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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 09-03399
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esquire
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF-86) on December 16,
2008. On December 23, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to
deny his application, citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG). 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on January 14, 2010, and requested
a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA assigned the case to me on April 22,
2010. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on May 13, 2010. I convened the hearing as
scheduled on June 22, 2010. Government Exhibits (GE ) 1 through 3 were admitted in
evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted 13 documents (AE A-M),
which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on June 29,
2010. At Applicant’s request, I kept the record open for a post-hearing brief and an
The passports are stamped “admitted as a refugee pursuant to Section 207 of the INA for an indefinite period1
of time. If you depart the U.S. you will need prior permission from INS to return. Employment authorized.
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additional document. Applicant timely submitted the brief and an exhibit marked AE N
and admitted into the record. I did not receive any objection from Department Counsel
concerning the post-hearing submissions. Eligibility for access to classified information is
granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to the Russian Federation (Russia). The request and the attached documents
are included in the record as Hearing Exhibit 1. The facts administratively noticed are set
out in the Findings of Facts, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a
through 1.d. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. I make the following
findings:
Applicant is a 28-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He graduated from
high school in June 2001. Applicant obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in 2008. He
has been employed with his current employer since November 2008. (GE 1) He held an
interim security clearance from January 2009 until December 2009. (Tr. 33) 
Applicant married in June 2009. He met his wife, who was born in Russia, on a
Christian dating service several years ago. (Tr. 22) His wife, who is a permanent resident
of the United States, resides with him. (AE M) She came to the United States in 2007 for
religious asylum. (AE ) Applicant and his wife are members of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church. (Tr. 23) Applicant and his wife have an infant son who was born on May 2, 2010.
(AE L)
Applicant’s wife was detained by the police in Russia for distributing religious
pamphlets. (Tr. 41) She has no desire to return to Russia. She has no contact with
anyone in Russia. Her Russian passport has expired. (AE N) She will become a United
States citizen as soon as a required three year-residency period ends. (Tr. 38)
Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law arrived in the United States in January
2010. Although they are still citizens of Russia, they have been granted religious asylum
in the United States because they are Christian (Seventh Day Adventist). They are in the
process of becoming permanent residents. (AE G) As part of the process, they need
their Russian passports. (AE H) They are not allowed to travel abroad without written
permission as part of the “refugee status.”  Applicant’s in-laws are not connected to the1
Russian government. His mother-in-law was a nanny and his father-in-law was a driver.
(Tr. ) They have no property in Russia, nor do they receive any pensions. (Tr. ) 
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Applicant’s brother-in-law is a citizen of Russia who resides in Germany. He fled
Russia for religious freedom about six years ago. (Tr. 26) Applicant’s brother-in-law is
seeking German citizenship. Applicant has seen his brother-in-law approximately five
times in the past five years by video-cam. His brother-in-law visited the United States
once. (Tr. 53)
Applicant’s other brother-in-law is a citizen of Russia, but lives in the United
States. He does not intend to return to Russia. He arrived in the United States in 2007
with Applicant’s wife. (Tr. 28) He is in the process of becoming a United States citizen.
(AE I)
Applicant’s manager, who holds a security clearance, recommends Applicant for
retention of his clearance. (AE A) Applicant is frank and honest. Applicant received an
award due to his professionalism and work ethic. Applicant is a highly regarded engineer
who is trustworthy. (AE A)
A senior software engineer describes Applicant as a key contributor in the design
of a unique database. Applicant is enthusiastic and works hard on all projects. He is a
trusted member of the team. (AE B)
An assistant program manager describes Applicant as a quick learner and
contributor to the team. He informed management about his plan to wed a foreign
national. Applicant delivers his work in a timely fashion with high quality. He has shown a
strong work ethic and professionalism in all his assignments. (AE C)
Applicant is described by colleagues as honest in all matters. His integrity,
attention to detail, strong work ethic and technical knowledge are notable. (AE D and E)
Family friends also describe Applicant and his family as loyal and solid citizens. (AE F)
Applicant does not speak Russian. He has never visited Russia. Applicant has
little or no contact with his in-laws or his wife’s brothers. Applicant testified credibly that
as a U. S. citizen, he would not jeopardize the United States. (Tr. 29)
I have taken administrative notice that the Russian Federation (Russia) has a
centralized political system, with power concentrated in the president and prime minister,
a weak multiparty political system, and a ruling-party dominated by a bicameral
legislature. Russia’s large population of more than 142 million people is both
multinational and multi-ethnic. Russia is a nuclear superpower that since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, continues to develop politically, socially, and economically. 
Russia has an active, recent, and ongoing collection program targeting the United
States. Russia and China have been the most aggressive collectors of sensitive and
protected United States technology and accounted for the majority of such targeting.
Russia’s lead in the targeting of United States technologies, through its industrial
espionage efforts, goes back to 1997. Russian espionage specializes in military
technology and gas and oil industry technical expertise. Russia continues to strengthen
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its intelligence capabilities directed against the United States. However, Russia is not
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information.
Russia’s human rights record remains uneven and poor in some areas. Additional
specific instances of these human rights abuses, as reported by the United States
Department of State, include: reports that the government or its agents committed
politically motivated killings and other arbitrary killings, credible reports that law
enforcement engaged in torture, abuse and violence, extremely harsh and life
threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention.
The United States and Russia share common interests on a broad range of
issues, including counter terrorism and the reduction of our strategic arsenals. Russia
shares the basic goal of stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, launched
in 1992 to facilitate dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet
Unio, was renewed in 2006 until 2013. During the past several years, Russia has
intensified its efforts to combat trafficking in persons. We are cooperating in the fight
against HIV/AIDS. Despite the cooperation, there remain areas in which the United
States and Russia disagree. The Obama administration is seeking ways to improve our
bilateral relations and enhance cooperation by focusing on areas of mutual interest,
while managing areas of disagreement.
The role Moscow plays regarding issues of interest to the United States is likely to
turn on many factors, including developments on Russia’s periphery and the degree to
which Russia perceives U.S. policies as threatening to what its leadership sees as vital
Russian interests.
In the conventional forces realm, Moscow remains capable of militarily dominating
the former Soviet space; although Russia’s experience in the August 2008 Georgia
conflict revealed major shortcomings in the Russian military, it also validated previous
reform efforts that sought to develop rapidly-deployable forces for use on its periphery.
Russia continues to use its military in an effort to assert its great power status and to
project power abroad.
There have been encouraging signs in the past year that Russia is prepared to be
more cooperative with the United States, as illustrated by President Medvedev’s
agreement last summer to support air transit through Russia of military cargo in support
of operations in Afghanistan and Moscow’s willingness to engage with the United States
to reduce the nuclear threat from Iran.
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
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access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon an applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines (AG).  These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole-person. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as
to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination of the loyalty of an applicant. It is merely an indication an applicant has not
met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for
issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of an applicant that may disqualify an applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b). 
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Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant’s wife, mother-in-law, father-in-law and two brothers-
in-law are citizens of Russia. (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.d). The security concern relating to
Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a). A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that creates a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶ 7(d) is raised by “sharing living
quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion.
Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d) are raised.
Applicant has foreign family ties through his 2009 marriage to his spouse who was
born in Russia. Applicant’s wife is a permanent resident of the United States. She is not
yet a United States citizen due to the three-year residency requirement. She was born in
Russia and has been living in the United States since 2007. Applicant’s in-laws are still
Russian citizens. Applicant’s brothers-in-law are still Russian citizens. However, none of
them live in Russia. None of them have any government connections or other position in
which they could otherwise benefit from Applicant’s access to sensitive information or
technology. Such ties do not automatically disqualify an Applicant from obtaining a
security clearance. Family ties with Russian citizens raise security concerns because of
the potential for foreign influence.
Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying condition in
AG ¶¶ 7(a), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
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proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the
government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially
in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002
DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). Nevertheless, the nature of a
nation’s government, its relationship with the United States and its human rights record
are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are
vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family
member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known
to conduct intelligence operations against the United States.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, whether because
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest.
Applicant is a United States citizen. He was born and educated in the United
States. He and his family, not including his spouse and in-laws, have lived in the United
States their entire life. He married a woman who was born in Russia who has resided in
the United States since 2007. They have a son who is a United States citizen. Applicant
and his wife and son are Seventh Day Adventist Christians. They will raise their family in
the United States. 
Applicant has never traveled to Russia. He does not speak Russian. He has no
contacts in Russia. His wife’s family is now living in the United States and is seeking to
become United States citizens. They are in the United States for religious asylum. They
do not plan to return to Russia. They have ended their ties to Russia. His wife’s passport
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has expired. His in-laws will have their passports destroyed once they become United
State’s citizens.
Applicant’s ties to the United States as a native-born citizen persuade me that
given the circumstances in this case, he would choose the interests of the United States
over any foreign connection, in the event that a conflict of interest arose. AG ¶ 8(b)
applies.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. Some of the factors in AG
¶ 2(a) were addressed above, but some warrant additional comment.
Applicant is a loyal U.S. citizen who has held a security clearance without any
security violations. In 2009, he married a woman who was born in Russia and is a
Russian citizen. She now resides with him and their infant son. She is a permanent
resident of the United States. She is in the United States for religious asylum. She has
no plans to return to Russia.
Applicant’s wife’s parents and siblings no longer reside in Russia. Her parents are
in the process of becoming permanent residents in the United States for the same
religious reasons. They want to become U.S. citizens. They have no other ties to Russia.
They are not connected in any way to Russia or its government. Applicant’s brothers-in-
law do not live in Russia. One brother-in-law lives in the United States and the other one
lives in Germany. They have no plans to return to Russia.
While Russia is actively engaged in the collection of U.S. information, there is still
no evidence suggesting that it targets its expatriate citizens such that would make
Applicant or his family members likely targets. Applicant’s wife and her family are all in
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the United States. Her brother is in Germany. There is no one with a tie to Applicant or
his wife living in Russia.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B and
evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has
mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence. Accordingly, I conclude he
has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to
grant his eligibility for access to classified information.
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a-d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge