1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE   
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
 ------------------------ )     ISCR Case No. 09-00274
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant violated the Department of Defense’s regulations for the safeguarding
of classified information while employed as a document control specialist. In October
2002, her careless handling of a classified document led to it being vulnerable to
compromise for six days. She failed to properly secure a closed area in April 2001, April
2004, September 2004, and June 2005. Her pattern of inadvertent security violations
raises considerable doubts about whether she can be counted on to address security
responsibilities with the care and attention required. Applicant deliberately omitted her
use of marijuana from 1974 to mid-1995 and of cocaine from 1986 to mid-1995 from her
May 1997 security clearance application. Clearance denied.
Statement of the Case 
On August 20, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct, that
provided the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her a security clearance. The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
2
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.
Applicant responded to the SOR on September 11, 2009, and she requested a
hearing. On December 11, 2009, the case was assigned to me to consider whether it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
her. With the agreement of the parties, I scheduled a hearing for January 11, 2010.
I convened the hearing as scheduled. Fourteen Government exhibits (Ex. 1-14)
and five Applicant exhibits (Ex. A-E) were admitted into evidence without objection.
Applicant and three witnesses testified on her behalf, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.)
received on January 21, 2010.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
At the hearing, Applicant moved to amend her answer to SOR 2.b based on her
testimony that she did not intentionally falsify her November 2002 security clearance
application. I granted the motion over the Government’s objections while advising the
parties that it did not relieve me of the obligation to make findings of fact based on all
the evidence. Department Counsel declined an offer of additional time to prepare a
response.
Findings of Fact
The SOR alleged under Guideline K, Handling Protected Information, that
Applicant failed to properly secure a closed area in April 2001 (SOR 1.a), April 2004
(SOR 1.c), September 2004 (SOR 1.d), and June 2005 (SOR 1.e), and that in October
2002, she failed to secure a secret-level classified document, which was later found in a
dumpster (SOR 1.b). Applicant was allegedly removed from her position in document
control and reassigned because of these security violations (SOR 1.f). Under Guideline
E, Personal Conduct, Applicant was alleged to have deliberately falsified security
clearance applications completed in May 1997 (SOR 2.a) and in November 2002 (SOR
2.b) by not disclosing her usage of marijuana and cocaine from about 1970 to 1995.
Applicant admitted the allegations when she answered the SOR. But at her hearing, she
denied falsification of her November 2002 security clearance application. After
considering the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 53-year-old senior administrative associate in a defense
contractor’s security department. She has worked for her employer since September
1984, and held her present position since about November 2005. (Ex. 10, 11.) Before
then, she was a security administrator in document control. She has been at her present
duty location since June 2009. (Tr. 59.) Applicant was initially granted a secret-level
security clearance in 1984. (Ex. 10.) She seeks to retain the top-secret level security
clearance that she has held since October 1997. (Ex. 13.)
The NISPOM provides for the use of closed areas for the storage of classified material in § 5-306.1
Access to controlled areas must be controlled to preclude unauthorized access, by the use of a cleared
employee or by a supplementing access control device or system. Access shall be limited to authorized
persons with appropriate level of security clearance and a need-to-know the information within the closed
area. Persons lacking the clearance and need-to-know must be escorted at all times by an authorized person
where inadvertent or unauthorized exposure to classified information cannot otherwise be effectively
prevented. During non-working hours, closed areas must have supplemental protection. Admittance to closed
areas shall be controlled by locked entrances and exits secured by either an approved built-in combination
lock or an approved combination or key-operated padlock. Doors secured from the inside with a panic bolt,
dead bolt, a rigid wood or metal bar, or other means approved by the cognizant security agency, do not require
additional locking devices. (Ex. 6.)
3
Handling Protected Information
Applicant began working for her employer as a document control specialist with a
secret-level security clearance in September 1984. In 1997, she was issued a top-
secret security clearance. (Ex. 1, 2, 13.) Over the years, she received security briefings,
including annual refresher briefings, a controlled area briefing in March 2001, and
closed area briefings in November 2001 and September 2004. (Ex. 1-5.) As a cleared
employee, Applicant had a responsibility under the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual (NISPOM), DoD 5220.22-M, to safeguard classified information
entrusted to her. See DoD 5220.22 § 5-101 (stating, “Individuals are responsible for
safeguarding classified information entrusted to them. The extent of protection afforded
classified information shall be sufficient to reasonably foreclose the possibility of its loss
or compromise.”) Applicant met her employer’s expectations in her primary role as
customer support in document control, processing incoming and outgoing classified
material into the facility. She was considered by her employer as very capable, but she
needed to expand her knowledge of security to become more effective. She did not
meet some of the training goals in 2003 or 2004, such as completing Defense Security
Service (DSS) correspondence courses on the essentials of security management and
protecting secret and confidential documents. (Ex. A.) Gaining more familiarity with the
NISPOM requirements for safeguarding classified information was specifically identified
as a key development need for Applicant at her annual performance review for 2004.
(Ex. A.) In 2005, Applicant was transferred out of document control, a closed area
approved for open storage of classified material  (Ex. 4.), because of a pattern of1
inadvertent  security violations. The details of those violations follow.
As the last employee to leave document control at the end of the work day on
April 4, 2001, Applicant signed the sign-out log, and secured the main door by cipher
and “S&G” locks. But she failed to close and properly secure an overhead roll-up door
at a service counter in the document control area. She was having problems with her
son’s father and was “distracted” when she left for the day. (Tr. 75.) A second-shift
security guard at the facility discovered the service door unlocked and unattended. He
gained access to the document control area, and notified a security manager. The
following morning, the combination to the document control area was changed, and all
employees in document control conducted self-inspections of their immediate areas. All
material appeared to be in proper order. Following its own investigation, Applicant’s
employer determined that Applicant was solely responsible for the security violation.
The two visitors, who remained in the facility after Applicant left work, had been
On April 8, 2002, Applicant’s employer established a disciplinary process for violations of the2
NISPOM, which provided for the following levels of disciplinary action.
Except where indicated, the following is a guideline for use in determ ining what to
recommend as appropriate discipline. It is not necessarily a set standard to be followed in all
cases and will vary depending upon the severity and circumstances of the violation.
 A. Non-Deliberate Breach of Security Minimum Security Action
     W ithin One Year Period
First W ritten W arning
Second Five Day Suspension W ithout Pay
Third Ten Day Suspension W ithout Pay
Up to and Including Termination
B. In case of deliberate breaches of security, the minimum disciplinary action is a five day
suspension without pay and circumstances may warrant recommendation of termination.
4
escorted until they departed, but the company’s security manager concluded that
compromise of classified information could not be precluded. The document control
area was vulnerable for more than four hours until it was secured by the second-shift
guard. Applicant apologized to her employer for her negligence in failing to secure the
window. Since it was her first known violation, she was counseled by her supervisor
about the importance of being extremely diligent in securing closed areas. A letter
verifying that she had been verbally reprimanded was placed in her personnel file.
Warning and sign-out forms were posted to remind the last person leaving document
control to secure the window. The DSS industrial security representative with cognizant
authority over the facility concluded there had been no loss, compromise, or suspected
compromise of classified material, and that corrective actions by Applicant’s employer
were adequate. (Ex. 1, 9.)
On October 10, 2002, Applicant received a secret-level classified document that
had been hand-carried into the facility. The document was logged into document
control’s accountability system. The next afternoon, the document was discovered
missing when the intended recipient came to retrieve it. Searches of classified
containers and the document control area failed to turn up the document. On October
14, 2002, steps were taken to search and then secure a dumpster at the facility in case
the document had fallen into a trash can next to Applicant’s desk and collected with
other trash on October 11, 2002. The dumpster remained under visual monitoring or
was secured before, during, and after its removal to a refuse facility on October 16,
2002, when Applicant sifted through the refuse and found the document intact but
soiled. The facility security officer (FSO) determined that the document had been left
vulnerable to compromise for six days. Applicant was found primarily responsible, as
the classified document was believed to have been inadvertently knocked into the trash
can next to her desk, from which it was then deposited into a large hamper and finally
the dumpster. She had failed to place the document on the shelf where it belonged and
left it on her desk. Corrective actions taken included removing individual trash cans in
document control. Applicant was issued a written reprimand under company policy
pertinent to first non-deliberate security infractions within a 12-month period.  (Ex. 2, 9.)2
C. A history of any prior security violations will also be considered in determining disciplinary
action. (Ex. 7.)
Disciplinary records for the June 2005 incident indicate that Applicant received a one-day suspension3
for failure to properly secure a closed area in April 2004. (Ex. 5.) The written reprimand and security violation
report on the April 2004 incident indicate that Applicant received verbal counseling and a written reprimand.
The evidence is consistent about her one-day suspension for the  September 2004 security violation, however.
(Ex. 3.) 
5
Applicant was the last employee to leave the document control area on April 7,
2004. Security personnel subsequently discovered the door to the secret-level closed
area to be closed but not properly secured. The spin-dial lock was not in the proper
position to secure the closed area. Applicant had rushed to pick up her young son by a
certain time. (Tr. 76.) Applicant admitted to her employer that she had been distracted
on exiting the facility, and she failed to engage the lock. Because the closed area had a
supplemental locking device, only cleared personnel could gain access, and the door
showed no signs of tampering, the facility FSO determined classified information was
not compromised. Applicant was reminded of the proper procedures for securing a
closed area, and was issued a written reprimand.  (Ex. 3, 5, 9, 76.)3
In May 2004, Applicant was transferred to document control duties at another
facility when her former work site closed. (Ex. 9, A, B.) While making his security rounds
on September 15, 2004, a company security guard found a lock open (had not been
spun) to the document control area, but the alarm was set. Sign-out logs reflected that
Applicant had been the last employee to leave the closed area, although she and a
coworker had left at the same time.  When interviewed by company security personnel
during its investigation, Applicant indicated that she had checked the door and it would
not open. She set the door/area alarm according to the written directions provided, and
once the security light was on, she assumed the door was locked. Security personnel
noticed that the procedures for opening and securing a closed area were on the back
side of the sign-in/out log. As a result of the incident, the procedures to secure the
closed area were posted on the inside of the door, and Applicant and her coworker were
instructed to spin the dial to engage the locking mechanism. The FSO determined that
compromise of classified information did not occur, since the area was found alarmed,
the badge-reader system was engaged, and no one had entered the closed area
between the time Applicant left and the security guard found the lock open. Because it
was Applicant’s second non-deliberate violation within the year, she was suspended
one day from work, and a copy of the security violation report was placed in her security
file. Applicant was warned that any further violations could result in discipline up to and
including termination. (Ex. 4, 9.)
On June 23, 2005, the document control area was found unsecured and
unattended during a routine, after-hours security check by a company security guard.
The spin-dial primary locking device had not been secured. Applicant had been the last
person to log out that day, and when interviewed by the assistant FSO, she admitted
that she had forgotten to spin the combination lock. No classified material was lost or
unaccounted for. Compromise of classified information up to the secret-level could not
be ruled out, although it was considered remote. Applicant was reminded of her
6
responsibilities to properly secure a closed area and to safeguard classified information.
Because it was Applicant’s fifth inadvertent security violation within the last four years,
and “given that the protection of classified material [was] the very basis of [Applicant’s]
assignment,” she was suspended from work without pay for three days, and issued a
formal notice of security/company violation by her employer. (Ex. 5, Tr. 81.)
In October 2005, after reviewing the company’s administrative inquiry of the June
2005 security incident, the DSS requested from Applicant’s employer an adverse
information report on Applicant based on her “definite pattern of negligence in the
handling of classified material.” (Ex. 5.) Applicant was reassigned from document
control duties around November 2005, where she was no longer tasked with locking a
secure area. (Ex. 9.) On December 9, 2005, Applicant’s employer notified the DSS that
Applicant had been reassigned to a position in the security office where her
performance and work assignments could be closely monitored. (Ex. 5, 9.) Applicant’s
violation was addressed in her annual performance evaluation for 2005, but her
supervisor was confident that it would not recur. (Ex. A.)
Applicant attributes her security violations to “situations” rather than to a lack of
security training. (Tr. 80.) Events at home were upsetting to her, and she had to pick up
her son at a set time. (Tr. 82.) Since her position transfer in late 2005, Applicant’s duties
in security have focused on security education (keeping track of employees’ security
briefings, maintaining security posters, noting security education in a notebook for DSS,
running security awareness week at her previous job location), processing visit
requests, and issuing badges. (Ex. A, Tr. 65-66, 104-06.) She has had limited access to
classified information since late 2005,  “maybe three times” involving bringing classified
material to document control for destruction. (Tr. 79.) She requires a security clearance
in her present job to access a clearance verification system, and for access to a closed
area. (Tr. 106-07.)
Personal Conduct
Applicant tried marijuana out of curiosity when the illegal drug was passed to her
in a social setting in 1974. She continued to smoke the drug in similar circumstances up
to twice weekly and then up to twice monthly, until 1993. (Ex. 11.) She continued to
smoke the drug after going to work for her current employer as a document control clerk
with a secret-level security clearance granted to her in September 1984. (Ex. 10.)
Applicant stopped using the drug in mid-1995. (Ex. 14.)
Applicant used cocaine in social settings about once a month from 1986 until
1994. In June 1994, Applicant separated from her now ex-husband. Around that time,
Applicant began a personal relationship with a person known by her to use both
marijuana and cocaine. Applicant’s cocaine use increased to twice monthly, as she
smoked the illegal drug with him on occasion. She discontinued using cocaine in mid-
1995 (“in like May or June,” Tr. 91.) when she became pregnant with their son, who was
born in February 1996. In March 1996, Applicant began to attend Narcotics Anonymous
meetings on a weekly basis. However, her boyfriend  increased his usage of cocaine
7
and marijuana during her pregnancy, and began to blame her for his drug usage.
Applicant left him in May 2007, and she and her son moved in with her sister. (Ex. 11.)
In May 1997, Applicant applied for a top-secret security clearance. (Ex. 13). She
executed a security clearance application (EPSQ) on which she responded “No” to the
illegal drug inquiries, including question 27 concerning whether she had illegally used
any controlled substance in the last seven years, and question 28 concerning whether
she had ever illegally used a controlled substance in a sensitive position, including while
possessing a security clearance. (Ex. 10.)
 In July 1997, Applicant was interviewed by a DSS special agent, in part about
her illegal drug use. Applicant provided details of her marijuana use from 1974 to 1993,
and of her cocaine use from 1986 until her pregnancy. She added that she was
attending Narcotics Anonymous on a weekly basis and had been receiving mental
health counseling. She told the investigator that she had knowingly falsified her EPSQ
by omitting her drug use, her cohabitation with her former boyfriend, as well as her
counseling, because she feared disclosure would adversely affect her security
clearance. (Ex. 11.) She initially testified at her hearing that her negative response to
the drug use question was “just an honest mistake. I think I was thinking of going back
the seven years.” (Tr. 69.) When asked again, she admitted that she falsified her
security clearance application in 1997 because “[she] was afraid that [she] wasn’t going
to be able to get a clearance.” (Tr. 70-71.)
In late September 1997, Applicant signed and notarized an agreement to abide
by the DoD policy to not use any narcotic, dangerous drug, or other controlled
substance in any amount in the future. (Es. 12.) In October 1997, Applicant was granted
a top-secret security clearance. (Ex. 13.)
In November 2002, Applicant executed a security clearance application (SF 86)
to update her top-secret security clearance. As she had in May 1997, she answered
“No” to both question 27 inquiring into any illegal use of drugs in the last seven years,
and question 28 about any use of illegal drugs and drug activity while in a sensitive
position, including while possessing a security clearance. (Ex. 13.) Applicant’s top-
secret security clearance was renewed in February 2003. (Ex. 3.)
In October 2003, Applicant was interviewed by a different DSS special agent. In
a signed, sworn statement, Applicant admitted that she had used both marijuana and
cocaine in the past, but that she was no longer using either illegal drug. In variance to
her previous disclosure of cocaine use starting in 1986, she reported first involvement
with cocaine in 1993. Applicant told this agent that she stopped using cocaine and
marijuana in mid-1995 because of her pregnancy. Applicant admitted that she had
purchased both marijuana and cocaine from friends when she used them, spending
between $25 and $100 per month. Applicant’s statement included the following
admission against interest:
I intentionally omitted my use of cocaine and marijuana from my SCA
because I was concerned that I would not get a security clearance if I
8
listed them. I now recognize the importance of being honest and I have
attempted to provide all relevant information concerning my past drug use.
(Ex. 14.) Applicant now maintains that she did not deliberately falsify her November
2002 SF 86. Rather, she testified that she was referring to her 1997 application (which
she maintains the investigator had with him) when asked why she had not disclosed her
drug use. (Tr. 87) Applicant attributed her negative response to the drug inquiries to the
fact that she had not used any illegal drugs in the seven years preceding her
application. (Tr. 71-73, 88.)
In the latest update of her security clearance, Applicant executed an Electronic
Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) on August 18, 2008. She
responded negatively to the drug inquiries, including question 24.b, “Have you ever
illegally used a controlled substance while employed as a law enforcement officer,
prosecutor, or courtroom official; while possessing a security clearance; or while in a
position directly and immediately affecting public safety?” (Ex. 8.) During an October
2008 interview (Ex. 9) and at her hearing, she was not asked about, and did not offer,
an explanation for her apparently false response to question 24.b. Her May 1997 EPSQ
indicates that she was granted a secret-level security clearance in 1984. She smoked
marijuana from about 1974 to June 1995, and used cocaine from 1986 to June 1995.
Character Evidence
Applicant’s performance evaluations from 2003 through 2005 show that she met
her employer’s expectations, although additional security training was identified as a key
development need that had not been fully met by the time of her transfer to a senior
administrative associate position. Applicant met or exceeded her employer’s
expectations in her new role, with her strong customer service orientation and “positive
people skills” leading to continued progress in that area within the operations security
team in 2006 in 2007. A strong team player, she demonstrated initiative and willingness
to accept new tasks. Key development needs were still in the area of security education,
where she was advised at her annual performance evaluations for 2006 through 2008 to
expand her knowledge of the security office and security responsibilities. (Ex. A.)
A senior site security specialist, who worked with Applicant in document control
from 1990 until Applicant was transferred in 2005, attests to Applicant’s good work
ethic, her professionalism, courtesy, and willingness to help others. She is aware that
Applicant committed a couple of inadvertent security violations and is of the opinion that
Applicant’s security clearance should be continued. (Ex. B, Tr. 45-46.) The former
manager of the document control office indicates that Applicant was a dedicated and
industrious worker. This former supervisor is aware that Applicant had a “couple of
violations over the years [which] were unintentional and were taken very seriously by
her.” She has no concern about recommending Applicant for a clearance. (Ex. C.) An
information systems security manager, who has known Applicant since May 2005, had
daily contact with her, including on occasion retrieving or storing classified information
within document control. In his opinion, Applicant displayed competency and a
professional demeanor. (Ex. D.) Applicant also has the support of the security manager
9
who disciplined Applicant for the June 2005 violation. (Ex. 5, E.) She continued to be
familiar with Applicant’s work performance until April 2009, and found Applicant to be an
“honest, sincere, and hardworking employee.” This security manager also recommends
Applicant for a position of trust, based on Applicant’s improved duty performance, her
commitment to security, and her integrity. (Ex. E.) Applicant’s direct supervisor in
document control, for all but a couple of years from 1994 until 2002 (Tr. 61-62.),
understands that the Government is concerned about “some inconsistencies” in
Applicant’s security clearance application, and of Applicant’s failure to secure a “metal
gate” so that document control was left open. He feels that Applicant made an
unintentional mistake that she is not likely to repeat. (Tr. 54-55.) He would consider any
mistake on her security clearance application to be unintentional based on what he
knows about her. He has never seen her under the influence of illegal drugs. (Tr. 56-
57.)
A close personal friend of Applicant’s for some 47 years knows that Applicant
used illegal drugs in the past. She believes Applicant stopped using illegal drugs 20
years ago. She considers Applicant to be of upstanding character. (Tr. 37-40.)
Applicant has been the sole financial supporter for her son since his birth. (Tr.
67.) She and her son live with her sister. (Tr. 77.)
Policies
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,
emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a
security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines
(AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative
guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are
required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified
information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c),
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a
decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government
must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under
Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
The SOR alleges Applicant violated ¶¶ 5-300 and 5-303 of the NISPOM when she failed to properly4
secure the document control area, a closed area approved for open storage of classified material up to the
secret level. NISPOM ¶ 5-300 is a general provision that requires contractors, such as Applicant’s employer,
to meet the requirements for the physical protection of classified material in its custody. NISPOM ¶ 5-303 sets
forth the specifics for approved storage of secret material. NISPOM ¶ 5-306 applies to closed areas.
10
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to
obtain a favorable security decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant
concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access
to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Handling Protected Information
The security concern for handling protected information is set out in Guideline K,
AG ¶ 33:
Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for
protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an
individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability
to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern.
Applicant committed five separate security violations between April 2001 and
June 2005 while employed as a classified document control clerk within a closed area
cleared to store material to the level of secret. Applicant violated the NISPOM and her
employer’s requirements concerning the proper storage of classified material by failing
to properly secure the document control area on four occasions, and in October 2002,
by failing to protect a secret-level classified document that had been hand-carried into
the facility. In addition to her general responsibility as a cleared employee to safeguard
classified information entrusted to her (see NISPOM, ¶ 5-100), Applicant was entrusted
with the responsibility to secure a closed area.  By not securing the document control4
window in June 2001, and by failing to engage locking mechanisms in April 2004,
The SOR alleges that Applicant left a document control window open in September 2004 (SOR 1.d).5
The company’s administrative inquiry shows that Applicant failed to spin a lock to the document control area
on that occasion. (Ex.4)
11
September 2004,  and June 2005, Applicant left the document control area vulnerable5
to unauthorized access. Under NISPOM ¶ 5-306, access to closed areas must be
controlled to preclude unauthorized access. Her negligent handling of the classified
document entrusted to her in October 2002 led to its inadvertent removal from the
facility to a waste site where it was eventually recovered intact but soiled. Compromise
of the secret-level document was considered unlikely, but it could not be precluded
because the document was not appropriately secured for six days. AG ¶ 34(g), “any
failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information,”
applies. After the April 2004 incident, Applicant was reminded of her responsibility to
spin the locking device when she left for the evening. Twice thereafter at her new
facility, she failed to engage the spin lock on the door to document control. So AG ¶
34(h), “negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by
management,” also applies.
Applicant’s negligence led to a classified document being improperly stored in a
trash dumpster for several days in October 2002, but she did not knowingly store the
classified information in an unauthorized location. AG ¶ 34(b), “collecting or storing
classified or other protected information at home or in any other unauthorized location,”
is not pertinent. Furthermore, AG ¶ 34(a), “deliberate or negligent disclosure of
classified or other protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not
limited to personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at
seminars, meetings, or conferences,” does not squarely apply because there is no proof
of unauthorized disclosure.
Mitigating condition AG ¶ 35(a), “so much time has elapsed since the behavior,
or it happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment,” applies in part in that her latest security violation occurred more than
four years ago. But the passage of time provides insufficient guarantee against
recurrence, especially when she has been called on only three times to handle
classified information since November 2005, and none of these occasions involved
securing a closed area.
Even with limited opportunity to prove compliance with security regulations,
reform may be established under AG ¶ 35(b), “the individual responded favorably to
counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude
toward the discharge of security responsibilities.” Applicant admitted her carelessness,
which is a vital first step in reform. Yet, despite being reminded by her supervisor to give
her full attention to the security task at hand and to exercise extreme diligence in
securing her work area, she committed similar violations in April 2004, September 2004,
and June 2005. It is difficult to find under these circumstances that she responded
favorably to counseling, even though she displayed a positive attitude and willingness to
comply with her security responsibilities. As of the date of her performance evaluation
12
for 2004, she had not completed the DSS security correspondence courses
recommended by her supervisor for the second straight year. One would have expected
Applicant to have sought security training or re-education to allay her employer’s and
DSS’ concerns about her security practices and there is no evidence that she did so.
(See Tr. 81.) When asked about the recurring nature of her violations, Applicant testified
that she tried to be more conscious about closing up document control, but that “things
were going on at home that were very upsetting to [her].” (Tr. 82.)
Following her fifth inadvertent violation in four years, Applicant was suspended
for three days without pay by her employer. After the DSS expressed concerns about
Applicant’s pattern of negligence, Applicant was reassigned by her employer to a
position in security where her work performance and work assignments could be closely
monitored. While she provided key support in several areas, including maintaining
security education logs and bulletins, key development needs continued to be
expanding her knowledge of the security office’s functions and her security
responsibilities. (Ex. A.)
That said, Applicant does not contend, and there is no evidence to indicate that
the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training. AG ¶ 35(c), “the
security violations were due to improper or inadequate training,” is not pertinent. None
of the mitigating conditions fully apply.
Personal Conduct
The security concern for personal conduct is set out in Guideline E, AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant abused marijuana and cocaine while she held a security clearance and
worked in document control routinely handling classified documents. She used
marijuana for some 20 years, from 1974 to around June 1995, and cocaine from 1986
until June 1995. Yet, when applying for a clearance upgrade to top secret in May 1997,
she falsely denied that she had used any illegal drugs in the last seven years and that
she had ever used an illegal controlled substance while possessing a security
clearance. Applicant omitted her drug use because she feared that she would be denied
a security clearance. AG ¶ 16(a), “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of
relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award
benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award
fiduciary responsibilities,” applies.
In ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006) the Appeal Board listed five circumstances6
in which conduct not alleged in an SOR may be considered:
 
(a) to assess an applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation,
mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated
successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative
Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole person analysis under Directive
Section 6.3.
(citing ISCR Case No. 02-07218 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 15, 2004); ISCR Case No. 00-0633 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct.
24, 2003)). I have considered the non-SOR misconduct for the five above purposes, and not for any other
purpose.
13
Applicant also responded negatively to the inquiries about illegal drugs when she
completed her SF 86 in November 2002, five years after she had detailed her illegal
drug involvement to a DSS agent in July 1997. Applicant had told a government
investigator in October 2003 that she intentionally omitted her past illicit drug
involvement as she was concerned she would not obtain a security clearance. I am not
persuaded by her hearing testimony that this admission against interest was made in
reference to her May 1997 EPSQ. There is nothing in her sworn statement of October
2003 (Ex. 14.) that shows the May 1997 EPSQ was discussed. When asked about her
counseling in October 2003, Applicant responded, “As I indicated on my SCA, I have
received counseling.” Applicant answered “No” to the counseling inquiry on her May
1997 EPSQ (Ex. 10.), while she had responded affirmatively to similar inquiry on her
November 2002 SF 86. (Ex. 13.) The evidence strongly suggests that the November
2002 SF 86 provided the basis for the interview in October 2003. That said, since there
was no evidence of any illegal drug use by Applicant after June 1995, her response to
question 27 on the November 2002 SF 86 was not shown to be false. But her answer to
question 28 concerning any illegal drug use ever while possessing a security clearance
was not true. Because the Government did not allege falsification of question 28, it
cannot provide an independent basis for denial of her clearance. However, it is relevant
in assessing the extent of her reform of her intentional false statement on her May 1997
EPSQ alleged in SOR  2.a.6
Applicant provided a detailed history of her illegal drug involvement when she
was interviewed by a DSS agent in July 1997. This effort at rectification was sufficiently
timely to qualify as a prompt effort to correct a May 1997 deliberate misrepresentation.
Yet, it is unclear whether she volunteered the information up-front. Her disclosures
appear to have been in response to questions by the investigators during all of her
interviews, including in July 1997. Furthermore, given her false responses on both the
November 2002 SF 86 (question 28) and her August 2008 e-QIP (question 24.b) to
whether she had ever used any illegal drug while possessing a security clearance, she
undermines her evidence in reform. Furthermore, although not alleged in the SOR,
there is discrepant information in the record about her first use of cocaine. She told a
DSS agent in July 1997 that she used cocaine beginning in 1986. In October 2003, she
told a different agent that she tried cocaine while at a party “sometime in about 1993.”
Applicant made no effort to explain this discrepancy.
14
Applicant’s May 1997 falsification is now sufficiently dated to satisfy the passage
of time component of AG ¶ 17(c), “the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed,
or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it
is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment.” Yet, intentional falsifications on security clearance applications are
not minor offenses. The Government justifiably requires full candor from its applicants
for security clearance. Applicant’s security clearance was upgraded to top-secret in
1997, and there is no indication that the Government knew at the time that she had
used illegal drugs in the recent past. Nor am I able to conclude that Applicant’s
misrepresentations are safely in the past. In October 2003, she told the agent that she
understood the importance of being fully honest. Yet, when she completed her latest
security clearance application in August 2008, she responded “No” to whether she had
ever used any illegal drug while possessing a security clearance. Her previous
disclosures about her drug involvement to the DSS agent did not relieve her of her
fiduciary obligation to admit on her August 2008 e-QIP that she had used illegal drugs
while possessing a security clearance. She presented no reasonable explanation that
could excuse her false responses to question 28 on her November 2002 SF 86 and
question 24.b on her August 2008 e-QIP. Her evidence in reform falls short of satisfying
AG ¶ 17(c) or AG ¶ 17(d), “the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.” 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of her conduct
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at
AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
Applicant had problems focusing on her security obligations when pressed for
time or distracted by problems at home. Disciplinary action and re-education failed to
prevent Applicant from committing three security violations between April 2004 and
June 2005. Given her limited opportunities to handle classified information in her
SOR 1.f alleges only the disciplinary action taken as a result of the security violations in SOR 1.a7
through 1.e and does not represent additional conduct of security concern committed by Applicant.
15
present position, one has to look to her overall duty performance for evidence of reform.
She has met her employer’s expectations, as shown by her annual performance
reviews. Applicant is recommended for a position of trust by several coworkers,
including her former security manager, who reportedly witnessed an improvement in
Applicant’s duty performance and commitment to security since the security violations.
At the same time, Applicant’s concealment of her drug use from her May 1997
EPSQ, and more recently, her false answers to question 28 on her November 2002 SF
86 and 24.b on her August 2008 e-QIP, are difficult to reconcile with the character
witness evidence of her personal integrity and trustworthiness. A former supervisor of
Applicant’s felt that if Applicant omitted information from her SF 86, it was a mistake and
not intentional. (Tr. 56.) Applicant does not dispute that she intentionally concealed her
illegal drug involvement from her May 1997 EPSQ. The evidence shows she has not
been completely up-front with her character witnesses about her past illicit drug use or
her efforts to conceal her drug abuse from the Government. Reform is not demonstrated
by looking to her problems at home to excuse her repeated security violations (see Tr.
82), or by responding “No” on her latest e-QIP to whether she had ever used any illegal
drug while in a sensitive position. Given the recurring nature of her security violations,
and the concerns about her judgment and trustworthiness because of her lack of full
candor, I am unable to conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to
continue a security clearance for Applicant.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline K: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant7
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
16
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge