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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 06-18379
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jennifer Goldstein, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
December 16, 2009
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Decision
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CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SCA), on May 6, 2005.
On May 19, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guidelines B and C
for Applicant.  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 21, 2009.  He answered the
SOR in writing on June 10, 2009, and requested a hearing before an Administrative
Judge.  DOHA received the request on June 15, 2009, and I received the case
assignment on July 31, 2009.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on August 12, 2009,
and I convened the hearing as scheduled on September 17, 2009.  The Government
offered Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 4, which were received without objection.  Applicant
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testified on his own behalf, as did four witnesses, and submitted Exhibits (AppXs) A
through D, without objection.  DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on
September 25, 2009.  I granted Applicant’s request to keep the record open until
October 15, 2009, to submit additional matters.  On September 28, 2009, and on or
about October 15, 2009, he submitted Exhibits E and F, without objection.  As AppX E
was not forwarded to the undersigned, by the Department Counsel, until October 19,
2009, the record closed on October 19, 2009.  Based upon a review of the case file,
pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is
granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Iran.  The request was granted.  The request, and the
attached documents, were not admitted into evidence, but were included in the record.
The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all of the factual allegations, with
explanations.  The Applicant emigrated to the U.S. in 1986, at the age of 14, to be with
his natural mother (TR at page 95 line 3 to page 98 line 21).  He became a naturalized
U.S. citizen in 1994 (Id).  He served in the U.S. Navy from 1992 to 1997, obtaining the
rank of E-5, Quartermaster 2  class (TR at page 39 line 21 to page 41 line 25, andnd
AppXs A and B).  The Applicant served his adopted country honorably (AppXs A and
B).
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
1.a. and 1.b.  The Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of Iran.  He retired
from the Iranian Department of Maritime Ports and Shipping (TR at page 86 line 20 to
page 88 line 21).  He was hired under the Shah’s regime, but retired under the current
regime (Id).  He has little contact with his father, and describes his feelings in the
following terms:
I do not feel any sentiments towards my father.  I recall that he was not a
terribly nice husband to my mother.  So therefore, I have no connections
with him.  No emotional ties (TR at page 100 lines 3~9).
The Applicant also has a half-brother, a half-sister, and a stepmother who are
citizens and residents of Iran.  His half-brother is “a full time student” (TR at page 88 line
22 to page 89 line 7).  He is unsure of what his half-sister does, and his stepmother is
“just a housewife” (TR at page 89 line 8 to page 90 line 3).  His contact with his half
siblings and his stepmother is “[v]ery rare” (TR at page 89 line16 to page 90 line 13).
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1.c. and 2.b.  The Applicant visited Iran in October of 2007, using his Iranian
passport to enter and exit the country (TR at page 91 lines 3~6).  He “had a curiosity
about the family members that were still there,” and “also was interested in seeing some
historic sites” (TR at page 104 lines 14~24).  He was there for about “a month,” but has
no intention of visiting Iran in the future (TR at page 101 lines 23~24, and at page 107
line 23 to page 108 line 22).
Guideline C - Foreign Preference
2.a.  The Applicant renewed his Iranian passport in November of 2003, despite
being naturalized in September of 1994 (TR at page 91 lines 7~16).  That passport has
since expired, and has been surrendered to and destroyed by the Applicant’s Facility
Security Officer (FSO) (TR at page 104 lines 14 to 24, at page 107 line 23 to page 108
line 22, and AppX F).  This is evidenced by a statement from the Applicant’s FSO (AppX
F).  The Applicant is willing to renounce any Iranian citizenship he may have, but
believes he had already done so when he joined the U.S. Navy (TR at page 91 line 17
to page 92 line 3, and at page 104 line 25 to page 105 line 6).
As the Applicant’s father, half-siblings, and step mother are Iranian and live in
Iran, I must also consider the country of Iran.  Iran is possibly the most serious threat to
the U.S.  Iran is a state that sponsors terrorism.  The U.S. has not had diplomatic
relations with Iran since 1980.  It is a theocratic Islamic republic in which Shi’a Muslim
clergy dominate the key power structures, and ultimate political authority is vested in a
learned religious scholar.  Iran’s dismal and worsening human rights record presents a
further threat to the U.S., as a large number of Iranians emigrated to the U.S. in 1979,
after their Islamic revolution.  These immigrants often left behind family members in
Iran.  Iran’s security forces often target family members of political prisoners for
harassment purposes.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG).  In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.  Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process.  The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.  According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.”  The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
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The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.  AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”  In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record.  Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .”  The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence.  This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours.  The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information.  Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
Paragraph 6 of the new adjudicative guidelines sets out the security concern
relating to Foreign Influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign interests, may be manipulated or induced
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by a
foreign interest.
Here, Paragraph 7(a) is applicable: “contacts with a foreign family member . . .
who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  The
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relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located . . .
are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose
between the interests of a foreign individual . . . and the interests of the U.S.”  The
Applicant rarely contacts, and has little emotional ties to, his Iranian relatives.  Apart
from his father, who was hired under the Shah’s regime, none of his Iranian relatives
have any connection with the Iranian government.  Furthermore, I find the Applicant, a
former member of the U.S. Navy, cannot be coerced by the government of Iran or any
other government.
Guideline C - Foreign Preference
Paragraph 9 of the new adjudicative guidelines sets out the security concern
relating to Foreign Preference:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
Subparagraph 10(a)(1) is applicable: “exercise of any right, privilege or obligation
of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a
family member.  This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign
passport.”  Here, the Applicant, a naturalized citizen, used an Iranian passport to enter
that country in 2007.  This is clearly countered, however, by the mitigating conditions
found under Subparagraphs 11(b) and 11(e).  Subparagraph 11(b) notes that where
“the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship,” this is
mitigating.  I find that Applicant’s renunciation intention to be genuine.  Furthermore,
under Subparagraph 11(e), the Applicant’s “passport has been destroyed [by] . . . the
cognizant security authority,” his FSO.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances.  Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person
concept.
The Administrative Judge should also consider the nine adjudicative process
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2)
the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3)
the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the
time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or
absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
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for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9)
the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
The record shows that the Applicant has little or no contact with Iran; and as
such, can not be coerced vis-a-vis any of his Iranian relatives.  He understands his
responsibility to the U.S., while holding a security clearance; and as such, clearly meets
the eligibility criterion.
Furthermore, he has the unqualified support of those who know and have worked
with the Applicant (TR at page 53 line 8 to page 85 line 10).  A Senior Vice President
(VP) of his firm, another VP, and his direct supervisor speak most highly of the
Applicant (Id).  They all feel he is trustworthy; and as such, should be granted a security
clearance.
I have considered all of the evidence, including the potentially disqualifying and
mitigating conditions surrounding this case.  Overall, the record evidence leaves me
without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security
clearance.  For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns
arising from his alleged Foreign Influence and Foreign Preference.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Richard A. Cefola
Administrative Judge