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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 08-08930
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Jr. Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se 
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on October 16,
2007. On June 16, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline B
(Foreign Influence) for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1990), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on July 1, 2009. He elected to have
his case decided on the record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the
government’s written case on December 9, 2009. Applicant received a complete file of
relevant material (FORM) on December 16, 2009, and was provided an opportunity to
file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the government’s
The Government submitted seven items in support of its contentions.1
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case.  Applicant submitted additional information by January 15, 2010. The case was1
assigned to me on February 2, 2010. Based upon a review of the case file, eligibility for
access to classified information is denied.
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to People’s Republic of China (PRC). The request and the
attached source documents were included in the record as attachments. (I-XVI) The
facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, dated July 1, 2009, Applicant admitted the factual
allegations in ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e, 1.f, and 1.g of the SOR. He submitted additional
information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.
Applicant is a 31-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He was born and
raised in China, he immigrated to the United States in August 1995. Applicant became a
naturalized United States citizen in May 2001. He submitted a security clearance
application on October 16, 2007. 
Applicant graduated from an American high school in August 1998. He received
an undergraduate degree and ultimately a master of science degree from a U.S.
university in 2006. Currently, he is employed as an engineer for a contractor. He has
been in his current position since March 2007.
Applicant married a woman he was introduced to online, who is a citizen of
China. He met her in person in China in 2006. In October 2008, they were married in
the United States. She resides in the United States with Applicant. She holds a
permanent resident card and intends to become a United States citizen when all the
conditions are met in approximately two years (Item 2). Applicant maintains that his wife
does not show any interest in his work, and she works in a medical field at a university. 
Applicant’s mother-in-law was an accountant for a local city planning department
in China, where she is a citizen and a resident. She retired in November 2007. Applicant
plans to sponsor her to the United States next year (Item 2). His father-in-law is
deceased.
Applicant has an aunt, three uncles, and several cousins who are citizens and
residents of China. He maintains contact with them through his mother who has been a
naturalized U. S. citizen since 2001. Applicant speaks to his relatives in China on the
telephone at holiday or festival times. He maintains that he does not contact them
separately or apart from the phone conversations that his mother has with them. 
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Applicant’s aunts and uncles are retired. He maintains they have not worked
since the 1990's. He knows they were teachers, doctors, and civil engineers. His cousin
works for a highway traffic station collecting tolls. Applicant describes his cousin’s work
as civil service, and not military or government service.
Applicant contends that his relatives in China do not know what Applicant does
for a living. He emphasized that “they do not possess any type of information as to what
kind of job I currently have, nor did they express any interest.”
Applicant traveled to China in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2007. In 1996, 1999,
and 2002, he traveled with his mother. Applicant was on spring or summer breaks from
high school or college. He reported that he accompanied his mother to China because
he had nowhere else to go, and that it was expected that he would visit his family. He
explained that it is common practice in his culture to have family members provide
shelter and food for visiting relatives. The visits were sometimes three months in length.
When Applicant was in college, he visited his Chinese relatives from January 2002 until
April 2002 (Item 7). 
In 2006 and 2007, Applicant visited China to meet the woman he would marry.
He spent the time on vacation. He had no personal financial business activities. He
reported the visit to the Facility Security Officer (FSO) for his company. He was briefed
and debriefed before and after the visits. He acknowledged that he made a short trip to
China in January 2008, and he acknowledged that he visited his relatives (Item 7).
In a 2008 sworn affidavit, Applicant acknowledged that he has maintained
contact with a childhood friend (XW), who is a citizen and resident of China. He is a
chemistry salesman in Shanghai. Applicant’s friend introduced him to Applicant’s wife in
2005. Applicant had online contact with his friend from 2005 until September 2008. Prior
to 2005, Applicant maintained contact with XW by email on a limited basis (Item 2).
Applicant maintains that his last contact with XW was in 2008, when Applicant was
married (Response to FORM).
Applicant’s other childhood friend (ZL), who is a citizen and resident of China,
maintained contact with Applicant while they were both in college from 2003 until 2006.
Applicant maintains he had very limited contact prior to 2003. The frequency declined
after 2006 when they graduated from college. ZL is a software engineer who works for a
non-governmental agency in China. ZL was present at Applicant’s wedding in 2008. He
has not contacted him since, and he has no information about his current address
(Response to FORM, July 2009).
Applicant admits that he has other friends who are citizens of China. He
acknowledges that he met these two students, who were married, while he was in the
university. They both were students of engineering. Applicant recalls that in 2005 and
2006, he had daily contact with them and shared an apartment with them. He left the
apartment when he graduated in 2006. Applicant received a phone call or two from
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them after 2006. He has not had contact with them since February 2008. He has no
further information about them.  
Applicant stressed that he has lived in the United States for almost half his
lifetime. He does not have any affiliation to any Chinese political entity. He has more
American friends than foreign contacts. Applicant emphasized that his contacts with
family and friends in China are limited. He has no sympathy for the Chinese
government. His allegiance is to the United States. He has confidence that as a well-
educated, professional United States citizen, he would not sell or disclose any classified
information to a foreign government (Item 2). He loves the freedom in the United States
and knows the duty of “being a United States citizen.” 
I take administrative notice of the following facts. China (PRC) is an authoritarian
state whose power is centralized in the Chinese Communist Party. In foreign relations,
China and the U.S. have been rivals since the Cold War, with particular disagreement
on the status of Taiwan, and China has continued to resist what it considers to be
superpower dominance by the U.S., despite improving economic relations. The United
States is a primary intelligence target of China because of the U.S. role as a global
superpower; its substantial military, political, and economic presence in the Pacific Rim
and Asia; its role as a developer of advanced technology that China requires for
economic growth; and the large number of Americans of Chinese ancestry, who are
considered prime intelligence targets by the PRC. China uses legal and illegal means,
including espionage, to obtain military related systems and technologies from the U.S.
China has a poor human rights record and its citizens lack freedom to peacefully
express opposition to the political system or to freely change those in charge of the
government. There are many high profile cases involving monitoring, harassment,
detention, arrest, and imprisonment of journalists, writers, activists, and defense
lawyers, many of whom were seeking to exercise their rights under the law. There is a
lack of due process and new restrictions on lawyers that further limit the progress
toward the rule of law. There are tight restrictions on freedom to practice religion and
freedom to travel. According to the U.S. State Department, the government of China
engages in serious human rights abuses including, extrajudicial killings, torture, coerced
confessions of prisoners, and forced labor.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
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2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern for Foreign Influence is set out in AG & 6:      
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
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considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associates with a
risk of terrorism. 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns. Under
AG & 7(a), a Acontact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or a resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion” may create a security concern. Similarly, under AG & 7(d) “sharing living
quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion”
may raise security concerns. Applicant’s wife is a citizen of China, although she resides
in the United States. Applicant met his wife through a friend in China. His mother-in-law
is a resident and citizen of China. Applicant has family connections with China, as his
aunt, three uncles and cousins are residents and citizens of China. Applicant and his
mother have visited their family on numerous occasions since 1999. Applicant spent
vacations in China and met his wife in person in China in 2006. He again visited her in
2007 and in 2008. Some of Applicant’s visits were three months in length. Applicant has
childhood friends with whom he has maintained a level of connection. China is a country
whose human rights record is dismal and the potential for abuse is high. Applicant’s
familial relationship with citizens and residents of China creates a heightened risk of
potential exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion. The evidence is
sufficient to raise these potentially disqualifying conditions, requiring a closer
examination.
The guideline also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate security
concerns arising from foreign influence. Under AG ¶ 8(a), the disqualifying condition
may be mitigated where Athe nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the
country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.” Applicant has lived more than
half his life in China. Applicant maintained contact with childhood friends who are
citizens and residents of China. Applicant met his wife through such a friend in China.
Applicant and his wife have been married since 2008. Although his wife maintains her
residency in the U.S., she is a Chinese citizen. She has emotional ties with her mother
in China. Applicant’s relatives are in China. He has visited his family on six occasions.
He stayed with his relatives on many such occasions. His last visit was in 2008.
Applicant and his wife keep in touch with their families in China. Applicant is a
naturalized U.S. citizen, however, there is a heightened risk due to his wife’s status and
his family ties to China. Unfortunately, China is a country that causes concern in the
area of potential exploitation and coercion which makes Applicant vulnerable. His
contact with his family cannot be construed as minimal. This creates a potential conflict
of interest. The evidence does not raise this potentially mitigating condition. 
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Under AG & 8(b), security concerns may be mitigated where Athere is no conflict
of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep
and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” As noted above,
Applicant has longstanding, close ties with his family. Applicant is a naturalized citizen;
however, there is a heightened risk due to his family ties to China. Unfortunately, China
is a country with a tendency to cause concerns in the area of potential exploitation and
coercions which makes Applicant vulnerable. His contact with his family cannot be
construed as minimal This creates a potential conflict of interest.  
The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not,
as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in
a foreign country and an Applicant has frequent, non-casual contacts with that relative,
this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could
potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-
02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or
duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, if
an applicant’s family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or
if the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. 
However, the complicated, competitive relationship of the PRC with the United
States places a significant, but not insurmountable, burden of persuasion on Applicant
to demonstrate that his relationship with his relatives living in China and his relatives in
the United States with close relationships to family members living in China does not
pose a security risk and he is not in a position to be forced to choose between loyalty to
the United States and his family living in China. With its mixed human rights record, and
political, economic, and military rivalry with the United States, it is conceivable that
China would target any Chinese citizen or former citizen living in the United States in an
attempt to gather valuable information from the United States.
China is a country whose human rights record is dismal and the potential for
abuse is high. Applicant’s familial relationship with citizens and residents of China
creates a heightened risk of potential exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure
or coercion. China’s intelligence operatives seek classified or economic information from
United States businesses and/or governmental agencies. Applicant’s connections to his
family members and his mother-in-law create a potential conflict of interest because
these relationships are sufficiently close to raise a possible security concern about his
desire to help these relatives living in China by providing classified information. 
Evidence that “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
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exploitation” is potentially mitigating under AG & 8(c). Applicant traveled to China
numerous times to visit his family. He also contacts them on a regular basis. I conclude
this potentially mitigating condition does not apply.
After a review of the remaining mitigating conditions, I find that none of them
applies in this case.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
A Guideline B decision concerning China must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation in the PRC. The PRC has a dismal human rights record, The PRC
is one of the world’s most aggressive nations in the collection of United States
intelligence and sensitive economic information.       
Applicant was born and raised in China. He has lived in the United States since
1995. He became a United States citizen in 2001. He received his undergraduate and
master degree in 2006 from an American university. His mother is a naturalized United
States citizen. He has worked for a defense contractor since 2007.
Applicant has traveled to China on six occasions since 1996. He visited his family
and also childhood friends in China. He went to China to meet a woman who would
become his wife. He married in 2008. His last trip to China was in 2008. He maintained
contact with some childhood friends as late as 2008. The familial ties are close and the
practices carried out by China create a heightened security risk. I am persuaded by the
totality of the evidence that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national
security to grant Applicant a security clearance. In reaching my decision, I considered
the evidence as a whole, including the appropriate factors and guidelines. 
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Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign
influence.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
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NOREEN A. LYNCH
Administrative Judge