KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: A review of the evidence shows that the delinquency amounts stated by the Judge are
supported by the record.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 09-00033.a1
DATE: 08/11/2010
DATE: August 11, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-00033
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On September 11, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
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of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On May 10, 2010, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Erin C. Hogan
denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse security
clearance decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  For the following reasons, the Board
affirms the Judge’s unfavorable decision. 
The Judge found that Applicant’s security clearance background investigation revealed that
he has 27 delinquent accounts which total approximately $86,707.  She also found that Applicant
has eighteen delinquent consumer debts with an approximate total of $14,617.  These debts are listed
in Applicant’s credit reports.  Applicant also owes delinquent income taxes and he has substantial
child support arrearages.  The Judge concluded that while circumstances beyond his control
contributed to his financial problems, he has not acted responsibly with regard to resolving his
delinquent accounts.  While he has taken action to address some of his debts, Applicant’s unresolved
debts raise questions about his reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment.
Applicant’s principal assignment of error on appeal is his contention that the Judge’s
statement regarding his total indebtedness is incorrect.  He asserts that the amount of his
indebtedness that was transcribed from an old credit report is incorrect and this error caused the
Judge to make the decision that he is not trustworthy.  An evaluation of Applicant’s claim is
hampered by the fact that Applicant, despite making a general reference to an $89,000 figure, does
not specify a dollar amount  from a particular credit report that he believes to be in error (there are
three credit reports in the record) and he does not indicate what he believes his total amount of
indebtedness to be.
The Judge referenced an $86,000 figure in her decision and indicated that it was obtained
from Applicant’s background investigation.  She went on to make independent findings of fact
concerning individual components of Applicant’s debt profile, including child support, rental and
related real estate debts, automobile loans, consumer debts, and taxes.  A review of the record
evidence leads the Board to conclude that the delinquency amounts stated by the Judge in her
decision are supported  by the record evidence.  Applicant has failed to establish error. 
Applicant asserts that he is accomplishing a reduction in his debts.  As the trier of fact, the
Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7,
2007).  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for
a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).  
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant
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conditions and factors. She discussed the applicability of the mitigating factors listed under
Guidelines F and indicated in some detail why the mitigating conditions either did not apply or
applied with insufficient strength to ultimately mitigate the security concerns raised in the case.  The
Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient
to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case
No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that
the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for her decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan       
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett             
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board