GE 1. Applicant held a security clearance from June 1985 to March 2005, when his clearance was denied1
after a hearing before a different administrative judge as discussed below. The Appeal Board affirmed that
adverse decision. ISCR Case No. 03-08475 (App. Bd. Sept. 14, 2005). 
1
                                                                     
                               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------, -------- -------- )       ISCR Case No. 06-10859
SSN: ------ ---- -------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff A. Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: James F. Campbell, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was denied a security clearance in 2005 based on personal conduct
concerns. He engaged in multiple incidents of similar conduct, some alcohol-related,
during the ensuing three years. The evidence is insufficient to mitigate resulting security
concerns. Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, testimony, and exhibits,
eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on September 6, 2007.  On1
August 11, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guidelines
G (Alcohol Consumption) and E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
GE 1.2
GE 15.3
The allegations set forth in the present SOR ¶¶ 1.a (but with an Oct. 2002 end date), 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 2.a, 2.d,4
2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h, 2.i, and 2.j, were all included in the May 6, 2004 SOR.
2
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on
December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense on September 1,
2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on September 8, 2009. He answered
the SOR in writing (AR) on September 28, 2009, and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on October 19,
2009, and the case was assigned to a different administrative judge on the following
day. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on November 17, 2009, setting the hearing for
December 10, 2009. On December 3, 2009, that administrative judge granted
Applicant’s motion for a continuance until the week of January 18, 2010. On December
23, 2009, DOHA reassigned the case to me. DOHA issued a revised Notice of Hearing
on December 24, 2009, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on January 19, 2010.
The Government offered exhibits (GE) 1 through 15, which were admitted without
objection. Applicant offered exhibits (AE) A through E, which were also admitted without
objection, and testified on his own behalf. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing
(Tr.) on January 27, 2010.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a major defense contractor, where he
began working in March 2002. He has no military service. He held a security clearance
from June 1985 to February 2002 while working for a different major defense contractor,
and the clearance transferred with him when he changed jobs. He is single with no
children.  In his response to the SOR, he formally admitted the factual allegations set2
forth in SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.g, 2.d through 2.j, and 2.l, with some explanations. He
denied the remaining SOR allegations, also with explanations. Applicant’s admissions,
including his statements in response to DOHA interrogatories,  are incorporated in the3
following findings.
DOHA issued a previous SOR to Applicant, which also cited security concerns
under Guidelines G and E, on May 6, 2004.  After a hearing, a different administrative4
judge found for Applicant on the Guideline G allegations, because the alcohol-related
incidents had occurred several years earlier, there was no indication of a recent
problem, and Applicant had successfully completed an alcohol-rehabilitation program.
However, the administrative judge found against Applicant on the Guideline E
allegations, because his pattern of numerous violations of state traffic codes indicated a
flagrant disregard for the law and suggested an unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations. Furthermore, he concluded that Applicant deliberately omitted and
concealed relevant and material facts concerning his October 1998 alcohol-related
GE 11. This decision, ISCR Case No. 03-08475, was dated March 2, 2005.5
See Note 1, supra.6
GE 11; Tr. 39, 123.7
AR; GE 3; GE 4; AE C; Tr. 46-47.8
AR; GE 5; GE 6; GE 7; GE 8; GE 9; GE 11; GE 12; GE 14; Tr. 123-124.9
3
arrest and criminal charge from his November 1999 security clearance application. The
administrative judge found that Applicant had failed to meet his burden to mitigate the
resulting personal conduct security concerns and denied his eligibility to continue
holding a security clearance.  Applicant appealed this adverse decision, which the5
Appeal Board affirmed on September 14, 2005.  The findings and conclusions of the6
administrative judge who decided that case are not binding precedent. After thorough
review of that hearing transcript (GE 14), Applicant’s response to that SOR (GE 12),
and the other exhibits pertinent to the allegations contained therein (GE 2 through 10), I
find that the Findings of Fact set forth in the administrative judge’s decision (GE 11) are
fully supported by the evidence, and they are adopted and incorporated herein by
reference. I will draw independent conclusions by applying applicable AG and whole-
person factors to the complete and updated facts and circumstances established by all
the evidence.
In October 1998, Applicant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI).
He had been at a bar drinking and commiserating with a friend after breaking up with his
girlfriend. He was very intoxicated, so his friend drove Applicant’s car when they left the
bar. They had an accident, and the friend left the site to find a tow truck. Applicant
remained with the car, and was arrested when police responded. His blood alcohol
content (BAC) was .24%. After he was formally charged with this offense, his friend told
the prosecutor that he, not Applicant, had been the driver on the evening in question.
The DUI charge was subsequently dismissed without trial.7
Between August 1998 and October 2000, Applicant was cited seven different
times for the traffic violations as set forth in SOR ¶¶ 2.d through 2.j. He admitted
committing all of those offenses, except the Driving While License Suspended offense
in SOR ¶ 1.h. The court later determined that Applicant’s license had been suspended
in error for non-payment of an earlier fine that he had actually paid on time.  8
On July 21, 2001, Applicant was stopped for speeding while driving home from a
bar. He failed a field sobriety test, and a portable breath registered his BAC at .191%.
He was arrested and charged with DUI. From August 19, 2001, to February 14, 2002,
he successfully completed an alcohol treatment program for a diagnosed condition of
Alcohol Abuse. In February 2002, pursuant to a plea agreement, Applicant plead guilty
to the lesser charge of Negligent Driving First Degree, and was sentenced as described
in SOR ¶ 1.e.  9
AR; AE C; Tr. 47-49, 58-59, 92-93.10
AR; GE 15; Tr. 34-35, 94-101. I granted Department Counsel’s motion to amend SOR ¶ 2.l to conform to11
the evidence by inserting the word “twice” between the words “cited” and “on.” 
AR; GE 15; Tr. 35-36, 81-84, 88-90, 117-121.12
4
On December 26, 2005, Applicant was cited for speeding in Nebraska, vice
California as originally alleged in SOR ¶ 1.k. This violation occurred when he entered a
construction zone and failed to notice the reduced speed limit. I granted Department
Counsel’s motion to amend the SOR to conform to the evidence by correcting the name
of the state.10
On December 29, 2006, Applicant began a trip to visit Canada for the New
Year’s holiday. The previous day he had hosted a party at his house, at which he had
one cooler with beer and another with soft drinks. He brought the soft drink cooler with
him on the trip, setting it on the front passenger seat. He was stopped twice, a few
hours apart, and cited for speeding. During the second stop, the police officer searched
his car and found an empty beer can in the soft drink cooler. Applicant was also cited
and fined for an open alcohol container violation, despite his claim that he did not know
the can was in the cooler.11
On December 30, 2006, Applicant stopped to visit a friend who lived near the
border before crossing into Canada. They had a meal, at which Applicant drank several
beers, but cannot recall how many. When crossing the border, Applicant was directed
by Canadian authorities to pull his car over for inspection but failed to do so. He was
stopped and arrested at 6:30 p.m. He told the arresting officer that he had consumed
one 12 ounce can of Budweiser beer at approximately 4:00 p.m. in a city about 120
miles south of the border. At 10:11 p.m., and again at 10:49 p.m., his BAC test results
were 110 and 120 mg/ml (equivalent to .110% and .120%), respectively. He was
charged with DUI, and released on foot on the U.S. side of the border. He walked to a
local hotel, where he spent the night and recovered his car the following day. Due to
technical flaws in the timing of the breath tests, Applicant’s Canadian attorney
convinced the prosecutor not to file formal charges in the matter and he was not
prosecuted.  12
On February 16, 2008, Applicant went on a lunchtime wine-tasting date. He does
not recall how much he drank. After he felt that he had waited long enough to safely
drive, he did so. At 9:24 p.m. he was on a highway and saw a disabled car stopped in
his lane ahead of him. Other cars ahead of him merged left and passed the car, but he
was unable to do so. He stopped just short of the disabled car. A local police officer who
was driving his police car behind Applicant was unable to stop and collided with the rear
of Applicant’s car. A state police trooper responded to the accident scene. He reported
detecting a moderate odor of alcohol on Applicant’s breath, and that Applicant
performed poorly on the field sobriety tests. Applicant provided two preliminary alcohol
screening device breath samples, both of which registered .068%. Applicant informed
the responding officer that he had taken a two-hour nap from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m., that his
AR; GE 15; AE A; AE B; Tr. 28-33, 54-55, 63-81. I modified the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b to conform to the13
facts.
AR; GE 15; Tr. 57-58, 62-63, 85-88. 14
GE 10.15
5
last meal was a sausage and cheese sandwich with chips at noon, and that his drinking
consisted of one Budweiser beer that he drank at home beginning at 12:30 p.m. and
ending at 4:59 p.m. that afternoon. Applicant was arrested at 10:09 p.m., and taken to a
hospital to provide a blood sample. The subsequent testing of this blood sample
revealed a blood alcohol content of .05. Under applicable state law, a reading greater
than .08 is an offense, while there is a presumption that one is not under the influence
for a reading of .05 or below. State law further provides a one-year statute of limitations
within which misdemeanor charges must be formally filed, and that any misdemeanor
arrest that does not result in formal charges shall be considered only a detention, rather
than an arrest. Applicant was never charged in connection with this incident, and the
police report found the accident to have been the fault of the local police officer, not
Applicant.    13
Applicant admitted consuming alcohol, at times to excess and to the point of
intoxication or impairment, from approximately 1977 to at least February 16, 2008. He
testified that his last alcohol consumption was in June 2008, when he drank what he
mistakenly believed to be a non-alcoholic beer at a party. He told an investigator during
an August 2008 interview that he last drank when he had two beers at a party at a
friend’s house. He was diagnosed as diabetic in February 2006, and said he did not
consume alcohol from then until December of that year, shortly before he was arrested
while crossing into Canada. Applicant testified that he consumed no alcohol after that
incident until the day of his February 2008 accident.   14
In preparation for his 2004 security clearance hearing, Applicant obtained an
alcohol abuse evaluation from a clinical psychologist recommended by the attorney who
represented him at that hearing. He met with this psychologist twice, on September 3,
and 4, 2004. The psychologist found that Applicant’s “history of substance use/abuse is
‘within normal limits.’” He wrote, “negative experiences with alcohol have already led to
changes in his use patterns in that he no longer consumes alcohol away from home,
even when dining out, because he does not wish to impair his judgment.” He concluded
that he did not believe Applicant “possesses any more than the ‘normal’ risk for alcohol
abuse and is at very little risk for alcohol dependence.” Applicant did not receive any
counseling or other type of treatment from this psychologist.  15
When completing his 2007 security clearance application, Applicant duly listed all
of the foregoing arrests, including the 1998 DUI arrest that he omitted from his 1999
application as discussed above. He also listed his treatment in the alcohol rehabilitation
program from August 2001 to February 2002. He did not list the 2004 consultation with
the clinical psychologist discussed in the preceding paragraph, however. He explained
that he failed to list that consultation because he did not receive any treatment, and the
AR; GE 1; GE 11; Tr. 42-46, 60-61, 124. 16
AR; AE B; Tr. 49, 125-126.17
6
matter had been fully disclosed during his previous security clearance hearing when he
introduced the evaluation report into evidence. Applicant’s testimony on this point was
completely credible. His explanation is understandable given the wording of the second
part of the question asking the applicant to “provide the dates of treatment.” There is no
evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that this particular omission was a
deliberate falsification.   16
Applicant denied the allegation, in SOR ¶ 2.m, that he was cited and fined for
speeding on January 29, 2008, and testified that this did not happen. The extracts of his
state driving record contain no reference to any such incident. Department Counsel
conceded that he had no evidence to prove the allegation, and was unaware of the
basis on which the drafter of the SOR included it.17
Applicant submitted his performance evaluations for the past six years. His
overall ratings reflect “Successful Contributor” for five of those years and “High
Contributor” for 2007. These evaluations further discussed his personal and technical
strengths and areas for development or improvement.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
7
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
AG ¶ 21 expresses the security concern pertaining to alcohol consumption:
Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable
judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about
an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.
AG ¶ 22 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. The DCs supported by the SOR allegations and asserted by Department
Counsel are:
(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under
the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or
other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual is
diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol
abuser or alcohol dependent; and
(f) relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and completion
of an alcohol treatment program.
8
Applicant’s alcohol-related incidents in 1998 and 2001 involved BAC readings of
.24% and .191%, both of which indicate significant intoxication. A friend later claimed to
have been driving Applicant’s car during the first incident, permitting him to avoid
criminal prosecution for DUI. He admitted driving during the second incident, after which
he completed a six-month alcohol treatment program for his diagnosed Alcohol Abuse.
He avoided further incidents prior to his 2004 security clearance hearing, and hired a
psychologist who provided an evaluation opining that Applicant had learned from his
earlier mistakes and future alcohol abuse was unlikely. Applicant claims to have
severely curtailed his alcohol consumption after his February 2006 diagnosis as a
diabetic. On December 29, 2006, he was cited for an open-container violation for which
he paid a fine rather than contest the ticket, despite his claim of ignorance that the beer
can was in his cooler. On December 30, 2006, he consumed what he told the arresting
officer was one beer several hours earlier, and what he testified during the hearing was
a few beers at a friend’s house with dinner. He was sufficiently intoxicated while driving
through the Canadian border control that he failed to comply with directions to pull over
for inspection, and was arrested. He had enough alcohol in his system to test at the
equivalent of .11% three hours and forty-five minutes after his arrest, and .12% a half
hour later. In February 2008, after an accident that was not his fault, his preliminary
BAC tested at .68%, with a subsequent blood alcohol level tested at .05. This occurred
at 9:24 p.m., after his consumption of what must have been a substantial amount of
wine around seven to eight hours earlier on a lunchtime wine-tasting date. These facts
clearly raise security concerns under AG ¶¶ 22(a) and (f). He also admitted to
consuming alcohol, at times to excess and to the point of intoxication or impairment
from 1977 to February 2008, supporting application of AG ¶ 22(c).
AG ¶ 23 provides conditions that could mitigate alcohol consumption security
concerns:
(a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol
abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and
has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or
responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
(c) the individual is a current employee who is participating in a counseling
or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment and relapse,
and is making satisfactory progress; and
(d) the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as
9
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Applicant has been involved in multiple alcohol-related incidents over the past 12
years, the most recent of which was about two years ago. None of these occurred under
unusual circumstances. His clinical psychologist’s 2004 opinion that he had learned
from earlier mistakes, and such incidents were unlikely to recur, was disproved by his
subsequent conduct. He provided insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion at
this point. Accordingly, AG ¶ 23(a) does not provide mitigation.
Applicant says he has not consumed alcohol since June 2008, and consistently
minimizes rather than acknowledges his issues of alcohol abuse. His 2006 and 2008
alcohol-related incidents preclude a finding of a pattern of responsible use since his
2001 treatment program. Insufficient time has passed to establish mitigation under AG ¶
23(b), given the duration and nature of his history of alcohol abuse. Similarly, there is
not sufficient evidence to support mitigation under AG ¶¶ 23(c) and (d). Applicant had
several relapses after his six-month alcohol treatment program, and demonstrated no
participation in counseling or treatment since then. He provided no current favorable
prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or social worker. 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes the DCs under this guideline. The specific Guideline E
concerns raised by the SOR allegation as asserted by Department Counsel are:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and
(d) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
asking if he had ever been charged with or convicted of an alcohol-related offense.18
asking about any arrests or charges in the last 7 years not reported in response to questions 21 to 25.19
GE 11 at 7.20
10
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information.  
Also raised are the judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness issues the Appeal Board
found to be inherent under AG ¶ 15. ISCR Case No. 06-20964 (App. Bd. Apr. 10, 2008).
Applicant is an educated man with sufficient experience in the criminal justice
system to have understood that he was charged with DUI in 1998, although that charge
was later dismissed. If he thought the dismissal of the charge eliminated his need to
disclose the incident in response to question 24  on his 1999 security clearance18
application, he should have reported the arrest in response to question 26  on that19
form. His negative response to both of those questions together constituted a deliberate
omission and concealment of relevant facts on that application, raising AG ¶ 16(a). His
omission of the psychologist’s alcohol abuse evaluation from his 2007 questionnaire
was not a deliberate omission or concealment of that information. He received no
treatment in connection with those consultations, and the results were introduced as
evidence on his behalf in his prior DOHA hearing.
Guideline E has been revised since Applicant’s last DOHA hearing, but Appeal
Board precedent (cited above) establishes that a pattern of behavior demonstrating
questionable judgment and unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations will
support security concerns under the guideline despite the language that would seem to
limit application of particular DCs to cases in which other guidelines are inapplicable.
Applicant was denied a security clearance in 2005 due to the falsification noted above,
and his pattern of unlawful behavior involving traffic violations. The previous judge
noted, “Applicant engaged in numerous violations of the state traffic code. Many were
similar or repeated violations, indicating a flagrant disregard for the law. . . . While any
one offense, standing alone, is relatively minor, the pattern of these offenses suggests
an unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations.”  Since that decision, Applicant20
was cited and fined for three additional speeding violations, an open container violation,
and committed at least one DUI (although Canadian authorities declined to prosecute).
This ongoing pattern supports continuing security concerns under AG ¶¶ 15 and 16(d).
These acts adequately raise concerns about his judgment, trustworthiness,
reliability, and willingness to comply with rules and regulations, and shift the burden to
him to establish mitigation. Additional whole-person analysis will be discussed in the
following section. 
AG ¶ 17 provides personal conduct MCs. The only MCs with potential
applicability to the foregoing security concerns are:
11
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the
individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
Mitigation under AG ¶ 17(a) was not established because Applicant did not
disclose his 1998 arrest until confronted with information obtained by the investigator
during his subsequent interview. He offered no evidence that would support application
of AG ¶ 17(b). Partial mitigation under AG ¶ 17(c) was established, since the omission
was more than ten years ago, and he fully disclosed his criminal history on his 2007
application. Standing alone, this concealment in 1999 would not support current
concerns. However, considered in connection with his pattern of other violations, it
continues to support some doubt about his trustworthiness and judgment. The only
counseling Applicant obtained was his 2001 and 2002 treatment for alcohol abuse, after
which he resumed drinking and suffered multiple relapses. AG ¶ 17(d) was not
established. Applicant did not demonstrate positive steps to reduce or eliminate his
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation or duress. AG ¶ 17(e) was therefore not
established.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
12
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct of security
concern spans the past twelve years. Multiple incidents similar to those that caused his
clearance to be denied in 2005 occurred in the three years following that decision. This
demonstrates the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of irresponsible conduct and
the ongoing potential for exploitation or duress. Although the last incident alleged
against Applicant took place two years ago, his repeated misconduct after losing his
clearance for similar reasons demonstrates the absence of rehabilitation or other
permanent behavioral changes. Applicant has been a well-educated, fully mature, and
accountable adult throughout the period in question, and he voluntarily chose to engage
in the conduct of concern. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He did not meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from his alcohol consumption and personal conduct.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline G: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.g: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a or 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant 
Subparagraphs 2.d through 2.l: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.m: For Applicant
13
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge