1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE   
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
 ------------------------- )     ISCR Case No. 08-04344
SSN: ----------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Paul T. Rennick, Personal Representative
______________
Decision
______________
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant continues to consume alcohol despite several detoxification treatments
and her completion of a partial hospitalization program for diagnosed alcohol
dependence in 2007. Alcohol consumption concerns are not mitigated, but personal
conduct concerns were not established because Applicant did not deliberately falsify her
September 2007 security clearance application. Clearance denied.
Statement of the Case
On May 11, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct, that provided
the basis for its decision to deny her a security clearance. The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of
Defense on September 1, 2006. 
The SOR cites falsification of a September 17, 2007, Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire1
(SOR 2.a) and a September 17, 2007 Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SOR 2.b).
2
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on June 17, 2009, and requested a
decision on the written record without a hearing. Around November 2009, after she had
responded to the Government’s File of Relevant Material, Applicant requested a hearing
before an administrative judge. On December 2, 2009, the case was assigned to me to
consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a
security clearance for her. On January 8, 2010, I scheduled a hearing for February 4,
2010.
The hearing was held as scheduled. Nine Government exhibits (Ex. 1-9) and 12
Applicant exhibits (Ex. A-L) were admitted without any objections. At the Government’s
request, I accepted the Government’s FORM dated August 31, 2009, minus any
attachments, as a supplement to the Government’s closing argument. Applicant
testified, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on February 16, 2010. Based on
review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified
information is denied.
Findings of Fact
The SOR alleged under Guideline G, alcohol consumption, that Applicant
continued to consume alcohol despite alcohol-related treatment (SOR 1.a); that she
received alcohol-related treatment in 1997, 2001, 2003, January 2006, and from
December 19, 2006 to January 19, 2007 (SOR 1.b to 1.h), for diagnosed alcohol
dependence; and that she was charged with driving under the influence in about 1982
(SOR 1.i). Under Guideline E, personal conduct, Applicant was alleged to have falsified
a September 17, 2007 security clearance application by not disclosing the full extent of
her alcohol treatment (SOR 2.a and 2.b).  Applicant admitted the allegations under1
Guideline G while denying that her alcohol consumption has led to the exercise of
questionable judgment on the job. She denied that she deliberately falsified her security
clearance application. After considering the record evidence, I make the following
findings of fact.
Applicant is a 48-year-old test engineer specialist, who has been employed by a
defense contractor since September 2007. She held a secret-level security clearance in
the past, granted to her in June 1987, for her previous employment of 11 years with a
different defense contractor. (Ex. 1, 4, L, Tr. 65.) From June 1980 to June 1982, she
pursued her associate degree in computer programming at a local community college.
(Ex. 1.) 
Applicant began to drink alcohol (beer, wine, or vodka) at about age 18, around
1979, when socializing with friends on the weekends. (Ex. 2.) She consumed three or
four alcohol drinks when she drank (Ex. 2), to intoxication around once a month. On one
Medical records of Applicant’s detoxification treatment in September 2001 indicate a past psychiatric2
history and hospitalization at facility X four years ago for six weeks. Information published by facility X
indicates that its clinical and medical staffs have expertise “not only in treating chemical dependence, but also
in psychiatric issues and those who are dually diagnosed.” (Ex. 9.) It is unclear whether the primary focus of
her 1997 treatment was on alcohol issues or mental health issues or both. Applicant informed DOHA in
January 2009 that she had six weeks of outpatient classes at facility X in 1997. (Ex. 4.)
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occasion in about 1982, she was arrested for driving under the influence. She
completed alcohol education classes, and the charge was expunged from her record.
(Ex. 1, 4, C, K.)
In the fall of 1985, Applicant met her now ex-husband, and they married in July
1990. They had their first daughter within the next two years, while Applicant worked
full-time and pursued her bachelor’s degree in financial accounting. Their second
daughter was born in the mid-1990s. (Ex. 1.) Around 1997, Applicant attended six
weeks of outpatient evening alcohol classes at a local alcohol rehabilitation facility
(facility X) because she was starting to drink alcohol on a daily basis. (Ex. 4, Tr. 110-
11.) In July 1998, Applicant went to work for a pharmaceutical company, initially in
systems quality management. (Ex. 1, D, L.)
Applicant and her ex-husband grew apart, and they divorced in June 2001. (Ex.
7.) Applicant’s alcohol consumption increased to five drinks at a sitting three or four
times weekly due to the stress of the divorce and having to move from the family home.
(Ex. 1.) By September 2001, she was drinking at least six beers a day and one gallon of
hard liquor per week. From September 27, 2001, to October 1, 2001, she underwent
voluntary detoxification treatment at a hospital for medically diagnosed alcohol
dependence. She had a history of treatment for depression  and was placed on an2
antidepressant. Aftercare recommendations included that she attend daily Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) meetings, obtain a sponsor in AA, and continue treatment with her
psychologist. (Ex. 7.)
With the help of nightly AA meetings, Applicant completely abstained from
alcohol, but only for eight days after her discharge. She stopped attending AA and
began drinking alcohol to intoxication twice a week. (Ex. 1, 8, I.) In 2003, and in
December 2005, she underwent inpatient alcohol detoxification, but she continued to
drink. She experienced withdrawal symptoms (“shakes”) when she tried to stop drinking.
By early January 2006, she was drinking one and a half pints of vodka daily. She was
stressed by being laid off from the employment she had held since 1998, and was
grieving the death of her brother within the last year. With her ex-husband and their
daughters expressing concern about her drinking, she voluntarily underwent alcohol
detoxification treatment from January 7, 2006, to January 11, 2006. She was diagnosed
by the director of the hospital’s chemical dependency program with alcohol dependence
and acute anxiety, not otherwise specified. Applicant planned to participate in an
outpatient program at facility X, but she was starting a new job with a consulting
company, and had to wait 30 days for her insurance to become effective. Applicant was
encouraged to consider scheduling her aftercare sooner. At discharge, Applicant’s
immediate plans included “hopefully” attending seven AA meetings per week, and
driving a different route home from work “in order to avoid the liquor store.” For
Two copies of the QNSP page containing question 21 were available for review (Ex. 1, A), with text3
missing from the left margin on both exhibits due to sloppy copying. On Exhibit 1 the date of initial treatment
appears as “2/2006,” while on Exhibit A the date appears as “/2006.” Consistency with the electronic version
of her security questionnaire and with facility X’s medical records leads me to conclude that she indicated
“12/2006" as the date of her admission to facility X.
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aftercare, her counselor recommended 12-step involvement, residential treatment,
outpatient counseling at a minimum, and sober housing. (Ex. 8.)
By mid-December 2006, Applicant had been unable to maintain abstinence for a
full week. She was drinking two pints of liquor per day and spending $150 per month on
alcohol. With the state’s department of child services involved because of her drinking,
and following a mental status examination at a local hospital, Applicant underwent
detoxification treatment at facility X from December 19, 2006, to December 23, 2006. At
discharge, she was referred to the facility’s partial hospitalization program for treatment
of diagnosed alcohol dependence. (Ex. 6.)
On December 25, 2006, Applicant was admitted to facility X’s partial
hospitalization/intensive outpatient treatment program. She was out of work on short
term disability, and was authorized to remain in treatment until January 19, 2007. At a
session on January 8, 2007, Applicant expressed concerns about her tendency to
isolate, become depressed, and then drink, but she was allowed to spend her last week
in the program as a commuter from home. She managed to remain abstinent while in
treatment, and she successfully completed the program. At discharge on January 19,
2007, her mood was stable. Applicant was discharged on Campral medication and
referred for management of her anti-anxiety medication and for once weekly
participation in an early recovery group. (Ex. 6.) AA meetings were recommended but
not mandated. Applicant attended various AA meetings in her area on a daily basis for
six months, and then occasionally thereafter until August 2007. She stopped attending
due to work and home demands, but she also was not comfortable with its spiritual
approach (Ex. 1, 4, I, Tr. 84.), or with speaking in public. (Tr. 85.) Applicant continued
with an online “Smart Recovery Program” until early 2009. (Tr. 43, 87-88.) As of
February 2010, she was reading AA books, which she claims are of some benefit. (Tr.
85-86.) She was never involved in the AA step program and was unable to recite any of
the AA steps when asked to do so by the Government at her hearing. (Tr. 86.)
In May 2007, Applicant was terminated from her employment with the consulting
company due to poor performance not related to alcohol consumption on her part. (Ex.
1, 4.) When she applied for her current position with the defense contractor, she
completed by hand a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QNSP) on July 23,
2007. In response to question 21, concerning whether she had consulted with a mental
health professional about a mental health related condition, Applicant indicated that she
was treated at facility X from December  2006 to January 2007.  She answered “Yes” to3
question 25 concerning any alcohol-related treatment in the last seven years, and
added, “Reported in 21.” (Ex. 1, A.) She thought it was sufficient to disclose only her
most recent, most comprehensive treatment. (Tr. 33-34.) 
DOHA alleged falsification of a September 17, 2007 e-QIP (SOR 2.a) and September 17, 20074
QNSP. Both parties acknowledge that the allegations concerned the electronic version of the security
clearance application (e-QIP) and not the handwritten QNSP, which Applicant completed in July 2007.
Applicant testified she was intoxicated but “to a limited extent.” She was not so drunk that she was5
unable to stand or could not converse. (Tr. 81.)
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Around September 17, 2007, Applicant was required to review an electronic
version of the security clearance application completed from her July 2007 QNSP. (Tr.
68-70.) She made no changes to her answer to question 21, or to question 25.  (Ex. 1,4
B, Tr. 71.) Applicant did not think to add her detoxification treatments because she
thought that the records of her prior treatments would be incorporated in the records of
her more comprehensive treatment at facility X, given she had authorized facility X to
access those records. (Tr. 75.)
Applicant was interviewed about her alcohol consumption and alcohol-related
treatment by an authorized investigator for the Government on December 21, 2007. She
denied that her use of alcohol had caused any adverse incidents because her 1982
drunk driving incident occurred so long ago and had been expunged from her record.
(Ex. 2, I, Tr. 39.) Applicant discussed her treatment at facility X, but did not disclose her
previous detoxification treatments. She has no present recall of the investigator asking
about treatment previous to her rehabilitation at facility X. (Tr. 38, 41) She also denied
that there had been any negative impact on her family because of her drinking.
Applicant indicated that while she had no present intent to drink, she could not rule out
drinking alcohol “in minimal amount” at a special occasion. (Ex. 2.) 
Advised by clinicians at facility X to abstain completely from alcohol (Tr. 107.),
Applicant consumed three to four glasses of wine with her sister at her sister’s home in
August 2007 in reaction to her mother’s terminal illness. As of her subject interview with
the investigator on December 21, 2007, she had consumed two or three glasses of wine
or beer on three other occasions while socializing with friends. She denied any intent to
drink alcohol in the future, but could not rule out the possibility of drinking on special
occasions. (Ex. 2, I.)
Applicant consumed six or seven drinks of vodka to intoxication  in November5
2008, when she had to euthanize her dog. (Tr. 79-80.) As of January 2009, Applicant
was drinking alcohol on a weekly basis, in quantities that depended on the occasion,
usually two to four beers or glasses of wine. She was not drinking before work and had
not reported to work under the influence of alcohol. (Ex. 4.) Nor was she frequenting
drinking establishments. (Ex. 5.) Applicant underwent a physical examination on
January 7, 2009, which showed her liver was “top normal to minimally enlarged.” (Ex.
5.)
Applicant considers herself to have relapsed on three occasions after her
treatment at facility X, those being when her mother died, when she had to euthanize
Applicant described a relapse as follows:6
W hen you start drinking too–where you’re not controlling it. W here you’re not limiting your
consumption to two or three and you’re to the point where [you] feel [you are] getting
intoxicated too often. Not intoxicated to the point of stumbling down, but to the point where
you’re having three drinks five times a day or something. (Tr. 92-93.)
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her dog, and when she was laid off from the pharmaceutical company.  (Tr. 43-44, 92,6
105.) In the year preceding her February 2010 hearing on her clearance eligibility, she
drank on average three times per week. In mid-January 2010, she consumed three
mixed drinks consisting of vodka and orange juice. (Tr. 83-84.) Her current boyfriend
drinks alcohol, and she has consumed alcohol with him. (Tr. 79.) She consumed three
or four beers after work on January 26, 2010,  four beers with her boyfriend at home on
January 29, 2010, and three glasses of wine with him on January 31, 2010. (Tr. 77-79,
83.) She keeps alcohol at her residence on occasion. She purchased the beer she
drank on January 29, 2010, from a local liquor store. (Tr. 99.)
Applicant denies drinking to intoxication, i.e., to the point of being unable to stand
or having slurred speech. (Tr. 45, 81.) Applicant does not believe that she has a current
problem with alcohol (“I believe that I am a functioning, competent mother,
employee–that I’ve had no issues at work. I’ve had no issues with driving. I’ve had no
issues with family. I currently moderate my consumption.”). (Tr. 89-90.) Applicant
believes that she has her drinking under control and that she is not going to have
another relapse. (Tr. 93.) While her coworkers are unaware of her alcohol problem (Tr.
91.), Applicant’s boyfriend and some friends do not let her consume more than “a
couple” of alcohol drinks “because they realize the issue that it can potentially become.”
(Tr. 93.)
Character References
Applicant has not allowed her alcohol problem to negatively affect her job
performance, including while she held a security clearance for a previous employer. (Ex.
E.) She has met or exceeded her employer’s requirements since the start of her
employment within a defense contractor’s engineering configuration management
group. (Ex. F, G, H.) Her work output for her first year on the job was in the acceptable
range and of satisfactory quality to require minimal rework. Applicant also showed that
she was able to function effectively in a high pressure and performance-oriented
environment. (Ex. E, G.) By late February 2010, she had recommended several very
good process improvements and was considered to be a valuable asset to the team by
her immediate supervisor. (Ex. E, H.) Her overall work performance for the March 2009
through February 2010 rating period exceeded her job requirements. (Ex. H.) 
Policies
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,
emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a
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security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines
(AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative
guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are
required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified
information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government
must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under
Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to
obtain a favorable security decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section
7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant
concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access
to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
The security concern for alcohol consumption is set out in AG ¶ 21: “Excessive
alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure
to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and
untrustworthiness.” Applicant has had one alcohol-related incident, a drunk driving
offense from 1982, that would implicate AG ¶ 22(a), “alcohol-related incidents away
from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse,
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disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual
is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent.” Despite her long history of
struggles with alcohol, there has been no impact on her work performance, so AG ¶
22(b), “alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an
intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, regardless of whether the
individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent,” is inapplicable. 
However, the responsibility for protecting classified information is not limited to
duty hours. She coped with marital problems in 1997 by drinking alcohol on a daily
basis. While in the process of her divorce in 2001, she drank at least six beers a day
and a half gallon of vodka per week. By 2005, she was experiencing withdrawal
symptoms when she tried to stop drinking. As of January 2006, she was drinking 1.5
pints of vodka per day. After undergoing another detoxification treatment program, she
was unable to abstain completely from alcohol for a full week. By December 2006, she
was consuming two pints of liquor per day. AG ¶ 22(c), “habitual or binge consumption
of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is
diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent,” applies. 
Furthermore, she has been diagnosed as alcohol dependent by staff physicians
and licensed substance abuse clinicians. AG ¶ 22(d), “diagnosis by a duly qualified
medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol
abuse or alcohol dependence,” and AG ¶ 22(d), “evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol
dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized
alcohol treatment program,” are implicated.
AG ¶ 22(f), “relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and
completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program,” is applicable because of her relapse
after January 19, 2007. Treatments previous to the partial inpatient hospitalization
program at facility X consisted primarily of alcohol education or detoxification protocols.
But after receiving comprehensive cognitive behavioral therapy and relapse prevention
counseling at facility X, Applicant admittedly drank to intoxication for several days, up to
two weeks time, around August 2007 and in November 2008. Moreover, Applicant’s
ongoing consumption of  three or four beers or glasses of wine three times a week, and
of three mixed drinks on occasion, raises serious concerns about her reform, given she
has been advised to abstain by treating clinicians at facility X.
Although Applicant was limiting her drinking to off-duty hours as of February
2010, her abusive relationship with alcohol is too recent and recurrent to favorably
consider mitigating condition AG ¶ 23(a), “so much times has passed, or the behavior
was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment.” AG ¶ 23(b), “the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or
issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem,
and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if
an alcohol abuser),” is implicated in part. Excepting court-mandated alcohol education
for her drunk driving offense, Applicant sought treatment on her own when she felt she
was losing control over her drinking in the past. But this does not satisfy the abstinence
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component of AG ¶ 23(b) triggered because of her diagnosed alcohol dependency. And,
while she responded “yes” to whether she is an alcoholic (“I guess based on the records
of what they go by and what they consider alcohol dependent–yes.” Tr. 89), her current
consumption pattern of up to four glasses of wine or beer on a regular basis raises
doubts about whether she accepts the diagnosis and is committed to her sobriety.
AG ¶ 23(c), “the individual is a current employee who is participating in a
counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment and relapse, and
is making satisfactory progress,” is designed to encourage employees to seek treatment
without fear of denial or loss of their clearance eligibility. At the same time, the
Department of Defense justifiably requires current employees to make the progress
necessary to avoid a relapse and need for further treatment. Alcohol education and
detoxification are not the equivalent of alcohol treatment if they do not address the
underlying issues and triggers that may lead to a relapse. While the evidence warrants
treating her latest admission to facility X as her first intensive alcohol treatment
program, Applicant cannot satisfy AG ¶ 23(c). She is not currently in treatment and
doubts persist about her recovery in light of her post-treatment relapses.
Applicant’s latest treatment at facility X fulfills the rehabilitation component of AG
¶ 23(d), “the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient counseling or
rehabilitation along with any required aftercare. . . .” Applicant met her initial treatment
goals. At discharge, she was referred to self-help groups, and I accept her testimony
that she attended AA and remained abstinent until August 2007. For those seven or
eight months, Applicant demonstrated “a clear and established pattern of modified
consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization,” which is
also  required under AG ¶ 23(d). But her drinking since August 2007 is contrary to
clinical advice, and she presented no recent assessment from a qualified medical
professional or substance abuse clinician that could dispel the security concerns raised
by her present consumption. A physical examination showing her liver to be “top normal
to minimally enlarged” is not a substitute for “a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a
recognized treatment program.” 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
The security concern about personal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant does not dispute that she failed to disclose her detoxification
treatments on her initial QNSP completed in July 2007, or on the e-QIP version she
In ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006) the Appeal Board listed five circumstances7
in which conduct not alleged in an SOR may be considered:
 
(a) to assess an applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation,
mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated
successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative
Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole person analysis under Directive
Section 6.3.
(citing ISCR Case No. 02-07218 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 15, 2004)); ISCR Case No. 00-0633 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct.
24, 2003)).
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reviewed in September 2007. However, she denies willful concealment in that she acted
on belief that information about her detoxification treatments in 2001, 2003, and January
2006 by other providers could be accessed through facility X because she had
authorized release of her clinical records to facility X. I accept her explanation as
credible. It is unlikely that Applicant would have listed her recent, more comprehensive
treatment at facility X if she wanted to conceal her alcohol problem from the
Government. Although Applicant had an obligation to list each inpatient detoxification
treatment separately on both the QNSP and e-QIP, AG ¶ 16(a), “deliberate omission,
concealment, or falsification of relevant facts form any personnel security questionnaire,
personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine
employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities,” does not apply because
she lacked the intent to deceive or conceal. 
As accurately pointed out by the Government, Applicant could have been more
forthcoming about her alcohol problem and her treatment when interviewed by a
Government investigator in December 2007.   Applicant told the investigator that she7
drank to intoxication on average twice a week from 2001 to December 2006, when she
entered facility X. Clinical records show episodes of daily drinking in heavy quantities by
Applicant in 2001, January 2006, and again in December 2006. Applicant told the
investigator that she had not attended treatment programs other than the December
2006 to January 2007 program at facility X. While she had several inpatient
detoxification treatments, they were not regarded by her, nor were they shown to be,
alcohol rehabilitation programs. Applicant does not dispute that she denied any arrests
when she had been arrested for drunk driving 25 years ago, but it was because the
charge had been expunged. Applicant also denied any family problems because of her
drinking, which, in contrast, is difficult to accept, given that the state’s department of
child services became involved around December 2006 because of her drinking. Yet, It
does not compel me to conclude that she falsified her security clearance application.
Concerns about her lack of candor on the QNSP or e-QIP are not substantiated (see
AG ¶ 17(f), “the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability”).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the conduct
AG ¶ 2(a) requires consideration of the following nine factors:8
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the
conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the
conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Treatment is viewed favorably, but adverse findings are warranted because of the abusive drinking9
that led her to seek the treatment. 
11
and all the circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶
2(a).  8
Applicant bears a substantial burden of mitigation, especially where she does not
fully satisfy any of the Guideline G mitigating conditions. She has not allowed her
abusive use of alcohol to interfere with her work performance. But security is a 24-hour-
per-day responsibility, and Applicant’s present drinking habits pose an unacceptable risk
to her sobriety. Even if I accept that she has consumed alcohol to intoxication only
following the deaths of her mother and  her pet, she consumes three or four drinks three
times a week. This drinking would not be problematic but for her history of abuse to the
point of medically diagnosed dependency and well-documented struggles to achieve
sobriety. Her current support network, which consists of friends (including a boyfriend)
who also drink alcohol, is not likely to provide her the guidance and support necessary
to achieve the abstinence recommended by the clinicians at facility X, or to avoid
drinking to intoxication if faced with a stressful event. I recognize that AA is not for
everyone, but one has to question whether just reading AA pamphlets is enough. She
has yet to admit that she is powerless over alcohol.
Applicant’s character references attest to her being a good mother, and a reliable
and productive employee. These recommendations weigh in her favor in assessing
whether her alcohol problem presents an unacceptable security risk. She has shown
good judgment in seeking detoxification and then alcohol rehabilitation treatment when
she felt she had lost control over her drinking. At the same time, any doubts must be
resolved in favor of national security. Her evidence in reform is insufficient to overcome
the Guideline G concerns.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline G: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant9
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
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Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance.
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
Administrative Judge