KEYWORD: Guideline B; Guideline F 
DIGEST: Applicant cited to Board precedent in support of his contention that he had mitigated
the security concerns in his case.  However, the prior case he cited is distinguishable from his
case.  Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASENO: 08-09052.a1
DATE: 01/25/2010
DATE: January 25, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-09052
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Samuel Bluck, Esq.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On March 30, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and
Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992,
as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On November 9, 2009, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge Elizabeth M. Matchinski denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision is
The Judge’s favorable Formal findings under Guideline B are not at issue on appeal.1
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Finding no error, we affirm the Judge’s decision.1
The Judge made the following relevant findings of fact: Applicant is 55 years old and is
married with three children.  In 2003, Applicant purchased a home.  In 2004, Applicant purchased
a second home and moved into it with his wife, intending to pay a new mortgage (for $172,000) on
the first home and an unsecured loan (for $43,000) with rent from a tenant and $400 a month of his
own money.  In 2005 the tenant stopped paying rent.  Applicant covered the mortgage payments for
both houses.  In 2006 Applicant’s earnings decreased and his wife was only willing to contribute 10-
15% of the household expenses.  The rental house went through foreclosure leaving Applicant with
no liability for that home, however, by December 2007 Applicant was past due $8,104 on a balance
of $9,369 on an installment loan taken out for a new roof for that property.  By January 2009,
Applicant’s delinquent debts totaled $92,558.  He is working with a debt management company
paying $385 a month for 48 months to resolve $48,718.05 of his debt.  Applicant and his wife have
refinanced their home, although the mortgage exceeds the current market value of the home.  In 2006
Applicant took a car loan of $36,073 which he pays on time. (The current balance is $19,569.)
The Appeal Board’s review of the Judge’s findings of facts is limited to determining if they
are supported by substantial evidence—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.”
Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1.  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility
of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Applicant objects to some of the Judge’s statements concerning his financial situation.  After
reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge’s material findings are based on substantial
evidence, or constitute reasonable characterizations or inferences that could be drawn from the
record.  The statements are therefore sustainable.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-24013 at 2 (App. Bd.
Mar. 4, 2008).
Applicant also contends that the Judge did not give adequate weight to his evidence of
mitigation.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether
the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement
with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the
evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in
a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 07-00553 at 2
(May 23, 2008).  The Judge discussed the evidence, including the mitigating evidence extensively
and explained why she concluded that Applicant had failed to meet his burden of persuasion.
Applicant cites the Board’s decision in ISCR Case No. 08-06567 (App. Bd. Oct. 29, 2009)
for the proposition that the Judge erroneously concluded that he did not act reasonably under the
circumstances of this case and did not do all he reasonably could to address his indebtedness.  After
review, the Board concludes that the case cited by Applicant is distinguishable from the instant case
on its facts, and does not contain any analysis or statement of law that renders the Judge’s
conclusions unsustainable.
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when
‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
Order
The Judge’s decision denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan       
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett             
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields            
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board