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                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------, --------- -------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-18481
SSN: ------ ---- -------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff A. Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: James Green, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was convicted of Statutory Rape in 1983, and admitted engaging in an
extensive pattern of deviant sexual activities over a period of several decades. He failed
to prove his claims that his misconduct was sufficiently known to family, friends, and
coworkers to alleviate his susceptibility to coercion or duress. Based upon a thorough
review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to
classified information is denied.  
Applicant submitted his security clearance application on August 24, 2006. On
May 13, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines D (Sexual
Behavior), E (Personal Conduct), and J (Criminal Conduct). The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President
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on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense (DoD) for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 19, 2009. He answered (AR)
the SOR in writing on June 1, 2009, and requested that his case be decided by an
administrative judge on the written record without a hearing. On August 28, 2009,
Department Counsel indicated his readiness to proceed and requested a hearing before
an administrative judge in accordance with Directive ¶ E3.1.7. Applicant was notified of
this election by letter dated August 31, 2009, and DOHA assigned the case to me on
September 22, 2009. Neither Applicant nor his counsel raised any objection to
Department Counsel’s request for a hearing on timeliness or other grounds.
DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on October 1, 2009, and I convened the
hearing as scheduled on October 27, 2009. Department Counsel offered Government
Exhibits (GE) 1 through 6, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on
his own behalf, as did three other witnesses, and offered Applicant Exhibits (AE) A
through D. These exhibits were admitted subject to Department Counsel’s reservation
of the right to further evaluate and possibly rebut AE D, which he first received right
before the hearing. I granted both counsel’s request to leave the record open until
November 3, 2009, for submission of additional evidence. On that date, Applicant
submitted additional evidence, with a copy to Department Counsel and requested that it
be considered. Department Counsel expressed no objection to their admissibility, and
submitted no other evidence. Applicant’s new exhibits were marked AE E through K,
and admitted. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on November 4, 2009.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 56-year-old engineer who has worked for a federal contractor for
almost four years. In his answer to the SOR, he denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.b,
2.a, 3.a, and 3.b, with explanations. He admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, and
1.d, including 1.d(1) through 1.d(10), with explanations. Applicant’s admissions are
incorporated into the following findings of fact.
Applicant is married for the second time. He has two adult daughters, one by
each of his wives, and an adult stepson. He enlisted in the Army from 1971 to 1976,
when he was medically discharged. He has never held a security clearance except a
temporary interim clearance with his current employer. (GE 1 at 6, 10, 14-20, 25-26, 32;
Tr. at 114-116, 120.)
Applicant pled guilty to, and was convicted of, Statutory Rape, 2  Degree, innd
December 1983. This offense involved his sexual molestation between January 1982
and August 1983 of his stepson, who was then 11 to 13 years old. He was sentenced to
ten years confinement, which was suspended subject to his successful participation in
and completion of the Sexual Psychopathy program at a state psychiatric hospital. As
part of his plea bargain, a second charge of Indecent Liberties involving other sexual
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contact with the stepson, also a felony, was dropped. Applicant was also sentenced to
ten years of probation, restitution and costs. (AR; GE 2.) 
After his August 1983 arrest, but before his December conviction, Applicant
attended a group outpatient sexual psychological treatment program. Applicant claims
that he “wholeheartedly participated in the treatment program, and followed all rules,
procedures, and treatment plans.” (AR at 3.) He found the program insufficient to meet
his needs, however, and sought additional treatment elsewhere. He “freely shared with
the group [his] concerns and the fact that he was seeking other treatment. This was
looked on unfavorably by the group and directly led to [his] being voted out of that
group.” (Id.) His subsequent assessment at the state hospital states that his course at
the outpatient treatment program “indicates that there was only superficial compliance
with the program, poor compliance with conditions, and perhaps a great deal of
rationalization by seeking the easiest way out, namely ‘obtaining Christian counselling’.”
(GE 4 at 2-3.) The outpatient program director described Applicant as “very antagonistic
and quite unhelpful to the other men in the group” and “a chronic, out-of-control
pedophile with both male and female victims.” The director recommended inpatient
treatment because Applicant “wished to control treatment, diagnose himself, and [was]
resistant to counseling.” (GE 4 at 24.) After being dismissed from this outpatient
program in October 1983, Applicant received treatment from a Ph.D. managerial
psychologist for several months. (GE 4 at 13; AE D; Tr. at 126-127.) 
Applicant participated in the inpatient sex offender treatment program at the state
psychiatric hospital from July 1984 until late October or early November 1985, when he
announced that he no longer desired to participate in the program after completing three
of the ten required steps. Among other things he admitted during treatment were
multiple molestation incidents involving both his elder daughter and stepson from 1976
to 1983, and early stage grooming behavior toward his younger daughter who was only
seven years old at the time of his arrest. (GE 4 at 6, 25.) In late November 1985, he was
returned to the custody of the county sheriff. The hospital reported to the court that
Applicant “was no longer amenable to treatment in the Sex Offender Program . . . and
that, as a sexual psychopath who was considered untreatable, he was not safe to be at
large. The prognosis is very poor.” (GE 4 at 25-26.) His final diagnosis was “Paraphilia,
pedophilia, predominantly homosexual. Alcoholism, in remission due to confinement.
History of street drug abuse. Antisocial personality disorder with passive-aggressive
traits.” (Id.)
As part of his sexual psychotherapy treatment, Applicant wrote a sexual
autobiography. In it, and during subsequent therapy sessions, he admitted to a pattern
of deviant sexual activities beginning at approximately age 6, and continuing to the time
of his arrest in August 1983, at age 30. As set forth in SOR ¶¶ 1.d(1) through 1.d(10),
these included heterosexual and homosexual acts with children and adults, many of
whom were relatives including his children, a nephew, and his brother-in-law. They also
involved engaging his first wife in group sex, acts of bestiality, using pornography for
arousal, and using alcohol and illegal drugs as disinhibitors towards physical and sexual
urges. (GE 4; AR; Tr. at 128-129.)
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After release from the state psychiatric hospital, in November 1985, Applicant
was confined in the county jail pending probation revocation proceedings. The court
held a series of hearings concerning Applicant’s amenability to further treatment and
work-release. On June 23, 1986, the judge ordered his release into active, intensive,
supervised probation, and an outpatient sex offender counseling program by an
approved psychologist. No evidence was provided by either party concerning this
course of treatment or its outcome, but on May 23, 1988, the court granted Applicant’s
petition and ordered termination of his suspended sentence, his discharge from
probation, and restoration of his civil rights. (GE 2 at 29-46.) There is no evidence of
any subsequent sexual misconduct, although he and his wife remain aware of and
discuss potential concerns and he avoids close or unsupervised contact with any
children except his grandchildren. (AR at 6; Tr. at 85-86.)
From June 1986 to November 2003, Applicant worked in the maintenance
department of an aviation services company, and ultimately became the director of
maintenance. He left that job under unfavorable circumstances after a dispute with the
owner over unsafe practices in connection with recording and scheduling maintenance
requirements about which he ultimately wrote a letter to the Federal Aviation
Administration. (GE 1 at 12, 28; Tr. at 118-119, 147-150.) He was then self-employed
performing aircraft maintenance services until his present employer hired him in June
2006. (GE 1 at 11; Tr. at 119-120.)
Applicant submitted letters from his stepson and younger daughter saying that
they had forgiven him, have reconciled, and presently have a good and loving
relationship. They claim in general terms to know all about their father’s past, but have
not told their children about it in detail. Instead, they taught their children to avoid and
report any improper touching by anyone. Applicant has a close and loving relationship
with his seven grandchildren, who are ages 10 to 18. (AE E; AE G; AE H; AE K; Tr. at
85-86.)
Applicant submitted testimony and letters from longtime friends, professional
acquaintances, coworkers, and supervisors expressing their opinions of his high
integrity, trustworthiness, responsibility, good judgment, and reliability. Many of these
people claimed to know, in general terms, about Applicant’s past “mistakes” and his
conviction for Statutory Rape in 1983. (AE A; AE B; AE C; AE F; AE I; AE J; Tr. at 36-
73.) None of these people demonstrated any specific or detailed knowledge about the
quantity and range of sexually deviant behavior to which Applicant admitted during his
sex offender treatment programs, and Applicant took the position that he disclosed his
past to the degree he thought someone needed to know. (GE 6 at 3; Tr. at 103-109,
138-141, 174-177.) 
On September 10, 1992, Applicant confronted his stepson over stealing
Applicant’s property to sell or pawn for funds to support the stepson’s cocaine use.
Applicant physically assaulted the stepson, after which he admitted the thefts. Applicant
was subsequently arrested and charged with Assault in the Fourth Degree. After a
contested bench trial, he was found guilty on November 10, 1992. After a series of
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continuances, his sentencing was deferred for 12 months on April 7, 1993, on condition
that he have no further violations, pay a $50 fee, and complete an anger management
program. On March 22, 1996, the court found that Applicant had substantially complied
with his deferred sentencing conditions, and dismissed the charge. (GE 3; GE 6 at 2;
AR at 5; Tr. at 88-90.)
In preparation for his hearing, Applicant and his wife visited the managerial
psychologist from whom he received several months of treatment between his post-
arrest outpatient program and his sentencing to inpatient therapy. This psychologist had
neither records nor recollection of his earlier course of treatment, but provided a
psychological evaluation based on two interviews with Applicant and one with his wife.
He found “many elements of a strong and healthy psyche,” and stated that it was
“difficult to find many weaknesses in [Applicant’s] psychological profile.” The
psychologist further stated that Applicant does not believe he is susceptible to blackmail
or leverage because he had “disclosed his full past” to his employer, and his family and
most of his friends are “fully aware of all issues.” He concluded “[Applicant’s]
psychological/mental health is excellent. There are no psychological factors that should
prevent [Applicant] from being granted full security clearance.” The psychologist’s
description of the “issues” from Applicant’s “full past” consisted of “illegal sexual
behavior,” “child sexual abuse,” and “pleading guilty to statutory rape.” There is no
indication this psychologist was aware or informed of the extent of sexually-deviant
behavior to which Applicant admitted during his other treatment programs. (AE D; Tr. at
109-111.)  
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider and apply the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG).
In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative
guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to
be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2, describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and (c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
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the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded in mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides, “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” 
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline D, Sexual Behavior
AG ¶ 12 expresses the security concern under this guideline:
Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or
emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may
subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or
duress can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness
and ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference
concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the
basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.
AG ¶ 13 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying (DCs):
(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has
been prosecuted;
(b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behavior
that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a
personality disorder;
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(c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and
(d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion
or judgment.
AG ¶ 14 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns (MCs):
(a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no
evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under
such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment; 
(c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and 
(d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet.
Applicant’s conviction of Statutory Rape and admission of additional child
molestation offenses for which he was never prosecuted establish security concerns
under AG ¶ 13(a). The record further shows a pattern of compulsive and high risk
sexual behavior for almost 25 years. This behavior was diagnosed, during two sex-
offender psychiatric treatment programs that he failed to complete, to be symptomatic of
his paraphelia, pedophilia, and antisocial personality disorder. This supports potential
disqualification under AG ¶ 13(b). The degree and extent of sexual deviancy that
Applicant committed, combined with the high regard in which he is now held by friends,
coworkers, and grandchildren, who were not shown to be remotely aware of that
conduct, establishes an ongoing vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress under
AG ¶ 13(c). Finally, as Applicant admitted, his sexual conduct reflected lack of judgment
under AG ¶ 13(d). The burden thus shifts to Applicant to extenuate or mitigate these
security concerns flowing from his admitted behavior under all four DCs.
Although a substantial number of the deviant sexual acts admitted by Applicant
took place prior to or during his adolescence, the substantial evidence of subsequent
conduct of a similar (or worse) nature, including a felony conviction, precludes mitigation
under AG ¶ 14(a). Applicant’s sexual behavior of concern all took place more than 25
years ago, but was frequent and not under unusual circumstances. Its likelihood to recur
is reduced by his lengthy abstention from such behavior, but he and his wife remain
concerned enough about his possible temptation to re-offend that they discuss it
regularly and try to avoid situations in which that might occur. This is commendable, but
also reflects their own rational doubts concerning his current reliability, trustworthiness,
and judgment, and precludes more than minimal mitigation under AG 14(b). 
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Applicant’s conviction for Statutory Rape was shown to be sufficiently well known
that, in itself, might support mitigation under AG ¶ 14(c). However, the nature and extent
of the behavior underlying that conviction, as well as all the other deviancy detailed in
SOR ¶¶ 1.d(1) through 1.d(10), were not shown to be known to the many friends,
coworkers, and grandchildren whose high regard he worked hard to establish and now
rightfully values a great deal. Accordingly, his sexual behavior continues to serve as a
potent basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress, and AG ¶ 14(c) was not established.
Much of Applicant’s sexual behavior of security concern was private, in that it was not
known to others. That would alleviate concerns under AG ¶ 13(d) for public sexual acts,
but his conduct did not reflect good judgment or discretion, and its private nature forms
the basis for ongoing coercion concerns under AG ¶ 13(c). 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes the DCs under this guideline. The specific Guideline E
concerns raised by the SOR allegations include:
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing . . .;  
and the judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness issues the Appeal Board has found to
be inherent under AG ¶ 15. ISCR Case No. 06-20964 (App. Bd. Apr. 10, 2008).
The nature and extent of Applicant’s crimes against his children, and his other
sexually deviant conduct, together with his concealment of his true culpability from
others whose knowledge of it would adversely affect his personal, professional, and
community standing, create ongoing vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, and
duress. These acts also raise serious concerns about Applicant’s judgment, reliability
and trustworthiness. 
AG ¶ 17 provides personal conduct MCs. The only MCs with potential
applicability to the foregoing security concerns are:
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
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unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
AG ¶ 17(c) was not established for the reasons discussed above concerning AG
¶ 14(b). Applicant produced evidence to support the first prong of AG ¶ 17(d), and is
taking commendable steps to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. This provides some
mitigation of the judgment and trustworthiness concerns, but not of the concerns over
exploitation, manipulation, or duress. The steps Applicant has taken to reduce
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation or duress are insufficient, because the nature
and extent of his sexual conduct understandably have not been revealed to those
whose good opinion he values and has worked hard to establish. AG ¶ 17(e) was not
shown to be applicable.
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct
AG ¶ 30 expresses the security concern pertaining to criminal conduct, “Criminal
activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its
very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws,
rules and regulations.” AG ¶ 31 describes Criminal Conduct DCs, two of which are
raised by the evidence: “(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;” and “(c)
allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was
formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted.”
Applicant was arrested and convicted of Statutory Rape, 2  Degree, a felony, innd
1983. He was also convicted of assaulting his stepson in 1992. These facts sufficiently
raise security concerns under the DCs set forth in AG ¶¶ 31(a) and (c). 
AG ¶ 32 sets forth potential criminal conduct MCs. These are: 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
(b) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those
pressures are no longer present in the person’s life;
(c) evidence that the person did not commit the offense; and
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(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited
to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or
restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or
constructive community involvement.
Applicability of the MC set forth in AG ¶ 32(a) is minimal for the reasons
discussed above concerning AG ¶ 14(b). There is no evidence Applicant was pressured
to commit these offenses by anything other than deviant sexual urges about which he
and his wife remain concerned, so AG ¶ 32(b) was not established. AG ¶ 32(c) was not
asserted, but Applicant provided sufficient evidence of rehabilitation through the
passage of more than 17 years since the assault and 26 years since the sex offenses,
his evident remorse, job training, and a good employment record to support mitigation of
criminal conduct security concerns under AG ¶ 32(d). Accordingly, Paragraph 3 is found
for the Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct of
security concern involves a period of almost 25 years during which he engaged in
numerous deviant sexual acts including felonious child molestation for which he was
ultimately convicted in 1983. He eventually completed court-ordered sex offender
treatment, after failing to complete his first two programs, and was discharged from
probation in 1988. He was also convicted of assault in 1992, but that charge was later
dismissed after he completed probation and an anger management program. His
participation in these events was voluntary and motivated by self-gratification or anger.
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There is no evidence of any sexual misconduct since 1983, or criminal conduct
since 1992, and Applicant has reestablished a good reputation and affectionate
relationships within his family and among his friends. This is positive evidence of
rehabilitation. He is highly regarded by professional acquaintances, coworkers and
supervisors as well. Many of these people know he was convicted of statutory rape
more than 25 years ago, and his children and wife know what he did to them. However,
during treatment he also confessed to a number of additional acts of deviant sexual
behavior as specified in SOR ¶¶ 1.d(1) through 1.d(10). Information about these actions
would be likely to severely damage the esteem in which he is currently held by these
people who have become important in his life. Despite his general assertions during the
security clearance process, and to the managerial psychologist whose opinion he
offered in evidence, that he had fully disclosed his past misconduct, no credible
evidence was presented to show that these people knew the specifics of his deviant
acts. The two close friends who testified knew very little, in fact. The potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress arising from this potentially humiliating
information continues to date and, if anything, grows in its ability to threaten his
increasing reputation as an honorable man. 
The likelihood of recurrence of deviant sexual conduct has been reduced by the
ongoing efforts of Applicant and his wife to prevent that. However, the potential for
coercion, exploitation, or duress from exposure of the [avoid the temptation to
editorialize] details of his past sexual conduct is certain to continue. Applicant presented
insufficient evidence to mitigate security concerns arising from his sexual behavior and
personal conduct. The record generates significant doubt as to his present eligibility and
suitability for a security clearance.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline D: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline G: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                  
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge