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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 07-08119
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Dennis J. Sysko, Esquire
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Between 1995 and 2004, Applicant mishandled classified and/or sensitive
information on multiple occasions and downloaded an unclassified phone directory from
a coworker’s computer without his knowledge or permission. This conduct generates
security concerns under Guidelines K, Handling Protected Information, M, Use of
Information Technology, and E, Personal Conduct. Applicant has committed no security
infractions in more than five years. In that time, his security awareness has been
outstanding. Applicant has mitigated the security concerns. Clearance is granted.
Statement of the Case
On July 14, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns as outlined
above. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
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(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR on August 4, 2009. He denied all of the allegations
and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on October 2, 2009. On
November 10, 2009, a notice of hearing was issued scheduling the case for December
2, 2009. The hearing was conducted as scheduled. I received nine government exhibits,
seven Applicant exhibits, and the testimony of four witnesses for the Applicant. The
transcript was received on December 10, 2009.
Preliminary Rulings of Procedure and Evidence
I. Applicant’s Motion in Limine
Government Exhibit (GE) 2 is Applicant’s Response to DOHA Interrogatories,
signed on January 5, 2009. As originally proffered by Department Counsel, it consisted
of among other things, records from another DoD agency including a 2004 clearance
decision revoking Applicant’s access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI),
and three investigative reports, on which the agency based its decision. The
investigative reports were summaries of polygraph examinations. In total, GE 2, as
originally proffered, was 166 pages long.
On November 30, 2009, Applicant’s counsel filed a Motion in Limine seeking to
exclude the investigative reports and the clearance decision. In doing so, he argued that
the polygraph examinations are inadmissible hearsay and are inherently unreliable
absent the opportunity to cross examine the investigator who conducted them. As for
the clearance decision, he argued that it, too, was inadmissible hearsay. 
In a response filed on December 1, 2009, Department Counsel withdrew sections
of proposed GE 2 pertaining to polygraph examination reports (pages 137-141, and
144-152). Citing Appeal Board case law, he argued that the clearance decision was
admissible because the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are not strictly applied to such
documents (ISCR Case No. 02-12199 (App. Bd. August 8, 2005)).
Department Counsel’s analysis is correct. In ISCR litigation, the development of
a full and complete record supersedes the technical application of the FRE (Directive ¶
E3.1.19). The admissibility of official records such as clearance decision statements are
instead governed by Directive ¶ E3.1.20, which states that they are admissible without
authenticating witnesses so long as they have “been furnished by an investigatory
agency pursuant to its responsibility in connection with assisting the Secretary of
Defense, or the Department or Agency head concerned, to safeguard classified
information within industry under E.O. 10865.” 
Although the clearance decision was not furnished by an investigatory agency,
as described in Directive ¶ E3.1.20, it was furnished by an authenticating witness -
Applicant himself (see Applicant’s testimony in response to Department Counsel’s voir
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dire questions regarding the clearance decision’s authenticity (Tr. 44-59)).
Consequently, I denied Applicant’s Motion in Limine and admitted the clearance
decision.
II. Motions Regarding SOR Subparagraph 2.b.
SOR subparagraph 2.b reads as follows:
Between 1994 and 2004, you deliberately misused Government
sponsored computers by inadvertently not write-protecting diskettes
before using them on a higher security level system and then re-using
them on a lower security level system.
At the hearing’s conclusion, Department Counsel moved to amend the allegation by
striking the words, “deliberately,” and “inadvertently”. Appellant’s counsel opposed the
motion, and moved to strike SOR subparagraph 2.b.
I denied both motions. However, I agree with Applicant’s counsel’s contention
that SOR subparagraph 2.b is nonsensical because conduct cannot be both “deliberate”
and “inadvertent.” Consequently, I resolve SOR subparagraph 2.b in Applicant’s favor. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 51-year-old single man with no children. He earned a bachelor of
science degree in chemistry in 1980 (GE 1 at 1). After working for a few months as a
chemist in the federal government shortly after graduation, he took a job with a defense
contractor (Id.). He has been working for this employer ever since. According to a
coworker who has shared an office with him since October 2007, he is “someone of
high trust and reliability” (AE E at 18). 
Applicant began his career with the defense contractor as an associate software
engineer tasked with coding hardware diagnostics and assisting with hardware
debugging of custom signal processing systems (GE 2 at 61). By 1987, Applicant’s
employer had promoted him to senior software engineer (Id.). 
In 1995, Applicant’s employer re-assigned him to a different location where he
remained through 2004 (Tr. 72). During this time, he held a Top Secret clearance with
SCI access. In March 1996, his employer promoted him to the position of senior field
engineer (GE 2 at 61). Applicant’s duties included managing software upgrades,
interfacing with factory engineers, and solving system anomalies (Id.). He performed
these tasks on site at a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) that used
his company’s information system. In 2001, Applicant’s employer promoted him to the
position of site engineer in charge (Id.). In this position, he supervised 12 employees
and supported multiple operational systems (Id.). He remained in this position through
October 2004 (GE 1 at 1; Tr. 81). 
As time progressed, this discrepancy was fixed (AE G).1
All of the diskettes at the SCIF were labelled ‘SECRET” (Id.). 2
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Applicant’s home office communicated with him through e-mail sent from an
unclassified system. The only accessible information system at the SCIF was classified,
and the program host prohibited Applicant and his team members from using it to
correspond with their home office (GE 2 at 119 - Affidavit of Coworker X, dated
November 3, 2004; Tr 74). Consequently, the only method of sharing unclassified
correspondence between the SCIF contractors and the home office was through home
e-mails  (GE 2 at 122 - Affidavit of Coworker Y, dated November 3, 2004). 1
Applicant’s home office required him, among other things, to prepare a weekly
unclassified report summarizing the status of the upkeep of the information systems for
which he was responsible (GE 3 at 11). This involved maintaining daily logs, then
compiling them into one report at the end of each week, and e-mailing them to the home
office. Applicant prepared and maintained the unclassified logs on the program host’s
computer diskettes.  2
Because Applicant could not use the program host’s e-mail system to send his
weekly reports to the home office, he had to print all of the daily program logs from the
program host’s diskettes, take them home, retype them onto his company-issued home
computer, then prepare and e-mail the reports to his supervisor (Id.; Tr. 77, 173).
Printing the information from the diskettes and taking this information home posed no
problem; however, the program host’s security regulations forbid taking any diskettes
from the facility (GE 3 at 11).
Because of the labor-intensive nature of this task, Applicant began to fall behind
on his weekly reports. Once in 1998, he skipped the step of printing the daily program
logs and taking them home. Instead, he took home a diskette containing the daily
program logs, inserted it into his company-issued home computer, copied the file
containing the daily program logs, and used it to prepare his weekly report (Tr. 88). He
did so because he was tired of having to retype the program logs onto his home
computer each time he prepared a weekly report (Tr. 135, 171; GE 2 at 29). He knew
that the program host’s security regulations prohibited him from taking any magnetic
media from the SCIF (GE 2 at 28). Also, he knew that the SCIF security guards would
have made him return the diskette if he had attempted to check it out of the SCIF (Tr.
132). Applicant, therefore, concealed the diskette from the SCIF security guards by
concealing it in his pants pocket when he exited the SCIF (Id.; Tr. 132). He returned it
the next day (Tr. 132; GE 2 at 29). 
This was not the first time Applicant improperly removed a diskette from a
classified facility (Tr. 173). In 1995, his employer tasked him with writing an operations
manual for an unclassified program (GE 2 at 29; Tr. 86). This work was to occur during
a temporary duty assignment (TDY) at another satellite location (GE 3 at 8). While
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working on the assignment, Applicant downloaded two files from a classified computer
system onto two diskettes, removed the diskettes from the facility, and referred to the
information on the diskettes, using his company-issued computer, to help him prepare
the manual (Id.). While preparing the manual, Applicant discovered that one of the
programs he had downloaded was classified (GE 3 at 9). He acknowledged that he did
not check the document thoroughly before downloading it (Id.). After discovering that
one of the programs was classified, Applicant deleted it from his computer (GE 2 at 30).
He does not recall whether he deleted it from the diskette (Id.). No record evidence
indicates that he knew one of the diskettes contained classified information before he
took it from the facility, or that he surreptitiously removed them from the facility knowing
that one contained classified information.
Applicant reported neither security violation to his facility security officer until
approximately nine years later, in February 2004, after a routine polygraph examination
that another DoD agency conducted (GE 3 at 9; see also GE 3 at 50 - Security Violation
Report, dated February 9, 2004). He did not immediately report these security violations
because he was afraid of losing his security clearance (Tr. 135).
Over the years, Applicant took other materials from the SCIF to assist him in his
work at home (Tr. 125-127). The program host prohibited removing material that
referenced the program regardless of whether the material was classified (Tr. 126).
Applicant acknowledged that a few of the materials he took home “were ones that if
somebody was familiar with the program [he or she] could read that piece of paper and
figure out it was about that program” (Tr. 127). On some occasions through February
2004, he concealed unauthorized information from the SCIF security (GE 3 at 27). He
knew this was against SCIF regulations, but considered that adhering to these particular
SCIF regulations impeded his job responsibilities, and disclosing his violations would be
“time-consuming and embarrassing (Tr. 135).
Twice in 2003, and once or twice between 1994 and 2003, Applicant accidentally
removed e-mails with classified banners to his home (GE 2 at 27). He did not know
whether the body of the e-mails contained classified data or if the messages were
accidentally marked classified (Id.). Each time this happened, he returned them to the
SCIF and shredded them (Id.). He did not report this activity to the requisite security
authorities. He never intentionally removed classified e-mails (Tr. 89). 
In 1997, Applicant copied an unclassified phone directory from a coworker’s
computer without his knowledge or permission (Tr. 107). The coworker’s work station
was located in the same room as Applicant’s work station (Tr. 107). One day, Applicant
noticed that his coworker left his computer unattended and unsecured, with a phone
directory on the screen. He perused it, and concluded that he needed some of the
contacts in the phone directory for “operational support” (Tr. 108). He then copied the
file onto one of his floppy disks, then copied it onto his computer (Tr. 108). The disk
used was classified at the same level as the coworker’s computer (Tr. 142). The phone
directory was not classified (GE 3 at 11). After copying the information, Applicant did not
tell his coworker (Tr. 108). Applicant did not report the 1997 misuse of the information
The record is unclear as to why Applicant did not hold a security clearance during this period.3
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system until seven years later, in February 2004, after his second meeting with the
SCIF’s facility security officer (GE 3 at 57).
In 2003, Applicant prepared a presentation on a Secret-level laptop (Tr. 93). The
presentation was unclassified (Tr. 94). Shortly before making the presentation,
Applicant decided to spell check it; however, the laptop lacked a spell-checker program
(Tr. 93). Applicant then saved the presentation on a 3.5 inch floppy disk and inserted it
into a computer system, classified at a higher level, that had the spell-checker program
(Tr. 94). He then spell-checked the presentation and made the necessary corrections.
He failed to write-protect the floppy disk before inserting it into the higher level-classified
computer, as required by security regulations (Tr. 95).
In the nine years Applicant worked at the SCIF, he ran programs saved on disks
containing lower-level classified information on higher-level systems between one and
two hundred times (Tr. 179). He may have failed to write-protect the disks on two other
occasions (Tr. 179).
In February 2004, an investigative agent subjected Applicant to three polygraph
examinations. In April 2004, the investigative agent interviewed Applicant. In June 2004,
the agency that conducted the investigation issued a clearance decision revoking
Applicant’s access to SCI (GE 3 at 25). 
After Applicant’s access to SCI was revoked, his employer transferred him to
another facility. He continued to maintain a Top Secret clearance (Tr. 84). According to
the Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) of the facility where Applicant worked
between 2004 and 2007:
Applicant conducted himself in a professional and security conscious
manner. He was proactive in his security responsibilities and even helped
to secure the proper marking of media, as required in a classified area (AE
A at 13).
Since losing his access to SCI in 2004, Applicant has received counseling
regarding security procedures (GE 3 at 14). The current facility where he works is
governed by “very very clear” security procedures, unlike the facility where he worked
between 1995 and 2004 (Tr. 160).
Other than a 19-month period between March 2006 and October 2007, Applicant
has continuously held a security clearance since 1980.  He had only committed one3
security violation in the 15 years before he was assigned to the satellite facility in 1995
(Tr. 116).
According to a coworker who Applicant supervised between 2002 and 2004,
Applicant displayed no irresponsibility in his attitude toward the discharge of his security
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responsibilities, even though the security rules at the SCIF often added additional work
(AE A at Tab I). According to Applicant’s supervisor from 1993 to 1996, Applicant
“always seemed security conscious . . . [and] maintained a positive attitude about
security” (AE E at 10). Applicant’s supervisor from 2001 through 2002 “directly observed
nothing but sheer dedication on [Applicant’s] part regarding program security and
functionality” (GE 3 at 18). When Applicant sought a new position within the company in
2007, his ex-supervisor “had no hesitations in recommending him . . . given [his] past
dealings with him” (Id.).
The ISSO at Applicant’s current assignment both testified and provided a
reference letter. He has held this position since Applicant began working at the program
in October 2007 (AE E at 9). Of the 40 to 50 people who work at the facility he
oversees, Applicant is the most diligent in adhering to security practices (Tr. 222). Also,
the ISSO noted the following:
[Applicant] often has had to handle and create classified media in the form
of CDs. He has played a key role in ensuring that this form of media is
being properly tracked and secured in designated security containers . . .
[Applicant] often has been responsible for opening and closing our
classified lab . . . During this time, [Applicant] has made it a point to be
security conscious and demonstrated his willingness to follow security
guidelines (Id.).
Since receiving the new assignment in 2007, Applicant has been proactive in
clarifying ambiguous security procedures (Id.). For example, when tasked with an
assignment that involved, among other things, the transfer of classified packages, he
identified an ambiguity regarding the company’s procedures for transporting such
materials, and did not begin the task until the company developed a more precise
procedure, which he helped to define and implement (Id.; Tr. 217).
The assistant ISSO (AISSO) also provided a reference letter (AE E at 11). His
duties include “follow[ing] behind the people that work late to make sure the lab and
office areas are secure” (Id.). He shared the following observations about Applicant’s
security awareness:
Whenever I’ve come behind [Applicant] I have never seen anything out of
order and he has even called me on occasion to clarify procedures when
something in the lab fell into a gray area. Several of his questions have
caused me to add detail to my security briefing so everyone will know how
to react to similar situations. (Id.).
The program’s advisory engineer has often performed security monitoring of
applicant’s desk and local safe (Id. at 21). They have both always been properly
secured (Id.). 
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A licensed, clinical psychologist testified for Applicant (Tr. 182-200). The witness
served in the U.S. Army as a military psychologist from 1985 to 1991 (AE G at 3). Since
leaving the Army, he has periodically served as a consultant as to the psychological
aspects of military-related issues such as administrative discharges, eligibility for
specialized schooling, and security clearances (Tr. 184; AE G at 2). He has provided
“low-intensity” counseling to Applicant on a monthly basis since approximately 2006 (Tr.
199). They discussed a number of issues including those leading to the revocation of
Applicant’s SCI in 2004. According to the psychologist, Applicant is now so sensitized to
security matters that “when he would give [him] copies of awards that he had received .
. . he would blacken out some of the names and some of the locations” (Tr. 201). The
psychologist had “never had this happen with any other candidate or subject” with
whom he had worked (Tr. 200).
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” Applicant
has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.
Analysis
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information
Under this guideline, “[d]eliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and
regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an
individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard
such information, and is a serious security concern” (AG ¶ 33). Applicant never
knowingly concealed classified copies of e-mails in his pants pocket in order to
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circumvent security checkpoints upon exiting a classified facility, as the SOR alleged.
Nevertheless, the multiple episodes of mishandling classified and/or sensitive
information over the years render the following disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 34
potentially applicable:
(b) collecting or storing classified or other protected information at home or
in any other unauthorized location;
(c) loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise
handling classified reports, data, or other information on any unapproved
equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or
computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, ‘palm’
or pocket device or other adjunct equipment; and
(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other
sensitive information.
Over the years, Applicant negligently removed classified e-mail, and intentionally
removed unauthorized information from the SCIF. However, in these instances, he
returned the materials to the office the next day, and shredded them. Although
Applicant’s conduct represents a significant security concern, he had no intent to collect
or store it at his home. AG ¶ 34(b) does not apply. 
Applicant’s negligent downloading of a classified file in 1995 and use of it to
prepare an unclassified operations manual triggers the application of 34(c). All of
Applicant’s security violations trigger the application of 34(g).
AG ¶ 35 sets forth the potentially applicable mitigating conditions. They are as
follows:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so
infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training
and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security
responsibilities; and
(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training.
The applicability of AG ¶ 35(c) is predicated on an unintentional security breach.
Applicant, however, knew that he was violating security regulations when he committed
his most significant security breach, the 1998 diskette-removal episode. Consequently,
the level of training he received before the security breach occurred is neither relevant
nor mitigating. AG ¶ 35(c) does not apply.
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Three of Applicant’s coworker’s submitted affidavits supporting his assertion that
the SCIF where he worked from 1995 to 2004 was governed by unusual security rules
that, at times, impeded communication with their employer. This does not mitigate
Applicant’s history of circumventing security regulations. AG ¶ 35(a), as it relates to
unusual circumstances, is inapplicable. 
Conversely, AG ¶ 35(a), as it relates to the passage of time without recurrence,
is applicable. Excluding a 19-month period between March 2006 and October 2007,
Applicant has continued to work with classified information. He has not committed any
security violations since 2004. The ISSO at his current job assignment characterizes
him as one of the most security-conscious employees at their facility.
Applicant completed remedial counseling regarding handling classified
information. He is vigilantly committed to adhering to security regulations. His vigilance
in identifying potential gaps and ambiguities in his company’s security policies has led to
the revision of both its security briefings and policies. AG ¶ 35(b) applies.
Guideline M, Use of Information Technology Systems
The security concern under this guideline is set forth in AG ¶ 39 as follows:
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining
to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the
willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and
information. Information technology systems include all related computer
hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication,
transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of
information.
In 1997, Applicant deliberately obtained unauthorized access to a coworker’s
desktop computer and downloaded an unclassified phone directory onto a floppy disk,
then copied it onto his desktop computer. Also, he negligently downloaded classified
information in 1995, intentionally removed a classified diskette from a SCIF in 1998, and
failed to write-protect a diskette before inserting it onto an information system classified
at a higher level in 2003. AG ¶¶ 40(a), “illegal or unauthorized entry into any information
technology system or component thereof,” and 40(e), “unauthorized use of a
government or other information technology system,” apply 
Applicant has not misused any information technology since 2004. Since then, he
has handled information technology in an exemplary manner. AG ¶ 41(a), “so much
time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual
circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur, and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” applies.
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Guideline E, Personal Conduct
Under this guideline, “conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified
information” (AG ¶ 15). 
Applicant’s conduct triggers the application of AG ¶ 16(d)(1) “untrustworthy or
unreliable behavior . . .,” and 16(d)3), “a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations.” The
applicability of these disqualifying conditions is predicated on Applicant’s conduct not
being “explicitly covered under any other guideline” (AG ¶ 16(d)). Applicant’s conduct is
covered under both Guidelines M, Use of Information Technology Systems (AG ¶¶ 39-
41), and K, Handling Protected Information, (AG ¶¶ 33-35), rendering their discussion
under these particular disqualifying conditions superfluous. The mitigating conditions set
forth in AG ¶¶ 17(d), “the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur,” and 17(e), “the individual
has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress,” apply for the reasons discussed in the previous sections.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant’s misconduct reflected a tendency to elevate expedience over security
consciousness when performing his tasks. Particularly troubling was the intentional and
surreptitious nature of some of his misconduct. Consequently, Applicant’s security
violations and misuse of information technology generate significant security concerns.
Applicant has not committed any security violations or engaged in any episodes
of information systems misuse in more than five years. The remoteness of Applicant’s
conduct alone, however, is not mitigating, given the seriousness of the conduct.
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Since 2004, Applicant has not only avoided committing any additional security
violations; he has attended remedial security counseling and demonstrated an
enthusiastic, vigilant attitude toward the discharge of his security responsibilities.
Specifically, he assisted in the revision of company security policy to eliminate gaps and
ambiguities that he had identified. Consequently, Applicant’s vigilance has led to an
improved security posture of an entire division within his company. 
Applicant has worked for his employer for nearly 30 years. He has maintained a
security clearance for nearly his entire tenure at the company. He is well respected by
his coworkers. One coworker, who supervised him between 2001 and 2002,
complimented his dedication to security awareness, which Applicant demonstrated while
working for him, and strongly endorsed his application to maintain his security
clearance. 
As the psychologist who counseled Applicant noted, he is now extraordinarily
sensitized to security matters. Under these circumstances, the seriousness of the
conduct is outweighed by the presence of rehabilitation and the minimal likelihood of
recurrence. Applicant has mitigated the security concerns.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline K: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline M: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.b: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 3.a - 3.b: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge