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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
----------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-11135
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Braden M. Murphy, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Elizabeth L. Newman, Esq.
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant completed a questionnaire for sensitive positions (SF-86) on or about
April 10, 2007. On March 17, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) enumerating security concerns arising
under Guideline M (Use of Information Technology Systems) and Guideline E (Personal
Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised Adjudicative Guidelines
(AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
In his April 18, 2009, response to the SOR, Applicant substantially admitted the
allegation set forth under Guideline M in SOR allegation ¶ 1.a and admitted SOR
allegation ¶ 1.b in part. With regard to the allegations under Guideline E, Applicant
wrote that he incorporated his responses to allegations ¶¶ 1.a-1.b with reference to
allegation ¶ 2.a,  and he substantially admitted the allegations set forth under ¶ 2.b. He
also requested a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me on September 9, 2009. The
government moved for a delay in scheduling the hearing until its witness was available.
 Motion, dated Nov. 25, 2009; Tr. 12-15.      1
 Id,      2
 Id.      3
 Tr. 16-18.      4
2
The request was granted without objection. The parties agreed to a hearing date of
December 1, 2009. A notice of hearing to that effect was issued on November 9, 2009.
The hearing was convened as scheduled. 
Department Counsel introduced five documents accepted into the record without
objection as exhibits (Exs.) 1-5. It also produced one witness. Applicant was
represented by counsel, who offered two documents accepted into the record without
objection as Exs. A-B. A witness provided testimony on behalf of Applicant. The parties
were given through December 9, 2009, to submit any other documents, but none were
offered. A transcript (Tr.) of the proceeding was received on December 10, 2009. The
record was closed on December 14, 2009. Based on a review of the testimony,
submissions, and exhibits, I find Applicant failed to meet his burden regarding the use
of information technology systems and personal conduct security concerns raised.
Security clearance is denied.
Preliminary Motions
Applicant presented a motion in limine “for an order (1) drawing an adverse
inference in Applicant’s favor, and (2) precluding Department Counsel from calling” his
witness for the government. The basis for the motion was that Department Counsel
intended “to elicit evidence from [the witness] as to the content of . . . [a] web site
whose link he discovered on the lap top and/or hard drive that Applicant turned into him
when Applicant resigned from his position. . . .”  The witness’ testimony was opposed1
because the witness “engaged in spoliation by irrevocably erasing these items when he
‘cleaned’ the computer and hard drive, so that they no longer exist and cannot be
introduced into evidence.”  Applicant argued that it would violate his due process rights2
to allow the person who “destroyed evidence to testify, untrammeled, as to what he
allegedly saw.”  3
Decision on the motion was deferred because the full scope of the witness’
testimony was unknown. The parties were advised, however, that the witness’
testimony would be permitted and given “appropriate weight” to the extent that it
clarified the company’s protocols for both cleaning and investigating the contents of
company computers, and explained what he claimed he found on the computer.  In light4
of Applicant’s admission he accessed pornographic web sites “to access pornography”
on his employer’s laptop computer at some point or points between 2006 and 2007,
witness testimony was unnecessary to establish pornography was accessed by
Applicant on his former employer’s computer equipment. The witness’ testimony on
both direct and cross examination was ultimately accepted into the record only to
confirm Applicant’s admission regarding the types and forms of files accessed on the
 Tr. 23.      5
 Tr. 21.      6
  Tr. 25. The government conceded that the allegation of child pornography “does no longer exist as one      7
of the elements of the SOR.” 
 Tr. 79-80. Applicant later testified that he personally acquired an external hard drive for the laptop at issue      8
in April or May 2006, for which he later received reimbursement. He stated that he did not register the hard
drive with his employer. Tr. 88.
 Tr. 78, 118.      9
 Id.      10
 Id.      11
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company’s equipment and to elaborate on company protocols for reassigning
previously assigned computer equipment.  
At the hearing, Applicant moved that the SOR be amended to delete any
reference to child pornography. Department Counsel stated, “I’m not sure it matters at
this point but that’s probably appropriate.”  In declining to proceed with regard to the5
child pornography portion of the charge, the government stated that it did “not believe
that there was any child pornography” found on the information technology system at
issue.  The allegation regarding child pornography was stricken from the SOR.6 7
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 30-year-old man working in the areas of business intelligence and
data integration for a software company that is a government contractor. He has worked
with computers since 1998, when he was a sophomore in college and performed
software and web site development. After school, for about three years, he managed
his own company which dealt mainly with different types of computer systems work, file
recovery, web development, and other information technology-related areas. In that
capacity, he was entrusted to work in customers’ homes unattended. He later worked
as a software sales manager. Applicant has a bachelor of science degree. He is single
with no children. 
In about June 2006, Applicant started working for his previous employer. He was
issued a company-owned laptop in July or August 2006, which he used at both his
office and his home.  Two or three weeks after starting work, he was also issued a8
handbook regarding the rules and regulations concerning his use of the laptop which he
“kind of flipped through.”   Before “flipping through” the handbook, he was “required to9
sign a form” that he “understood the policies” dictated by his employer, including the
use of business equipment and internet use.  Applicant denies any specific knowledge10
“of the section having to do with what you could or couldn’t access or download with
your computer,” but acknowledges that he had “some general knowledge of what you
could or couldn’t use that computer for.”  He assumed there was a policy prohibiting11
 Tr. 119.      12
 Tr. 79.      13
 Id.      14
 Tr. 81, 116. Applicant testified that he used his employer’s laptop to access pornography from home      15
“about six times.” Contrast “I don’t know how many times adult pornographic websites were accessed over
the 1.5 years (6/06-12/07) of my employment on the . . . computer from my home.” Ex. 2 (Attachment to
Interrogatories of Jan. 15, 2009) During that same interview, Applicant noted that after reviewing his former
employer’s policies, the applicable policy states that a “violation can lead to disciplinary action.” Id. He does
not clarify whether the referenced violation is regarding personal use or pornography. 
 Tr. 81-82.      16
 Tr. 116-117.      17
 Tr. 119-120. No evidence was offered demonstrating Applicant’s home computer’s anti-virus protection.      18
 Tr. 99.      19
 Id.      20
 Tr. 100.      21
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the downloading of internet pornography.  His “general knowledge” was that he could12
use the computer for “work-related purposes, discretionally for personal use such as e-
mail or maybe buying something like a book on amazon.com.”  Applicant was generally13
aware of policies used by companies regarding pornography access. He knew it was
not “okay” to use the computer to access pornographic web sites.   14
Between September or October of 2006 until about the end of 2007, Applicant
used the laptop at issue to access pornographic web sites. He viewed the proscribed
content at home, where he lived alone, on at least six occasions.  He estimates that he15
downloaded “about 12 movie files,” each consisting of about 500 megabytes.  He16
would use the work equipment for such materials when he could not access the internet
on his own personal home computer.  Of the movie files, some were downloaded from17
the internet, while one or more were copied from his home computer onto the
company’s external hard drive.18
After receiving his interim security clearance in about May 2007, but prior to
October 2007, Applicant served his employer as the Assistant Facility Security Officer.19
In October 2007, he was named the Facility Security Officer.  In preparation for this20
advancement, he took an online class “that was really kind of an orientation to the
Industrial Security Program. It wasn’t specific to the Facility Security Officer.”  He also21
received instruction from his predecessor. He did not receive specific training regarding
the prohibition against using company-owned and provided computer equipment for
accessing pornography.  
In about November 2007, while using his employer’s equipment to surf the
internet for satiric web sites, he clicked on a pop-up or advertisement that took him to a
 Tr. 82-83, 125-126.      22
 Tr. 84-85. In Interrogatories dated January 15, 2009, at Ex. 3, Applicant denied all knowledge of the      23
website at issue and its content.
 Tr. 89.      24
 Id.      25
 Tr. 91.      26
 Tr. 92.      27
 Id., Tr. 94 (“W hen you handed it over it no longer had any of the pornographic material or the [potentially      28
racially insensitive internet site’s] material on it, is that right?” “Yes. I deleted everything off the computer.” Tr.
94. He “just dumped everything in [his] personal files” without looking to see what was in them. Tr. 111).
 Tr. 93.      29
 Tr. 94, 96.      30
 Tr. 98-99; Ex. A (Exit Checklist).      31
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website he now “speculates” is or was a website which has a name that can be
construed as racially divisive or offensive.   There, he saw material that could be22
deemed racially insensitive.  23
In storing his cache of pornographic materials on his employer’s equipment,
Applicant maintained two separate sections on his external hard drive: one for work and
one for “personal things.”  He never stored classified information on the hard drive and24
did not receive a security clearance until September 2007.  Before resigning and25
leaving his former place of employment, Applicant “removed everything from the
computer that [he] was not told to leave on there.”  He specifically left files related to26
the security office and demonstrative images that were on the internal hard drive of the
computer. As a result, “everything was returned in the state in which [Applicant] got it.”27
His cache of pornography was deleted from the external hard drive, as was material
from the site which could be interpreted as racially insensitive.  By simply deleting the28
material without the aid of a special “un-erase” program or formal “wipe down,” the
material was not protected from recovery. He was not expecting the machine to be
audited and was unaware of a policy under which hard drives were or might be
examined.29
As Applicant prepared to leave the company in late December 2007, he met with
his successor for about 90 minutes to review the demonstration images, give him
passwords, and show him how the programs and laptop worked.  Applicant then left30
the equipment with his successor. He ultimately received a receipt for the transfer of
equipment.  Applicant’s last day of employment with this entity was December 28,31
2007. Applicant’s successor was tasked to “go through“ the virtual server images that
comprise a virtual computer, including scripts, programs, source code and applications
 Tr. 40-41.      32
 Tr. 41-42.      33
 Tr. 43-44.      34
 The lack of existent evidence is irrelevant to the extent Applicant admits he downloaded pornography.      35
 Tr. 107.      36
 Tr. 123.      37
 Tr. 109.      38
 Tr. 110.      39
 Tr. 128-133.      40
 Ex. 5 (Handbook) at 33.      41
 Id.      42
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“to see what went where.”  As a business practice, it was part of wiping “the entire32
image and re-ghost [it] with a new image with updated drivers, updated service packs”
before the equipment was reassigned.  In the process, pornography was found.  At33 34
the end of that process, the hard drive was scrubbed of all information, including
evidence of inappropriate access.35
Applicant did not know that the proscribed materials had been uncovered until he
was interviewed in August 2008 as part of the security clearance process. Prior to that
time, he did not disclose or acknowledge his use of his former employer’s equipment to
access prohibited material.  
In acknowledging his use of his former employer’s equipment to access and view
pornographic films and content, Applicant states that “I think looking back on it, it was a
mistake. I should have been familiar with the policy, I should have followed the policy.”36
He never used company-owned equipment to access pornography in prior or
subsequent jobs. In his present employment, the company has a policy regarding the
personal use of its property for accessing the internet “very similar” to his former
employer’s policy: “One of the things that it specifies is you not view pornographic
material.”  From the time he was granted a security clearance in 2007 until the present,37
no other adverse incidents have been reported.  Applicant does not think his viewing of38
pornography makes him vulnerable to blackmail.  A close personal friend testified that39
he has never known Applicant to be racially insensitive in any matter.40
The company’s handbook is 38 pages in length. Under the section entitled
“Necessary Rules,” one complete page is entitled and discusses “Internet Usage.”41
Internet connections are identified as being primarily for business purposes. Employees
are “advised to use discretion when connecting to the internet for personal use” and
unauthorized use is “strictly prohibited.”  The first example of unauthorized use is42
 Id.      43
 Id. at 35.      44
 Id. at 7.      45
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      46
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      47
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      48
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“[c]onnecting to, posting, or downloading pornographic material.”  Further, it is noted43
that all files downloaded from the internet must be checked for possible computer
viruses. Under a section entitled “Inspection,” it is noted that desks, cabinets, and
“storage devices” may be provided for the convenience of employees, but remain the
sole property of [the company]” and can be inspected by any agent or representative of
the company at any time.  Any questions regarding policies could be directed to44
designated individuals.45
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these
guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process.
The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and
commonsense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a
number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge
must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
The government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in
the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a46
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  47 48
 Id.      49
 Id.      50
 AG ¶ 39.      51
 Id.      52
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A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access49
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.50
Based upon consideration of the evidence, Guideline F (Financial
Considerations) is the most pertinent to this case. Conditions pertaining to this
adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as
well as those which would mitigate such concerns, are set forth and discussed below.
Analysis
Guideline M – Use of Information Technology Systems
Under Guideline M, “noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or
regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns
about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the willingness
or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information.”  It further51
notes that “Information Technology Systems include all related computer hardware,
software, firmware, and data used for the communication, transmission, processing,
manipulation, storage, or protection of information.”  The Directive sets out several52
potentially disqualifying conditions under this guideline. Here, Applicant admits he
accessed  pornography on his former employer’s computer equipment through the
internet and copied from his home computer while generally aware that such access
was prohibited or essentially proscribed under company policy. He then maintained
such files on his employer’s equipment until his departure from the company.
 Regardless, in neglecting to read the handbook, Applicant proceeded at his own peril.       53
 The only inadvertent activity suggested involves the potentially racially divisive web site that Applicant      54
conceded he may have visited. Inasmuch as there is insufficient evidence that Applicant actually visited this
site, however, that portion of the allegation is found in favor of Applicant.  
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Therefore, both Use of Information Technology Systems (UITS) Disqualifying Condition
(DC) AG ¶ 40(e) (unauthorized use of a government or other technology system) and
AG ¶ 40(f) (introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or
media to or from any information technology system without authorization, when
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations) apply. With such conditions
raised, the burden shifts to Applicant to overcome the case against him and mitigate
security concerns. 
Applicant admitted he accessed pornography from the internet through
company-owned equipment. He similarly copied pornographic material onto his
company’s information systems from his personal computer. He denies having read the
38-page employee handbook, of which he acknowledged receipt, but admits that he
assumed there was a prohibition against accessing pornographic material in this
manner.  Moreover, the incidents at issue are multiple in number and occurred53
between the autumn of 2006 and the end of 2007. The repeated incidents were
sufficiently recent and conducted with adequate notice of his company’s policy to raise
serious concerns regarding Applicant’s judgment and ability to understand and
appreciate established rules and policies. Such facts and concerns obviate application
of UITS mitigating condition (MC) AG ¶ 41(a) (so much time has elapsed since the
behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely
to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment). 
In accessing pornography from the internet, and in transferring pornographic at
home, Applicant violated clearly enunciated policies regarding the improper and
unauthorized use of the internet with company-owned equipment. Such policies were
clearly set forth in the employee handbook, receipt of which he acknowledges. The
contents of such a handbook are not optional considerations posed by the equipment’s
rightful owner or suggestions for professional conduct. They are rules to be read and
followed. Moreover, Applicant’s access of pornography carried with it the very real
possibility of compromising the employer’s information systems through viruses and
other internet-bred problems. His access of such material was intentional and not in
furtherance of his employer’s mission. It was covertly acquired, deleted, and never
reported. Consequently, neither AG ¶ 41(b)  (the misuse was minor and done only in
the interest of organizational efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another
person use one’s password or computer when no other timely alternative was readily
available) nor AG ¶ 41(c) (the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was
followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification of
supervisor) apply.   Therefore, none of the mitigating conditions apply.54
 Revised Adjudicative Guideline (AG) ¶ 15.      55
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Guideline E – Personal Conduct
Under Guideline E, “conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified
information.”   Here, Applicant received and acknowledged an employee handbook he55
chose not to read. In violation of clearly detailed policy regarding the use of the internet
with company-owned equipment, he accessed pornography on his employer’s
computer equipment from the internet and his home computer. Applicant failed to
identify the dates of such access, but admits the conduct occurred between the autumn
of 2006 and the end of 2007. That time frame suggests that some, if not all, of that
material was accessed during this period or at least remained on his employer’s
equipment until he left his job. It is also significant because between about May 2007
and late December 2007, he served as his employer’s Assistant Facility Security
Officer, then as the Facility Security Officer. Although these facts are not amenable to
the situations contemplated in the enumerated disqualifying conditions, such conduct
raises the general security concerns noted in AG ¶ 15, above, regarding questionable
judgment, lack of candor, and dishonesty or unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations that can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and
ability to protect classified information.  
The same reasons set forth in the preceding section regarding UITS obviate
applicability of Personal Conduct (PC) mitigating condition (MC) AG ¶ 17(c) (so much
time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual
circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment). Moreover, while Applicant now freely
admits his misconduct and stresses that his misuse of his employer’s equipment to view
pornography does not make him vulnerable to blackmail, it is notable that this
disclosure and admission was not made until after his undisclosed deletion of the
pornographic files and their ultimate discovery. At best, such after-the-fact efforts only
raise AG ¶ 17(e) (the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress) in part. None of the other
mitigating conditions apply. 
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
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rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the
guidelines and the whole person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole person”
factors. Applicant is a well-educated man with significant professional experience in
information technology and computers. At the time at issue, Applicant was in his late
20s and had worked in the information technology arena since he was a sophomore in
college. He later managed his own business in that field. Applicant admits he accessed
pornography with his employer’s computer equipment. He also acknowledges that he
signed a form stating he understood the contents of the employee handbook, but seeks
to mitigate concerns by stating he never read the handbook before or after its initial
receipt. Such facts, however, do not reduce concerns. They only highlight his
unreliability and lack of appreciation for rules and policies. This is particularly true given
Applicant’s experience in the field, the fact he was generally aware that such activity
was not authorized, and his personal assumption that  there was a policy prohibiting the
downloading of pornography.
Applicant did not simply access and maintain pornography as an idle employee
by day or unthinking employee at night. He intentionally accessed and/or transferred
pornography improperly in the privacy of his home, away from the workplace in which
his activities might be observed. In deleting the material, he did so in a cursory manner.
He did not think his employer would ever examine its own equipment. Application of
professional common sense and a skim through the employee handbook, however,
should have apprised him that his employer reserved the right to inspect its property at
any time. Of particular concern is the fact that Applicant accessed pornography while
serving as a trusted information technology professional and applicant for a security
clearance who would eventually serve as the Assistant Facility Security Officer, then as
the Facility Security Office. In those capacities, he violated company policy concerning
internet usage, maintained pornographic material, failed to disclose its acquisition or
maintenance, and ultimately tried to conceal its acquisition prior to his departure. In
doing so, he demonstrated poor judgment, unreliability, and betrayed the trust of his
employer.
The way in which the company discovered Applicant’s misuse of its internet-
capable equipment is relatively irrelevant. The employer had a right to inspect its own
property. The fact that the evidence has since been scrubbed is similarly irrelevant.
Applicant freely admitted to his conduct. While he has worked for another company for
about two years without incident, insufficient time has passed to demonstrate that
Applicant no longer misuses information technology systems, fully appreciates
employer policies, and follows established company procedures. Given his background,
profession, work responsibilities, and positions, Applicant’s flagrant disregard of his
employer’s policies, his lack of concern regarding his equipment use, or his general
12
negligence raise and sustain genuine security concerns regarding both his use of
information technology systems and his personal conduct. Therefore, it is concluded
that security concerns raised by Applicant’s access of pornography remain unmitigated.
Clearance is denied. 
  
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline M: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a – 1.b Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a – 2.b Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge