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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE   
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
 ------------------------- )     ISCR Case No. 07-12019
SSN: ----------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was cited 19 times between November 2001 and April 2007 for driving
while his license was revoked, and he continues to operate a motor vehicle without a
valid operator’s license. He was convicted in April 2001 at a general court martial for
assault, but his culpability for a March 2006 misdemeanor larceny was not established.
He owes more than $52,000 in delinquent debt, and disclosed no past due debts on his
security clearance application. The criminal conduct, financial considerations, and
personal conduct concerns are not mitigated. Clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing  (e-
QIP) on November 20, 2006. On June 5, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing the
security concerns under Guideline J, Criminal Conduct, Guideline F, Financial
Considerations, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct, that provided the basis for its
preliminary decision to deny him a security clearance. The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
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20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of
Defense as of September 1, 2006.
Applicant responded to the SOR on June 19, 2009, and requested a hearing. The
case was originally assigned to a DOHA administrative judge on August 3, 2009. On
October 5, 2009, the case was transferred to me because Applicant was on temporary
duty in my jurisdiction. On November 9, 2009, I scheduled a hearing for December 9,
2009.
I convened the hearing as scheduled. Sixteen Government exhibits (Ex. 1-16)
were entered into evidence, Exhibit 9 over Applicant’s concerns about relevance.
Applicant testified, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on December 17, 2009.
Findings of Fact
The SOR alleged under Guideline J, Criminal Conduct, that Applicant was
charged in September 2000 with domestic assault, dismissed with domestic counseling
to be provided on post (SOR 1.a); that he was convicted at a general court martial in
April 2001 of striking a superior officer, of assault, and of communicating a threat, and
sentenced to six months confinement and a reduction in rank (SOR 1.b); and that he was
charged in March 2006 for felony larceny, which was dismissed when the complainant
failed to appear in court (SOR 1.c). Applicant was alleged under Guideline F, Financial
Considerations, to owe eight delinquent debts totaling $53,425 (SOR 2.a-2.h). Under
Guideline E, Personal Conduct, Applicant was alleged to have falsified his November
2001 e-QIP by not disclosing the April 2001 court-martial proceeding (SOR 3.a) or any
delinquent debts (SOR 3.b), and to have been cited for several motor vehicle infractions
between August 2001 and April 2007, including 18 times for driving while his license was
suspended or revoked (SOR 3.c-3.v). Applicant denied the SOR allegations with the
exception of SOR 1.b (court-martial conviction), 3.b (omission of delinquent debts), and
3.c (operating a motor vehicle without insurance in August 2001).
After considering the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, I make the following
findings of fact.
Applicant is a 31-year-old divorced father of two children, who works for a defense
contractor on tactical communications systems platforms for new military vehicles. (Tr.
130.) He previously served on active duty in the United States military from July 1997
until July 2001. In January 1999, he married a member of the military. A son was born to
the couple in December 1999. (Ex. 11.)
In September 2000, Applicant was arrested by the military police and charged
with domestic assault on a female (then his spouse). They argued over the keys to the
vehicle when he wanted to leave with their son, and he called the police. She
complained to the police that he had struck her in the head and pushed her to the
ground. (Tr. 46.) Applicant denies that he hit his spouse (Tr. 54.), although he was
Section 20-28 of the pertinent state’s general statutes provides as follows:1
Except as provided in subsection (a1) of this section, any person whose drivers license has
been revoked who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of the State while the license
is revoked is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Upon conviction, the person's license shall be
revoked for an additional period of one year for the first offense, two years for the second
offense, and permanently for a third or subsequent offense.
The restoree of a revoked drivers license who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways
of the State without maintaining financial responsibility as provided by law shall be punished
as for driving without a license.
(a1) Driving W ithout Reclaiming License. - A person convicted under subsection (a) shall be
punished as if the person had been convicted of driving without a license under G.S. 20-35
if the person demonstrates to the court that either subdivisions (1) and (2), or subdivision (3)
of this subsection is true:
(1) At the time of the offense, the person's license was revoked solely under G.S. 20-16.5 ;
and
(2) a. The offense occurred more than 45 days after the effective date of a revocation order
issued under G.S. 20-16.5(f) and the period of revocation was 45 days as provided under
subdivision (3) of that subsection; or
b. The offense occurred more than 30 days after the effective date of the revocation order
issued under any other provision of G.S. 20-16.5 ; or
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charged in state court for domestic assault. (Ex. 1.) Pending his court appearance, he
received domestic abuse counseling on base. (Tr. 54-55.) In November 2000, the charge
was dismissed. (Ex. 2.)
By December 2000, Applicant and his spouse had separated, and a military
mediator was involved to work out custody issues. After Applicant’s spouse picked up
their son on a day that he was supposed to have custody of their child, military social
work services set up a meeting between Applicant and his spouse in December 2000. At
the meeting, Applicant became upset with the discussion and with the lack of support
from his unit. When told that he could not leave, he reacted “inappropriately.” (Tr. 48-49.)
Military records show he pushed his spouse into a file cabinet, struck a superior
noncommissioned officer who attempted to stop the assault, and threw a chair against
the wall, causing damage to government property. (Ex. 3.) Applicant asserts that he only
bumped his spouse and the staff sergeant, and pushed the chair back against the wall in
an effort to push past them to get to the door. (Tr. 49-50.) He was arrested for two
counts of assault and one count of damage to government property. (Ex. 3.) In April
2001, he was sentenced in a general court martial to a reduction in rank (E-4 to E-1),
and 180 days confinement for striking a superior noncommissioned officer, assault
consummated by battery, and communicating a threat (two counts). (Ex. 4.) Applicant did
not serve the full 180 days. He was given an honorable discharge in July 2001, and was
recalled to the active reserve from June 2003 to August 2004. (Ex. 11, 13, 15.)
Between July 2001 and June 2006, Applicant held a succession of civilian jobs in
the area, as a sales representative for a car dealer, as a loader at a retail distribution
center, as a loss prevention officer, and then as a manager. (Ex. 11.)  Applicant was
cited on 17 different occasions for various motor vehicle infractions or offenses, including
16 times for driving with a revoked or suspended license  (SOR 3.d-3.s). He testified that1
(3) At the time of the offense the person had met the requirements of G.S. 50-13.12, or G.S.
110-142.2 and was eligible for reinstatement of the person's drivers license privilege as
provided therein. In addition, a person punished under this subsection shall be treated for
drivers license and insurance rating purposes as if the person had been convicted of driving
without a license under G.S. 20-35, and the conviction report sent to the Division must
indicate that the person is to be so treated.
Applicant testified that he bought a sports car out of high school and received a ticket just before he2
was scheduled to deploy overseas. After he returned, he did not think about the ticket, and the state
suspended his license indefinitely for failure to appear in court. He was issued a driver’s license in the state
where he was living, and he continued to operate a vehicle on what he believed to be a valid operator’s license
until he had a car accident on the military installation. He learned that license was invalid because of the
indefinite suspension in the other state, but he continued to operate a vehicle anyway because he had a job
and had to maintain a household. (Tr. 122-23.) 
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it stemmed from another state suspending his right to operate a vehicle indefinitely for
failure to answer a speeding charge filed against him at age 18.  (Tr. 120-22.) A guilty2
finding was entered only for operating without insurance in August 2001 (SOR 3.c). The
other charges filed by civilian authorities were dismissed, several of them after Applicant
had paid fines imposed by the court. (Ex.  14, 15, 16, Tr. 118.) On November 23, 2002,
and again on June 29, 2003, Applicant was charged by military police with operating on
post while his license was suspended. The available record does not reflect the
disposition of charges filed against him, which included the criminal offenses of driving
while license revoked or disqualified. (Ex. 14, 15.) In March 2006, he was charged with
misdemeanor larceny when a female friend complained to the police that he had taken
her cellular phone and refused to return it. (Ex. 6.) The charge was dismissed when she
failed to appear in court. Applicant denies that he took her cell phone. (Tr. 50-51.)
In June 2006, Applicant began working as a common access card operator for a
defense contractor on the military installation. (Ex. 11.) He was cited in August 2006, in
September 2006, and again in April 2007, for driving while his license was revoked (SOR
3.t-3.v). As of December 2009, he still did not have a valid operator’s license because he
had about $2,300 in fines yet to pay, having paid about $6,000 in fines plus legal fees for
three attorneys since 1998. (Tr. 127.)
Applicant and his spouse were divorced in August 2006. (Ex. 11.) Applicant took
custody of their son. His ex-wife pursued custody through the court, and she and
Applicant were awarded joint custody, although she became the primary custodial
parent. Applicant and his ex-wife continue to have disputes over the custody of their son,
but they have not risen to the level of police involvement. (Tr. 57-59.)
On November 20, 2006, Applicant completed his e-QIP, from which a
Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (Ex. 11) was prepared. He responded “No” to
whether there had been any military disciplinary proceedings against him in the last
seven years, to whether he was over 180 days delinquent on any debts in the last seven
years, and to whether he was currently over 90 days delinquent on any debts. (Ex. 11.)
Applicant was aware that he had delinquent debt in his name, but he did not have the
information to provide the accurate responses he knew were required. (Tr. 71-74.) He
The military police report (Ex. 3) shows that Applicant was more aggressive. He grabbed his then3
spouse and threw or pushed her into a file cabinet, he struck the superior officer in the face, and he threw a
chair against the wall and slammed a door. (Ex. 3). The confinement order indicates that he was convicted
at a general court martial. (Ex. 4.)
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had no idea when the debts became delinquent. (Tr. 76.) Applicant sought no guidance
or assistance in how he should answer the financial questions. (Tr. 73.)
A check of Applicant’s credit on December 14, 2006, revealed several accounts
where balances had been charged off or placed for collection, or both. A credit union had
charged off a $690 balance as of April 2006 (not alleged in SOR). In June 2001, a joint
account for a computer bought by his then wife in August 2000, was placed for collection
with a $1,443 past due balance (SOR 2.g). (Tr. 92.) Applicant also owed a $6,090
charged-off balance on an individual automobile loan taken out in September 1999 for
$15,440 (SOR 2.d). The car was totaled in an accident and Applicant disputed any
ongoing responsibility for the debt. (Tr. 83-84.)  A joint automobile loan opened in May
2000 for $13,503 was in collection with a $7,807 past due balance (SOR 2.h).
Applicant’s ex-wife kept the car, and he later learned that it had been repossessed. (Tr.
95.) He was left owing a deficiency balance that he did not pay. (Tr. 96-97.) By January
2005, Applicant had voluntarily surrendered a mobile home that had been damaged in a
2002 storm. (Tr. 86.) He owed $19,996 on a $27,947 mortgage loan that he had taken
out for the home in March 2000 (SOR 2.e). His insurance did not pay the claim, and he
had to choose between paying the mortgage for his damaged mobile home and the rent
on the townhouse that he and his family lived in after the storm. (Tr. 88-90.) As of
December 2006, wireless telephone service debts of $328 and $144 were in collection
(not alleged in SOR), but he took care of those debts (Tr. 104.). (Ex.  10.)
On January 23, 2007, Applicant was interviewed by a government investigator
about his previously undisclosed arrest in December 2000. He indicated that his ex-wife
had picked up their son from daycare on a day that he was scheduled to have their son.
Angry with her, he went to her place of duty where they argued. Reportedly in the
process of getting his son and the car seat away from his spouse, he “accidentally hit” a
staff sergeant in the face. He maintained that the incident was reported to his unit
commander a week later, and that the investigating officer had recommended a special
court martial for the offenses.  As for his failure to list the offense on his e-QIP, Applicant3
maintained that he had disclosed the court-martial information when he initially filled out
the form, and that he was told some days later to complete it again for some unknown
reason. He did not have the court-martial information available so he responded
negatively to the question concerning any court martial or other military proceedings.
(Ex. 13.)
On May 29, 2008, Applicant was interviewed by a government investigator about
the March 2006 misdemeanor larceny charge. He explained that a female friend accused
him of stealing her cellular telephone after a party at his house. He denied taking the
cellular phone, and indicated that the charge was dismissed when she failed to appear.
Applicant explained that he had not disclosed the charge on his e-QIP because he
thought he was not required to list dismissed charges. (Ex. 5.)
W hen questioned by Department Counsel about whether he was still driving, Applicant responded,4
“No. I get rides as much as I can. W e have company vehicles, I ride with them.” Asked how he got to court
for his hearing, Applicant stated, “ I rode with someone.” (Tr. 123.) But in response to my inquiries about the
purchase of tires in September or October 2009 for $800, Applicant admitted he bought them for a friend’s
truck because he primarily drove the vehicle. (Tr. 136.)
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Subsequent checks of Applicant’s credit on September 9, 2007 (Ex. 9.), October
10, 2008 (Ex. 8.), and May 11, 2009 (Ex. 7.), showed little progress toward resolving his
delinquent debt. Instead, recent credit checks showed new past due debt in collection of
$104 since June 2007 (SOR 2.f), $481 since December 2006 (SOR 2.b), and $504 for a
cable box (Tr. 97.) since September 2008 (SOR 2.a). (Ex. 7, 8, 9.) As of April 2009, he
also owed about $17,000 in student loan debt that was in default (SOR 2.c). (Ex. 7.)
As of December 2009, Applicant was paying $216 per month toward his student
loan debt. The creditor started garnishing his wages in April or May 2009 to collect the
debt. (Tr. 99.) He has been paying $51 or $59 per month on another student loan for the
past year. He had been behind on his payments on that loan. Applicant is unaware of the
current balance of that student loan. (Tr. 101-02.) Applicant intends to resolve his debts,
excluding the student loans and the vehicle debt in SOR 2.d, through debt consolidation.
(Tr. 94, 116.) In late summer or early fall 2009, Applicant gave a debt consolidation firm
a power of attorney to obtain financial information about his accounts. (Tr. 94.) He
expects that reducing the amount spent on restaurant meals and other lifestyle changes
will give him the $230 he needs per month to pay the debt consolidation company. (Tr.
116.)
Applicant’s annual take-home income after tax is about $36,000. He pays $416
per month in child support. He had been delinquent in his child support payments in the
past but was current as of December 2009. (Tr. 106-07.) He earns enough to pay his
current bills, but has had to juggle payments on some debts when he has had
unexpected expenditures, such as for vehicle tires. (Tr. 108.) Around September 2009,
Applicant spent $800 for tires for a friend’s truck that he was driving, even though he did
not have a valid operator’s license. Applicant gave no reason for why he was driving
without a license.  (Tr. 137.) His employer is aware that he does not have a valid license,4
so he is not allowed to drive the company’s vehicles. (Tr. 130-31.) Applicant pays $109
per month for a storage unit and was two months behind in his payments as of
December 2009. (Tr. 112.) Applicant opened one new checking account in the last
couple of years, on which he has regularly had an $800 balance to hold hotel rooms for
work. (Tr. 114-15.)
Applicant has on average about $300 in his checking account. He has a savings
account that may have some funds on deposit one day and none the next. (Tr. 109.) He
pays $200 per month for wireless phone services (cellular phone lines for himself and his
girlfriend, and mobile Internet). Applicant lives with his current girlfriend and their child.
Applicant’s girlfriend does not work outside the home. (Tr. 111.)
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Policies
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,
emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a
security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In
addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines
list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required to be
considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of
human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the
adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair,
impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence
contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present
evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15,
the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department
Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion when seeking to
obtain a favorable security decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
about the potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Criminal Conduct
The security concern for criminal conduct is set out in Guideline J, AG ¶ 30:
Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code provides as follows:5
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,
knowingly and willfully - (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device
a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic
terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the
matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B,110, or 117, or section 1591, then the
term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years. (b)
Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for
statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a
judge or magistrate in that proceeding. (c) W ith respect to any matter within the jurisdiction
of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to - (1) administrative matters,
including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services,
personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule,
or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative
branch; or (2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any
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Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or
willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.
Concerning the September 2000 domestic assault charge in SOR 1.a, dismissed
charges can be considered in evaluating an applicant’s security suitability under AG ¶
31(c), “allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was
formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted.” Applicant does not deny a domestic
incident over the car keys, so AG ¶ 31(c) applies, even if I accept his claim that he did
not strike his spouse with his closed hand as was reflected in the police report. AG ¶
31(a), “a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses,” applies because of the
December 2000 assault of his spouse and of the military superior who attempted to stop
the assault (SOR 1.b). His conviction and sentence of imprisonment at a general court
martial in April 2001 substantiate the assaults described in the police report of the
incident. But the more recent charge of misdemeanor larceny in March 2006 is not
corroborated in the available record. Applicant denies he took the cellular phone and the
complainant failed to appear in court.
With the passage of almost nine years since the December 2000 assaults,
Applicant would appear to satisfy mitigating condition AG ¶ 32(a), “so much time has
elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” The absence of any recurrence is
evidence of reform under AG ¶ 32(d), “there is evidence of successful rehabilitation;
including but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity,
remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or
constructive community involvement.” However, I cannot fully apply either AG ¶ 32(a) or
¶ 32(d) in light of his deliberate misrepresentations on his November 2006 e-QIP (see
Guideline E), which is felonious conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  Furthermore, his5
committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable
rules of the House or Senate. 
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continued disregard of pertinent state law by driving without a valid license is punishable
as a misdemeanor.
Financial Considerations
The security concern for finances is set out in AG ¶ 18:
Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended
is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
Applicant defaulted on about $17,000 in student loan debt (SOR 2.c). He stopped
paying on the mortgage for a mobile home after it was damaged in a storm. Although the
mobile home was repossessed, the creditor is pursuing Applicant for $19,996 of the
mortgage balance (SOR 2.e). Applicant told the lender that he was not going to pay the
debt because he felt the insurance should have covered it, although he recognizes it as
a valid debt. (Tr. 91.) Similarly, he stopped paying on an automobile loan after the car
was totaled in an accident since the insurance company was to have sent the lender a
check (SOR 2.d). The lender pursued him for a debt of $6,090 for the car, which he does
not intend to pay, but it remains on his credit record as a debt in collection. He failed to
pay the $1,443 balance for a computer that his then spouse purchased on his name
(SOR 2.g). He is also being held responsible for a $504 cable television debt for a cable
box that was not returned (SOR 2.a), and for a $7,807 deficiency balance on a loan for a
car used by his ex-wife (SOR 2.h). He acknowledges that the car was in his name.
Applicant does not recognize collection debts of $481 and $104 (SOR 2.b and 2.f) that
are on his credit record. Excluding those two debts, his delinquent debt totaled about
$52,840. AG ¶ 19(a), “inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts,” and AG ¶ 19(c), “a
history of not meeting financial obligations,” apply.
Concerning the potentially mitigating conditions, AG ¶ 20(a), “the behavior
happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it
is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment” cannot apply in light of the Applicant’s lack of
demonstrated attempts to resolve the debts. The first prong of AG ¶ 20(b), “the
conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control
(e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a
death, divorce or separation),” would be pertinent in that weather caused such damage
to the mobile home that he and his family had to move to rental premises. But it also
appears that after insurance would not cover the cost of repairs, he simply walked away
from the property. Even if I found it was reasonable for him to do so under the
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circumstances, he has no valid explanation for defaulting on his student loans, or for
failing to timely address the computer or cable television debts.
AG ¶ 20(d), “the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors
or otherwise resolve debts,” is pertinent to the extent that he worked with one of his
student loan lenders when he was behind. The majority of his student loan debt is being
repaid at $216 per month since about April or May 2009, but repayment in response to
garnishment action is not entitled to the same weight in mitigation had he contacted the
lender and made repayment arrangements on his own. About three months before his
hearing, he initiated contacts with a debt consolidation firm, which would qualify as a
good-faith effort, albeit belated, to resolve his debts. Yet, there has been no recent follow
up on his part that would demonstrate a credible willingness to resolve his debts in the
near future. 
Moreover, it would be premature to apply AG ¶ 20(c), “the person has received or
is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the
problem is being resolved or is under control.”  Having paid $6,000 in fines for his driving
offenses, with about $2,300 yet to pay, Applicant does not have funds available to put
toward his delinquent debts. He indicates that he should be able to reduce discretionary
spending on restaurant meals, but he has yet to accumulate any savings.
Applicant disputes the car debt in SOR 2.d, but it remained on his credit record as
a debt in collection as of April 2009. (Ex. 7.) He presented no documentation about the
accident or the extent of his insurance coverage that could lead me to conclude that the
debt is not valid. AG ¶ 20(e), “the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the
legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of
actions to resolve the issue,” is not satisfied. The financial concerns have not been
sufficiently mitigated.
Personal Conduct
The security concern for personal conduct is set out in Guideline E, AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant did not disclose his court-martial convictions or his financial
delinquencies when he completed his e-QIP in November 2006. He denies any
intentional falsification, claiming that he had listed the court martial on a previous
iteration of the form that was returned to him for corrections or additions, and that while
he knew he owed delinquent debt, he lacked sufficient information about the accounts to
report accurately about the debts. Applicant understood that he was required to be
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truthful and complete in his responses on the e-QIP, and that his responses could affect
whether or not he obtained a security clearance. (Tr. 73.) Had Applicant acted
reasonably and in good faith, he would have responded affirmatively to the court-martial
and financial delinquency questions, and added that he did not know the details, or in the
alternative left blank the sections for additional detail. Furthermore, Applicant’s overall
credibility is suspect in light of his inconsistent testimony about whether he was operating
a motor vehicle without a license. Applicant denied to Department Counsel that he was
driving, and he asserted that he relied on others for rides. But when questioned about his
purchase of tires for $800 in September or October 2009, Applicant admitted he bought
the tires for a truck that he was driving without a valid license. AG ¶ 16(a), “deliberate
omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security
questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations,
determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security
clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities,” applies
because of his knowing, false statements on his e-QIP.
Applicant’s record of 19 separate citations for driving while his license was
revoked between November 2001 and April 2007 (SOR 3.d–3.v) reflects an ongoing
disrespect for the law that could have been alleged under Guideline J. Under Guideline
E, this pattern of violations implicates AG ¶ 16(d):
Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other
guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination,
but which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information. This includes but is not limited to
consideration of:
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations.
None of the mitigating conditions apply, given the extent, seriousness, and
recency of the Guideline E concerns. AG ¶ 17(a), “the individual made prompt, good-
faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted
with the facts,” does not mitigate his e-QIP falsifications. During his interview of January
23, 2007, about the previously undisclosed arrest for assault in December 2000 leading
to the general court martial, Applicant asserted that the incident occurred at his spouse’s
unit where he went to take custody of their son from her. While he may not have recalled
that the incident took place during a meeting set up by military social work services
personnel, he was not completely forthright about his misconduct on that occasion. He
indicated that he got into a verbal argument with his spouse, took their son from her
because it was his day to have custody, and in the process of attempting to get the car
seat away from her, he accidentally hit a staff sergeant in the face with his elbow. Even
assuming that his misconduct was less serious than it appears in the police report, I
cannot apply AG ¶ 17(a) where Applicant failed to candidly disclose in January 2007 that
he had assaulted his spouse.
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Despite the passage of three years since his e-QIP falsifications and of two-plus
years since his last citation for driving while license revoked, I cannot apply either AG ¶
17(c), “the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,”
or AG ¶ 17(d), “the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to
change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors,
circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate
behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.” Reform of the personal conduct
concerns is undermined by his ongoing efforts to downplay the seriousness of his past
assaultive behavior, as evidenced by his claim at his hearing that he had “bumped” the
staff sergeant in December 2000, by his continued operation of a motor vehicle without a
license, and by his false testimony when asked by Department Counsel whether he was
still driving.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct and
all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶
2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
Applicant displayed poor judgment in several different aspects over the last
decade. While there has been no recurrence of assaultive behavior since the breakup of
his marriage, he concealed his conviction at a general court martial when he applied for
a security clearance. He also denied any delinquent debts when he knew his mobile
home had been repossessed around October 2004 for failure to pay the mortgage, and
he was being held responsible for a $19,996 balance. He continues to operate a motor
vehicle despite several citations and substantial fines for driving without a license. Fines
and attorney fees for the driving violations have placed added stress on his finances.
While his defaulted student loans are now being addressed as a result of a wage
garnishment, and he has some stability in his family life and employment, concerns
persist about his judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.h: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.i: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.j: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.k: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.l: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.m: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.n: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.o: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.p: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.q: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.r: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.s: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.t: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.u: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.v: Against Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge