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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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----------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 09-02829
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Francisco Mendez, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant, a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen from Brazil, continues to vote
in Brazilian elections to maintain his dual citizenship. Also, his wife, a naturalized U.S.
citizen who is also from Brazil, works for a Brazilian government agency located in the
U.S. that purchases material for the Brazilian government. These facts create Foreign
Preference and Foreign Influence security concerns that Applicant failed to mitigate.
Clearance denied.
Statement of the Case
On October 9, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under
Guidelines B, Foreign Influence, and C, Foreign Preference. The action was taken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines.
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DOHA received Applicant’s answer on October 23, 2009. He admitted all of the
allegations and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on December 7,
2009. On December 28, 2009, DOHA issued a notice of hearing scheduling the case for
January 26, 2010. I conducted the hearing, as scheduled. At the hearing, I received four
Government exhibits, thirty-seven Applicant exhibits, and the testimony of two Applicant
witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, I left the record open, at Applicant’s
request, for him to submit additional evidence. Within the time allotted, Applicant
submitted two additional documents that I received as AE LL and AE MM. DOHA
received the transcript on February 3, 2010.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 58-year-old married man with two adult children. He was born in
Argentina, and raised in Brazil. In 1970, at age 18, he became a Brazilian citizen. (Tr.
70)
Applicant attended college and graduate school in Brazil, earning a bachelor of
science in electrical engineering and a master’s degree in computer science. (GE 1 at
13; AE KK) In 1975, Applicant moved to the U.S. to pursue a doctorate in computer
science. After earning his Ph.D in 1978, Applicant returned to Brazil and joined the
faculty of the college he previously attended.
Applicant remained in Brazil until 1991 when he decided to move back to the
U.S. (GE 3 at 11) He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1999. (Tr. 37) Since 1992, he
has been on the faculty of a U.S. university.
Currently, Applicant is the senior associate dean of engineering, and is a
consultant in the field of capacity planning. (AE J) Among other things, he is in charge of
all research programs that the university conducts. Applicant is internationally
renowned, having lectured throughout the world, patented several innovations, and
published a prolific body of work. Also, he has testified as an expert witness in several
patent infringement cases. (AE KK) In 1997, Applicant was designated an “Association
for Computer Machinery Fellow,” the most prestigious honor in the information
technology field. (AE Z)
Much of the research Applicant conducts is U.S.-Government funded. (Tr. 85) He
conducts some of his research for DoD agencies, and needs a security clearance to
facilitate it.
Applicant travelled to Brazil approximately seven times between 2002 and 2008
to visit his ailing parents. (Answer) Each time, he used his Brazilian passport. This
enabled him to enter the country promptly without having to apply for a visa. (Tr. 58) He
has not returned to Brazil since March 2008. Both of his parents are now deceased. (Tr.
57) He surrendered his Brazilian passport to the university’s facility security officer
(FSO) in January 2010. (AE LL) Applicant appeared reluctant about surrendering his
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passport, asking at the close of the hearing if he could retrieve it if his security clearance
application was denied. (Tr. 109)
Applicant votes in Brazilian presidential elections. He does so in order to maintain
his dual citizenship with Brazil. (Tr. 58; AE GG) When questioned regarding whether he
will continue to vote in Brazilian presidential elections, Applicant responded, as follows:
If I am still holding a Brazilian citizenship, I have to do that. It’s Brazilian
law. And during my entire life, I have always been a law-abiding citizen.
(Tr. 105)
Applicant and his wife have been married for more than 35 years. She is a dual
U.S.-Brazilian citizen. (GE 3 at 12) She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2000. She
works for a branch of the Brazilian government that purchases material for the Brazilian
Army from the U.S. Army. (Tr. 65) Products purchased include, among other things,
medicines unavailable in Brazil, avionics, machine gun spare parts, and night vision
accessories. (GE 4; Tr. 88) This organization consists of 30 employees, 18 of whom are
civilian. The remaining 12 are Brazilian army members. Applicant’s wife is a purchasing
agent who prepares the procurement contracts. (Tr. 64-66, 95)
Both of Applicant’s children were born in the U.S. (Tr. 15) They are dual U.S.-
Brazilian citizens based upon their parents’ Brazilian citizenship status. (Tr. 61-62). Both
are married to U.S. citizens and live in the U.S. (Tr. 62) His son works for the federal
government and his daughter works for a research institute. (Tr. 60)
Applicant’s parents-in-law are deceased. Two sisters-in-laws, a brother-in-law,
two nieces and a nephew are citizens and residents of Brazil. (Answer) Another brother-
in-law is a citizen and resident of Israel. 
Applicant visited his siblings-in-law when he travelled to Brazil to visit his parents.
Since his parents passed away and he no longer regularly travels to Brazil, his contact
with his siblings-in-law has decreased. Now, he only talks to them if they call for his wife
and he happens to be at home. (Tr. 59) Applicant and his wife did, however, pay for one
sister-in-law and his brother-in-law to visit them in the U.S. (Tr. 63)
Applicant’s nieces and nephews living in Brazil are the children of his brother-in-
law. One is a college student and the others are teenagers. (Tr. 64)
Applicant’s brother-in-law living is Israel is a dual citizen of Israel and Brazil. He
has lived in Israel for 12 years. (Tr. 67) Applicant has not seen him since he moved to
Israel, and does not know where in Israel he lives. Applicant’s brother-in-law last called
him in 2009 to tell him his daughter was in the U.S. (Tr. 67) Applicant and his wife then
contacted this niece and paid her travels arrangements to visit them. Applicant has
never been to Israel. (Tr. 66)
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Applicant and his wife maintain a bank account in Brazil. They use it to wire
money to Applicant’s siblings-in-law. (Answer, Tr. 68) They send them approximately
$800 per month, collectively, to help with rent and medical expenses. (Tr. 68-69)
Between March and June of 2008, using the bank account in Brazil, they transferred
approximately $26,000 to a sister-in-law to help her purchase a home. (GE 2 at 9)
Applicant earns more than $250,000 annually and has a net worth of $2.2 million.
(Tr. 69) The account he shares with his wife in Brazil constitutes less than 1.7 percent of
his net worth. All of the money used to support Applicant’s siblings-in-law comes from
his wife’s salary.
Brazil is a charter member of the United Nations. (AE II) It has enjoyed “friendly,
active relations [with the U.S.] encompassing a broad political and economic agenda.”
(Id.)
The security of Israel is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Relations between
the U.S. and Israel “are continually strengthening in every field.” (AE JJ)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying
conditions and mitigating conditions.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. 
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a
number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge
must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
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Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under this guideline, “[w]hen an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a
preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United
States.” (AG ¶ 9) Applicant’s use of a Brazilian passport for nine years after becoming a
naturalized U.S. citizen and his continued participation Brazilian presidential elections
triggers the application of AG ¶ 10(a), “exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of
foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of
another family member.” Specifically, AG ¶¶ 10(a)(1), “possession of a current foreign
passport,” and 10(a)(7), “voting in a foreign election,” apply.
Applicant surrendered his passport to his employer’s FSO after the hearing. AG ¶
11(e) “the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security
authority, or otherwise invalidated,” applies.
Applicant continues to vote in Brazilian presidential elections to fulfil his obligation
as a Brazilian citizen. Consequently, none of the other mitigating conditions apply.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 explains the foreign influence security concern as follows
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Although Applicant’s two adult children are dual U.S.-Brazilian citizens, both live
in the U.S. and are married to U.S. citizens. Also, one works for the federal government.
Under these circumstances, they do not generate any security concerns.
Conversely, Applicant’s wife, a dual U.S.-Brazilian citizen, works as a
procurement officer for a Brazilian government agency that purchases supplies for the
Brazilian army. AG ¶ 7(d), “sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless
of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” applies.
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Applicant’s siblings-in-law, who are either Brazilian citizens and residents or
Israeli citizens and residents, trigger the application of AG ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign
family member, business, or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a
citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” Also, Applicant’s
maintenance of a bank account in Brazil that he used to, among other things, wire
money to a sister-in-law to help her purchase a home, generates a security concern
under AG ¶ 7(e), “a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the
individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.”
Since Applicant’s parents died, he rarely sees or speaks with his siblings-in-law.
Applicant and his wife provide financial support for them through money deposited in a
Brazilian bank account. Though this support is significant to their relatives, it represents
a minuscule percentage of Applicant and his wife’s net worth. AG ¶¶ 8(c), “contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation,” and 8(f), “the
value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such
that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence,
manipulate, or pressure the individual,” apply. Applicant’s relatives in Brazil do not pose
a security concern.
Applicant has not seen his brother-in-law living in Israel in 12 years, and does not
know where in Israel he lives. Although Applicant and his wife arranged for his brother-
law’s daughter to visit them while she was in the U.S., their contact, in sum, is
sufficiently casual and infrequent for AG ¶ 8(c) to apply to these relatives, also.
Brazil is a staunch U.S. ally; however, friendly countries can conduct espionage
as readily as hostile ones. Consequently, Applicant’s position as a procurement agent
for a Brazilian government agency that purchases equipment and supplies for the
Brazilian army poses a significant conflict of interest for Applicant that his deep and
longstanding personal and professional relationships and loyalties in the U.S. cannot
overcome. None of the mitigating conditions apply. In reaching this conclusion, I
considered Applicant’s reluctance to surrender his Brazilian passport and his intent to
continue voting in Brazilian elections.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
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individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant is an extraordinarily accomplished expert in his field. He is dedicated to
his family and is a pillar of his community. These factors cannot overcome the
vulnerability to coercion generated by his wife’s employment with a Brazilian
government agency that purchases supplies for the Brazilian army, and his intent to
continue voting in Brazilian elections in order to maintain his Brazilian citizenship. Upon
considering this case in the context of the whole-person concept, I conclude Applicant is
an unacceptable candidate for a security clearance. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b - 1.c: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d-2.g: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge