DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 09-05357 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Eric H. Borgstrom, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
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CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
On April 22, 2009, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) as part of his employment with a defense contractor. 
On December 3, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) for Applicant detailing security concerns for foreign 
influence under Guideline B and foreign preference under Guideline C. (Item 1) The 
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information 
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the 
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. Applicant acknowledged receipt of the 
SOR on December 8, 2009. (Item 3) 
  
 Applicant answered the SOR on December 17, 2009. (Item 2) He admitted the 
two factual allegations under Guideline C and the three factual allegations under 
Guideline B, but denied that these facts created a security concern. He elected to have 
the matter decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel 
submitted the Government’s written case on January 31, 2010. Applicant received a 
 
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complete file of relevant material (FORM) on February 11, 2010, and was provided the 
opportunity to file objections, and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the 
disqualifying conditions. Applicant did not submit additional information. The case was 
assigned to me on April 23, 2010. Based on a review of the case file, pleadings, and 
exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 Department Counsel in the FORM asked that administrative notice be taken of 
certain facts concerning Russia. I considered the request and the documents provided 
by Department Counsel. (Items 5 through 10) Administrative notice is taken of the facts 
as noted below in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following 
essential findings of fact. Applicant admitted the factual allegations in the SOR with 
explanation but denied the factual allegations raised security concerns under foreign 
influence and foreign preference.   
 
 Applicant is 50 years old and has been employed as an electronic tester for a 
defense contractor for about one year. Applicant was born, raised, and educated in the 
Soviet Union before the government collapsed and it became Russia. He received the 
equivalent of a Bachelor's Degree in Electronics in 1982. He worked for the next 18 
years, from April 1982 until August 2000, as an electrical engineer at an airport in 
Russia. During this time, he served his one month obligatory military service. In 1998 or 
1999, Applicant submitted his request to the United States for the "green card lottery." 
He was advised in 2000 that he had been selected. Applicant, his wife, and his teenage 
daughter entered the United States pursuant to the green card lottery on September 17, 
2000. In response to questions on the e-QIP concerning citizenship, Applicant 
responded that he has citizenship with the United States and Russia, and that he has 
not denounced his Russian citizenship. (Item 3, e-QIP, dated April 22, 2009; Item 4, 
Answers to Interrogatories, Testimonies, June 4, 2009 - June 11, 2009, at 4).    
  
 Upon entering the United States, Applicant and his family initially lived with a 
childhood friend who had preceded him to the United States by the green card lottery. 
They lived with his friend for about nine months, and then lived in a series of apartments 
until he purchased his own home in June 2004. Applicant quickly found work in the 
electronics industry. He worked at a company as a principal engineering technician from 
November 2000 until April 2006. That company moved its operation, so Applicant was 
unemployed from April 2006 until November 2006. His wife was employed, so there 
were minimal financial problems. Applicant worked at another electronics firm from 
December 2006 until April 2009, when he received a better offer from his defense 
contractor employer. (Item 4, Answers to Interrogatories, Testimonies, at 5)   
 
 
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 Applicant renewed his Russian passport in April 2004, and it expired in April 
2009. Applicant became a United States citizen in October 2007. His wife and daughter 
are also United States citizens. Applicant's parents and mother-in-law are deceased. 
Applicant does not have any siblings. His father-in-law is a retired Russian government 
employee in the agricultural area. He is approximately 73 years old and in poor health. 
Applicant's wife's 53-year-old half-brother resides with Applicant's father-in-law. 
Applicant's wife talks to her father every Sunday evening. Applicant noted in a June 
2009 security clearance interview that he last spoke to his father-in-law two weeks 
before the interview. He last saw him in August 2000 before he left for the United 
States. Applicant has a number of friends in Russia with whom he maintains contact. 
One is a childhood friend and another is a college classmate. He talks to them about 
three to seven times a year by phone, and last saw them in August 2000 before he left 
for the United States. Another is also an electrical engineer and a fellow worker from the 
airport he considered his best friend. He talks to him about once a month. He last saw 
him about three years ago when the friend came to the United States for a conference 
and stayed with Applicant and his family. Another of his contacts is an electrical 
engineer who worked at the same Russian airport but is now employed in a store in 
Russia. He talks to him about every other month. He last saw him before he left for the 
United States. Another childhood friend is a pediatric doctor who he talks to about three 
to seven times a year and last saw in August 2000. Applicant also may call his 
supervisor at the Russian airport on New Year's Eve for a holiday greeting. Applicant 
has not returned to Russia since he immigrated in August 2000. He maintains a quiet 
normal lifestyle in the United States living with his family and repairing and improving his 
house. (Item 4, Answers to Interrogatories, Testimonies, at 4-5)  
 
 Since Applicant became a United States citizen in October 2007, he voted in the 
Russian national elections on March 3, 2008, as well as the United States Presidential 
election in November 2008. He told security investigators and in response to the SOR 
that it is his intention to renew his Russian passport in late 2009 or early 2010 to 
facilitate moving his father-in-law to the United States. There is no indication in the file if 
Applicant renewed his Russian passport. In response to the SOR, he stated that he 
maintains a dual citizenship with Russia because he wishes to receive a pension for his 
18 year employment at the airport in Russia. 
 
 Russia is a federation of 21 republics. It is one of the world's nuclear super 
powers. The government continues to centralize with power concentrating in the 
president and prime minister. There is a weak bicameral legislature, but the president 
wields strong executive powers. He appoints the ministers and the prime minister. The 
president is also the leader of the armed forces and the Security Council. Russia is not 
as hostile to the United States as the old Soviet Union. However, but it is still hostile to 
the United States. It cannot be considered a "friendly" country. 
 
 Russia, as the Soviet Union did before it, has an active and ongoing intelligence 
collection program targeted on the United States. They are one of the most aggressive 
collectors of sensitive and protected United States technology, particularly for military, 
 
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and gas and oil industry technologies. Russia also provides various technologies to 
other countries, many of which are not friendly to the United States. 
 
 There is extensive and on-going terrorism in Russia. The United States 
Department of State warns United States citizens about dangers of traveling in Russia. 
The Caucasus region is especially prone to terror from the Chechen uprising which 
started in 1994 and continues today. There are human rights abuses, disappearances, 
and kidnappings. Russia's human rights record is uneven with political motivated 
killings, law enforcement torture, abuse, violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and 
harsh life-threatening prison conditions. Authorities do not observe the rights of privacy 
in residences, and there is on-going electronic wiretapping without cause. Telephone 
and internet companies are required to provide police and authorities access to their 
databases, and phone and internet lines. Individuals are restricted in their movement 
because they must carry identification with them at all times, and must register with 
local authorities within a certain timeline after arriving in an area. (See, United States 
Department of State, Background Notes - Russia, April 2009) 
 
Policies 
 
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), 
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the 
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
 
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Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such 
consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
 Applicant has frequent contact with his father-in-law in Russia. His wife talks to 
her father weekly, and Applicant talks to him on occasion. Applicant also intends to 
bring his father to the United States to live with them. This indicates that Applicant has a 
close relationship with his father-in-law, who is a citizen and resident of Russia. There is 
no information to suggest the extent of his relationship and contacts, if any, with his 
brother-in-law. However since he lives with Applicant's father-in-law, it can be assumed 
that there is some form of relationship and some level of communications, no matter 
how minor. He does acknowledge that his bother-in-law is a resident and citizen of 
Russia. Applicant does contact a number of friends in Russia and talks to them a 
number of times a year. He has not seen any of them since he immigrated to the United 
States, except one who visited him in the United States when he came here to attend a 
conference. Applicant's contact with his father-in-law, brother-in-law, and friends raises 
security concerns under Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 7(a) 
(Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or 
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion); and FI DC AG ¶ 7(b) (Connections to a foreign person, group, government, 
or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign 
person, group, or country by providing that information).. 
 
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 The mere existence of a foreign family members or friends is not sufficient to 
raise the above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Applicant’s contact with his 
father-in-law, brother-in-law, and friends in Russia must be examined to determine 
whether the contacts create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, 
manipulation, pressure, or coercion. “Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased 
risk compared to some normally existing risk that can be inherent anytime a family 
member is subject to a foreign government. The factors that heighten the risk in 
Applicant's case are the extensive human rights abuses, terrorist activity, on-going 
extensive intelligence gathering, and the Russian hostility towards the United States.  
 
 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns for his father-in-law and 
friends in Russia. I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) AG 
¶ 8(a) (The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these 
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are 
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the 
interests of the U.S.); FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) (There is no conflict of interest, either because 
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, 
or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest); and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) (Contact or communication 
with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could 
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation). 
 
 Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign 
family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the 
family members were not “in a position to be exploited.” The underlying premise was 
that an applicant should not be placed in a position where he or she is forced to make a 
choice between the interest of the family members and friends and the interest of the 
United States. There was no balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk. 
Under the new guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed 
to determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the 
United States interest.  
 
 The nature of the human rights abuses, terrorist threats, intelligence collection, 
and conflicts in Russia places a heavy burden on Applicant in mitigating the 
disqualifying conditions and the security concerns. Applicant's relationship with his 
father-in-law is close. His wife talks to her father almost weekly, and Applicant talks to 
him occasionally. Applicant plans to bring his father-in-law to the United States to live 
with him. This indicates a close and not casual relationship so there could be a 
circumstance where Applicant is placed in a position of having to choose between his 
father-in-law in Russia and the interests of the United States. He does not talk about 
any contacts with his brother-in-law. The contacts, if any, with his brother-in-law appear 
to be casual and minor. Contacts with his friends are also not frequent, just a few times 
a year by telephone, and are as casual friends only. His sense of loyalty or obligation to 
them is that of only a friend or acquaintance rather than a personal sense of loyalty or 
 
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obligation to the individual. This infrequent and casual friendly contact and friendly 
loyalty or obligation does not create a security concern. There is no heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, or pressure. The infrequent and casual 
contacts and his friendship with them do not raise a conflict of interest if he had to 
protect classified information. Accordingly, FI MC AG ¶ 8(a) and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) do not 
apply to Applicant's father-in-law, but does to the brother-in-law and the friends.  
 
 Applicant has some sense of loyalty to Russia. He was educated in Russia, lived 
there for 40 of his 50 years, worked for many years at one job, and still has friends and 
family in Russia. Since he did apply for the green card lottery and came to the United 
States, he does have a positive feeling for this country. He and his family came to this 
country for a better life. A conflict of interest between his sense of loyalty to his father-in-
law and sense of loyalty to the United States is possible. In balancing all of the factors 
mentioned and considered above with regard to his father-in-law, I am not satisfied 
Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is such that he can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the United States. I am convinced that his relationship with 
his friends and brother-in-law is such that he would resolve any conflict of interest 
regarding them in the interest of the United States. FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) does not apply to 
his father-in-law, but does apply to his friends and brother-in-law. Applicant has not met 
his heavy burden to show that his contact with his father-in-law does not cause a 
security concern. I conclude Applicant has not mitigated security concerns rising from 
his contact with his father-in-law in Russia, but has mitigated the security concern for his 
contact with his friends and brother-in-law in Russia.  
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
 When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States, then he may be prone to provide information or make 
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States (AG ¶ 9). The principal 
goal of the Foreign Preference assessment is to determine the risk, based on foreign 
associations, that information may be compromised if access to sensitive information is 
approved. It is not a measure of Applicant's loyalty to the United States. 
 
 Applicant is a dual citizen of Russia and United States. Applicant stated in his 
security clearance application, as well as in response to the SOR, that he is a dual 
citizen of the United States and Russia. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized a right under the United States Constitution for United States citizens to 
have a dual citizenship with another country. (Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
Eligibility for a security clearance must be determined by application of the disqualifying 
conditions for foreign preference to the factual circumstances. The President in 
promulgating the disqualifying conditions could have specified that dual citizenship by 
itself was a security concern, but he did not. The rule concerning dual citizenship raises 
a security concern based only on an exercise of dual citizenship. Applicant came to the 
United States on a Russian passport. He received a United States passport when he 
became a United States citizen in October 2007. His Russian passport expired in April 
2009, but Applicant twice indicates he would renew his Russian passport. Since 
 
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Applicant indicated his intent to renew the passport and there is no statement from 
Applicant that the passport was not renewed, it is reasonable to assume and find that 
Applicant has a current Russian passport. Since becoming a United States citizen, he 
voted in the Russian presidential election in March 2008. His possession of a Russian 
passport and his voting in a foreign election raises Foreign Preference Disqualifying 
Condition (FP DC) AG ¶ 10(a) (Exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign 
citizenship after becoming a United States citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a 
family member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign 
passport; and (7) voting in a foreign election). 
 
 In regard to FC DC AG 10(a), I have considered Foreign Preference Mitigating 
Conditions (FP MC) AG ¶ 11(b) (The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce 
dual citizenship), and FP MC AG ¶ 11(e) (The passport has been destroyed, 
surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated). Applicant has 
not denounced his citizenship with Russia. In fact, he positively states he is a dual 
citizen with Russia. He stated he would renew his Russian passport, so it is assumed 
that he has in his possession a valid current Russian passport. He has not presented 
evidence to the contrary. Applicant has not mitigated security concerns for access to 
classified information raised by his exercise of dual citizenship with Russia.  
 
 “Whole-Person” Analysis  
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all 
the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative 
process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which 
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and 
other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance 
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the 
guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
 I considered that Applicant came to the United States for a better and freer life for 
he and his family. He has done well in the United States, finding work, owning a house, 
and prospering. I considered he has a father-in-law in Russia that he is close to and 
intends to have him come to the United States. I also considered he exercised dual 
citizenship with Russia by possessing a Russian passport and voting in the Russian 
presidential election. Applicant failed to present information that his contacts with his 
 
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father-in-law in Russia and his exercise of dual citizenship do not create a security 
concern. Access to classified information is denied. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:  Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.a (1): Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.a (2): Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline B:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2a:  Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.b:  For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.c:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge