applicant’s assertion that he can be relied upon to
recognize, resist, and report a foreign power’s attempts at
coercion or exploitation.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence.  Overall, the record evidence leaves2
me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security
clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns
arising from foreign influence.
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.f: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge