KEYWORD: Guideline G
DIGEST: Applicant challenges the Judge’s suggestion to have Department Counsel question
Applicant.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that Department Counsel’s examination of
Applicant was conducted improperly.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 08-09898.a1
DATE: 11/19/2010
DATE: November 19, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-09898
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On December 23, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
1See Government Exhibit (GE) 1, Security Clearance Application, at 28; GE 4, Interrogatories, July 9, 2009,
at 6.  
2GE 3, Interrogatories, 23 April 2009, includes a letter from an attorney, describing a payment plan for this fine,
which had been approved by the court.  
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of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline G ( Alcohol Consumption)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On August 30, 2010, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Darlene D. Lokey
Anderson denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to
Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether certain of the Judge’s factual
findings were supported by substantial record evidence; whether Applicant was denied due process;
whether the Judge was biased against Applicant; and whether the Judge failed properly to apply the
whole-person factors.  Consistent with the following discussion, we affirm the decision of the Judge.
The Judge found that Applicant has a history of excessive alcohol use, continuing “off and
on” from 1973 until at least 2008.  During that time, Applicant had four instances of alcohol-related
offenses.  In 1992, 2002, and 2008, he was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI).  In 1992 and 2008, he was convicted of DUI.  In 2002, he pled guilty and was convicted of
a form of reckless driving termed “wet reckless.”1  Decision at 3.  During the security clearance
interview, Applicant learned that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest stemming from the
2002 offense, due to his having failed to pay off his fine.2   In 2000, Applicant was arrested and
charged with being drunk in public.  
Applicant intends to continue drinking alcohol, though he acknowledges that he has a
problem with drinking and driving.  He also believes that he is an unlucky person who has been
caught.  
Applicant enjoys an excellent reputation for his integrity, trustworthiness, and job
performance.
Applicant challenges certain of the Judge’s findings of fact, notably her finding that
Applicant has abused alcohol off and on during the times stated above.  However, the Judge’s
finding is a reasonable interpretation of the record evidence.  Considering the evidence as a whole,
the Judge’s material findings of security concern are sustainable.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 08-07528
at 2 (App. Bd. Dec. 29, 2009).
Applicant states that the Judge erred by permitting Department Counsel to cross-examine
him.  “No matter how well intended . . . this is an adversarial relationship between Applicant and
the Government Counsel, this should not have been suggested by [the Judge] . . .” Brief at 2.  This
argument suggests that Applicant believes the Judge expressed bias against him.  We have examined
the record and find nothing to suggest that Department Counsel’s cross examination of Applicant
3See Tr. at 31-32: “Q: Now, since your DUI . . . the last one, the 2008 one . . . have you ever had alcohol and
gotten behind the wheel of a car?  A: Yes.  But I wasn’t legally drunk.  Q: Okay.  A: I wasn’t .08.  I may have had a
beer.”  
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was conducted in a manner at variance with the Directive.  Applicant’s appeal brief is not sufficient
to rebut the presumption that the Judge was impartial.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 08-01306 at 4 (App.
Bd. Oct. 28, 2009). 
In support of his appeal, Applicant cites to evidence not contained in the record, concerning
his enrollment in an alcohol education program.  He had entered this program after the close of the
record.  We cannot consider this new evidence.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.29. (“No new evidence shall
be received or considered by the Appeal Board.”)   
The record supports a conclusion that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated
a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made’” both as to the mitigating conditions and the whole-person factors.3  Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  The
Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Jean E. Smallin                  
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields                  
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                     
James E. Moody
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Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board