Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
 Adjudication of this case is controlled by the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, approved by the President on2
December 29, 2005, which were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. Pending
official revision of the Directive, the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines supercede the guidelines listed in
Enclosure 2 to the Directive, and they apply to all adjudications or trustworthiness determinations in which an
SOR was issued on or after September 1, 2006.
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------. )
SSN: ---------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-10924
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Julie Mendez, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen, Administrative Judge:
On May 29, 2008, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to request a security clearance for his employment
with a defense contractor. After reviewing the results of the ensuing background
investigation, adjudicators for the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
were unable to make a preliminary affirmative finding  that it is clearly consistent with1
the national interest to grant Applicant’s request. On October 9, 2009, DOHA issued to
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts which raise security concerns
addressed in the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG)  under Guideline E (personal2
conduct), and Guideline D (sexual behavior).
The Government submitted ten items to support its case.3
2
Applicant timely responded to the SOR, and admitted the factual allegation in ¶
1.a and ¶¶ 2.a through 2.c of the SOR. He elected to have his case decided on the
record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the government’s written
case on December 15, 2009.  Applicant received a complete file of relevant material3
(FORM) on December 28, 2009, and was provided an opportunity to file objections and
submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the government’s case. Applicant
submitted additional information in a timely manner. The case was assigned to me on
January 29, 2010. Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits
Applicant’s request for a security clearance is denied.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 43 years old. He graduated from high school and attended college
from September 1986 until July 1987 (Item 4). Since January 1997, Applicant has
worked as an engineering technician for a defense contractor. He held a security
clearance during his civilian employment, including access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) (Item 6).
From 1990 until April 2008, Applicant accessed an internet website to view child
pornography. He also read sexual fantasy stories involving children on the website five
to seven times per week (Item 3). When he viewed pictures of children engaging in
sexual activity, he masturbated (Item 7). 
On November 7, 2007, as part of a security investigation conducted by another
agency, Applicant was interviewed. He admitted viewing an internet website that
contains pictures of children between the ages of 12 and 18 engaged in intercourse,
oral sex, and anal sex (Item 5). He also admitted viewing “pop up” pictures of children
engaging in sexual activities two to three times per week.  
Applicant admitted in an interview in May 2008, that he withheld the full extent of
his access to the child pornography because he was afraid it would affect his job. He
originally stated in an April interview that he viewed the site approximately two to three
times per week rather than five to seven times per week. Applicant also admitted that he
visited the website from 1990 not 1998. He further admitted that the child pornography
images did not just “pop up.” He accessed and opened image files to view the child
pornography. Applicant told the investigator that he enjoyed visiting the site because “it
fed into his ability to imagine himself in the stories” (Item 5). He elaborated that he likes
to pretend that he was more sexually active in high school. He has never married.
Applicant acknowledged that he intentionally provided false information to the
investigators. In August 2008, Applicant’s eligibility for SCI was revoked as a result of
the sexual behavior and personal conduct (Item 6). He did not appeal that decision.
In August 2008, DoD investigators interviewed Applicant as part of his security
clearance investigation. He stated that he began accessing the website in 2004. He
acknowledged that he visited the site daily for 10 to 15 minutes. He explained that the
 Directive. 6.3.4
 Commonly referred to as the “whole person” concept, these factor are: (1) the nature, extent, and5
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time
of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).6
3
website had images and stories about sexual fantasies with underage girls. He visited
the website at home and not at work (Item 9). 
Applicant believes he suffers from depression. His elderly parents are ill. His
sister and nephew depend on Applicant financially. He regrets his lapse in judgment. He
does not intend to access any underage pornography in the future. He hopes to obtain
medical help for his depression in the future (Response to Form).
Applicant acknowledged that this was not a responsible thing to do and that he
realized that he used poor judgment. He believes his misleading information to the
government was prompted by extreme shame and humiliation. He also feared the loss
of his job. 
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the Revised
Adjudicative Guidelines (AG).  Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors4
listed in ¶ 2(a) of the new guidelines.  The presence or absence of a disqualifying or5
mitigating conditions is not determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant.
However, specific applicable guidelines must be followed whenever a case can be
measured against them as they represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial
of a clearance. In this case, the pleadings and the information presented by the parties
require consideration of the security concerns and adjudicative factors addressed under
Guideline E (personal conduct) at AG ¶ 15, and Guideline D (sexual behavior) at AG ¶
12.
A security clearance decision is intended to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to6
have access to classified information. The government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the government meets its burden, it
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy burden
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.7
 See Egan; Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).8
4
of persuasion.  A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary7
relationship with the government based on trust and confidence. The government,
therefore, has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite
judgement, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.8
Analysis
Sexual Behavior.
The security concerns about Applicant’s sexual behavior, as expressed in the AG
¶ 12, is that “sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicated a personality or
emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No
adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on
the sexual orientation of the individual.”
The following disqualifications are relevant. AG ¶ 13(a) “sexual behavior of a
criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted” is an applicable
disqualifying condition. Applicant viewed child pornography on a website for many
years. This is sexual behavior of a criminal nature. 
AG ¶ 13(b) “a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behavior
that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a personality disorder”
is also an applicable disqualifying condition. Applicant viewed the website five to seven
times per week for many years. He deliberately sought and viewed child pornography
on the internet and masturbated as a form of sexual gratification while viewing the child
pornography. He admits enjoying it, and claims it allows him to pretend he was sexually
active in high school.
AG ¶ 13(c) “sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to
coercion, exploitation, or duress” is an applicable disqualifying condition. Applicant
admits he was ashamed and humiliated by his conduct. He did not fully disclose this
behavior to his employer during an interview during a security investigation for fear of
losing his job. 
AG ¶ 13(d) “sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of
discretion or judgment” is an applicable disqualifying condition. Applicant’s decision to
view the website at home reflects lack of judgment and discretion. 
An applicant might be able to mitigate Guideline D security concerns. AG ¶ 14(a)
“the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of
5
subsequent conduct of a similar nature” does not apply. Applicant was at least 20 years
old when he began his viewing. He continued this behavior for almost 18 years.
Likewise, AG ¶ 14(b) “the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment” does not apply.
Applicant viewed the child pornography from the 1990's until at least April 2008. He
stated that he viewed the website five to seven times a week.
One mitigating condition ‘the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion,
exploitation, or duress,” AG ¶ 14(c) may apply. Applicant finally disclosed the full extent
of his behavior during his May 2008 interview. The government is aware of the full
extent of his conduct. However, it does not fully apply because members of his family or
coworkers are not aware of this behavior.
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by Guideline D (Sexual
Behavior) given the recency and long term adult criminal sexual misbehavior.
Personal Conduct.
The security concern about Applicant’s personal conduct, as expressed in the
AG ¶ 15, is that “[c]onduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty,
or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an
individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.” 
As to SOR ¶ 2 available information requires consideration of the disqualifying
conditions listed in AG ¶ 16(b) “deliberately providing false or misleading information
concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator security official, competent
government representative” and AG ¶ 16(e) “personal conduct, or concealment of
information about ones’ conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect
the person’s personal, professional, or community standing.” Applicant admitted that he
intentionally misled an investigator during an interview by not fully disclosing the exact
years and frequency of his viewing child pornography on the internet. He gave another
version in a later interview in August 2008, and minimized his conduct by stating that he
began accessing the site in 2004. Certainly his behavior and concealment of such would
affect his professional and community standing. His questionable judgment, lack of
candor and admitted actions casts doubt on his trustworthiness.
The mitigating condition outlined in AG ¶ 17(c) “the offense is so minor, or so
much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such
unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment” does not apply. Applicant
admitted that he last viewed an internet site containing child pornography in April 2008.
However, he previously lied about the exact dates of his viewing. AG ¶ 17(d) “the
individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the
behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or
factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable or other inappropriate behavior, and such
behavior is unlikely to recur” does not apply for the reasons given above. Applicant has
 See footnote 5, supra.9
6
not obtained any counseling, although he believes he may do so in the future. AG ¶
17(e) “the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability, to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress” does not apply. 
AG ¶ 17(a) “the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the
omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts” is not a
mitigating condition due to the fact that Applicant only provided further and more truthful
information during a third interview with the other agency investigators. In his 2008
interview with DoD investigators, Applicant again minimized his involvement by stating
that he began viewing sites in 2004.  
For the same reasons described above regarding sexual behavior under
Guideline D, Applicant has not demonstrated honesty, good judgment, or
trustworthiness under Guideline E to mitigate security concerns.
Whole Person Concept. 
I have evaluated the facts presented in this record and have applied the
appropriate adjudicative factors, for and against, under Guidelines E, and D. I have also
reviewed the record before me in the context of the whole person factors listed in ¶ AG
2(a).  Applicant is a mature adult who held an SCI clearance since 1997. However, he9
engaged in viewing child pornography from 1990's until at least April 2008. He admits
this happened five to seven times a week. He claimed he enjoyed the activity as it
helped him have a better image of his sexual self. He believes he may be depressed,
but has not sought any counseling.
Applicant lied about the frequency and the time span of his conduct with
investigators. He did not fully disclose the information until a third interview. He lost his
SCI access as a result. In 2008, when speaking to DoD investigators, he changed the
time frame for his behavior to 2004. His poor judgment, and his minimalization of his
behavior when responding to the SOR, and in his 2008 interview leave me with doubts
as to his judgment. He regrets his mistake and is sorry for the incident. The positive
information about Applicant is insufficient to overcome the adverse information about his
conduct under Guideline D and Guideline E. This raises serious doubts about his
reliability and trustworthiness. Applicant’s recent conduct does not mitigate the security
concerns under these guidelines. As protection of the national interest is paramount in
these determinations, my doubts must be resolved in favor of the national interest.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline D: AGAINST APPLICANT
7
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant Applicant access to classified information. Clearance is denied
                             
                                                    
NOREEN A. LYNCH
Administrative Judge