KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST:  The Board does not have the authority to waive provisions of the Directive.  A party’s
disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence does not demonstrate error.  Adverse
decision affirmed.
CASENO: 09-03724.a1
DATE: 03/23/2010
DATE: March 23, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-03724
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On September 4, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On January 12, 2010, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Carol G.
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Ricciardello denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant
to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  For the following reasons, the Board affirms the Judge’s unfavorable
decision. 
The Judge found that Applicant owes more than $136,000 for a defaulted home equity loan.
Applicant obtained the loan to help his brother refinance the brother’s home.  The home equity loan
remained unpaid after the house was sold at foreclosure.  Applicant and his brother have not
formulated a plan to repay the debt.  Applicant stated he plans on paying the debt, but he did not
provide any details on how or when he plans to do so.  Applicant plans to get married and to obtain
a masters degree.  Applicant has not had financial counseling.  He does not have a written budget.
The Judge concluded that Applicant is unable and unwilling to repay the loan.  She also concluded
that although circumstances were somewhat beyond Applicant’s control, Applicant has not acted
reasonably under the circumstances.  The Judge pointed out that it has been two years since
Applicant defaulted on the debt, yet he has not saved any money to put toward paying the debt.
Rather, Applicant is focused on other financial priorities, such as marriage and additional education.
The Judge concluded that there are no clear indications the problem is being resolved nor has he
made a good-faith effort to repay the debt.
 Applicant asserts that the Judge failed to show how Applicant can be a threat, when he has
consistently paid his debts on time and the exception of the home equity loan is a common
circumstance for hundreds of thousands of Americans.  Further, Applicant asserts that the Judge’s
decision to deny him a clearance runs contrary to current government policy which calls for relief
for people who have lost their home.  Applicant also argues that his circumstances and the efforts
he has made to enable his eventual repayment of the debt mitigate the government’s case against
him. 
Applicant’s arguments concerning whether or not he is a threat, or whether the Judge’s
decision runs contrary to government policy, do not establish error.  The Board and the Judge are
bound by the provisions of the Directive.  The Board does not have the authority to waive provisions
of the Directive.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 08-08012 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 20, 2009).  Nor does the
Board have the authority to entertain challenges to the wisdom or legality of provisions of the
Directive.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-01961 at 3 (App. Bd. Jul. 12, 2007) and ISCR Case No. 04-
10821 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 19, 2006).
 Regarding Applicant’s mitigation argument, the presence of some mitigating evidence does
not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the
Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7,
2007).  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for
a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
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evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).  
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors.  She discussed the applicability of Adjudicative Guidelines ¶20 at some
length, indicating her understanding that the precipitating events that led to the loan default were the
financial circumstances and actions of Applicant’s brother and not Applicant.  However, as discussed
in a preceding paragraph, the Judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that
Applicant acted prudently in making attempts to resolve the delinquent debt in the two years since
the default.  The Judge also noted that undertaking the responsibility of the home equity loan was
a voluntary act on Applicant’s part, notwithstanding his sense of obligation to his brother.  These
conclusions are reasonably supported by the record as are the Judge’s conclusions about the
applicability of the other mitigating conditions and her whole person analysis.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board
concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
her decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general
standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the
Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan     
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett               
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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Signed: William S. Fields                  
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board