1 
 
 
                                                              
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  ) ISCR Case No. 07-13837 
                                                            )                                                           
                                                            )                                                                                           
Applicant for Security Clearance  ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Tovah Minster, Esquire, Department  Counsel 
For Applicant: James W. Green, Esquire 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
ANTHONY, Joan Caton, Administrative Judge: 
 
 After a thorough review of the hearing transcript, pleadings, and exhibits, I 
conclude that Applicant mitigated security concerns under Guideline J, Criminal 
Conduct, but he failed to mitigate security concerns under Guideline F, Financial 
Considerations, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct. His eligibility for a security 
clearance is denied. 
 
Applicant executed a security clearance application (SF-86) on June 19, 2006. 
On April 17, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued 
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline J, 
Criminal Conduct, Guideline F, Financial Considerations, and Guideline E, Personal 
Conduct. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense 
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) 
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 
2 
 
 
 On September 4, 2009, Applicant answered the SOR in writing and elected to 
have a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on March 
4, 2010. Applicant and Department Counsel agreed that his hearing would be held April 
28, 2010. On April 27, 2010, Applicant requested a continuance so that he could be 
represented by counsel. I granted Applicant’s request, and with the consent of the 
parties, rescheduled Applicant’s hearing for May 4, 2010. The hearing was held, as 
rescheduled, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to 
grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The Government called no 
witnesses and introduced 38 exhibits, which were marked Ex. 1 through 38 and 
admitted to the record without objection. The Government also offered an explanatory 
chart, identified as an allegation matrix, which showed where information relating to 
specific allegations could be found in the Government’s exhibits. I marked this 
document as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1. Applicant did not object to my review of HE 1. 
Applicant testified on his own behalf and called one witness. He offered four exhibits, 
which were marked as Ex. A through D and admitted without objection. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, I left the record open for two weeks, at Applicant’s request, so 
that he could provide additional information for the record. Applicant timely submitted six 
additional exhibits, which were marked as Ex. E through Ex. J and admitted without 
objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on May 12, 2010. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 The SOR contains 12 allegations of disqualifying conduct under AG J, Criminal 
Conduct (SOR ¶¶ 1.a. through 1.l.); 15 allegations under AG F, Financial 
Considerations (SOR ¶¶ 2.a. through 2.o.); and seven allegations of disqualifying 
conduct under AG E, Personal Conduct (SOR ¶¶ 3.a. through 3.g.). In his Answer to the 
SOR, Applicant admitted all Guideline J, Guideline F, and Guideline E allegations and 
provided additional information. Applicant’s admissions are admitted as findings of fact. 
(Answer to SOR; Tr. 21, 35; Ex. D.)  
 
 Applicant is 50 years old and employed as an aircraft mechanic by a federal 
contractor. He was awarded a security clearance for the first time in 1978, when he was 
serving in the military. He held the clearance during his 20 years of military service. 
After his retirement from the military and honorable discharge in 1998, he was 
employed in several jobs that did not require a security clearance. He was also 
unemployed from June to October 2001, from October 2002 until August 2003, and 
from January to March 2004. However, from March 2000 until October 2002 he was 
employed by the federal government as an aircraft mechanic in a position that required 
a clearance. He has worked for his present employer in a position requiring a security 
clearance since April 2004. He now seeks renewal of his eligibility for access to 
classified information.  (Ex. 1; Tr. 55-58.) 
 
 Applicant married in 1985. He and his wife divorced in 1991. In 1994, Applicant 
began a relationship with another woman. During this relationship, from 1994 to 1998, 
Applicant was deployed for approximately six months of every year. He gave his 
girlfriend power of attorney so that she could handle his financial responsibilities while 
 
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he was deployed. He and his girlfriend also were joint owners of a checking account. 
(Ex. 1; Tr. 60-62, 106-108.)  
 
 In October 1996, Applicant’s girlfriend gave birth to their daughter. Applicant and 
his girlfriend were married in 1997. At some time during her marital relationship with 
Applicant, his wife became involved with another man. Applicant and his wife became 
estranged and separated, although their financial relationship continued until about 
2002.  Applicant’s wife was physically abusive to him and they were unable to share 
custody of their child without animosity and physical confrontations. Applicant 
determined that his wife had not divorced her former husband before marrying him, and 
in 1998 he undertook court action to dissolve his marriage as bigamous. The custody 
issue was not resolved, and in 2003, at Applicant’s request, a domestic relations court 
terminated his parental rights as in the best interest of his daughter. (Ex. 3; Tr. 65-66, 
108-111.) 
 
 After he and his wife separated, Applicant became involved with another woman. 
Applicant and the woman lived together, and the relationship lasted for about two years. 
(Tr. 66-69.) 
 
    Applicant is now married to his third wife. Applicant’s wife testified as a witness 
on his behalf, and she stated that she and Applicant have been married “almost five 
years.”1 (Tr. 58-59, 129.) 
 
     Criminal Conduct 
 
 The SOR alleged, and Applicant admitted, that for a five-year period between 
1996 and 2001, he presented worthless checks to obtain property. The SOR alleged at 
¶ 1.a. that in April 1996, Applicant engaged in the criminal act of Worthless Check-
Obtain Property (WC-OBT Prop), and the charge was nolle prossed in November 1996.  
The SOR alleged at ¶ 1.c. that Applicant engaged in three counts of WC-OBT Prop in 
February 1997, and the charge was nolle prossed in November 1997. The SOR alleged 
at ¶ 1.b. that Applicant was arrested in October 1997 and charged with WC-OBT Prop, 
in violation of state law. (SOR; Answer to SOR; Ex. 2; Ex. 4; Ex. 5; Ex. 6; Ex. 17.) 
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 1.d. that Applicant was arrested in September 1998 and 
charged with obtaining property with a worthless check. The SOR also alleges at ¶ 1.e. 
that in April 1998, Applicant committed three counts of WC-OBT Prop, and in December 
1998, the court ordered him to pay $160. (SOR; Ex. 2; Ex. 7; Ex. 8; Ex.17.) 
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 1.f. that Applicant engaged in seven criminal acts of WC-
OBT - - five in March, April, and May of 1998 and two in March 2000 - - and in October 
 
1 When he executed and signed his SF-86 on June 19, 2006, Applicant listed his first wife only. He did 
not list his second and third wives, even though the testimonial evidence suggests he was married to his 
third wife when he executed his SF-86.  
 
4 
 
 
2001, he pled nolo contendere to all charges and was sentenced to pay court costs, 
which were waived. (SOR; Ex. 9; Ex. 15.) 
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶¶ 1.h. and 1.i. that Applicant was charged with obtaining 
property for worthless check on February 26, 2000, and, on the next day, February 27, 
2000, he was cited with an additional worthless check charge. The SOR alleged at ¶ 
1.k. that on April 19, 2001, Applicant was charged with nine counts of obtaining property 
for worthless check. (SOR; Ex. 2; Ex. 17; Ex. 18; Ex. 20.) 
 
 Applicant denied ever intentionally writing a worthless check.  He opined that his 
second wife wrote many of the checks on their joint account without his knowledge 
when they were disputing the custody of their daughter or when he was deployed. He 
provided a document from the county court in the jurisdiction in which many of the 
worthless checks were written. The document recited that on October 31, 2001, 
Applicant had been placed on probation for four months and ordered to make restitution 
for some of the worthless checks. The document further recited that Applicant’s 
probation had been terminated in February 2002 upon satisfactory compliance with the 
terms of the probation. (Ex. D; Tr. 62-64.) 
 
 Applicant acknowledged that he had not satisfied all of the worthless check 
charges during his four-month probationary period. He stated that he satisfied some of 
the charges individually at other times. He did not provide documentation to establish 
the resolution of specific worthless check charges. (Tr. 62-64, 103.)  
 
 In February 2000, after separating from his second wife, Applicant was involved 
with a woman. She complained to police that Applicant was bothering her. Applicant 
was arrested and charged with Trespassing after Warning and Resisting and Opposing 
a Police Officer. He was found guilty of Trespassing After Warning and sentenced to 
two days of incarceration, with credit for two days served. The charge of resisting and 
opposing a police officer was nolle prossed. This conduct is alleged at SOR ¶ 1.g. 
(SOR; Ex. 16; Ex. 17; Tr. 66-68.) 
 
 Applicant denied any violence in the relationship with the girlfriend. He claimed 
that that the girlfriend initiated contact with him. He told the girlfriend that he did not 
want any more contact with her, and she reported to the police that he had contact with 
her. In March 2000, Applicant was arrested and charged with Trespass Occupy. He 
pled nolo contendere, was found guilty, and was sentenced to two days imprisonment. 
The court issued a restraining order forbidding Applicant to contact the girlfriend.  
Applicant’s criminal conduct is alleged at SOR ¶ 1.j. (SOR; Ex. 19; Tr. 68-69.) 
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 1.l. that in October 2001, Applicant was arrested and 
charged with Violation of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence. He was 
placed on probation, required to complete a first step program, and to have no contact 
with the girlfriend. Applicant took part in a domestic violence program, although he 
denied any violence in the relationship with the girlfriend. On August 13, 2002, Applicant 
completed the first step program, and January 9, 2003, his probation was terminated. 
 
5 
 
 
He has not been charged with domestic violence since 2001. Applicant’s wife, who 
testified as a witness on his behalf, stated that during their five-year marriage, there had 
been no incidents of domestic violence. (SOR; Ex. 2; Ex. 17; Ex. 21 to Ex. 23; Ex. A; 
Ex. B; Tr. 69-72, 111-113, 130.) 
 
                                                Financial Considerations  
 
 Applicant is responsible for 14 unresolved delinquent debts. The SOR alleged at 
¶ 2.a. that a creditor obtained a judgment against him for a $958 debt to a computer 
company, and, as of April 7, 2009, the debt had not been paid. Applicant claimed he 
had satisfied the judgment in 2006. The judgment was listed on Applicant’s credit report 
of April 9, 2009. At his hearing Applicant stated he intended to provide proof of payment 
in a post-hearing submission. However, he failed to do so. (SOR; Ex. 25; Tr. 75-76.)  
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 2.b. that Applicant owed a communications company $311 
on an account shown as past due on his April 7, 2009 credit report. The SOR alleged at 
¶ 2.c. that he owed a telecommunications company a delinquent debt of $161. Applicant 
stated that he had satisfied the $311 debt in 2007 or 2008, and he stated that he had 
satisfied the $161 debt at an unspecified time. He failed to provide documentation to 
establish that either debt had been satisfied. (SOR; Ex. 25; Tr. 76-77.)   
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 2.d. that Applicant owed a creditor $636 on a delinquent 
debt in collection status. The debt was listed on Applicant’s credit report of April 7, 2009. 
Applicant admitted the debt but did not know if it had been paid or otherwise satisfied. 
He stated he would try to provide documentation to establish the status of the debt, but 
he failed to provide documentation. (SOR; Ex. 25; Tr. 77-78.) 
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 2.e. that as of April 7, 2009, Applicant was making partial 
payments on his home mortgage. Applicant stated that he was late in paying his 
mortgage and unable to make full monthly payments because he had to allocate money 
to unexpected and expensive car repairs. He claimed he was renegotiating the amount 
of his home mortgage payments with the creditor and would provide documentation to 
corroborate the new mortgage payment plan. However, he failed to do so. (SOR; Ex. 
25; Tr. 79-80.) 
 
 The SOR alleged at ¶ 2.f. that in 2002, a creditor had obtained a judgment 
against Applicant on a $2,575 debt, and the judgment remained unsatisfied. Applicant 
claimed that the judgment was being satisfied through a $50 allotment deducted each 
month from his military retirement pay. He also claimed that he had made payments 
totaling over $1,600 on the debt. As a post-hearing submission, he provided a copy of 
his retirement pay monthly summary for January 4, 2010. The summary showed that 
two allotments of $50 were deducted from Applicant’s monthly retirement pay. However, 
neither allotment identified the creditor listed at SOR ¶ 2.f. (SOR; Ex. 26; Ex. J; Tr. 80-
81.) 
 
 
6 
 
 
                                           
 The SOR identified eight judgments of restitution ordered against Applicant in 
2001 for property he acquired by writing worthless checks. The judgments of restitution 
and the amount Applicant was ordered to pay on each of them are as follows: SOR ¶¶ 
2.g. ($50); 2.h. ($14); 2.i. ($38.59); 2.j. ($75); 2.k. ($75); 2.l. ($47.60); 2.m. ($225); 2.n. 
($303.35.). Applicant did not know if the judgments of restitution had been satisfied. He 
stated that in 2001 he was going through financial and domestic stress. He stated he 
would try to obtain and provide documentation establishing that the judgments of 
restitution had been satisfied. However, he failed to do so. (SOR; Ex. 27; Ex. 28; Ex. 29; 
Ex.30; Ex. 31; Ex. 32; Ex. 33; Ex. 34; Tr. 81-83.) 
 
 The SOR cross-alleged under the financial consideration adjudicative guideline 
the financial criminal conduct alleged at ¶¶ 1.a. through 1.f.; ¶ 1.h.; ¶ 1.i.; and ¶ 1.k. 
(SOR ¶ 2.o.) 
 
 Applicant discussed his monthly budget at his hearing, and, as a post-hearing 
submission, he provided a current budget. His budget documents that his net monthly 
salary is $3,135 and his wife’s net monthly salary is $1,600. Applicant also receives 
$1,202 in military retirement pay. However, after taxes, deductions, and allotments2 are 
subtracted, Applicant’s net monthly retirement pay is approximately $518. His net 
monthly income, then, is approximately $5,253.  (Ex. E; Ex. J; Tr. 84-85.) 
 
 Applicant listed the following monthly expenses: mortgage: $2,900; groceries: 
$450; clothing: $150; utilities: $380; car expenses: $520; medical expenses: $35; 
miscellaneous: $389.  His monthly household expenses total $4,824. (Ex. E.) 
 
 Applicant reported that he and his wife pay $395 each month on six current 
debts, five of which are credit card debts. The sixth debt identified on his payment list is 
the debt alleged at SOR ¶ 2.f.  Applicant’s budget shows that he pays $50 a month on 
that debt. Applicant shows a net monthly remainder after expenses and debt payment of 
$34.  (Ex. E.)  
 
 Applicant listed real estate assets valued at $220,000 and 401(k) plan balances 
for himself and his wife of approximately $28,000. He has $188 in his personal savings 
account. He supports his mother with an allotment of $135 from his paycheck every two 
weeks.  (Ex. E; Ex. G; Ex. I; Tr. 100-101, 121-122.) 
 
 Before he purchased his home in 2006, Applicant consulted a debt management 
firm. The firm provided him with a plan for resolving his debts. Applicant did not hire the 
firm to act on his behalf to resolve his debts because he concluded that the firm’s fee 
was too high. However, he followed the debt management program and paid off some 
of his debts. (Tr. 101-102.) 
 
 
2 From his military retirement pay, Applicant authorized the following allotments: a $35 health insurance 
premium, two discretionary payments of $50 to creditors not identified in the SOR, and a loan payment of 
$288 to a creditor not identified in the SOR. (Ex. J.) 
 
7 
 
 
                                                 Personal Conduct 
 
 Applicant was served with final judgments deriving from his eviction from four 
apartments for failure to pay rent. In September 1998, a final judgment was entered, 
giving a landlord the right to recover an apartment leased to Applicant. Applicant stated 
that this apartment had been occupied by his second wife, who shared occupancy of 
the apartment with her lover while he was on deployment. Applicant did not know about 
the lover, and he had provided his former wife with money to pay the rent, but she had 
not used the money for that purpose. When he returned from deployment, he learned 
that she no longer resided in the apartment and had not paid the rent for several 
months. The landlord took action to evict Applicant. The final judgment is alleged at 
SOR ¶ 3.d. (SOR; Ex. 38; Tr. 85-86.) 
 
 A year later, in November 1999, Applicant was again served with a final judgment 
of eviction entered against him for failure to honor his lease agreement. Applicant stated 
that he was filing for divorce from his second wife when he rented the apartment. He 
was paying legal fees, experiencing financial difficulties, and lacked sufficient funds to 
pay the rent. The final judgment is alleged at SOR ¶ 3.c. (SOR; Ex. 37; Tr. 88.) 
 
 In August 2000 and February 2001, another landlord twice obtained final 
judgments to evict Applicant from an apartment for failure to pay his rent and honor his 
lease agreement. These evictions also occurred when Applicant was experiencing 
financial difficulties. The final judgments authorizing the evictions are alleged at SOR ¶¶ 
3.a. and 3.b. (SOR; Ex. 35; Ex. 36; Tr. 88-89.) 
 
 In June 2006, Applicant executed an SF-86.  Section 23f on the SF-86 reads: 
 
In the last 7 years, have you been arrested for, charged with, or convicted 
of any offense(s) not listed in response to a, b, c, d, or e above? (Leave 
out traffic fines of less than $150 unless the violation was alcohol or drug-
related.) 
 
 
Applicant answered “No” to Section 23f. He did not disclose his 2000 and 2001 arrests, 
charges, citations, and convictions, which were alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.g., 1.h., 1.i., 1.j., 
1.k., and 1.l.  Applicant stated that he did not deliberately fail to list his 2000 and 2001 
offenses. He stated that he thought the offenses had occurred more than seven years 
before 2006, and he therefore was not required to report them. (SOR; Ex. 1; Tr. 93-94.)     
 
 Section 27d on the SF-86 reads: “In the last 7 years, have you had any 
judgments against you that have not been paid?” Applicant answered “No” to Section 
27d and did not disclose the judgments listed in SOR ¶¶ 2.a., 2.f., 2.g., 2.h., 2.i., 2.j., 
2.k., 2.l., 2.m., and 2.n. When asked to explain his state of mind when he answered as 
he did, Applicant stated: 
 
 
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I did not know I had the judgments even in - - I didn’t - - I did not know I 
had the judgments at that time. I just - - I thought that was part of what 
happened. I thought I - - I just didn’t know I had those on me. It was so 
long ago. That’s why I answered no. 
 
(Ex. 1; Tr. 94-95.) 
 
 Section 29 on the SF-86 reads: “In the last 7 years, have you been a party to any 
public record civil court actions not listed elsewhere on this form?” Applicant answered 
“No” to Section 29.  He failed to disclose the civil judgments alleged at SOR ¶¶ 2.a., 2.f. 
through 2.n., and 3.a. through 3.d. Applicant stated that he did not disclose the civil 
judgments because “I did not know that it was there.” (Ex. 1; Tr. 95.)  
 
 Applicant acknowledged that he had completed several security clearance 
applications in the 20 years that he had held a security clearance. He denied ever 
intentionally falsifying any information on a security clearance application. (Tr. 95-96.) 
   
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, and 
it has emphasized that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the 
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine 
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information. Id. at 
527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.    
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an  
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, the administrative judge applies these guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
 
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The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in seeking a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
 
Analysis 
 
 Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 
  Under the Criminal Conduct guideline “[c]riminal activity creates doubt about a 
person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into 
question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.”  
AG ¶ 30. 
 
  Applicant admits writing worthless checks to obtain property from 1996 to 2001. 
While he stated that some of the worthless checks were written by his second wife 
during his deployments, many were written after he retired from military service in 1998. 
In his answer to the SOR, he admitted all allegations of writing worthless checks. He 
provided documentation establishing that, in 2002, he was released from four months of 
probation to which he had been sentenced for obtaining property in exchange for 
worthless checks. He was released from probation because he had made restitution for 
some of the worthless checks. Applicant was unable to specify the specific checks or 
amounts that he had repaid in restitution.  
 
10 
 
 
  In 2000, Applicant was arrested, found guilty of trespassing, and enjoined from 
contact with a woman who had complained of receiving unwanted attention from him. 
He was incarcerated for two days. In 2001, after contact with the woman again, he was 
arrested and charged with Violation of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic 
Violence. He was placed on probation, required to complete a first step program, and 
ordered to have no further contact with the woman. Applicant complied with the terms of 
his probation.   
 
 Applicant’s criminal history raises concerns under AG ¶ 31(a) and AG ¶ 31(c). 
AG ¶ 31(a) reads: “a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.” AG ¶ 31(c) reads: 
“allegation or admission or criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was 
formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted.” 
 
  Two Criminal Conduct mitigating conditions might apply to Applicant’s case.  If 
“so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under 
such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the 
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” AG ¶ 32(a) might apply.  If 
“there is evidence of successful rehabilitation, including but not limited to the passage of 
time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher 
education, good employment record, or constructive involvement,” then AG ¶ 32(d) 
might apply. 
 
  The record demonstrates that Applicant’s criminal behavior between 1996 and 
2001 was consequential. Even though some of the worthless checks were written by 
Applicant’s second wife, Applicant acknowledged that he also wrote worthless checks 
during a time of domestic turmoil. Additionally, he demonstrated poor judgment by 
violating a protective order requested by a former girlfriend. 
 
   In 2002, Applicant completed court-ordered probation and provided restitution 
for some of the worthless checks he wrote. Additionally, in 2003, he also completed a 
court-ordered rehabilitative program that focused on preventing domestic violence. He 
has not been arrested or charged with any criminal behavior since his release from 
these two probations. 
 
  Applicant’s criminal behavior occurred between 1986 and 2001, approximately 
nine to 14 years ago. During these years, Applicant was in volatile and stressful 
domestic relationships. His actions during those years demonstrated that he was 
unreliable, untrustworthy, and exercised poor judgment. Applicant participated in and 
completed two court-ordered probations. He made restitution for some of the worthless 
checks he wrote. He has not been involved in criminal conduct since 2001. I conclude 
that AG ¶¶ 32(a) and 32(d) apply in mitigation to the criminal conduct alleged in this 
case.   
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set 
out in AG & 18:       
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds.  
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns. Under 
AG ¶ 19(a), an Ainability or unwillingness to satisfy debts@ is potentially disqualifying.  
Similarly under AG ¶ 19(c), Aa history of not meeting financial obligations@ may raise 
security concerns. Additionally, AG ¶ 19(d) raises the following security concern: 
“deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check 
fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and 
other intentional financial breaches of trust.” Although Applicant did not owe large 
amounts of consumer debt, he allowed old debt to accumulate and remain unsatisfied. 
He failed to provide documentation establishing that he had paid or settled his 
delinquent debts. His monthly financial shortfall prevented him from making full payment 
on his monthly mortgage obligation. Between 1996 and 2001, he wrote worthless 
checks, and he failed to provide documentation showing that he had satisfied eight 
judgments in restitution that were levied against him in 2001. This evidence is sufficient 
to raise the disqualifying conditions identified at AG ¶¶ 19(a), 19(c), and 19(d). 
 
Guideline F also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate security 
concerns arising from financial difficulties. Several Guideline F mitigating conditions 
could apply to the security concerns raised by Applicant’s financial delinquencies. 
Unresolved financial delinquency might be mitigated if it happened so long ago, was so 
infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does 
not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. 
(AG ¶ 20(a)) Additionally, unresolved financial delinquency might be mitigated if the 
conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s 
control, such as loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical 
emergency, or a death, divorce, or separation, and the individual acted responsibly 
under the circumstances. (AG ¶ 20(b)) Still other mitigating circumstances that might be 
applicable include evidence the person has received or is receiving counseling for the 
problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under 
control (AG ¶ 20(c) or the individual has initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue 
creditors or otherwise resolve debts. (AG ¶ 20 (d))  
 
Applicant has a history of financial delinquency that dates to at least 1996. From 
1996 to 2001, he was involved in two stressful domestic relationships. He provided 
 
12 
 
 
money and legal authority to his second wife to pay his debts when he was deployed in 
military service. She, however, was not trustworthy, failed to pay his debts, and wrote 
worthless checks. Applicant also wrote worthless checks. He served a court-directed 
probation and satisfied by restitution some debts he incurred by writing fraudulent  
checks. However, he failed to provide documentation establishing that he had satisfied 
four outstanding debts and eight judgments of restitution alleged in the SOR. He also 
failed to provide documentation about the status of his mortgage, which fell into arrears 
when he paid other debts in lieu of his mortgage. 
 
Applicant testified that he had been paying the debt alleged at SOR ¶ 2.f. He 
provided some corroboration for his testimony that he had a payment plan in place with 
the creditor and had authorized a monthly allotment of $50 from his military retirement 
pay to satisfy the debt. Accordingly, the allegation at SOR ¶ 2.f. is concluded for 
Applicant.   
 
Applicant’s domestic relationships between 1996 and 2001 were stressful and 
difficult. However, he did not respond reasonably to these circumstances when he wrote 
worthless checks and failed to satisfy his just debts. Although he now appears to be in a 
stable domestic situation, he was unable to provide documentation establishing that he 
had paid or satisfied most of his long-standing financial delinquencies. Moreover, his 
monthly budget suggests that he may be financially overextended. He has less than 
$200 in his savings account and his net monthly remainder is about $34. He did not 
appear to be attentive to his financial obligations or to have a clear plan for resolving 
them. I conclude that AG ¶¶ 20(a), 20(b), 20(c), and 20(d) do not apply in mitigation to 
the facts of Applicant’s case. AG ¶ 20(e) does not apply to the facts of this case. 
  
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
  
 AG ¶ 15 explains why personal conduct is a security concern: 
  
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. 
 
 From 1998 to 2001, Applicant failed to pay his rent, thereby causing his landlords 
to sue to evict him. Judgments were entered for the landlords four times, and Applicant 
was evicted. 
 
 When Applicant completed and certified his SF-86 in 2006, he failed to report, in 
response to Section 23, that he had been arrested for, or charged with, or convicted of 
criminal conduct as alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.g., 1.h., 1.i., 1.j., 1.k., and 1.l. He also failed to 
report, in response to Section 27, the unsatisfied judgments against him as alleged in 
SOR ¶¶ 2.a., and 2.f. through 2.n.  Additionally, in response to Section 29 on the SF-86, 
 
13 
 
 
Applicant failed to disclose that he had been a party to public civil record court actions 
alleged in SOR ¶¶ 2.a., 2.f. through 2.n. and 3.a. through 3.d. 
 
 Applicant denied that his falsifications in his responses to Sections 23, 27 and 29 
were deliberate. He said that he failed to report his criminal conduct in 2000 and 2001 
because he thought the individual criminal acts had occurred more than seven years 
before he completed and certified his SF-86 in June 2006 and he was, therefore, not 
required to report them. He explained that he failed to report that he was party to public 
record civil cases because “I didn’t know that it was there.” He explained his failure to 
report any judgments levied against him as follows: “I did not know I had the judgments 
even in - - I didn’t - - I did not know I had the judgments at that time. I just - - I thought 
that was part of what happened. I thought I - - I just didn’t know I had those on me. It 
was so long ago. That’s why I answered no.” 
 
The Guideline E allegations in the SOR raise a security concern under AG ¶¶ 
16(a) and 16(d)(3). AG ¶ 16(a) reads: “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification 
of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, 
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, 
award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or 
award fiduciary responsibilities.” AG ¶ 16(d)(3) reads: 
 
credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other 
guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, 
but which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information. This includes, but is not limited 
to consideration of . . . (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations. 
 
  Several Guideline mitigating conditions might apply to the facts of this case. 
Applicant’s disqualifying personal conduct might be mitigated under AG ¶ 17(a) if “the 
individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or 
falsification before being confronted with the facts.” If “the refusal or failure to cooperate, 
omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or 
inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the 
individual specifically concerning the security process” and “[u]pon being made aware of 
the requirement to cooperate or provide information, the individual cooperated fully and 
completely,” then AG ¶ 17(b) might apply.  If “the offense is so minor, or so much time 
has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not case doubt on the individual’s 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment,” then AG ¶ 17(c) might apply. 
 
  AG ¶ 17(d) might apply if “the individual has acknowledged the behavior and 
obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the 
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other 
 
14 
 
 
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.” AG ¶ 17(e) might apply if 
“the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to 
exploitation, manipulation, or duress.”   
 
 Applicant’s failure to pay his rent at various times between 1998 and 2001 
resulted in final judgments granting his landlords’ requests to evict him. Applicant’s 
failure to pay his rent is not recent, but it is a serious matter. Applicant is now a 
homeowner who has failed to pay, in full, his monthly mortgage payments. It is not clear 
at this time that Applicant’s failure to pay his housing obligations occurred under such 
unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur. I conclude that AG ¶ 17(c) does not 
apply to the facts of this case.  
 
The Appeal Board has cogently explained the process for analyzing falsification 
cases: 
 
(a) when a falsification allegation is controverted, Department Counsel has 
the burden of proving falsification; (b) proof of an omission, standing 
alone, does not establish or prove an applicant’s intent or state of mind 
when the omission occurred; and (c) a Judge must consider the record 
evidence as a whole to determine whether there is direct or circumstantial 
evidence concerning the applicant’s intent or state of mind at the time the 
omission occurred. [Moreover], it was legally permissible for the Judge to 
conclude Department Counsel had established a prima facie case under 
Guideline E and the burden of persuasion had shifted to the applicant to 
present evidence to explain the omission.  
 
ISCR Case No. 03-10380 at 5 (App. Bd. Jan. 6, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-23133 
(App. Bd. June 9, 2004)).  
 
 Applicant is a mature adult who has, in the course of his employment in the 
military and as a government contractor, completed an SF-86 several times. He denied 
that he deliberately falsified his answers to Sections 23, 27, and 29. However, he failed 
to give coherent credible reasons for providing “No” answers to the questions in the 
three sections. 
 
 Applicant falsified material facts on the SF-86 that he executed and certified as 
true in June 2006. Nothing in the record suggests that he took prompt good faith action 
to correct the omissions, concealments or falsifications before he was confronted with 
the facts. (AG ¶ 17(a).) Nothing in the record suggests that his failure to report his 
criminal behavior was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate 
advice specifically about the security clearance process from authorized individuals or 
legal counsel. (AG ¶ 17(b).) When he executed his security clearance application, 
Applicant knew he had a record of criminal behavior. As a mature adult, he knew that 
his criminal behavior was not minor, so remote in time, so infrequent, or had occurred 
under such unique circumstances that it would not seriously impact his eligibility for a 
security clearance. (AG 17(c).) Applicant failed to provide documentation that he 
 
15 
 
 
obtained counseling or had taken other positive steps that might alleviate the 
circumstances that caused his unreliable conduct and, as a result, such behavior was 
unlikely to recur. (AG ¶ 17(d).) Nothing in the record suggests that Applicant took 
positive steps to reduce or eliminate the vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress that his behavior caused. (AG ¶ 17(e).) I conclude, therefore, that none of the 
applicable personal conduct mitigating conditions applies to the facts of Applicant’s 
case. 
 
 I observed Applicant carefully at his hearing, and I listened to his explanations of 
his state of mind at the time the falsifications occurred. I conclude that he failed to carry 
his burden of persuasion to rebut the Government’s prima facie case under Guideline E. 
I conclude that his falsifications to his answers to Sections 23, 27, and 29 were 
deliberate. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his or her 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
        
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a mature adult. After 
two volatile domestic relationships, he now appears to be in a mature and stable 
marriage. This suggests some successful rehabilitation. 
 
However, the delinquent debts alleged in the SOR remain unresolved. Applicant 
has had difficulty meeting his monthly mortgage payments, and his net monthly 
remainder appears to be $34. When he completed his SF-86 in June 2006, Applicant 
deliberately falsified material facts when he answered sections 23, 27, and 29. His 
failure to honestly report his past criminal behavior and his financial record create a 
situation that could seriously mislead the government about his honesty, reliability, and 
trustworthiness. His falsifications were not minor: they went to the heart of his capacity 
 
16 
 
 
for truthfulness, a critical qualification for one who would hold a security clearance. 
Applicant’s failure to be truthful was deliberate. He made no effort to correct his 
falsifications before the government confronted him with his lack of candor. His 
deliberate falsifications are recent. 
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts at the present 
time as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For these 
reasons, I conclude that while Applicant’s criminal conduct was mitigated by the 
passage of time, he failed to mitigate the security concerns arising from his financial 
delinquencies and personal conduct.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline J:   FOR  APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a. - 1.l.:  For Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline F:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a. - 2.e.:  Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 2.f.:   For Applicant 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.g. – 2.o.:  Against Applicant   
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline E:             AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 3.a. - 3.g.:  Against Applicant 
 
                              Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
                                                     
___________________________________ 
Joan Caton Anthony 
Administrative Judge