DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February1
20, 1990), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (RAG) effective within the DoD on September 1, 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 09-02394
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Francisco J. Mendez, Jr., Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
On 3 June 2009 the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines
B, Foreign Influence, and C, Foreign Preference.  Applicant answered the SOR 24 June1
2009 and requested a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 29 July 2009 and I
convened a hearing 25 August 2009. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 1 September
2009.
 
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations. He is a 39-year-old lead information
systems engineer employed by a defense contractor since November 2007. He has not
previously held a clearance. 
Applicant was born in Iran in March 1970. In 1986, he fled Iran illegally with his
mother, stepfather, and sister and came to the U.S., because they believed it unsafe for
them to remain in Iran. Applicant’s aunt had been executed by the government for anti-
revolutionary activity when he was 12 years old, and his mother had been briefly
detained a year later. Applicant’s stepfather was a legal permanent resident of the U.S.,
and was able to sponsor the family for legal residence in the U.S. Applicant, his mother,
and his sister became naturalized U.S. citizens in October 1992. He has voted in every
election since. 
Applicant was in high school when he fled Iran. He completed high school in the
U.S. and went on to college, eventually obtaining undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral
degrees. He has worked in the U.S. since obtaining his undergraduate degree. He owns
three homes, the one he lives in and two rental properties. His real estate holdings are
worth nearly one million dollars. He has no financial interests or property in Iran.
Applicant’s father and stepmother are resident citizens of Iran, neither of whom
are employed in any government-related position. His stepfather is a dual citizen of the
U.S. and Iran, whose business travel occasionally takes him to Iran. He and Applicant’s
mother divorced in 1997. Applicant has little contact with him out of deference to his
mother, but considers him more of a father to him than his birth father.
Applicant’s parents divorced when he was two, and his father was not involved in
his life growing up. He provided no financial support to Applicant or his sister.
Consequently, Applicant and his father are not close. Applicant has seen his father
twice since fleeing Iran. In 1998, Applicant visited his father and stepmother in Turkey
for two weeks to, as he put it, “give him his 15 minutes of fatherhood.” [Tr 43] He also
saw his father briefly in 2000, when his father visited the U.S. Applicant continues to
have sporadic telephone contact with his father. 
In 2001, Applicant learned that his father was seriously ill and might die. In
contemplating that he might travel to Iran to see his father before he died, Applicant
obtained an Iranian passport in June 2001. He knew he would not be able to go to Iran
on his U.S. passport. However, both his mother and sister warned him against returning
to Iran, citing the possible repercussions. Applicant reconsidered, and decided not to go
to Iran. He never used the Iranian passport, which expired in June 2006. His mother has
possession of the passport. His father recovered.
Applicant’s character references, superiors and coworkers from his current and
previous employers, uniformly praise his work, his trustworthiness, and his integrity.
Each of them hold, or have held, security clearances, and so are aware of the
3
requirements for access and handling of protected material. Each strongly recommends
Applicant for his clearance.
Iran is a fundamentalist Islamic republic with a poor human rights record. Its
relations with the U.S. are confrontational and unlikely to improve given Iran’s efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons, its sponsorship of, support for, and involvement in,
international terrorism, and its support for violent opposition to the Middle East peace
process. Although Iran is a known collector of U.S. intelligence and sensitive economic
information, it is not known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information. 
Travel to Iran remains problematic. The Department of State’s July 2009 Travel
Warning continues to warn U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of travel to Iran,
noting that dual national Iranian-American citizens may encounter difficulty in departing
Iran. Some elements of the Iranian government and population remain hostile to the
U.S. Consequently, American citizens may be subject to harassment or arrest while
traveling or residing in Iran. Americans of Iranian origin are urged to consider the risk of
being targeted by authorities before planning travel to Iran. In addition, Iranian
authorities may deny dual nationals access to the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran,
because they are considered to be solely Iranian citizens. Large-scale demonstrations
have taken place in various regions throughout Iran over the past several years as a
result of a sometimes volatile political climate. U.S. citizens who travel to Iran despite
the travel warning are urged to exercise caution.
The U.S. government does not currently have diplomatic or consular relations
with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and, therefore, cannot provide protection or routine
consular services to American citizens in Iran. The Swiss government, acting through its
Embassy in Tehran, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran. Neither U.S.
passports nor visas to the United States are issued in Tehran. The Iranian government
does not recognize dual citizenship and generally does not permit the Swiss to provide
protective services for U.S. citizens who are also Iranian nationals. In addition, U.S.
citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been
detained and harassed by Iranian authorities.
Policies
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (RAG) list factors to be considered in
evaluating an applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative
judges must assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly
raised by the facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial commonsense consideration of the factors listed in RAG ¶ 2(a). The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or
against an applicant. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed
where a case can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance
governing the grant or denial of access to classified information. Considering the SOR
allegations and the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative
guidelines are Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference).
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).2
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.3
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7(a).4
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7(b).5
4
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it establishes a prima facie case against access
to classified information. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant
bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.2
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information3
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Security4
concerns may also be raised if there are connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.5
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 8(a).6
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 8(b).7
5
Applicant has virtually no contact with his father, even less with his stepmother.
And, neither of them are connected in any way to the Iranian government. He did not
travel to Iran in 2001 because of concerns over the consequences to him. He now
understands the potential consequences for his clearance if he travels to Iran. Under
Guideline B, the mere existence of a foreign family member is not sufficient. The nature
of Applicant’s contact with the family member must be examined to determine whether it
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion. “Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased risk over some normally
existing risk that can be said to be inherent anytime a family member lives subject to a
foreign government. One factor that heightens the risk in Applicant’s case is the nature
of the Iranian government and its hostility towards the United States.
In assessing Applicant’s potential for foreign influence, I have considered the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interest of
the U.S.  I have also considered whether there is no conflict of interest, either because6
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government,
or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest.7
Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign
family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the
family members were not “in a position to be exploited.” Thus, an administrative judge
could not apply a balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk. Under the new
guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to determine if
an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S. interest.
The nature of the government of Iran, its disregard for human rights, and its
pursuit of nuclear weapons place a heavy burden on Applicant in mitigating the
disqualifying conditions and the security concerns. Applicant has little relationship with
his father and stepmother. Further, given their lack of connection to the Iranian
government, it is highly unlikely that there could be a circumstance where Applicant is
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of his family and the
government of Iran or interests of the United States because of the nature of the Iranian
government. Applicant’s relationship with his stepfather has been deeper that with his
father, but their contact has been sharply curtailed since he divorced Applicant’s mother
in 1997. In addition, it does not appear that he is permanently resident in Iran or has any
connection to the Iranian government. It is highly unlikely that he could be the focus of
efforts to manipulate or pressure Applicant.
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 10(a) exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship8
after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This included but is not
limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport;
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in9
a foreign country;
¶ 11(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;10
6
Applicant’s sense of loyalty is demonstrably to the U.S. He has little if any sense
of loyalty to Iran or to his father. He left Iran for to escape persecution over 23 years
ago, and has established his roots in the U.S. He fled Iran because of fear of
prosecution, and does not return for the same reason. His fears are well-founded, as his
family has personally experienced persecution. He fled Iran at an early age, and has
spent the better part of his adolescence, and all of his adulthood, here. He completed
his education here and purchased property here. His sense of loyalty or obligation is not
to Iran but to the United States. A conflict of interest in this case is extremely unlikely. In
balancing all of the factors mentioned and considered above, I am satisfied Applicant’s
loyalty to the United States is such that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the United States. Accordingly, Applicant has met his heavy burden
to show that his contacts with his family in Iran do not cause a security concern. I
conclude Applicant has mitigated security concerns rising from his contact with his
family in Iran. I resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
The government also established a case for disqualification under Guideline C by
showing that Applicant obtained an Iranian passport after becoming a U.S. citizen in
October 1992, when he contemplated travel to Iran to see his dying father. However, he
did not make the trip, and did not use the passport, which expired in June 2006.  Thus,8
the passport is not current.
Applicant has mitigated the Guideline C security concerns. Although he has been
a dual citizen of Iran and the United States since his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, his
Iranian citizenship would have little security significance if based solely on his parents’
citizenship. For his conduct to fall within the security concerns of Guideline C, he must
have acted in a way to indicate a preference for a foreign nation over the United States.
However, inimical intent or detrimental impact on the interests of the United States is
not required before the government can seek to deny access under Guideline C. The
government has a compelling interest in ensuring those entrusted with this nation's
secrets will make decisions free of concerns for the foreign country of which they may
also be a citizen.
 
Strictly speaking, Applicant does not fully meet the mitigating conditions (MC) for
foreign preference. His dual citizenship is largely based on his parents’ citizenship, but
is based partly on his active exercise of dual citizenship after being born a U.S. citizen,
however unwitting it may have been.  He has not expressed a willingness to renounce9
his foreign citizenship.  However, the Iranian requirements for renouncing citizenship10
are onerous and raise an individual’s profile more than taking no action to renounce. All
¶ 11(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual11
became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor;
¶ 11(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise12
invalidated; 
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exercise of dual citizenship occurred after he obtained U.S. citizenship, while he was an
adult.  However, the passport is expired and retained by his mother.  And he never11 12
used the passport, having reconsidered his notion of going to Iran to see his—as he
believed—his dying father. As with traveling to Iran, Applicant understands the potential
consequences for his clearance should he ever renew his Iranian passport. On balance,
Applicant has demonstrated that he can be counted on to always act in preference to
the United States. Indeed, a commonsense reading of the record reveals multiple
reasons to view his attachments to the U.S. as overwhelmingly stronger than his
attachments to Iran. All his financial and personal interests are in the U.S. I resolve
Guideline C for Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a-d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted. 
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge