1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE   
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
 ------------------------------------ )     ISCR Case No. 08-02565
SSN: ------------------------ )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was incarcerated in 1998 following his felony drug conviction for the
manufacture and delivery of LSD. After his parole ended in 2001, he continued to
exhibit a disregard for the law by repeatedly operating a vehicle while his license was
revoked or suspended, and by using illegal drugs in 2004 and 2006. He lost a job in
2002, due in part to his abuse of alcohol. He owes about $11,463 in delinquent debt that
is only partially attributed to a motorcycle accident. Applicant’s omission of arrest record
information from his security clearance application was unintentional, but serious
concerns persist about his judgment and reliability. Clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case
Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on September 26, 2007. On June 2, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) issued to Applicant a statement of reasons (SOR) detailing the
security concerns under Guideline J, criminal conduct; Guideline H, drug involvement;
Guideline F, financial considerations; and Guideline E, personal conduct; which
provided the basis for its preliminary decision to deny him a security clearance and refer
2
the matter to an administrative judge. The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense as of
September 1, 2006.
On June 25, 2009, Applicant answered the SOR and he requested a hearing.
The case was assigned to me on July 17, 2009, to decide whether it is clearly
consistent to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. On August 11, 2009, I
scheduled a hearing for September 17, 2009.
I convened the hearing as scheduled. Seven government exhibits (Exs. 1-7) and
one Applicant exhibit (Ex. A) were admitted without any objections, and Applicant
testified, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on September 25, 2009.
Findings of Fact
DOHA alleged under Guideline J, criminal conduct, that Applicant was charged in
May 1996 with operating to endanger (SOR 1.a); with operating after license revocation
in about October 1996 (SOR 1.b) and in about 1998 (SOR 1.f); and with operating on a
suspended license in about December 1996 (SOR 1.c), and in about January 1997
(SOR 1.d), all charges dismissed. Also under Guideline J, DOHA alleged that Applicant
was sentenced to eight years in prison for an October 1997 charge of manufacture or
delivery of LSD (SOR 1.e); was arrested in July 2002 for violating the Abuse Prevention
Act (SOR 1.g); was convicted and placed on probation for operating after suspended
license in 2003 (SOR 1.h); and pleaded guilty and paid restitution on charges of
operating after suspended license, leaving the scene of property damage, and use
without authority filed in January 2005 (SOR 1.i). 
Under Guideline H, drug involvement, DOHA alleged that Applicant used cocaine
from about February 2004 to at least August 2006 (SOR 2.a) and ecstasy from
February 2004 to at least August 2004 (SOR 2.b); that he “made” and used LSD in at
least 1997 (SOR 2.c); and that he was sentenced to eight years in prison for the
October 1997 charge of manufacturing or delivering LSD (SOR 2.d). 
Under Guideline F, financial considerations, Applicant was alleged to owe
delinquent medical debt totaling $7,333 (SOR 3.a-3.c, 3.e-3.f) and two other debts in
collection totaling $4,130 (SOR 3.d, 3.g). 
Under Guideline E, personal conduct, DOHA alleged that Applicant falsified a
Questionnaire for National Security Positions (his e-QIP) by deliberately not disclosing
the charges filed against him in July 2002, 2003, and 2005 (SOR 4.a); that Applicant
was dismissed from his employment in about July 2002 for unsatisfactory performance
due in part to alcohol consumption (SOR 4.b); and that a civil restraining order was filed
against him in about April 2002 (SOR 4.c).
The charge was disposed of as a civil infraction under Chapter 277, Section 70C (Ex. 6). Pertinent1
state law provides for a violation of a municipal ordinance, a bylaw, or a misdemeanor offense to be treated
as a civil infraction not liable to punishment by incarceration. The court can, in such cases, impose a fine of
not more than $5,000. An adjudication of responsibility shall neither be used in the calculation of second and
subsequent offenses under any chapter, nor as the basis for the revocation of parole or of a probation
surrender. An adjudication of responsibility under this section may include an order of restitution. 
3
Applicant admitted the criminal conduct allegations with the exception of 1.i,
which he denied on the basis of a not guilty finding. He admitted the drug involvement
and financial indebtedness. Concerning the personal conduct allegations, Applicant
acknowledged he had not reported his most recent arrests on his e-QIP, but he had
misread the question and not intended to omit the information. Applicant admitted that
he had been dismissed from a job in 2002 in part due to alcohol, and that a civil
restraining order had been filed against him in 2002.  Concerning the restraining order,
Applicant added, “she wanted to punch me for finding out she was cheating.”
After considering the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the following
findings of fact.
Applicant is 33 years old, and he has been employed by a defense contractor
since September 2007. He installs material to seal off radiation (“poly install”) (Ex. A).
He seeks his first security clearance (Ex. 1).
Applicant was ticketed for driving to endanger in May 1996. He and a friend in
another vehicle were observed swerving on the road. Applicant contended that he was
trying to avoid raised manhole covers in the roadway, but the judge was not persuaded
by his explanation and he had to pay the ticket (Tr. 30).1
Applicant’s driver’s license was revoked for receiving multiple speeding tickets.
He was cited for driving on a revoked or suspended license in October 1996, December
1996, January 1997, and May 1998 (Ex. 6). He admits that he drove without a valid
license, but the charges were dismissed (Tr. 30-31).
In January 1997, Applicant began attending a technical institute located in
another state (Ex. 1). He was without a valid driver’s license and unable to find a job
nearby that would give him the income he needed to support himself. He had a
roommate who “knew a couple of things,” and they began to  manufacture and distribute
LSD early in the summer of 1997. Applicant, who occasionally smoked marijuana,
began using LSD as well (Tr. 65). By October 1997, Applicant wanted to get out of the
drug business, and he planned to start fresh back home. Unbeknownst to him, the drug
activities of the Applicant and his roommate had been under investigation. In early
October 1997, Applicant was caught with “1,440 hits” of mescaline (Tr. 32). He was
arrested and charged with manufacturing and distributing LSD or an analog, a class X
felony offense (Exs. 1, 2, 5, Tr. 32). 
In late May 1998, Applicant pleaded guilty to the felony drug charge, and he was
sentenced to eight years in prison. He was incarcerated initially in that state’s
Concerning his termination, Applicant testified, “I was having a bad couple of years after the breakup2
with my fiancee and was trying to make myself feel a little better with the bottle and I lost my job over it. The
deal was he let me go, rather than fire me, that way I could collect unemployment and get some help with my
alcohol problem” (Tr. 40-41). 
4
penitentiary, and then in a “boot camp” correctional facility for first time offenders with
no violent crimes (Ex. 2, Tr. 32-33, 87-90). While he was in prison, he attended court
ordered Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings (Tr. 60). Applicant spent the final weeks
of his incarceration in a halfway house pending processing of his paperwork, and he
was released on parole in late January 1999. He returned to his home state where he
had to report to a probation officer once a week until his parole ended in 2001 (Ex. 2, Tr.
90-91).
Applicant was employed by a woodworking company on his release from
incarceration, and then he went to work as a technician for an auto dealer (Ex. 1).
Applicant cohabited with a girlfriend from June to November 2001, until they broke up
and Applicant moved out (Ex. 1). In April 2002, she obtained a civil restraining order
against him (Ex. 6), although Applicant denies that he abused her (Ex. 2, Tr. 34). In
early July 2002, Applicant was charged criminally with violation of the state’s Abuse
Prevention Act (Ex. 6) when his former girlfriend apparently complained to the police
that he had violated the restraining order. Applicant denies that he called her (Ex. 2, Tr.
35), and the charge was continued without a finding and then dismissed after he paid
court costs (Ex. 6).
Applicant enjoyed the freedom to come and go as he pleased, and over the June
to July 2002 time frame, he drank beer at a bar after work on a daily basis. He left the
bar usually before he had consumed too many drinks to drive safely, but he continued
to drink at home until he fell asleep. Most nights he consumed close to 30 beers (Ex. 2),
and he reported to his job the next day at times with a hangover or wearing sunglasses
(presumably to cope with the effects of drinking). He eventually lost his job as an
automotive technician in July 2002, due to his drinking and unsatisfactory performance
(Exs. 1, 2, Tr. 40-41).2
Applicant began attending Alcohol Anonymous (AA) meetings with his ex-
girlfriend’s father during the latter half of 2002. Applicant stopped attending AA meetings
after six months because he was feeling fine and he had reduced his alcohol
consumption to a couple beers with friends once a week (Tr. 60-61). He thought he
might have been a “functional alcoholic” over the month or so that he had been drinking
to excess (Ex. 2).
Applicant was unemployed for over a year, until about September 2003. When
his unemployment benefits ran out, he began working as a meat clerk for a supermarket
(Tr. 51). A friend, who had started sleeping at his apartment, introduced him to the
“wrong crowd.” From February 2004 to August 2004, Applicant snorted cocaine and
ingested ecstasy in pill form on the weekends when socializing with his new friends
(Exs. 1, 2, Tr. 33, 64-65). Applicant told a government investigator in January 2008 that
he bought the cocaine and ecstasy at clubs (Ex. 2), but he clarified at his hearing that
Applicant explained that by the court hearing, his female friend was eight months pregnant, and that3
she was going to be believed over him in spite of the truth (Tr. 37, 93).
5
his friend purchased the drugs with money he gave him (Tr. 63-64). At Applicant’s
request, this friend eventually moved out, and Applicant ceased his illegal drug use (Tr.
37-38).
In late October 2004, Applicant was out to a club with a female friend. He
maintains that he left the club with someone else, and that his companion, who had
been drinking, left her car in the road following an accident (Ex. 2, Tr. 36-37). Yet she
called the police and complained that he had taken her car without her permission (Tr.
92). Applicant was arraigned in January 2005 on charges of operating after his license
had been suspended, leaving the scene of an accident with property damage, and use
without authority. Applicant told a government investigator in January 2008 that he
pleaded guilty, paid a $3,500 fine, and his case was continued without a finding (Ex. 2).
He now claims that he pleaded no contest on legal advice.  Criminal records show that3
in August 2005, he admitted sufficient facts to operating after license suspended,
leaving the scene of property damage, and use of a motor vehicle without authority. He
was ordered to pay restitution of $2,515.88 to be paid within three months in three
installments, and his case was continued without a finding for one year and then
dismissed after payment of restitution and assessments (Exs. 6, 7).
In May or June 2005, Applicant was fired from his job at the supermarket (Exs. 1,
2). Applicant had been suspended without pay for making a comment off the job about a
coworker. Applicant was terminated when he failed to show for scheduled work hours
(Ex. 2).
Over the next two years, Applicant worked as a kitchen manager at a restaurant
and as a technician at an automobile body shop (Ex. 1). Following the death of a close
friend, he “went on a bender for the night” and used cocaine while intoxicated at a
house party in August 2006 (Exs. 1, 2, Tr. 33, 65, 67).
In September 2007, Applicant began working for his present employer (Ex. A).
On September 26, 2007, Applicant completed an e-QIP on which he disclosed his
felony drug conviction, and his use of ecstacy and cocaine on multiple occasions
between February 2004 and August 2004, and cocaine once in August 2006 when he
was intoxicated. Applicant did not disclose that he had been charged with violation of
the Abuse Prevention Act in 2002, with operating after license suspended in 2003 and
2005, and with leaving the scene of an accident with property damage in 2005, because
he believed only convictions had to be listed (Ex. 2, Tr. 40, 75). Applicant listed one
delinquent debt of $781.70 owed a utility company since June 2005 (SOR 3.g) (Ex. 1).
Available credit reports (Exs. 3, 4) showed Applicant also owed delinquent
medical debts of $331 from September 2003 (SOR 3.f), $560 from February 2004 (SOR
3.c), and $6,279 from March 2004 (SOR 3.e). In September 2007, a consumer credit
card debt of $2,218 was placed for collection (SOR 3.d). Applicant had fallen behind on
this credit card account in the past. He took out a loan and paid off the balance. After
Applicant testified that he always paid his motorcycle loan on time (Tr. 48). As of May 2009, Equifax4
was reporting no past due balance but also that the account was 30 days past due as of March 2009 (Ex. 4).
6
the card was reinstated, he again fell seriously behind in his payments and his account
went into collection (Tr. 43).
Although he already possessed two trucks, for which he was paying insurance,
Applicant was pressured by the woman he was dating into buying a new motorcycle in
July 2008 (Tr. 49-50). He financed the purchase through a loan of $20,528, to be repaid
at $365 per month (Ex. 4). Applicant has been current on those payments for the most
part.4
 
As of May 2009, Applicant had not resolved the delinquent debt balances listed
in the SOR. With interest continuing to accumulate, he owed $3,349 on the retail credit
card account in SOR 3.d, despite a claim of minor payments on the account in 2008 (Tr.
43-44). Additional medical debt of $81 (SOR 3.a) and $82 (SOR 3.b) from May 2008
had been placed for collection (Ex. 4). 
Applicant was unable to repay his delinquent debts in part because of a
motorcycle accident in April 2008 (Tr. 38). Applicant was hit head on by a car who had
crossed into his lane. He suffered a fracture, and incurred orthopedic and physical
therapy costs that became his priority (Tr. 38-39, 57). After paying $750 in out-of-pocket
medical costs over the past year, he owes the physical therapist just under $300 and
the orthopedic surgeon about $360. He has ongoing prescription costs of about $10 per
week (Tr. 57-58). Applicant rejected an insurance settlement that would have covered
his medical expenses plus paid him $2,000 for his pain and suffering. He has not sought
any legal help to negotiate with the insurance company (Tr. 59-60, 82). Applicant plans
to use future settlement proceeds to pay off his delinquent debt (Tr. 83). 
In September 2009, Applicant contacted the creditor of SOR 3.d and he
promised to pay $75 per month on the debt starting in early October 2009 (Tr. 44).
Applicant was one month behind on a credit card account that he opened in June 2009
to rebuild his credit (Tr. 46-48), despite a reported “couple hundred bucks” in
discretionary income each month (Tr. 54) on an hourly wage of $21.84 (Ex. A).
Applicant’s income tax refund for tax year 2008 was $1,200 or $1,300. He spent about
$800 of the refund on a camping vacation that he took with friends in June 2009 (Tr. 55-
56).
 
During an interview with a government investigator in January 2008, Applicant
had denied any current association with persons who use illegal drugs. He expressed
an intent to refrain from illegal drug use in the future (Ex. 2). But at his hearing in
September 2009, Applicant admitted that at a couple of barbecues over the last few
summers, he had been at social gatherings of friends or family members (sister) where
others were smoking marijuana. Applicant elected not to smoke the drug himself and he
went outside (Tr. 68, 78). To Applicant’s knowledge, his sister smokes marijuana once a
week or once a month. He has asked her to refrain from using marijuana in his
presence (Tr. 79).
The available record contains no detail about the incident that led to the disciplinary action.5
7
Applicant consumes alcohol at party settings, such as family cookouts, when he
does not have to work the next day. Since July 2002, he has consumed about 16 beers
at a sitting once or twice a month, which for him is the minimum amount “to even feel a
buzz” (Ex. 2). As of September 2009, Applicant was sharing about 30 beers with a
friend once a month (Tr. 62, 84). At a pig roast in August 2009, Applicant drank 20
beers over the course of the entire day (from about 1000 hours to 2200 hours).
Applicant rode his motorcycle home because he did not feel that he was intoxicated (Tr.
83-84). Applicant does not think that he has a drinking problem (Tr. 63). Applicant has
been ticketed for moving violations, including speeding, within the past two years,
including in late August or early September 2009 (Tr. 58).
Applicant’s work performance with the defense contractor has been fully
satisfactory since he started in September 2007. He had one disciplinary incident
between March 2008 and September 2008 that was discussed with his supervisor, but it
did not affect the quality of his work (Ex. A).5
Policies
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,
emphasizing “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security
clearance, the administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines
(AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative
guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are
required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified
information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c),
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
“whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a
decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the
government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and
other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or
8
proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of
persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant
concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access
to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Criminal Conduct
The security concern about criminal conduct is set out in Guideline J, AG ¶ 30:
Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.
The May 1996 charge of operating to endanger was disposed of as a civil
infraction. However, AG ¶ 31(a), “a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses,”
and AG ¶ 31(c), “allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted,” apply because of
Applicant’s repeated operation of a motor vehicle after his driver’s license had been
suspended or revoked, and because of his felony conviction, albeit dated, for
manufacture and distribution of LSD in 1997.
Applicant served his sentence and his parole, apparently without incident. But
after he completed his parole, he violated the drug laws by abusing cocaine and ecstasy
multiple times in 2004 and by using cocaine at least once in August 2006. He was
placed on probation for operating a motor vehicle in May 2003 after his license had
been suspended. The available evidence fails to substantiate the July 2002 violation of
the Abuse Prevention Act, but while he also denies any culpability with respect to the
January 2005 charges,  court records indicate that sufficient facts were found to sustain
findings that he operated a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, left the
scene with property damage, and used a motor vehicle without authority. His case was
ultimately dismissed without a finding, but not until after he had paid $2,515.88 in
restitution. Even if I accept Applicant’s testimony that he did not drive his friend’s car in
October 2004 without a license and without authority, AG ¶ 32(a), “so much time has
elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual
9
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” cannot reasonably be applied, given his
record of criminal violations. Furthermore, AG ¶ 32(c), “evidence that the person did not
commit the offense,” has limited applicability in this case only to the allegations of
domestic abuse. It would not mitigate his admitted drug manufacture and distribution, or
his repeated operation of a vehicle while his license was suspended or revoked.
Applicant’s good work performance in his defense contractor employment is
some evidence of reform under AG ¶ 32(d), “there is evidence of successful
rehabilitation; including but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of
criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher education; good
employment record, or constructive community involvement.” It has been four plus
years since Applicant was charged criminally, and three years since he last used an
illicit drug. Yet, insufficient reform in his personal life, evidenced most recently by
speeding, excessive drinking at times, and continuing association with illegal drug
users, preclude me from concluding that his criminal conduct is safely in the past.
Drug Involvement
The security concern about drug involvement is set out in Guideline H, AG ¶ 24:
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may
impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and
include:
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed
in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or
cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and
(2) inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a
manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
Applicant went off to college without a valid operator’s license because of his
repeatedly driving after suspension or revocation. When he could not find a job nearby,
he and his roommate began manufacturing and distributing LSD (and apparently
mescaline) in the summer of 1997. Applicant began using LSD as well, and he
continued his drug involvement until he was arrested in October 1997. Afforded a fresh
start after he was paroled, Applicant returned to his old drug using habits in February
2004. Over the next seven months, Applicant used cocaine and ecstasy on weekends
when socializing with friends. Then in August 2006, he snorted cocaine while drinking
on at least one occasion. AG ¶ 25(a), “any drug abuse,” and AG ¶ 25(c), “illegal drug
Applicant’s largest medical debt (SOR 3.e) was reportedly placed for collection in September 20066
after there had been no activity on the account since March 2004 (Ex. 4).
10
possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or
distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia,” are implicated.
Applicant’s illegal drug involvement, when viewed as a whole, cannot reasonably
be considered as “so long ago,” or as “so infrequent” to qualify for mitigation under AG ¶
26(a), “the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” Although I find Applicant credible
when he denies any intent to use illegal drugs in the future, it is not enough to satisfy
AG ¶ 26(b), “a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future.” He continues
to associate with friends and family members (sister) who use illegal drugs, so AG ¶
26(b)(1), “disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts,” is not satisfied.
Applicant has been at a couple of barbecues in the past few summers where others
have smoked marijuana. While he exhibited good judgment by not using the drug
himself on those occasions (See AG ¶ 26(b)(2), “changing or avoiding the environment
where drugs were used”), he has been susceptible to peer influence in the past, as
when he used cocaine on multiple occasions in 2004 after some experience with NA
and AA, and seven years of abstinence from illegal drugs. He used cocaine on at least
one more occasion, in August 2006. His present three years of abstinence is not long
enough to qualify as an “appropriate period of abstinence” under AG ¶ 26(b)(3), given
his history of drug involvement and ongoing association with known illegal drug users.
Financial Considerations
The security concern about finances is set out in Guideline F, AG ¶ 18:
Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended
is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
As of his e-QIP in September 2007, Applicant was seriously delinquent on a retail
charge account (SOR 3.d), on some medical debts (SOR 3.c, 3.e-3.f),  and on a utility6
account (SOR 3.g). He incurred additional medical debt following a motorcycle accident
in 2008. While he has been making payments to his orthopedist and physical therapist,
a couple of medical debts from 2008 totaling $163 were placed for collection (SOR 3.a-
3.b). Disqualifying conditions AG ¶ 19(a), “inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts,” and
AG ¶ 19(c), “a history of not meeting financial obligations,” apply.
AG ¶ 20(a), “the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” does not apply in
11
mitigation. Accounts were placed for collection as recently as May 2009, and Applicant
had made little effort to address his old delinquencies as of September 2009.
AG ¶ 20(b), “the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn,
unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual
acted responsibly under the circumstances,” is implicated in part. Applicant’s April 2008
motorcycle accident was outside of his control. While most of his delinquent medical
debt predated the accident, out-of-pocket payments for prescriptions, and for orthopedic
and physical therapy services from the accident, impacted his ability to repay his
delinquent debts. However, AG ¶ 20(b) does not mitigate his questionable financial
decisions. After he used loan proceeds to pay off a delinquent balance on his account
with the creditor in SOR 3.d, he ran up new charges on his reinstated account that he
then failed to pay. In July 2008, he financed the purchase of a new motorcycle taking
out a loan of $20,528 when delinquent debts remain unpaid. About $800 of his income
tax refund for tax year 2008 was spent on a camping vacation instead of delinquent
debt repayment.
Applicant testified credibly that he contacted the creditor in SOR 3.d in
September 2009 and arranged to pay $75 per month toward the debt starting in October
2009. This belated effort to address his debt is not enough to apply either AG ¶ 20(c),
“the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are
clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control,” or AG ¶ 20(d),
“the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise
resolve debts.” Applicant expects to receive sufficient funds from an insurance
settlement to cover his delinquent obligations. But the evidence of record is insufficient
to mitigate the financial concerns.
Personal Conduct
The security concern about personal conduct is set out in Guideline E, AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant failed to indicate on his September 2007 e-QIP that he had been
charged in July 2002 with violating the Abuse Prevention Act; that he had been found
guilty of operating a vehicle in May 2003 after license suspension;  or that he had been
charged in January 2005 with operating a vehicle after suspension, leaving the scene of
property damage, and use of a vehicle without authority. These charges fell within the
scope of question 23.f concerning any arrests within the last seven years. Applicant has
consistently denied any intentional concealment, maintaining that he misread the
question as pertaining to convictions only. The 2002 and 2005 charges were continued
Despite Applicant’s abuse of alcohol on occasion, the government did not allege Guideline G, alcohol7
consumption. In the absence of any evidence to indicate that Applicant was intoxicated or impaired on the job,
or drinking on the job, it would not qualify as an alcohol-related incident under Guideline G, AG ¶ 22(b),
“alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition,
or drinking on the job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol
dependent.” So the loss of his job, due in part to his off-duty drinking, would not be explicitly covered under
Guideline G.
12
without a finding, although Applicant had to pay substantial restitution for the 2005
leaving the scene with property damage charge. The 2003 operating a vehicle after
suspension charge was dismissed, but only after he had been placed on probation.  The
e-QIP inquiry at issue (“In the last 7 years, have you been arrested for, charged with, or
convicted of any offense(s) not listed. . . .”) is clearly stated, but Applicant’s disclosures
of his dated yet very serious felony drug offense, of his employment terminations, and of
his recent drug use lead me to conclude that Applicant lacked the willful intent required
for AG ¶ 16(a), “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used
to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or
status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities.” 
As alleged in SOR 4.b, Applicant’s abuse of alcohol led to a loss of his
employment at a car dealership in July 2002. AG ¶ 16(c), “credible adverse information
that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself
for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other
characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected
information,” is implicated.  Applicant reported to work with hangovers from drinking the7
night before, and he wore sunglasses at times to conceal that he had been drinking to
excess. There is no evidence that he has allowed alcohol to negatively effect his
present employment, and seven years have passed since Applicant was dismissed from
a job due in part to drinking. But I am unable to fully mitigate the judgment concerns
under AG ¶ 17(c), “the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior
is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment.” As recently as August 2009, Applicant consumed 20 beers at a pig roast. He
and a friend share about 30 beers once a month and he sees no need to change that
behavior. Concerns persist for his judgment and reliability given his binge drinking.
Applicant does not dispute the issuance of a civil restraining order against him in
April 2002 (SOR 4.c), but he denies any factual basis for the order (“it was all fiction,”
Tr. 34). AG ¶16(e), “personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1)
engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, professional, or
community standing,” is potentially applicable because the issuance of a restraining
order could negatively affect Applicant’s reputation. But the available record evidence
did not sufficiently establish that Applicant abused his former girlfriend, or that he
13
contacted her in violation of the protection order. AG ¶ 17(f), “the information was
unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability,” applies to mitigate the
issuance of the restraining order.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the conduct
and all the circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶
2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant made a serious error in judgment in becoming involved in LSD
manufacture and distribution in 1997. After he was paroled, he took steps toward
becoming a productive member of society, but he showed immaturity and disregard of
the law in repeatedly operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended or
revoked. He turned to alcohol after he and his fiancee broke up in 2002, and drank to
excess on a daily basis in June and July 2002. In 2004, he succumbed to peer influence
and used cocaine and ecstacy on the weekends for about seven months. Sufficient
facts were found to sustain findings that he had operated a friend’s car without a valid
license and without her permission, and left the scene of an accident involving property
damage in October 2004, although he denies any involvement. In August 2006, he
snorted cocaine while out drinking with a friend. A motorcycle accident in April 2008 set
him back financially. Yet, he exhibited poor financial judgment by financing a new
motorcycle for $20,528 in July 2008, when he owed delinquent debts in collection.
Applicant has abstained from illegal drugs since August 2006, but he risks his sobriety
by binge drinking and by continuing to associate with illegal drug users. He has
performed his duties with a defense contractor in a fully satisfactory manner since his
hire in late September 2007. However, he has yet to demonstrate that he possesses the
good judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness required for access to classified
information.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
14
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.g: Against Applicant
Paragraph 4, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 4.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 4.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 4.c: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to
classified information is denied.
Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge