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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 09-07326
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: John B. Glendon, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
On February 2, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B
(Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG).
In a February 14, 2010, response, Applicant admitted the allegations raised. I
was assigned the case on May 3, 2010. Department Counsel and Applicant agreed to a
June 15, 2010, hearing date.  DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing to that effect on May
14, 2010.  
The hearing took place as scheduled. Department Counsel submitted five
documents which were accepted into the record as exhibits (Exs.) 1-5. He also
submitted a file of official U.S. documents containing facts about Iraq. It was accepted
 DX 1, Administrative Notice, Subpart iii (U.S. Dep’t of State, Travel Warning: Iraq, Feb. 25, 2010).1
 DX 1, Administrative Notice, Subpart v (U.S. Dep’t of State, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights2
Practices: Iraq, Feb. 25, 2009).
 DX 1, Administrative Notice.3
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as desk exhibit (DX) 1 i-v without objection. Applicant gave testimony and submitted six
documents, accepted as Exs. A-F, without objection. Applicant was given through June
22, 2010, to submit any additional materials. On June 16, 2010, Applicant submitted six
additional documents, which were accepted collectively into the record as Ex. G without
objection. The transcript (Tr.) was received on June 24, 2010. The record was then
closed. Based upon a review of the case file, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
security clearance is granted.
Administrative Notice
The Government requested administrative notice of certain facts related to Iraq,
as represented in the materials comprising DX 1 i-v. I take notice of the following facts:
The Republic of Iraq is a parliamentary democracy. It proclaimed its current constitution
in 2005 and held free elections in 2006, after a U.S.-led coalition removed Saddam
Hussein and his Ba’athist regime from power. In the wake of that transition, the United
States and its allies have endeavored to set a solid foundation of democratic institutions
in Iraq. 
In 2007, 92% of Iraq’s exports were in crude oil and crude oil materials. Almost
half of Iraq’s exports went to the United States. The United States’ ultimate goal in Iraq
is to establish a peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure nation that will be an
ally of the United States in the war against terrorism. To that end, the United States has
worked closely with Iraq’s new government and invested in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Success in Iraq is a high priority of the United States.
Despite the presence of U.S. forces and the new government, terrorist forces,
insurgents, and forces armed by terrorist groups continue to plague Iraq. The U.S.
Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens of the inherent danger in traveling
to and through Iraq. While stability is being slowly restored and economic prosperity is
returning to the region, Iraq remains a dangerous and unpredictable place, particularly
in the International (or Green) Zone and northern Iraq. In addition to the threat of
terrorism, sectarian violence often occurs. As recently as January 2010, an American
citizen was kidnapped in Baghdad.   1
Furthermore, there are U.S.-substantiated reports of human rights abuses,
including a “climate of violence; misappropriation of official authority by sectarian,
criminal and insurgent groups; arbitrary deprivation of life; disappearances; torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”  The new government’s2
effectiveness in adhering to the rule of law has been hampered by on-going violence,
corruption, sectarian bias, and the lack of civilian oversight and accountability.  Despite3
 DX 1, Administrative Notice, Subparts i-v.4
 Tr. 39.5
 Tr. 11.6
 Tr. 11.7
 Both Applicant’s current and former spouses are U.S. citizens.8
 Tr. 33. Applicant tendered his expired Iraqi passport to Iraqi officials. 9
 Tr. 18-22.10
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improvements, the U.S. Department of State consistently maintains that Iraq remains a
dangerous and unpredictable place.  4
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 48-year-old interpreter working for a defense contractor. He was
raised in Baghdad.  After high school, when he was 19 years old, he went to study in5
Europe in order to escape the ill treatment his family received in Iraq.  Linguistic6
difficulties led him to Morocco to continue his studies. He arrived in Morocco in 1981.
He continued his studies in Morocco until he completed law school in 1987. Applicant
then decided to emigrate to the United States. He chose to move to the United States
because, after studying the U.S. Constitution in school, he wanted to live in “the land of
opportunity and the land of freedom.”  He hoped to settle and start a family. Today, he7
considers the United States to be his true home.
Applicant arrived in the United States in September 1987. In 1988, he married a
woman he met during his studies. They divorced in 1990. From 1988 until 2000,
Applicant managed a pizzeria. He remarried in 1995, the same year he received a
green card. Applicant and his current wife have two children, both of whom are still in
school.  His spouse is a registered nurse. From 2000 through 2004, Applicant managed8
a restaurant. 
In February 2005, Applicant became a U.S. citizen. He does not maintain dual
citizenship with any foreign nation.  In March 2005, he received a U.S. passport. In April9
2005, Applicant found work with his present employer. He was assigned to act as an
interpreter for the United States military, utilizing his extensive knowledge of Arabic,
Spanish, and English. He has been devoted in his efforts to support the United States
and coalition forces in their effort to maintain stability in the Middle East. Among his
assignments were several months as a prison translator in Iraq, an extensive
assignment working with high level detainees, and lending support to a notable
strategic assignment.  He was commended for his work with interrogations, which10
 Tr. 19-25; Exs. G (Recommendations and honors).11
 Tr. 35-37.12
 Tr. 37.13
 Tr. 39.14
 Tr. 25.15
 Tr. 52.16
 Tr. 47.17
 Tr. 41.18
 Id.19
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continued through 2007.  His more recent assignments involved advising the U.S.11
military regarding cultural practices and local activities, as well as aiding in area
assessment.  Most recently, he was assigned to work in a rural area north of Baghdad,12
where he assisted with atmospheric intelligence.  That area was formerly controlled by13
Al Qaeda, but its presence there “has almost completely disappeared.”14
Today, Applicant continues his work as an interpreter in the Middle East. He
travels there on a visa and pays a fine on his departure because he is a U.S. citizen.15
Applicant continues to share his unique linguistic skills and vast knowledge of Arabic
culture. Despite his current assignment, he does not maintain a bank account or any
business interests in Iraq. While abroad, Applicant maintains contact with his wife and
children in the United States. Here, his wife, a registered nurse, has an established
career. His eldest child volunteers at Applicant’s wife’s place of employment.
Applicant’s family regularly participates in community cleanup projects. Applicant no
longer has a mortgage. His approximately $500,000 home is unencumbered.  He has16
investments worth about $800,000.
Applicant comes from a large family that was critical of the former regime in Iraq.
“My mom once told me if we worked day and night until we died we [sic] never pay back
the American [sic] because they removed Saddam Hussein from . . . power.”  Applicant17
has one sister who lives in the United States. She followed her husband to this country
after his family left Iraq as refugees.  The rest of Applicant’s family remains in Iraq,18
where they are citizens and residents. This includes two other sisters, five brothers, and
an elderly mother. Most of his family members live in or around Baghdad, although one
brother lives in another city.  One brother, who is unemployed and mentally ill, and one19
sister live with Applicant’s mother. The other brothers consist of a grocer, a veterinarian,
a government-employed security officer, and a military officer in the Iraqi army. Except
for the brother who lives with their mother, all of Applicant’s brothers are married. None
of their wives work outside of the home. The military officer brother was a colonel in the
 Tr. 29-30.20
 Tr. 44.21
 Tr. 30.22
 Tr. 28.23
 Tr. 28.24
 Tr. 28.25
 Id. Applicant’s father owned and managed a family business. Tr. 47.26
 Tr. 29.27
 Tr. 46.28
 Tr. 49-50.29
 Tr. 50.30
 Tr. 48.31
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Iraqi Army until the regimes changed in the mid-2000s.  He then started a private20
business. He recently rejoined the reorganized Iraqi Army as a Lieutenant Colonel,
teaching in Iraq’s military school.21
When Applicant has contact with his siblings, it is by telephone and usually
occurs about once a year.  Noting that he is busy with his own life and family, and that22
his siblings and other relatives are similarly busy with their own lives, Applicant credibly
testified that he has little contact with his family in Iraq. “We’re not like it used to be
when we were kids, [living] together in one house. Now we are grownup people and
each one of us has his own family.”  He has not informed his foreign family members23
that he works in Iraq.  At the hearing, Applicant testified that he had not spoken with24
any foreign family members in the six or seven months before the hearing.  He speaks25
with his widowed mother slightly more, checking on her health about twice a year.26
Otherwise, he has “zero communication” with family abroad.  When Applicant first27
started working in the Middle East, he purposefully limited his communication with his
family in Iraq in order to maximize their respective security and privacy.  He does not28
tell them he works in Iraq, nor does he contact them when he is in Iraq.  His family29
thinks he still works in a restaurant.  Applicant last saw his family in Iraq on a visit in30
2004, before he started his current work.31
Because Applicant worked in a prison in Iraq, he no longer freely travels within
the country. When in Iraq, he stays on a secure base. Applicant has complied with all
 Tr. 51.32
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).33
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).34
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instructions regarding discretion in his assignments and maintaining minimal contact
with family members abroad.32
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations
for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions
and mitigating conditions, which are required in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for
access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.
Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a33
preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  34
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 Id.35
 Id.36
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.37
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 Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access35
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily36
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the37
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find Guideline B (Foreign Contacts)
to be the most pertinent to the case. Conditions pertaining to this adjudicative guideline
that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which
would mitigate such concerns, are discussed below.
Analysis
The concern under Guideline B is that foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. The adjudication can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S.
citizens to obtain protected information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Conditions pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns, are
set forth and discussed in the conclusions below.
The country at issue is Iraq. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the United
States has had a unique relationship with that country. In many respects, the two
countries are partners. Despite improvements in that country, the State Department
continues to depict Iraq as dangerous and unpredictable, noting that numerous
insurgent groups remain in that country. Terrorist tactics are not uncommon. Therefore,
considerations under this guideline must be conducted with the highest scrutiny. 
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The SOR contains four allegations under this guideline: First, Applicant’s mother
is a citizen and resident of Iraq. Second, seven of his siblings are citizens and residents
of Iran. Third, one brother was a Colonel in the Iraqi army. Fourth, Applicant visited Iraq
in 2004. 
Over the years and across the miles, Applicant’s ties with his family members in
Iraq have faded. Despite Applicant’s purposefully guarded and limited contact with his
family members in Iraq, he maintains ties with his mother and siblings. Indeed, one of
Applicant’s considerations for keeping his work and his location a secret from them is to
assure their mutual security. Given the facts presented, Foreign Influence Disqualifying
Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion) and AG ¶ 7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information) apply.
In choosing to utilize his unique skills and serve the U.S. military, Applicant
knowingly undertook dangerous and highly meaningful work. To pursue that work, he
purposefully altered his relationships with his family members living in Iraq. He ceased
visiting Iraq in 2004. He limited his contact with his siblings to annual phone calls. He
maintains contact with his elderly mother only about twice a year, by telephone. He
does not contact his relatives when he is in Iraq. He has not let them know that he left
his life as a restaurant manager in 2004. Such intentional changes altered the nature of
his familial relationships. Through these efforts, he has not only isolated them from
knowledge of his work on behalf of this country, but, as instructed, helped to insulate
himself. While danger still exists in Iraq, Applicant’s nexus to family members in Iraq
does not heighten his risk  Consequently, Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions AG ¶
8(a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and
the interests of the U.S.) and AG ¶ 8(c) (contact or communication with foreign citizens
is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation) apply . 
Applicant has demonstrated commitment to, and satisfaction with, his life as a
U.S. citizen. His interpretative skills and commitment to the United States are valuable
assets in the current efforts to resolve conflict in the Middle East, as are his brother’s
efforts in training the new Iraqi army. Moreover, Applicant’s depiction of his current
relationships with family members in Iraq is notable in its accentuation of his sense of
professionalism over any sense of sentimentalism. He calls the United States his true
home. It is where he started his family, built a home, and acquired a financial portfolio
valued in excess of $1.3 million dollars. It is where his wife is employed and his children
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attend school. Applicant adheres to his mother’s belief that the United States is to be
thanked for the removal of Saddam Hussein, and he feels his work helps repay the debt
incurred. His testimony revealed a man who would resolve any conflict between his
family and this country in favor of the United States. Finally, there is no evidence that
terrorists, criminals, the Iraqi government, or those conducting espionage have
approached Applicant or his family, or that Iraqi officials have asked Applicant or his
family for classified or sensitive information. In light of these considerations, AG ¶ 8(b)
(there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest). Foreign influence security concerns are mitigated.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a). Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate
determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall
commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the
whole-person concept. 
A Guideline B decision concerning Iraq must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation in Iraq, as well as dangers existing in Iraq. Iraq is a very dangerous
place because of violence from insurgents and terrorists. Such forces continue to
threaten the government of Iraq, the interests of the United States, U.S. Armed Forces,
and our allies, as well as the citizens of Iraq. Applicant recognizes that his work in the
Middle East could endanger his family in Iraq. The United States and Iraq are allies in
the war on terrorism, and the United States is committed to the establishment of a free
and independent government in Iraq. Iraq and the United States have close
relationships in diplomacy and commerce. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole-person”
factors. Applicant’s testimony was highly credible and forthright. He is an intelligent,
direct, and mature professional. Appellant is well-educated and multi-lingual. He left
Iraq as a teenage, in pursuit of higher education in a free environment. He came to the
United States in his mid-20s in order to build a new life in a land offering freedom and
opportunity he did not find elsewhere. He persevered at his work, started a family, and
achieved financial success. His family and all of his assets are in the United States. He
purposefully undertook potentially dangerous work for the U.S. military. He often put
himself in harm’s way, working alongside U.S. Armed Forces on several operations
while providing essential services. He has made significant contributions to national
security, fully aware of the risks to himself and his family. He has proven himself to be
 See ISCR Case No. 07-00034 (App. Bd. Feb. 5, 2008).38
 AG ¶ 8(b).39
 See ISCR Case No. 04-06242 at 2 (App. Bd. Jun. 28, 2008).40
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uniquely talented. In undertaking that work, he purposefully partitioned himself from his
family members still living in Iraq. All these factors demonstrate that Applicant will
recognize, resist, and report any attempts by a foreign power, terrorist group, or
insurgent group at coercion or exploitation.  Applicant’s strong personal and financial38
connections in the United States, as well as his commitment to the Untied States and
its efforts, demonstrate “such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the
U.S., [that he] can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.”     39
After weighing the evidence of Applicant’s connections to Iraq and to the United
States, his often emotional testimony, and all the facts previously noted, I conclude he
has carried his burden of mitigating the foreign influence security concerns cited. I take
this position based on the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 4848 U.S.
518 (1988), my “careful consideration of the whole person factors”  and supporting40
evidence, my application of the pertinent factors under the adjudicative process, all the
evidence in this decision, and my interpretation of my responsibilities under the
Guidelines. For the reasons stated, I conclude Applicant is eligible for access to
classified information.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a – 1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance granted.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge