KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to issue a
favorable security clearance decision.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 09-02800.a1
DATE: 10/08/2010
DATE: October 8, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-02800
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On December 23, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
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and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On July 26, 2010, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge Matthew E. Malone denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision is
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
did not correctly weigh the evidence.  In his brief he states that all events concerning his financial
situation were provided to DOHA during the hearing. He then summarizes the evidence and argues
why it should support a favorable determination.  
Applicant’s argument does not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious
or contrary to law.  The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to
make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the
evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence,
or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  A party’s
disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different
interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or
reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge made the following relevant findings of fact: Applicant had accrued
21 delinquent debts totaling approximately $95,203.  Decision at 2.  Many of the debts had
originally arisen when Applicant became unemployed in 2006 and experienced divorce-related
support obligations.  Id. at 7.  Even though Applicant has had a steady income since 2007, most of
his debts remained unpaid and had not been addressed in a constructive manner.  Id. at 8-9.  At the
time of the hearing, Applicant still owed $54,000 in delinquent debt.  Id. at 7.  He had failed to
follow through on a debt counseling and consolidation effort in 2008.  Id. at 9.  Applicant intended
to file for federal bankruptcy protection, but had not retained an attorney for that purpose until less
than a week before his hearing.  Id. at 8.
In light of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s financial
problems were still ongoing and that he had not met his burden of persuasion as to mitigation.   See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The Judge weighed the mitigating
evidence offered by Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and
considered the possible application of relevant conditions and factors.  He found in favor of
Applicant under Guideline E and as to seven of the SOR factual allegations under Guideline F. 
However, he reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the
government’s security concerns.  The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the
record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory
explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).  “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
Therefore, the Judge’s unfavorable security clearance decision under Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jean E. Smallin                
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed; William S. Fields               
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                       
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board