DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-09408
SSN: ------------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gregg A. Cervi, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
March 31, 2010
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Decision
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LOKEY ANDERSON, Darlene, Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted her Electronic Questionnaire for National Security Position
on dated August 14, 2008.  (Government Exhibit 8).  On July 15, 2009, the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing
the security concerns under Guidelines B and E for Applicant. The action was taken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President
on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
The Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on September 9, 2009, but
submitted an incomplete answer by failing to admit or deny the allegations.  DOHA
requested the information by letter dated September 18, 2009.  Applicant responded
with another answer to the SOR on October 14, 2009, wherein she elected to have the
case determined on a written record in lieu of a hearing.  Department Counsel
submitted  the Government’s File of Relevant Material (FORM) to the Applicant on
December 2, 2009.  The Applicant was instructed to submit information in rebuttal,
extenuation or mitigation within 30 days of receipt.  Applicant received the FORM on
December 19, 2009, and she submitted no reply.  The case was assigned to the
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undersigned for resolution on February 5, 2010.  Based upon a review of the case file,
pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.    
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a request that I take administrative notice of
certain facts concerning the current political conditions in Pakistan.  Applicant made no
objection.  The request and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence
but were included in the record. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the
Findings of Fact, below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact are based on Applicant's Answer to the SOR, the
FORM and the exhibits.  The Applicant is 53 years of age and employed as a Linguist.
She seeks a security clearance in connection with her employment in the defense
industry.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence).  The Government alleges in this
paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because she has foreign contacts
that could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise
of classified information.
The Applicant was born in Pakistan in 1956 to Pakistani parents.  She came to
the United States in 1978, and became a naturalized United States citizen in 2006.  In
1978, she was married in Pakistan to her spouse, also a Pakistani national, who
became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1984.  The Applicant has seven
siblings.  One of her siblings, a brother, is a citizen of the United States who resides in
Pakistan.  
Paragraph 2 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct).  The Government alleges that the
Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance because she intentionally falsified material
aspects of her personal background during the employment process.
The Applicant completed an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing dated August 14, 2007.  Section 14/15 stated: “Your relatives and
Associates: Give the full name, correct code, and other requested information for each
of your relatives and associates, living or dead, specified below. 1. Mother, 2. Father, 3.
Stepmother, 4. Stepfather, 5. Foster Parent, 6. Child (Adopted and Foster Child also), 7.
Stepchild, 8. Brother, 9. Sister, 10. Stepbrother, 11. Stepsister, 12. Half-brother, 13.
Half-sister, 14. Father-in-law, 15. Mother-in-law, 16. Guardian, 17. Other Relative, 18.
Associate, 19. Adult Currently Living With You”.  The Applicant failed to list any brothers
or sisters.  As stated above, she has seven siblings.  
One of her brothers resides in Pakistan.  The Applicant stated that her brother
visited Pakistan in 2007.  At the time, of his visit, his intention was to stay for a few
weeks.  He later decided to extend his visit because his wife and his daughters wanted
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to spend more time with their grandparents.  Currently, the Applicant’s brother is still
residing in Pakistan, but he plans on returning to the USA in the near future.  Applicant
claims that she was unaware of her brothers plans to extend his visit and contends that
he is simply a long-term visitor.  She states that she last had contact with him in June
2009, and that she is unaware of his activities in Pakistan. 
The Applicant completed Foreign Influence Interrogatories in April 2009, issued
to her by the Department of Defense, in which she was required to reply to the following
question: “9. Do you have any immediate family member (spouse, father, mother, sons,
daughters, brothers, sisters), other relative (including in-laws), cohabitant, friend, or
business or professional associate who is a citizen of a foreign country, or who lives in a
foreign country?”  The Applicant responded “NO”.  This was a false answer.  The
Applicant has a brother who lives in Pakistan.  (Government Exhibit 10).       
The Applicant claims that when she completed the security clearance application
and the interrogatories, she thought her brother was still residing in the United States.
She states that she never intentionally falsified any information on the security
clearance application.  She claims that she did not disclose the existence of her siblings
because she no longer has contact with them and did not have information about them.
Under the particular facts of this case, I find this behavior unconvincing and not worthy
of belief.  In fact, at the time that the Applicant provided the answer to the security
clearance application and to the interrogatories, in April 2009, the Applicant’s brother
had been living in Pakistan for two years, since 2007.  I find that the Applicant
intentionally and deliberately failed to disclose her siblings on the security clearance
application and in her interrogatories because she thought that the information might
jeopardize her chances of obtaining a security clearance.      
I have taken official notice of the following facts concerning the country of
Pakistan.  Pakistan is a low-income country, with a population that is 97% Muslim.  It
has a coalition government led by Prime Minister Yousef Gilani and President Asif Ali
Zardari, widower of assassinated Pakistan People’s Party leader Benazir Bhutto.
Although Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime of
Afghanistan, after September 11, 2001, Pakistan reassessed its relations with the
Taliban and pledged support to the U. S. and international coalition in Operation
Enduring Freedom to remove the Taliban from power.  Despite this support, members
of the Taliban are known to be in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of
Pakistan and in the Balochistan Province, which borders Iran and Afghanistan.  The
leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, is operating openly in Pakistan.  Extremists led by
Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban “TTP) commander Baitullah Mehsuc and other al-
Qaida extremists have re-exerted their hold over areas in the FATA and the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP).  The TTP has gained support by promising to fill a vacuum
left by ineffective governments structures.  Streams of Taliban financing crossing the
border of Pakistan to Afghanistan has allowed the insurgency in Afghanistan to
strengthen its military and technical capabilities.    
In addition to the Taliban, the FATA in Pakistan continues to prove vital
sanctuary to al-Qaida and a number of foreign and Pakistan-based extremist groups.
The security situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen in 2008, including an increase
in al-Qaida’s presence to levels unseen since 2001-2002, driven in part by insurgent
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access to safe havens in western Pakistan through the porous Afghan-Pakistan border.
Al-Qaida exploits the permissive operating environment to support the Afghan
insurgency while also planning attacks against the U.S. and Western interests in
Pakistan and worldwide.  Together with the Afghan Taliban and other extremists
groups, al-Qaida uses this sanctuary to train and recruit operatives, plan and prepare
regional and transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda and obtain equipment and
supplies.
The Pakistan Government has a poor human rights record.  Reported human
rights problems in Pakistan include extrajudicial killings, torture and rape by security
forces, lack of judicial independence, arbitrary arrest, wide-spread corruption,
disappearance and imprisonment of political opponents, and trafficking in women and
children.  Pakistan creates concern for the United States because of weapon
technology transfers and weapon technology cooperation with certain countries.
Pakistan has also supplied nuclear technology to Iran and Libya and sought assistance
from both North Korea and China for its own weapons programs.
POLICIES
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Accordingly, the
Department of Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992  Directive sets forth policy factors
and conditions that could raise or mitigate a security concern; which must be given
binding consideration in making security clearance determinations.  These factors
should be followed in every case according to the pertinent criterion.  However, the
conditions are neither automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can
they supersede the Administrative Judge’s reliance on her own common sense.
Because each security clearance case presents its own unique facts and
circumstances, it cannot be assumed that these factors exhaust the realm of human
experience, or apply equally in every  case.  Based on the Findings of Fact set forth
above, the factors most applicable to the evaluation of this case are:
Foreign Influence
6.  The Concern.  Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism. 
Condition that could raise a security concern:
7. (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident of a foreign country if that contact
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creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion. 
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
None.
Guideline E (Personal Conduct)
15.  The Concern.  Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified
information.  Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers
during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security
clearance process.
Conditions that could raise a security concern:
16.(a) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and
material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award
benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award
fiduciary responsibilities;
16.(b) Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant
facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other
official government representative. 
Condition that could mitigate security concerns:
None.
In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 18-19, in
evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the Administrative Judge should
consider the following general factors:
a.  The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation;
 c.  The frequency and recency of the conduct;
d.  The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
e.  The extent to which participation is voluntary;
f. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavior
changes;
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g.  The motivation for the conduct; 
h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress; and
 i.  The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
The eligibility criteria established in the DoD Directive identify personal
characteristics and conduct which are reasonably related to the ultimate question,
posed in Section 2 of Executive Order 10865, of whether it is “clearly consistent with the
national interest” to grant an Applicant’s request for access to classified information.
The DoD Directive states, “The adjudicative process is an examination of a
sufficient period of a person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is
eligible for a security clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is
predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines.  The
adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the
whole person concept.  Available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable should be considered in reaching a determination.” 
The Administrative Judge can draw only those inferences or conclusions that have
reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record.  The Judge cannot draw
inferences or conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural in
nature.  Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865,
“Any determination under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the Applicant
concerned.”
The Government must make out a case under Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
and Guideline E (Personal Conduct)  that establishes doubt about a person's judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness.  While a rational connection, or nexus, must be shown
between Applicant's adverse conduct and her ability to effectively safeguard classified
information, with respect to sufficiency of proof of a rational connection, objective or
direct evidence is not required.
Then, the Applicant must remove that doubt with substantial evidence in
refutation, explanation, mitigation or extenuation that demonstrates that the past
adverse conduct is unlikely to be repeated, and that the Applicant presently qualifies for
a security clearance.
An individual who demonstrates a foreign influence and has foreign connections
may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests
of the United States.  The Government must be able to place a high degree of
confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by all security rules and regulations,
at all times and in all places.
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CONCLUSIONS
Having considered the evidence of record in light of the appropriate legal
standards and factors, and having assessed the Applicant's credibility based on the
record, this Administrative Judge concludes that the Government has established its
case as to all allegations in the SOR.   
The evidence shows that the Applicant, who was born in Pakistan, has foreign
family ties in Pakistan, a brother.  It is not clear from the evidence presented as to
whether her relationship with her brother in Pakistan is close or continuing and why he
made such an odd change in plans.  She states that she rarely communicates with her
brother or with any of her siblings for that matter.  However, she has been protective
and not candid about their existence.  Her unwillingness to disclose her brother’s name
and later his residency in Pakistan is troubling and indicates potential dishonesty, lack of
trustworthiness and reliability. Given these facts, there is cause for concern in this case.
The Applicant has not been truthful or candid in answering the questions about
her relatives, and given this strange and suspicious behavior, there may be something
she is trying to hide from the Government.  Thus, she may be in a vulnerable position
and subject to coercion, exploitation and/or pressure by the Pakistani government.  It is
also noted that the current political situation in Pakistan elevates the cause for concern
in this case. Pakistan creates concern for the United States because of weapon
technology transfers and weapon technology cooperation with certain countries.
Pakistan has also supplied nuclear technology to Iran and Libya and sought assistance
from both North Korea and China for its own weapons programs.  In this case, the
possibilities are great that the Applicant may at some point be placed in a position to be
forced to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group organization, or
government and the interests of the United States.          
Under Foreign Influence, Disqualifying Condition 7.(a) contact with a foreign
family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a
citizen of or resident of a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion applies.  None of
the Mitigating Conditions apply.  In this case, Applicant’s brother in Pakistan, and the
mystery that surrounds his existence, and her other siblings, creates a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation, and she may become subject to foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Therefore, there is a possibility of
foreign influence that exists that could create the potential for conduct resulting in the
compromise of classified information.  Thus, I find that the Applicant is vulnerable to
foreign influence.  Accordingly, I find against the Applicant under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence).
The evidence further shows that the Applicant intentionally and deliberately
falsified her security clearance application and her responses to interrogatories
concealing the fact that she has seven siblings, one of whom resides in Pakistan.
Applicant has provided no convincing evidence to establish that any mitigating condition
applies.  Had Applicant disclosed the existence of her siblings on her security clearance
application and in response to the interrogatories, and indicated that her brother has
resided in Pakistan for the past two years, her assertions that she is unaware of his
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activities in Pakistan would have greater weight.  However, given the Applicant’s
questionable behavior, the Applicant cannot be trusted with the national secrets.  
 
Under Personal Conduct, Disqualifying Conditions 16.(a) The deliberate
omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel
security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct
investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status,
determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities, and 16.(b) Deliberately providing false or misleading information
concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative apply.  None of the
mitigating conditions are applicable.  I find the Applicant has not been truthful or candid
with the Government concerning her siblings and therefore cannot be trusted with the
national secrets.  Accordingly, I find against the Applicant under Guideline E (Personal
Conduct).
Furthermore, there is no evidence in support of mitigation under the whole
person analysis.  The Applicant has submitted no favorable recommendations or
sufficient documentation to support security clearance eligibility.  I have considered the
“whole person concept” in evaluating the Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified
information.  Under the particular facts of this case, the totality of the conduct set forth
under all of the guidelines viewed as a whole, support a whole person assessment of
poor judgement, untrustworthiness, unreliability, a lack a candor, and an unwillingness
to comply with rules and regulations, and/or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard classified information.
  
Considering all the evidence, the Applicant has not met the mitigating conditions
of Guidelines B and E of the adjudicative guidelines set forth in Enclosure 2 of the
Directive.  Accordingly, she has failed to meet her ultimate burden of persuasion under
Guidelines B and E.  
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as
required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1: Against the Applicant.
Subpara. 1.a.: Against the Applicant
Paragraph 2: Against the Applicant.
Subpara. 2.a.: Against the Applicant
Subpara. 2.b.: Against the Applicant
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DECISION
In light of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interests to grant or continue a security clearance for the
Applicant.
Darlene Lokey Anderson
Administrative Judge