KEYWORD: Guideline F 
DIGEST: In light of Applicant’s financial history, his evidence that he had paid off some non-
SOR debts and partially paid one SOR debt was not sufficient to mitigate the security concerns
in his case.  Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASE NO: 09-07853
DATE: 10/06/2010
DATE: October 6, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-07853
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On April 9, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested the case be decided on the written record.  On July 29, 2010, after considering the record,
Administrative Judge Edward W. Loughran denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision is
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the
evidence shows that he is trustworthy, reliable and lives within his means.  His appeal brief contains
new evidence, in the form of a documentary exhibit that indicates he has paid a debt subsequent to
the close of the record in this case.  The Board cannot consider this new evidence on appeal. See
Directive ¶ E3.1.29.  Applicant’s remaining arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision
is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  
In this case, the Judge made the following relevant findings of fact: Applicant admitted
owing 11 delinquent debts and two unpaid judgements totaling $16,634. Decision at 2.  Although
he paid six debts not alleged in the SOR and made a partial payment on one debt alleged in the SOR,
the Judge was unable to make a determination that Applicant acted responsibly under the
circumstances, principally because of questions that were unanswered by the limited information
available in the record.  Applicant has not resolved most of the debts alleged in the SOR and his
financial issues are recent and ongoing.  “There is no evidence that Applicant received financial
counseling.  There is insufficient evidence for a determination that Applicant made a good-faith
effort to . . . resolve his delinquent debts, or that his overall financial problems are . . . under
control.” Id. at 5.
In light of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s financial
problems were still ongoing and that he had not met his burden of persuasion as to mitigation.   See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The Judge weighed the limited
mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying
conduct and considered the possible application of relevant conditions and factors.  He found in
favor of Applicant as to one of the SOR factual allegations.   However, he reasonably explained why
the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns. 
Applicant’s appeal argument can reasonably be construed as an alternative interpretation of
the evidence.  It is well established that such an argument is insufficient to demonstrate error. See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10859 at 4 (App. Bd. Sep. 2, 2010).
 The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision under Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan           
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board