1
                                                             
                           
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------- )       ISCR Case No. 09-05018
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
On December 10, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant. The SOR enumerated security
concerns arising under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline F (Financial
Considerations), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG). 
In his January 19, 2010, answer to the SOR, Applicant responded to the
allegations raised in the SOR and requested an administrative determination.
Department Counsel submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM), dated May 19,
2010. Applicant received the FORM on June 26, 2010, but did not submit any additional
information for consideration. The case was assigned to me on August 11, 2010. Based
on a review of the case file and exhibits, security clearance is denied.
 FORM at 3.1
 Id. at 3-4.2
 Id. at 4-5.3
 Id. at 5.4
 Id.5
 Id.6
 Id. at 7.7
 Id. at 8.8
2
Administrative Notice
The Government requested administrative notice of certain facts and materials
regarding the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan). Eight documents were included
in the FORM as Items I – VIII. The documents were published by the U.S. Department
of State (I-III, VI, VIII), U.S. Senate committees (IV, VII), or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (V)
between 2008 and 2010. Administrative notice is taken of both the Government’s
summary of facts and Items I–VIII. 
Pakistan is a parliamentary federal republic. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan
supported the United States and an international coalition in Operation Enduring
Freedom to remove the Taliban from power. Despite this effort, members of the Taliban
remain in various parts of Pakistan. The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, is openly
operating in Pakistan, as are extremists from the Pakistani Taliban and Al-Quaida.1
Taliban financing has been traced from Pakistan to Afghanistan, allowing the
insurgency in Afghanistan to strengthen its military and technical capabilities.  Pakistan2
has intensified its counterinsurgency efforts, but its record for dealing with militants has
been mixed.  3
The U.S. Department of State has defined several areas of Pakistan to be
terrorist safe havens.  Al-Quaida and its extremists have waged a campaign of4
destabilizing suicide attacks throughout Pakistan. The attacks targeted high profile
government, military, and western-related sites.  Nearly 1,000 individuals were killed in5
2008 due to such attacks.  The U.S. State Department warns U.S. citizens of the risks6
of traveling to Pakistan in light of terrorist activity. Since 2007, several American citizens
present in Pakistan have been kidnapped for ransom or other personal reasons.7
The human rights situation in Pakistan remains poor. Extrajudicial killings,
torture, and disappearances occur. Arbitrary arrests, governmental and police
corruption is widespread, and the Pakistani government maintains several domestic
intelligence agencies to monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, the
media, and suspected foreign intelligence agents.  Credible reports indicate that8
authorities use wiretaps and monitor mail without the requisite court approval, and also
 Id.9
 Id. at 8. See also FORM Attachment IV (Annual Threat Assessment, Statement Before the Committee on10
Armed Services, United States Senate, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Mar.10, 2009) at 12.
 See FORM, Item 4 (Security Clearance Application, dated Jul. 24, 2007) at 11-18.11
 Response to the SOR, dated Jan. 19, 2010.12
 FORM Item 6 (Interrogatories, Testimonies, Interview of Apr. 28, 2009) indicates Applicant ”emigrated to13
the U.S. in 4/84. . . . He applied for U.S. citizenship in approximately 1995 and was naturalized on 11/19/91.
. . .” Given the sequence of the events and the juxtaposition of the dates, I conclude the 1995 date was meant
to be 1985. 
 Id. Applicant also visited Saudi Arabia in 2000 for a religious event before continuing his trip into Pakistan.14
3
monitor phones and electronic messages.  In addition, Pakistan continues to develop9
its own nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles, and seek more
advanced warhead and delivery systems.10
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 61-year-old linguistic and cultural advisor who has worked for the
same defense contractor since June 2007. His current position follows a decade of
sporadic work in diverse fields, including postal delivery and theme park retail
merchandising, with multiple periods of intervening unemployment.  Applicant is11
divorced. He has earned a program certificate from a teacher training school. On July
24, 2007, Applicant completed a security clearance application (SCA). He has been
working abroad since at least the beginning of 2010.  In his response to the SOR,12
Applicant provided scant information related to the Guideline B and Guideline E
allegations, and submitted no documentary evidence regarding the Guideline F
allegations. 
Born and raised in Pakistan, Applicant visited the United States in 1982. He then
immigrated to the United States in 1984. Applicant applied for U.S. citizenship in
approximately 1985.  He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in November 1991.13
Applicant was issued a U.S. passport in January 2002. Since his emigration, Applicant
has visited Pakistan about every two and a half years in order to visit his family
members living there. His last trip to Pakistan was in May 2008. He has also visited the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) to visit two of his brothers and their wives. His last trip to
that country was in April 2009.14
Applicant’s parents are deceased, but he still has a large family living abroad.
Applicant has two married brothers who are citizens and residents of Pakistan, and two
married brothers who are Pakistani citizens residing in the UAE. They are employed as
a real estate speculator, a utility company supervisor, an electrical company supervisor,
and a cargo shipping supervisor, respectively. His sisters-in-law are Pakistani citizens
 FORM Item  6, supra, note 13.15
 Id.16
 Id.17
 Id.18
 Response to the SOR, supra, note 12.19
 Id. See also FORM Item 6, supra, note 13.20
 Id.21
4
living with Applicant’s brothers. Applicant also has four sisters who are citizens and
residents of Pakistan. One sister is single and works around the family home. One
sister is a housewife and the widow of a painter. His other two sisters are housewives,
married to husbands who are citizens and residents of Pakistan. One of their husbands
is a former physician’s assistant, the other is a medical practitioner serving in the
Pakistani Army at a military hospital.  Applicant has telephonic contact with his siblings15
and their spouses “once or twice a month and sees them on average once every two
and a half years when [he] visits either Pakistan or the [UAE].”  Applicant also has over16
30 nephews and nieces, with whom contact is limited to his visits to Pakistan and the
UAE. 
Applicant “does not have contact with any other foreign nationals. [He] is
confident that all of his relatives support the general policies and interests of the U.S.
Government.”  He does not believe he has ever been monitored by any intelligence17
agencies, and he has never been contacted by foreign intelligence personnel. He has
not discussed his work with any of his family members and no family members have
asked about his work.  18
When Applicant completed his security clearance application (SCA) in July 2007,
he answered “no” to questions inquiring whether he had any delinquent debts that were
delinquent for over 180 days in the preceding seven years, and whether he was
currently 90 days delinquent on any debts. Applicant, for whom English is a second
language, was “unsure” as to the wording and meaning of the questions.  When the19
nature of the questions was explained to him during an April 2009 interview, he noted
that he had some medical bills that he could not currently afford to pay.  In providing20
his SCA answers, he did not intentionally attempt to mislead regarding his finances.21
Applicant’s credit report reflects several negative entries. Those entries are for
delinquent debts and are represented in the SOR as allegations ¶¶ 2.a-2.j. Applicant
denies having any obligations owed to the creditors noted in allegations ¶¶ 2.a, 2.g, 2.i,
  Response to the SOR, supra, note 12. (In denying liability for these debts, Applicant states that he either22
has no knowledge of the accounts or never received a bill for the services alleged).
 Id.23
 Id.24
 Id.25
 See FORM Item 2, SOR, dated Dec. 10, 2009.26
 FORM, Item 6, supra, note 13.27
 Id.28
5
and 2.j, representing approximately $6,523.  He submitted no evidence that he has22
disputed these four entries with the credit reporting bureaus. With regard to allegation ¶
2.b, for an alleged debt of approximately $545, Applicant states that he was told by the
creditor that it had no record of his having an account.  Applicant wrote that he paid the23
debts noted in allegations ¶ 2.c and ¶ 2.d, for approximately $28,085. He provided
confirmation numbers regarding these two debts, but he did not explain how the
balances were paid or what the confirmation numbers represented. There is no
documentary evidence that these debts have been addressed.  In addition, Applicant24
wrote that he is working on taking steps to address the debts noted in allegations ¶¶
2.e, 2.f, and 2.h, representing an approximate debt of $1,321, but he did not describe
what those steps are.  25
Most if not all of the accounts at issue are for medical or medically-related
services.  Applicant stated that he believed any medical accounts on his credit report26
were probably for medical services provided when he was without medical insurance.27
Applicant intends to honor his medical debts when he has the salary to pay them.   28
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations
for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions
and mitigating conditions, which are required in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for
access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.
Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” All available, reliable information about the
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).29
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).30
 Id.31
 Id.32
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.33
6
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, must be and were considered in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching my
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence submitted.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a29
preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  30
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access31
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily32
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the33
7
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find Guideline B (Foreign Contacts),
Guideline F (Financial Considerations), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) to be the
most pertinent to the case. Conditions pertaining to these adjudicative guidelines that
could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would
mitigate such concerns, are discussed below.
Analysis
Guideline B – Foreign Influence
The concern under Guideline B is that foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. The adjudicator can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S.
citizens to obtain protected information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Conditions pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns, are
discussed in the conclusions below.
The country at issue is Pakistan. The presence of terrorist groups in that country
poses significant concern, as does the anti-Western sentiment expressed by those
groups. At present, Pakistan is unable to control extremist factions within its borders.
Moreover, Pakistani officials have been known to disregard human rights and monitor
individuals within its borders. Such factors demand that review of the facts in this case
be conducted with heightened scrutiny.
Applicant has several siblings and in-laws who are citizens of Pakistan and
residents of either Pakistan or the UAE. He maintains regular telephonic contact with
them all, and he visits them regularly. Such contacts are sufficient to raise Foreign
Influence Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) and AG ¶ 7(b) (connections to a
foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest
between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and
the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that
8
information). With disqualifying conditions thus raised, the burden shifts to Applicant to
mitigate security concerns.
Applicant has immediate family members who are citizens and residents of
Pakistan and he also has family members who are Pakistani citizens residing in the
UAE. Based on the available facts, it can be assumed that he is close to these family
members and their spouses. He regularly speaks with them on the telephone and,
despite the presence of terrorists in that country and U.S. State Department warnings,
he has visited his family in Pakistan about every two and a half years. While he does
not believe his travels have been monitored, he seems to be aware that it is a very real
possibility. Given such facts, Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition AG ¶ 8(a) (the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.) does not apply. 
Based on Applicant’s regular telephonic and personal contact with his siblings
and their spouses, Applicant and his siblings appear to have a familial bond. In the
absence of facts concerning his life and ties within the United States, such bonds are
sufficiently significant to obviate application of AG ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest,
either because the individual’s sense of loyalty to or obligation to the foreign person,
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest) and AG ¶ 8(c) (contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation). No other
mitigating conditions apply.
Foreign influence security concerns arise when foreign contacts may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in
a way that is not in U.S. interests. Scrutiny of such potential is heightened when the
country is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information or is associated
with a risk of  terrorism. Pakistan raises such concerns. Here, Applicant has
understandable bonds with family members who are citizens of Pakistan, and he often
visits them in their country. Such relationships can be manipulated by authorities or
terrorists seeking either to harm Americans or American interests, or gain sensitive
information. Based on the scant information provided by Applicant, Foreign Influence
security concerns remain unmitigated.
 AG ¶ 18.34
9
Guideline F – Financial Considerations
  Under Guideline F, “failure or an inability to live within one’s means, satisfy
debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
an unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified
information.”  The guideline sets out several potentially disqualifying conditions. Here,34
Applicant’s credit report reflects over $35,000 in delinquent debt. Applicant admits
some of the debts noted are owed and remain unpaid. He stated that he has satisfied
about $28,000 of the debts noted at SOR allegations ¶¶ 2.c – 2.d, but provided no
documentation supporting this statement. Given such facts,  Financial Considerations
Disqualifying Condition (FC DC) AG ¶ 19(a) (inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts)
and FC DC AG ¶ 9(c) (a history of not meeting financial obligations) apply. With such
conditions raised, the burden shifts to Applicant to overcome the case against him and
mitigate security concerns. 
In the past decade, Applicant experienced multiple periods of unemployment. At
various points during that time, he apparently was without medical insurance. Lacking
such insurance when he was unemployed and needed health care, Applicant acquired
delinquent debt. In 2007, he acquired stable employment as a linguistic and cultural
expert. To date, however, he has yet to reach a salary level at which he feels he can
honor his delinquent debts. Such circumstances are sufficient to raise Financial
Considerations Mitigating Condition (FC MC) AG ¶ 20(a) (the behavior happened so
long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment) and FC MC AG ¶ 20(b) (the conditions that resulted in the behavior
were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation) and the
individual acted responsibly under the circumstances).
Applicant wrote that he has satisfied about $28,000 of the debts at issue. While
he provided a confirmation number regarding 2009 payments on those accounts, those
confirmations numbers have little significance in isolation. There is no indication as to
what those numbers reference or what they confirm (ie. account payment confirmation,
check transaction confirmation, etc.) He denies liability for some debts, but provided no
evidence that he has disputed them with either the alleged creditors or the credit
reporting bureaus. In sum, there is no documentary evidence supporting his contention
that he has worked toward addressing any of the debts at issue. Therefore, FC MC ¶
20(d) (the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise
resolve debts) does not apply. Furthermore, in failing to provide any tangible evidence
regarding his finances, Applicant also failed to note whether he has received financial
 AG ¶ 15.35
 Id.36
10
counseling. Consequently,  FC MC ¶ 20(c) (the person has received or is receiving
counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being
resolved or is under control) cannot apply.
Although Applicant raised facts which tend to mitigate the creation of some of his
delinquent debt, he provided no documentary evidence reflecting any attempts to
address the debts at issue. In declining a hearing, Applicant chose to rely on a written
record that is devoid of documentary evidence regarding any efforts to address those
debts. Given the record as a whole, financial considerations security concerns remain
unmitigated.
Guideline E - Personal Conduct
Under Guideline E, security concerns arise because “conduct involving
questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with
rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information.“  In addition, “any failure to35
provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process” is of special interest.36
Personal conduct security concerns were raised when Applicant denied having any
delinquent debts on his 2007 SCA. The SOR alleges several delinquent debts are owed
by Applicant, based on his credit report. Such allegations, if substantiated, are sufficient
to raise Personal Conduct Disqualifying Condition AG ¶ 16(a) (deliberate omission,
concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire,
personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine
employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities). Consequently, the
burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate the resultant security concerns raised by the
allegations.
Under the facts presented, there is no evidence that Applicant intended to
conceal or mislead when he denied having any delinquent debts. Applicant affirmatively
has stated that he did not intend to mislead when he answered questions related to his
finances. Moreover, it is apparent that English is Applicant’s second language; it is not
the language for which he is currently valued for his linguistic expertise. He explained
that he initially failed to comprehend the meaning of the financial questions, and that he
later corrected his response when investigators specifically asked him about some older
medical bills he could not yet afford to repay. Absent actual evidence that he
intentionally falsified his answers to SCA questions regarding his finances, and in light
11
of both his comments and the scant evidence of record, AG ¶ 16(a) does not apply.
Under the unique circumstances regarding this particular Applicant, however, I find that
application of AG ¶ 17(c) (the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment) is sufficient to mitigate the personal conduct security concerns
alleged.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a). Under AG ¶ 2(c), the
ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an
overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and
the whole-person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole-person”
factors. Applicant is a mature individual who recently began using his native linguistic
and cultural knowledge to conduct specialized and significant work abroad. Prior to that,
he had an erratic employment record. Despite that record, it appears he endeavored to
seek stable employment to support himself. Little more can be said, however, given the
scant personal and financial information provided by Applicant in response to the SOR
and the FORM.
Without additional facts concerning his life in the United States, foreign influence
security concerns can only be analyzed with reference to his foreign relatives and his
trips abroad. Such facts do not mitigate foreign influence security concerns. Moreover,
without any documentary evidence concerning his efforts to address the debts at issue
in the SOR, financial considerations security concerns remain unmitigated. The most
direct, relevant, and material information Applicant provided is with regard to why he
answered “no” to questions regarding whether he had delinquent debts on his SCA.
Under the circumstances depicted, his explanation mitigates personal conduct security
concerns. 
In these cases, the burden is placed squarely on an applicant to overcome
security concerns. With foreign influence and financial considerations security concerns
remaining, the clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials. Such a conclusion is not
a reflection on an applicant’s patriotism or loyalty to the United States. It is merely a
12
determination that an applicant failed to carry his burden. In light of the security
concerns remaining unmitigated, clearance is denied.   
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a-1.g Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a-2.j Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance denied.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge