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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 -------------------- )  ISCR Case No. 08-11563 
 SSN: ----------- ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines G (Alcohol 
Consumption), E (Personal Conduct), and F (Financial Considerations). Eligibility for 
access to classified information is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on February 26, 2008. On 
October 15, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent her a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her 
application, citing security concerns under Guidelines G, E, and F. DOHA acted under 
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended 
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of 
Defense on September 1, 2006.  
 
 
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 Applicant received the SOR on October 19, 2009; answered it in an undated 
document; and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the 
request on November 23, 2009. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on 
December 3, 2009, and the case was assigned to me on January 19, 2010. DOHA 
issued a notice of hearing on January 27, 2010, scheduling the hearing for February 18, 
2010. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 9 
were admitted in evidence without objection. Department Counsel submitted a 
demonstrative exhibit summarizing the evidence of Applicant’s financial problems, and it 
was marked as Hearing Exhibit (HX) I and attached to the record. Applicant testified, 
presented the testimony of one witness, and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A 
through H, which were admitted without objection. I kept the record open until March 5, 
2010, to enable her to submit additional documentary evidence. She timely submitted 
AX I through Q. Department Counsel’s comments regarding AX I through Q are 
attached to the record as HX II. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on February 
26, 2010. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶ 1.a-1.c, 
2.a, 3.b-3.f, 3.i, 3.k, and 3.l. Her admissions in her answer and at the hearing are 
incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 55-year-old technical writer for a federal contractor. She has 
worked for her current employer since January 2008. She married in December 1978, 
divorced in June 1980, remarried in June 1984, and divorced in December 1990. She 
has two adult sons. She received a clearance in January 1980 while she was employed 
by a defense contractor. She does not hold a current security clearance. 
 
 Applicant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) in November 1996. 
She pleaded guilty and entered an accelerated rehabilitative disposition program. The 
program consisted of six weeks of alcohol education classes, but no evaluation or 
treatment. She completed it, and her arrest record was expunged. (AX C; Tr. 70-71.) 
 
 Applicant cohabited with a man for about 17 years after her last divorce. When 
her cohabitant left her in January 2007, the breakup was emotionally difficult for 
Applicant. After her cohabitant left her, she discovered he had been hiding unpaid bills. 
(Tr. 75-78.) She began falling further into financial difficulty because there were no 
longer two incomes to cover her financial obligations. (GX 2 at 5.) She also began 
consuming alcohol to excess, usually drinking alone at home. (Tr. 74.) 
 
 In April 2007, Applicant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). She 
had been drinking with friends, started to drive home, realized she was drunk, pulled off 
the road, and fell asleep in her car. (GX 4; Tr. 72.) Her blood-alcohol level was .10 per 
cent. The prosecutor reduced the alleged blood-alcohol level to .08 per cent, and she 
pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DUI. She paid a fine and was required to attend an 
alcohol education class, but she did not receive any evaluation or treatment for alcohol 
 
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abuse or alcohol dependence. (GX 2 at 8.) She completed a highway safety and 
intervention program in October 2007. (AX F.) 
 
 When Applicant submitted her most recent security clearance application, she 
disclosed her April 2007 DUI arrest, but she did not disclose her 1996 arrest. She 
explained that she misunderstood the question and believed that she was required to 
report only arrests that occurred in the seven years preceding her application. (Tr. 59, 
92.) I found her explanation plausible and credible. 
 
 In October 2008, after Applicant realized that she was about to lose her home 
where she had lived for 25 years, she drank to excess and was arrested again for DUI. 
(GX 8.) She notified her facility security officer of her arrest and asked her employer for 
time off to receive alcohol rehabilitation treatment. (Tr. 97.) She pleaded guilty to DUI 
with a blood-alcohol level of .15 percent. She was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with 
credit for time served, a $750 fine, and 48 hours of community service. She was placed 
on probation, required to surrender her driver’s license, and required to undergo 
rehabilitative treatment. (GX 2 at 30-31.)  
 
Applicant completed a three-day detoxification program on December 27-29, 
2008, and an inpatient treatment program from January 16 to February 13, 2009. There 
is no evidence of a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence. However, upon 
her discharge from the inpatient program, a medical doctor’s prognosis was “Fair, if 
patient follows through with aftercare recommendations.” (GX 2 at 27-28.) 
 
Applicant then entered an intensive outpatient treatment program, requiring 
therapy sessions three times a week. She completed the program in May 2009. There is 
no evidence of a diagnosis, but she received a “favorable” prognosis from a certified 
alcohol counselor, conditioned on continued use of her established support systems. 
She then completed another outpatient program requiring group therapy once a week 
for about six weeks. (Tr. 81-83; GX 2 at 29.)  
 
As of the date of the hearing, Applicant had not consumed alcohol for a year, and 
she was attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings once or twice a week. (Tr. 63, 
80, 83.) She was released from probation in November 2009, and she expects that her 
driver’s license will be returned to her in June 2010. (Tr. 90.)  
 
 Applicant began falling behind on her home mortgage payments in February 
2007. She was laid off from her job in December 2007 until she started her current job 
in January 2008. (GX 1 at 11-13; GX 2 at 5.) At some time during this period, she 
suffered a “TIA”1, which she described as a “minor stroke.” She did not suffer any 
permanent neurological injury, but she incurred medical bills. (Tr. 64-65.)  
 
Foreclosure proceedings on Applicant’s home were started several times 
between June 2008 and September 2008. She completed a “short sale” of her home in 
                                                          
1  A TIA is a mild cerebrovascular stroke with reversible symptoms that last from a few minutes to several 
hours. Webster’s New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 2009) at p. 1495. 
 
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November 2008, settling the mortgage debt for less than the full balance. (AX E and G.) 
She now lives in a rented apartment. The defaulted mortgage was not alleged in the 
SOR. 
 
 Applicant’s credit bureau reports for March 2008, May 2009, and December 2009 
reflect the 13 delinquent debts alleged in the SOR (GX 5; GX 6; GX 7.) Applicant 
testified the medical debt in SOR ¶ 3.a was for her son’s medical treatment and had 
been paid, but she provided no documentation of payment. (Tr. 101.)  
 
 Applicant testified she made payments in 2008 on the utility bill in SOR ¶ 3.b and 
was trying to negotiate a settlement agreement, but she had not reached any 
agreement. (Tr. 102-03.) She testified she submitted the medical debt in SOR ¶ 3.c to 
her insurance company, but her claim was denied because it was for treatment of a 
preexisting condition. She disputed the denial in 2007, but she had no further contact 
with the doctors or the insurance company. (Tr. 99-100.) She provided no documentary 
evidence of her payments, negotiations, or disputes. 
 
Applicant has not resolved the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.d. She provided a letter 
from the creditor alleged in SOR ¶ 3.e stating that the account was paid in full, but it 
refers to a different account from the debt alleged in the SOR. (AX K; AX L.) She 
submitted the medical debt in SOR ¶ 3.f to her insurance company in 2005, but it has 
not been resolved. (Tr. 106.) She has not contacted the creditor alleged in SOR ¶ 3.g. 
(Tr. 108.) She could not identify the creditor alleged in SOR ¶ 3.h (Tr. 109-10.) She 
testified that she made payments on the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.i, that the debt alleged 
in SOR ¶ 3.j was paid, that the debt alleged in SOR 3.k was consolidated with another 
debt, and that the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.i was paid, but she provided no 
documentation for any of these transactions. (Tr. 110-18.)  
 
Applicant testified that she paid about $300 on the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.m 
(Tr. 119.) She provided no documentation of payment, but she submitted a settlement 
offer dated October 7, 2009. (AX M.) There is no evidence that she accepted the offer.  
 
Applicant’s net monthly income is about $2,000, and her expenses are about 
$1,700, leaving a net remainder of $300. (Tr. 119-24.) She has about $2,000 in savings 
and more than $1,000 in her retirement account. She admitted that she had not 
addressed her delinquent debts until recently because she was not acting responsibly 
during 2007 and 2008, and it was not until 2009 that she “came back to [her] senses.” 
(Tr. 125.) 
 
 Applicant’s close friend for about 12 years, a retired police officer with 25 years of 
experience in law enforcement, testified that Applicant began drinking heavily because 
of stress from the breakup of her 17-year relationship, being laid off from her job, and 
her financial problems. The witness testified that Applicant is hard working and 
trustworthy. Before the stressful events, Applicant did not abuse alcohol and appeared 
to have her life under control. (Tr. 49-56.) 
 
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 The president of the company for whom Applicant works has known her for two 
years. He describes her as a woman of integrity, devoted to her family and work, 
organized, efficient, competent, and an employee with high initiative. (AX B.) Applicant’s 
project manager also describes her as a woman of integrity, intelligence, competence, 
and dedication. (AX Q.) The facility security officer for Applicant’s employer has known 
her for two years and considers her a hard worker, a person of integrity, and security 
conscious. (AX A.) Applicant completed information assurance awareness training in 
August 2008, and she received a certificate of achievement in November 2008. (AX O 
and P.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in 
conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a 
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant 
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have 
established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
 
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of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it 
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security 
clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity 
clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 
U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.a alleges Applicant was arrested for DUI in April 2007; pleaded guilty; 
was sentenced to probation for six months, fines and fees totaling about $972; and was 
required to complete alcohol education and intervention classes. SOR ¶ 1.b alleges she 
was arrested for DUI in October 2008. SOR ¶ 1.c alleges that Applicant’s excessive 
consumption of alcohol required alcohol detoxification and inpatient treatment, and that 
she was discharged from treatment with a fair prognosis dependent on compliance with 
aftercare recommendations. She admitted all three allegations in her answer to the 
SOR and at the hearing. 
 
 Applicant’s arrest for DUI in 1996 was not alleged in the SOR. Thus, it may not 
be considered as an independent basis for denying her a clearance. However, it may be 
considered to assess her credibility; to decide whether a particular adjudicative 
guideline is applicable; to evaluate evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed 
circumstances; to consider whether she has demonstrated successful rehabilitation; or 
as part of a whole person analysis. ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 
2006) (citations omitted). I have considered her 1996 arrest only for these limited 
purposes. 
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 21 as follows: “Excessive 
alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure 
to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and 
trustworthiness.” Two disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant:  
 
AG ¶ 22(a) (alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving 
while under the influence . . . , regardless of whether the individual is 
diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent); and 
 
 
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AG ¶ 22(c) (habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of 
impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as 
an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent).  
 
 Applicant’s record of DUI arrests raises AG ¶ 22(a). Her level of intoxication 
when she was arrested for DUI and her testimony about her drinking habits raise AG ¶ 
22(c).  
 
 The disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶ 22(d), (e), and (f) would be raised if there 
were a diagnosis or evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence. Although 
Applicant’s medical records contain a prognosis by a medical doctor and another by a 
counselor, the records do not reflect a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol 
dependence. Thus, AG ¶¶ 22(d), (e) and (f) are not raised. 
 
 Since the Government produced substantial evidence to raise the disqualifying 
conditions in AG ¶¶ 22(a) and (c), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence 
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has 
the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts 
to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).   
 
 Security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated if “so much time has 
passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 23(a). Applicant’s alcohol-
related behavior was frequent and did not occur under circumstances making it unlikely 
to recur. Thus, the focus is on the first prong (“so much time has passed”). There are no 
Abright line@ rules for determining how much time must pass to establish this prong of 
AG ¶ 23(a). The determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the totality of 
the evidence. If the evidence shows Aa significant period of time has passed without any 
evidence of misconduct,@ then an administrative judge must determine whether that 
period of time demonstrates Achanged circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a 
finding of reform or rehabilitation.@ ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 
2004). 
 
 On the date of the hearing, Applicant had abstained from alcohol for about a year 
and was regularly participating in AA. A year is a “significant period of time.” On the 
other hand, her history of alcohol related conduct dates back to 1996. She did not 
complete her probation until November 2009, and her driving privileges are not yet 
restored. In explaining her financial difficulties, she admitted that she was not acting 
responsibly in 2007 and 2008, and it was not until 2009 that she “came back to [her] 
senses.” I conclude Applicant has not had insufficient time to demonstrate that she will 
continue to maintain her sobriety. It is too soon to conclude that she is rehabilitated. 
 
 Security concerns also may be mitigated if “the individual acknowledges his or 
her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to 
overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol 
 
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dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser).” AG ¶ 23(b). Applicant has 
acknowledged her excessive alcohol consumption and had taken significant steps to 
overcome her problems with alcohol, but insufficient time has passed to establish a 
pattern of abstinence. 
 
 Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated if “the individual is a 
current employee who is participating in a counseling or treatment program, has no 
history of previous treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress.” AG ¶ 
23(c). Applicant receives credit under this mitigating condition, because she is 
continuing her aftercare program and is making progress. She has no “history of 
previous treatment and relapse,” because her DUI arrests in 1996 and 2007 were 
followed by alcohol and safety education, but no medical evaluation or treatment.  
 
 Finally, security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated under AG ¶ 
23(d) if -- 
 
the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient 
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has 
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or 
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as 
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar 
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified 
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff 
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.  
 
This mitigating condition is partially established. Applicant successfully completed 
extensive inpatient and outpatient treatment and is complying with the aftercare 
requirements. As noted above in the discussion of AG ¶¶ 23(a) and (b), she has not had 
sufficient time to demonstrate a “clear and established pattern” of abstinence. The 
prognosis by a medical doctor was “fair,” which is marginally favorable. The prognosis 
by a counselor was more positive, but the record does not demonstrate the counselor’s 
qualifications sufficiently to establish that he is the equivalent of a licensed clinical social 
worker.  
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
 SOR ¶ 2.a alleges Applicant falsified her security clearance application by 
intentionally failing to disclose her DUI arrest in 1996. SOR ¶ 2.b alleges that she failed 
to disclose her DUI arrest in October 2008 during an interview with a security 
investigator.  
 
 Department Counsel moved to withdraw SOR ¶ 2.b in light of evidence that the 
DUI arrest occurred after the interview. (Tr. 131-32.) I have granted the motion to 
withdraw ¶ 2.b, and I have reflected the withdrawal in my formal findings. 
 
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 The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15 as follows:  
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.   
 The relevant disqualifying condition in this case is “deliberate omission, 
concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security 
questionnaire.” AG ¶ 16(a). When a falsification allegation is controverted, as in this 
case, the Government has the burden of proving it. An omission, standing alone, does 
not prove falsification. An administrative judge must consider the record evidence as a 
whole to determine an applicant’s state of mind at the time of the omission.  See ISCR 
Case No. 03-09483 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 17, 2004).  
 
 Applicant testified that she misunderstood the question about previous arrests 
and believed that she needed to report only those arrests that occurred in the seven 
years preceding her application. She was open and candid throughout the hearing, 
even when discussing painful and embarrassing events. I am satisfied that she did not 
intentionally falsify her security clearance application, and I resolve SOR ¶ 2.a in her 
favor. 
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18 as follows:  
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds. 
 
Two disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant: AG ¶ 19(a) (“inability or 
unwillingness to satisfy debts, and AG ¶ 19(c) (“a history of not meeting financial 
obligations”).  
 
 Security concerns based on financial problems can be mitigated by showing that 
“the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual=s 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 20(a). Applicant’s 
delinquent debts are recent and numerous, but they occurred largely because of the 
 
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breakup of her 17-year relationship, leaving her solely responsible for numerous debts 
that were jointly incurred. However, instead of acting aggressively to resolve her 
financial problems, she lapsed into a period of alcohol abuse and neglect of her 
financial obligations. This mitigating condition is not completely established. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the 
conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person=s 
control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical 
emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly 
under the circumstances.” AG ¶ 20(b). Both prongs, i.e., conditions beyond the person=s 
control and responsible conduct, must be established. Applicant had a short period of 
unemployment before she began her current job, which exacerbated her financial 
problems caused by her domestic breakup. She also incurred unexpected medical bills 
after her mild stroke. However, she admitted at the hearing that she did not act 
responsibly during 2007 and 2008. Thus, this mitigating condition is not completely 
established. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the 
person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear 
indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control.” AG ¶ 20(c). This 
mitigating condition is not established because Applicant has not received financial 
counseling and her problems are not yet under control. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the 
individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve 
debts.” AG ¶ 20(d). Good faith means acting in a way that shows reasonableness, 
prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation. ISCR Case No. 99-0201, 1999 
WL 1442346 at *4 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 1999). An applicant is not required, as a matter of 
law, to establish resolution of each and every debt alleged in the SOR. See ADP Case 
No. 06-18900 (App. Bd. Jun. 6, 2008). An applicant need only establish a plan to 
resolve financial problems and take significant actions to implement the plan. ISCR 
Case No. 07-06482 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008). There also is no requirement that 
an applicant make payments on all delinquent debts simultaneously, nor is there a 
requirement that the debts alleged in the SOR be paid first. Id.  
 
Applicant testified she paid or made payments on the debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 
3.a, 3.b, 3.i, 3.l, and 3.m, but she submitted no documentation of any payments. She 
does not have a concrete plan to resolve her debts. I conclude that AG ¶ 20(d) is not 
established. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “the 
individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is 
the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of 
the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue.” AG ¶ 20(e). Applicant 
testified she disputed the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.c, but she provided no documentation 
of the dispute. Thus, AG ¶ 20(e) is not established. 
 
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Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guidelines G, E, and F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the 
factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant 
additional comment. 
 
 Applicant is a mature adult who suffered significant emotional and financial 
setbacks shortly before starting her current job. She previously held a clearance while 
employed by a defense contractor. She has the respect and support of her current 
employer. She has taken significant steps to prevent further alcohol-related problems. 
With the passage of time, she may well be able to demonstrate that she has overcome 
them. 
 
 Unfortunately, Applicant’s financial problems went largely unresolved while she 
dealt with her alcohol-related problems. Her first priority on financial matters was to 
avoid foreclosure on her home. She appears to have resolved that problem through a 
short sale. Her testimony reflected some piecemeal attempts at dealing with selected 
creditors, but she has no overall plan to resolve the debts alleged in the SOR. 
Importantly, she has not provided documentary evidence of her actions, even though 
she testified she had the necessary documentation and was given additional time to 
produce it. She has sufficient income to begin addressing the debts in the SOR, now 
that the home foreclosure issue has been resolved. With more time, she may be able to 
gain control of the financial disarray she now faces. See Directive ¶¶ E3.1.37 through 
E3.1.40 (reconsideration authorized after one year). 
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines G, E, 
and F, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has refuted the personal conduct allegations, but she has not mitigated the 
security concerns based on alcohol consumption and financial considerations. 
 
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Accordingly, she has not carried her burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with 
the national interest to grant her eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption): AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:     For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.b:     For Applicant (withdrawn) 
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline F (Financial Considerations); AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 3.a-3.m:    Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances, it is not clearly consistent with the national 
interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to 
classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge