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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 08-04597
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Stephanie N. Mendez, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF-86) on May 12, 2006.
On March 8, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny his
application, citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action
was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG). 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on March 22, 2010, and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA assigned the case to me on April 22,
2010. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on May 13, 2010. I convened the hearing as
scheduled on June 24, 2010. Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4 were admitted in
evidence without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted nine
documents (AE A-I), which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the
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transcript of the hearing (Tr.) On June 30, 2010. Eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to Afghanistan. (Tr. 16) The request and the attached documents are included in
the record as Hearing Exhibit I. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the
Findings of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶ 1.a and
¶1.b. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. I make the following
findings:
Applicant is a 61-year-old man who was born and educated in Afghanistan. He
was selected to attend an army academy, and he graduated in 1972. Applicant served
as an officer in the Afghan military from 1972 until 1979. (Tr. 23) He fled Afghanistan,
after being jailed in 1979, and lived in a refugee camp. Applicant requested to come to
the United States and has lived in the United States since 1981. (Tr. 20) He became a
naturalized U.S. citizen in 1996. In 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2004, Applicant traveled to
Afghanistan. (SOR ¶ 1.b) He has been employed with his current employer since March
2005 as an interpreter and cultural advisor. (GE 1) Applicant has held a security
clearance for approximately five years while working in Afghanistan for the U.S. Army.
Applicant is married and has four children who are U.S. citizens. (GE 1) His wife is
a naturalized U.S. citizen. (Tr. 23) His father died in 1976. His mother is a permanent
resident in the United States. (Tr. 49) Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are
naturalized U.S. citizens and residents of the United States.
Applicant’s oldest brother lives in Afghanistan. (SOR ¶ 1.a) He is in his late70's
and is mentally disabled. (Tr. 26) He rarely leaves his home. (Tr. 30) Applicant’s nephew,
who cares for Applicant’s brother, speaks to Applicant on the phone several times a year
to provide information about his father’s health. 
When one of Applicant’s other brothers died in 1998, Applicant went to
Afghanistan for the funeral. (Tr. 27) Applicant returned to Afghanistan in 1999 to settle
his estate. (Tr. 28) When visiting, Applicant stayed with his family for approximately one
month. (Tr. 66)
Applicant’s remaining brothers live in the United States. One brother is a
naturalized U.S. citizen who is also an interpreter in Afghanistan. The other brother is a
U.S. permanent resident. (GE 2)
Applicant has one sister who is also an interpreter in Afghanistan. His sister-in-law and two
brothers-in-law are also working as interpreters in Afghanistan.
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Applicant has three sisters. Two sisters are naturalized U.S. citizens and residents
living in the United States.  One sister is a citizen and resident of Germany. (GE 2)   1
In 2004, Applicant returned to Afghanistan because his son was getting engaged.
The Afghan tradition is that the father of the groom makes a “proposal” to the bride’s
family. (Tr. 29) He went again in 2004, due to the engagement party. His wife and son
traveled with him. (Tr. 30) The trip lasted approximately one month.
In 2005, Applicant attended his son’s wedding in Afghanistan. (GE 3) As was the
custom, the bride’s family invited the guests and Applicant’s family paid for the
celebration. At the wedding there were many guests, including one of Applicant’s former
military colleagues. Applicant had the command’s permission to attend the wedding. (Tr.
68)
Applicant has no property in Afghanistan. He has no desire to permanently return
to the country. Applicant had a small bank account in Afghanistan to provide for his son’s
fiancee. Since they are now married and living in the U.S., the account is closed. (Tr. 31)
Applicant owns a home in the United States.
At the hearing, Applicant was passionate about his feelings for the United States.
He related that he has worked very hard to be a bridge between coalition forces and the
Afghan government. He would like to bring both sides to a peace or friendship table. His
goal is to improve communication between the two countries. (Tr. 102) As part of his
daily work, Applicant has business meetings with the police department, Afghan Army
department and Afghan intelligence. (Tr. 38)
Applicant was candid in answering questions about his contacts with former
colleagues from his time in the military academy or in the Army. When Applicant moved
to the United States he had no contact with them. (Tr. 82) However, he did see them on
the street at times when he visited Afghanistan before his interpreter position with the
U.S. Army. He was credible in his testimony that he did not maintain regular contact with
them. He also explained that he sees one of them as part of his work with the U.S. Army
during meetings. He explained that naturally when someone who has known him from
his early years in Afghanistan sees him they say hello. He acknowledged that many
times he does not even recognize them. (Tr. 149) He also tried to explain that the
educated community in Afghanistan is small and everyone knows everyone. He has
received telephone calls once or twice from one former military colleague who he sees at
business meetings when something occurs that might need to be communicated to his
Army command. (Tr. 101)  
Since March 2005, Applicant served as an interpreter/cultural advisor for the
Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan and Combined Joint Special Operations
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Task Force-Afghanistan. (AE A) He remained in his position until he returned to the U.S.
in January 2010. He resides on U.S. military installations when he works in Afghanistan.
He does not leave the compound except with permission. (GE 3). However, as part of his
position, he sees former military colleagues in meetings. (Tr. 33) His one brother who
lives in Afghanistan did come to the gate of Applicant’s base to see him. (Tr. 129)
Applicant is not allowed to walk freely on any city streets in Afghanistan. (Tr. 146)
Applicant has been viewed as an invaluable member of the team and most important as
a friend to all members of the Operations Detachment. (AE B)
Applicant asserted his pride of U.S. citizenship and love for his work with the Army
(AE A). He worked long hours for six days a week. He went on missions with the U.S.
Army. He has willingly put himself in danger every day for almost five years in order to
help the United States. Applicant emphasized that he would never betray the United
States. He wants to “sacrifice his life and his family’s life for the United States.” (Tr. 38)
Applicant is proud to be a first generation American. He wants to support the U.S. “by his
blood.” (Tr. 102)
There is no evidence in the record that Applicant breached any security policies or
procedures while holding a security clearance in Afghanistan. He has alerted his
command of his travels and contacts in Afghanistan. He has letters of appreciation for
his work in Afghanistan (AE A-H).
Applicant disclosed in his 2009 DOHA interrogatories the nature and extent of his
extended family. He has cousins, aunts and uncles who reside in Germany. His wife,
who is also employed as an interpreter in Afghanistan, has extended family in
Afghanistan. Applicant has little or no contact with them. He does know that his wife has
family members (sister and husband) who are serving as interpreters in Afghanistan. (Tr.
132) 
A Special Forces major commanding a unit in Afghanistan recommends Applicant
for continued service. The major worked closely with Applicant during an eight month
combat rotation in Afghanistan. During that time, he writes that Applicant is “without
doubt the most trustworthy and patriotic individual he has had the pleasure of working
with.” Applicant’s “performance while serving with the United States Special Forces from
July 2009 through January 2010 was superlative.” (AE G)
The major described Applicant’s contributions to mission accomplishment by
stating:
Applicant served as the unit Commander’s personal interpreter and
Cultural Advisor. In this capacity, he personally liaised with numerous
political and military officials within the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan. As part of this liaison, he would engage these individuals in
order to gain concurrence with key initiatives, mitigate Anti-Afghan Forces’
Propaganda and/or pass critical information to key leaders. The end result
of his work was that the unit and subsequently coalition force commanders
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built and or maintained close personal relationships with Afghan
personalities who directly shaped the military and political environment of a
particular province in Afghanistan. 
Applicant’s success in the endeavor was evident during the AAF’s
relatively ineffective Summer Campaign. Applicant’s wise counsel,
unwavering dedication and tireless service was an integral part of the unit’s
ability to disrupt the AAF’s propaganda machine while allowing the unit and
coalition forces the opportunity to seize the offensive in the information
operations arena. The impact of this feat was that the unit enjoyed
operational freedom of action to defeat the enemy on the battlefield while
leveraging his influence with local, provincial and national leaders to ensure
their support. Applicant’s performance in this capacity was absolutely
brilliant and his loyalty beyond reproach.
Applicant presented another 2010 recommendation from a Special Forces major
who commands a unit with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. (AE H) The major supports
Applicant for retention of his security clearance. According to the major, Applicant’s
previous experience as a former Afghan military officer provides him with an immense
knowledge base. This network easily allows Special Forces operators to execute key
leader engagements which are crucial to their operational success in Afghanistan.”
For over four years, Applicant has selflessly served as a linguist in support
of United States Special Forces units in Afghanistan. He is an expert in
translating both written and spoken Persian-Dari and Pashtu. The scope of
his responsibilities range from translating messages and coordinating
meetings with high profile indigenous leadership to gathering sensitive
information. He has a tireless work ethic and is ready 24 hours a day where
he is always prepared for meetings or combat patrols.
In 2009, Applicant was recommended for increased responsibility as a Category
III Interpreter, after serving for over four years as a Category II Interpreter in Afghanistan.
According to another Special Forces major who commands a unit in Afghanistan,
Applicant has faithfully and conscientiously assisted Special Forces Operational
Detachments Alpha and Bravo with exemplary translations and assistance in Advanced
Special Operations; significantly assisting in the overall success of Operation Enduring
Freedom-Afghanistan.  (AE C) Moreover, 
Applicant possess a perfect command of both the Pashtu and Dari
languages greatly enabling Special Forces’ mission capabilities. Applicant
has also served as a cultural advisor to multiple senior officer commanding
all Special Forces in a particular province for the past several years where
he has been a vital source of information concerning the people, customs,
and culture of Afghanistan. His expertise has led to outstanding rapport
between Special Forces and the local national population. His
professionalism and maturity make him the lead interpreter for our Fire
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Base in all interactions with local power brokers and members of the
Government of Afghanistan. Applicant is greatly respected by all members
of our Special Forces Detachments and by the entire community. 
Applicant’s Assistant Detachment Commander commended Applicant’s work in
Afghanistan in 2006. He worked with Applicant on a daily basis and found him to be one
of the most important assets to the mission. (AE E) Applicant not only possesses
language and dialect skill but his knowledge of cultural nuances is unique. The
commander noted that “Applicant has a unique ability to gather information from
individuals whom would have rather not given the information to a foreigner.  Applicant
has a distinct ability to quickly comprehend difficult tasks. (AE E)
Applicant’s linguist manager, a master sergeant with the U.S. army, reports
Applicant has served as an integral member of the Special Operations Task Force,
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan since March 2005.
Applicant’s manager vouches for the professionalism and dedication of Applicant’s work.
He is considered to be among the best and most trusted linguists. Applicant interacts on
a daily basis, as part of his duties, with Government Officials of Afghanistan (including
Chiefs of National Police, Colonels, Generals, and Governors). (AE A) 
A staff sergeant who worked with Applicant reports that Applicant is a mature
professional who can work unsupervised in certain situations. He is an extremely
patriotic citizen, loyal to the United States of America, who will work tirelessly in support
of his country. Applicant is an asset to anyone who chooses to employ him. (AE D) The
staff sergeant went on to say that: 
Applicant can be depended on to ensure that his supervisor’s message is
conveyed clearly and concisely and likewise. Most importantly, Applicant
will ask questions when he is unsure of the content of the message.
Applicant consistently improves his language skills to support military
operations by studying military terminology during his off duty hours.
Applicant is completely discreet and professional in all of his supervisors’
operations and will not discuss sensitive issues at inappropriate times or
places. Applicant can be depended on to relay unscheduled telephonic
messages, asking appropriate follow up questions with no supervision.
Applicant received several awards, commendations and medals/command coins
while serving as a translator in Afghanistan from 2005 until 2010. (AE I) He was also
awarded several command coins which he brought to the hearing. Applicant received
them for meritorious service over the years. (Tr. 98)
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Afghanistan set forth in the
Hearing Exhibits, including the fact that Afghanistan has been an independent nation
since August 19, 1919, after the British relinquished control. A monarch ruled from 1919
until a military coup in 1973. Following a Soviet-supported coup in 1978, a Marxist
government emerged. In December 1979, Soviet forces invaded and occupied
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Afghanistan. Afghan freedom fighters, known as mujaheddin, opposed the communist
regime. The resistance movement eventually led to an agreement known as the Geneva
Accords, signed by Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union which
ensured Soviet forces withdrew by February 1989.
The mujaheddin were not a party to the negotiations for the Accords and refused
to accept them. As a result civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal. In the mid
1990's, the Taliban rose to power largely due to the anarchy and warlordism that arose
after the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban sought to impose an extreme interpretation of
Islam on the entire country and committed massive human rights violations. The Taliban
also provided sanctuary to Osama BinLaden, Al Qa’ida, and other terrorist organizations.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, demands to expel BinLaden and
his followers were rejected by the Taliban. U.S. forces and a coalition partnership
commenced military operations in October 2001 that forced the Taliban out of power by
November 2001. A new democratic Government took power in 2004. Despite progress
made since the Taliban was deposed, Afghanistan still faces many daunting challenges.
Among these challenges are: defeating terrorists and insurgents, recovering from over
three decades of civil strife; and rebuilding a shattered physical, economic, and political
infrastructure.
The Taliban, al-Qa’ida, other insurgent groups, and anti-Coaliton organizations
continue to operate in Afghanistan, resulting in numerous attacks and deaths. Insurgents
have targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Afghan journalists, government
workers, and UN workers. Instability along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier continued to
provide al-Qa’ida with leadership mobility and the ability to conduct training and
operational planning, targeting Western Europe and U.S. interests in particular. Kabul, in
particular has seen a rise in militant attacks, including rocket attacks, vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and suicide bombings.
At this time, the risk of terrorist activities remains extremely high. The country’s
human rights record remains poor and violence is rampant. According to recent reports
from the U.S. Department of State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings
of Americans and other Western nationals. Travel warnings are ongoing. Overall, the
State Department has declared that the security threat to all American citizens in
Afghanistan remains critical as no part of Afghanistan is immune from violence.
The United States supports the efforts of the Afghan Government to establish,
a vibrant civil society, one that emphasizes democratic principles through a
rule of law and creates accountable and transparent forms of government.
The United States and its international partners remain committed to
helping Afghans realize their vision for a country that is stable, democratic,
and economically successful, and to an Afghan Government committed to
the protection of women’s rights, human rights, and religious tolerance.
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Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon an applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of
potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination of the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant has
not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify an applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to an applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
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facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b).
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
Applicant has a brother who is a citizen and resident of  Afghanistan. (SOR ¶ 1.a).
Applicant traveled to Afghanistan in at least 1998, 1999, 2000, and twice in 2004. (SOR
¶ 1.b). The security concern relating to Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  
Applicant’s oldest brother is a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. He is in his mid
70s and mentally disabled. He is not employed. Applicant maintains some contact with
him through his nephew several times a year by telephone. He saw him when he
attended a funeral for another brother in 1998 and again in 2000. Applicant’s
connections to his brother in Afghanistan could create a potential conflict of interest
between his security obligations and his desire to help him, only in a situation wherein he
was taken hostage or otherwise threatened with harm if Applicant did not cooperate.
None of them have any government connections or other position in which they could
otherwise benefit from his access to sensitive information or technology. Applicant did
not maintain any contact with any former colleagues when in the United States.
However, under either disqualifying condition, security concerns could arise in
connection with the potential that hostile forces might seek protected information from
See ISCR Case No. 02-26978 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005).2
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Applicant by threatening harm to his family member in Afghanistan. Based on this
evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b) are raised.
Before his work as an interpreter, Applicant traveled to Afghanistan in 1998, 1999,
2000, and 2004. He was there in 1998 and 1999 for his brother’s funeral and to settle his
estate. He visited his older brother in 2000. The visit to his brother in 2000 is
incorporated into AG ¶ 1.a and has no independent security significance.  2
Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the
government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, either because the
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest.
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Applicant has been in the United States since 1981, and he has been a U.S.
citizen since 1996. His wife and children are U.S. citizens. His mother is a resident of the
United States. His father is deceased. His in-laws are citizens and residents of the
United States. Applicant’s other brothers and sisters do not live in Afghanistan and are
citizens of the United States.
Applicant’s work as an interpreter and cultural advisor supported the U.S. military
mission in Afghanistan, not the work of those who seek to destroy the growing
democracy in Afghanistan. The new Afghanistan government relies upon the U.S. for
support, both financially and militarily, as it moves forward with a new form of
government. While Afghanistan’s human rights record under the Taliban was very dismal
and serious problems continue, its human rights record is slowly improving under this
government. Since working as an interpreter with the Army for five years, neither
Applicant nor his brother has been pressured by any organization to provide any type of
information, classified or otherwise, about the United States.
In every case where a sibling lives overseas, there is a risk of pressure on this
relative and through them upon the holder of a security clearance. Under the facts of this
case, a heightened risk for exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion
is not substantial. Applicant has significant ties to the United States and few ties to
Afghanistan. Except for his older brother, his other siblings do not live in Afghanistan. All
but one sister are citizens and residents of the United States. One sister is a citizen and
resident of Germany. Applicant’s children are United States citizens. His mother is a
resident of the United States as well as his in-laws. His wife is a citizen who is also an
interpreter in Afghanistan. Her brother and his wife are interpreters in Afghanistan.
Applicant has no financial or property interests in Afghanistan. He wants to help the
United States in its role in the redevelopment of Afghanistan. Applicant’s ties with the
U.S. are much stronger than his ties with Afghanistan. The Army holds his work as a
translator and cultural advisor in high regard. He provided more than language
interpretation skills. He explained nuances and practices which greatly assisted the
military in accomplishing its mission. During his time in Afghanistan, he worked very hard
to help the Army. He developed a high level of trust with the Army and the Afghan locals.
Applicant spoke about his undivided loyalty to the United States. Based on his
relationship and loyalty to the United States, he can be expected to resolve any conflict
of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. He has lived in the United States since 1981, after
fleeing, and did not return to Afghanistan until his brother’s funeral and to settle his
estate. He owns property in the United States. He has worked in the United States for
many years. He has endured dangerous conditions in Afghanistan on behalf of the U.S.
Army.  He has held a security clearance without any security violations. He credibly
testified that he would report someone to the United States government if asked about
classified information. There is no evidence that he has connections or contact with any
people other than his brother or the former military colleagues he sees as part of his job
with the Army in Afghanistan. I find Applicant has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in America that he can be expected to resolve any potential
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conflict of interest in favor of the United States. He has established application of AG ¶
8(b).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
The Appeal Board requires the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an
applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family ties to the
U.S. relative to his or her ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.;
and, many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7
(App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Certain circumstances weigh against
Applicant in the whole person analysis. First, Applicant has an older brother who still
lives in Afghanistan. Terrorists, and even friendly governments, could attempt to use
Applicant’s brother to obtain information. Second, he was educated in Afghanistan and
served as an officer in the Afghan military. Third, he has some contact with his older
brother. Fourth, he traveled to Afghanistan after he became an interpreter when he
asked for the hand of a bride for his son. In 2005, he attended the wedding in
Afghanistan and among the guests was a former military colleague. 
Substantial mitigating evidence weighs in favor of granting Applicant a security
clearance. Applicant fled Afghanistan after being jailed in 1979. He lived in a refugee
camp. Applicant wanted to come to the United States. He is a mature person, who has
lived in the United States since 1981 , and has been a naturalized citizen since 1996. He
has a strong sense of patriotism toward the United States, as witnessed by his
dedication and work with the U.S. Army. There is no evidence that he has ever taken any
action that could cause potential harm to the United States. His military supervisors, who
ISCR Case 04-02511 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 20, 2007).3
4
I conclude that the whole person analysis weighs heavily toward approval of his security clearance. Assuming
a higher authority reviewing this decision determines the mitigating conditions articulated under AG 8 do not
apply and severs any consideration of them, I conclude the whole person analysis standing alone is sufficient
13
work with him daily in a war zone, praised his work in the cause of freedom in
Afghanistan. After fleeing in 1979, he never returned until his brother’s funeral. He has
established his life in the United States. He now owns property in the U.S.
Applicant is a loyal U.S. citizen who has worked under dangerous conditions in
support of the national defense. He credibly testified that he would report any attempt to
use his family members to coerce him to reveal classified information. The Appeal Board
has held that “generally, an applicant’s statements, by themselves, as to what he [or she]
would do in the face of threats by a foreign government or entity are entitled to little
weight. On the other hand, an applicant’s proven record of action in defense of the
United States is very important and can lead to a favorable result for an applicant in a
Guideline B case.”3
Applicant held a security clearance during his tenure with the U.S. Army without
indication that he breached security policies or procedures. He served the United States
in a dangerous, high-risk situation and his character references establish his significant
contributions to U.S. national security. While contribution to a company is not normally to
be considered a factor in granting a clearance, the Appeal Board noted in ISCR Case.
No. 05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14, 2006):
As a general rule, Judges are not required to assign an applicant’s
prior history of complying with security procedures and regulations
significant probative value for purposes of refuting, mitigating, or
extenuating the security concerns raised by applicant’s more immediate
disqualifying conduct or circumstances. See, e.g. ISCR  Case. No. 01-
03357 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 13, 2005); ISCR Case No 02-10113 at 4 (App.
Bd. Mr. 25, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-10955 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 30,
2006). However, the Board has recognized an exception to that general
rule in Guideline B cases, where the applicant has established by credible,
independent evidence that his compliance with security procedures and
regulations occurred in the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances
in which the applicant made a significant contribution to the nation’s
security. See. e.g. ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July 14, 2006).
The presence of such circumstances can give credibility to an applicant’s
assertion that he can be relied upon to recognize, resist, and report to a
foreign power’s attempts at coercion or exploitation.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence.   The complicated state of affairs in4
to support approval of a security clearance in this case.
14
Afghanistan places a significant burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that
his foreign family members do not pose an unacceptable security risk.  He has met that
burden. Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. 
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge