KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: Viewed in light of the record as a whole and the Egan standard, the Judge’s adverse
decision is sustainable.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 09-01595.a1
DATE: 11/06/2009
DATE: November 6, 2009
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-01595
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On March 19, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and
Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
The Board cannot consider the information Applicant provided in her appeal brief concerning the origin of her1
debts and her plans to pay them off in the future, since it constitutes new evidence.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
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amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a decision on the written record.  On August 28, 2009,
after considering the record, Administrative Judge Paul J. Mason denied Applicant’s request for a
security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse security
clearance decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Finding no error, we affirm.
The Judge found that Applicant had served in the U.S. military from 1983 until 2005 and had
held a security clearance since 1984.  She has five delinquent debts, totaling approximately $12,800.
They became delinquent between 2002 and 2005.  Additionally, Applicant answered “no” to the
question on the security clearance application (SCA) inquiring whether she had debts more than 180
days delinquent.  This answer was not correct.  The Judge concluded that these facts establish
disqualifying conditions under the Directive.  
In analyzing Applicant’s case for mitigation, he concluded that her military experience and
history of holding a security clearance militated against an innocent mistake in providing the false
answer to the SCA.  Regarding the debts, the Judge stated that Applicant’s having failed to respond
to the file of relevant material resulted in numerous unanswered questions about her
finances–questions about the reasons for her delinquent debts, her plans to pay them off, etc.   As1
a consequence, the Judge concluded that Applicant had not met her burden of persuasion as to
mitigation.  Viewed in light of the record as a whole and of the Egan standard, the Judge’s adverse
decision is sustainable.  See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) (“The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.’”). 
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.     
  
Signed: Jean E. Smallin                
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields                
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
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Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                 
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board