DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 09-05626 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Based on a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for access to 
classified information is denied. 
 
On February 19, 2009, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) as part of his employment with a defense contractor. 
(Gov X 4) On April 26, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) 
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) for Applicant detailing security concerns for 
foreign influence under Guideline B. (Gov X 1) The action was taken under Executive 
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), 
as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the Department of Defense on September 1, 
2006. Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on April 11, 2010. (Gov X 2) 
  
 Applicant answered the SOR on May 10, 2010. (Gov X 3) He admitted seven of 
the eight factual allegations under Guideline B. The one factual allegation he denied 
 
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was because the information in the allegation was no longer accurate. Applicant 
provided new information. I considered that Applicant admitted this allegation with the 
new information. He elected to have the matter decided on the written record in lieu of a 
hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on June 22, 
2010. Applicant received a complete file of relevant material (FORM) on July 31, 2010, 
and was provided the opportunity to file objections, and submit material to refute, 
extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying conditions. Applicant submitted additional 
information correcting factual information in the FORM. Department Counsel had no 
objection to the additional information. The case was assigned to me on October 4, 
2010. 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 Department Counsel in the FORM asked that administrative notice be taken of 
certain facts concerning Afghanistan. I considered the request and the documents 
provided by Department Counsel. Administrative notice is taken of the facts as noted 
below in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following 
essential findings of fact.  
 
 SOR 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c allege that Applicant's parents, two brothers, and four 
sisters are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. SOR 1.d alleges that Applicant's 
brother is a citizen and resident of Uzbekistan. SOR 1.e alleges that Applicant's step-
brother is a citizen of Afghanistan and a resident of Russia. SOR 1.f alleges that 
Applicant traveled to Uzbekistan is 2008. SOR 1.g alleges Applicant traveled to 
Afghanistan from about April 2008 to October 2008. SOR 1.h alleges that Applicant 
sends approximately $1,000 yearly to his family in Afghanistan. Applicant initially 
admitted all factual allegations except allegation 1.e which he denied. In denying this 
allegation, Applicant notes that his stepbrother now resides in Afghanistan. I have sua 
sponte amended SOR allegation 1.e to read that his stepbrother is a resident of 
Afghanistan. Applicant has now admitted all allegations in the SOR for foreign 
preference. (Gov X 3)   
 
 Applicant is 26 years old and has been employed as a linguist or translator for a 
defense contractor for almost two years. Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. 
He left Afghanistan and went to Uzbekistan as a teenager at the urging of his parents 
because of the recruitment of teenagers for service by the terrorist organization, the 
Taliban. He immigrated to the United States as a refugee in May 2002 and completed 
high school. He worked at various jobs and became a United States citizen at the first 
opportunity in September 2007. Applicant is working for the defense contractor in his 
native country of Afghanistan. Most of Applicant's large family is still in Afghanistan. In 
addition to his immediate family, he has sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law and nieces and 
nephews who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. None of these relatives work 
 
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for the Afghan government. Applicant contacts his parents by telephone a few times a 
week. Most of his siblings he talks to by telephone once a week or at least bi-weekly. 
He visited his family for over six months in 2008 to assist with the care of his sick 
mother. He went across the border into Uzbekistan during this visit to see his brother. 
Applicant does has one sister who is a citizen and resident of the United States. (Gov X 
4, 5, 7)  
 
 Afghan was an independent monarchy nation from 1919, when the British 
relinquished control, until 1973 when the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup. 
The Soviet government supported a coup in 1978 that led to a Marxist government, and 
Soviet forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan starting in December 1979. Afghan 
freedom fighters, the Mujaheddin, opposed the Soviet occupation which led to fierce 
fighting. An accord was reached requiring Soviet forces to withdraw from Afghanistan in 
February 1989. The Mujaheddin were not a party to the accord and refused to accept 
the agreements. This led to a civil war that permitted the Taliban to come to power in 
the mid 1990s. The Taliban imposed an extreme form of Islam on the entire country and 
committed extensive human rights violations. They also provided sanctuary for terrorist 
organizations like Al Qu'ida. When the Taliban would not expel Al Qu'ida after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the United States and coalition 
partners commenced military operations in October 2001 that forced the Taliban from 
power in November 2001.  
 
 Afghanistan formed a democratic government in 2004. Even though progress 
has been made since then, Afghanistan faces many challenges including defeating 
terrorists and insurgents, recovering from decades of civil strife, and rebuilding an 
economy and infrastructure. The Taliban-backed insurgency has continued with 
increasingly frequent, sophisticated, dangerous, and destabilizing activities in spite of 
United States and coalition military operations. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of 
the violence. The Taliban continues to maintain momentum in spite of losses to their 
leadership. Armed conflict has spread to almost one-third of the country including areas 
previously free of violence. The lack of security in many areas and generally low 
government capacity and competency has hampered efforts at self-governance and 
economic development. There is continued government corruption and an expanding 
drug trade. The human rights record is poor with extrajudicial killings, torture, poor 
prison conditions, official impunity, prolonged pretrial detention, restrictions on freedom 
of press and religion, violence against women, sexual abuse against children, and 
human trafficking. The Taliban has strengthened its activities because of Pakistan 
funding sources, the drug trade, and kidnappings. The Taliban insurgent operations 
result in numerous attacks and deaths targeted at non-government organizations, 
journalists, government workers, and United Nation workers. There is an increase in 
militant attacks by rockets, vehicle-born explosive devices, and suicide bombing, even 
in the capital city, Kabul. The United States Department of State classifies Afghanistan 
as a critical security threat to United States citizens.  
 
 
 
 
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Policies 
 
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), 
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the 
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such 
consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
 Applicant's extensive family, except for one sister who is a citizen and resident of 
the United States, are all citizens and residents of Afghanistan. He talks to most of them 
frequently by telephone. He visited then for an extensive period in 2008, and he sends 
them money for their support. Applicant's contact with his family in Afghanistan raises 
security concerns under Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 7(a) 
(Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or 
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion); and FI DC AG ¶ 7(b) (Connections to a foreign person, group, government, 
or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign 
person, group, or country by providing that information). 
 
 The mere existence of foreign family members or friends is not sufficient to raise 
the above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Applicant’s contact with his family in 
Afghanistan must be examined to determine whether the contacts create a heightened 
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
“Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased risk compared to some normally 
existing risk that can be inherent anytime a family member is subject to a foreign 
government. The factors that heighten the risk in regard to Afghanistan are the critically 
dangerous conditions in the country, the human rights abuses, the extensive terrorist 
activities, and the Taliban hostility to the United States and its coalition partners.  
 
 I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) AG ¶ 8(a) 
(The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these 
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are 
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the 
interests of the U.S.); FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) (There is no conflict of interest, either because 
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, 
or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest); and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) (Contact or communication 
 
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with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could 
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation). A disqualifying condition based on 
foreign family members can be mitigated by balancing the potentially conflicting loyalties 
to the family members and the interests and loyalties to the United States to determine 
if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the United States 
interest.  
 
 The conditions in Afghanistan place a heavy burden on Applicant in mitigating 
the disqualifying conditions and the security concerns. Applicant's contacts with his 
family are not casual or infrequent but are close. He talks to them frequently by 
telephone, visited them for an extensive period in 2008, and sends them money for their 
support. Applicant has not established that his sense of loyalty to the United States will 
outweigh his sense of loyalty or obligation to his family members in Afghanistan. He did 
leave Afghanistan as a refugee from the Taliban. However, he is young and has only 
been in the United States for approximately eight years, and a citizen for only three 
years. He has only one sibling in the United States, and the rest of his family are in 
Afghanistan. He has not presented any information that he owns any property in the 
United States or has any overwhelming connections to the United States. Applicant did 
become a United States citizen at the earliest opportunity, and he is employed in 
support of United States forces fighting in a hostile war zone in his native country. 
However, he has not presented information whether he is employed in Afghanistan 
because of his sense of loyalty and obligation to the United States or the position is 
simply a very good job with good pay for which he is qualified.  
 
 The limited information Applicant presents does not meet his burden to establish 
that his sense of loyalty to the United States outweighs the connection to his family 
members in Afghanistan. He has not established he would resolve any conflicts in favor 
of Unites States interests. A conflict of interest between his sense of loyalty to his family 
and sense of loyalty to the United States is possible because of the critical adverse 
circumstances faced by Applicant as a United States citizen with family members living 
in the hostile conditions in Afghanistan. In balancing all of the factors mentioned and 
considered above with regard to his family, I am not satisfied Applicant’s loyalty to the 
United States is such that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor 
of the United States. I am satisfied that his trip to Uzbekistan in 2008, his lengthy visit to 
Afghanistan in 2008, and his sending funds to his family in Afghanistan are not 
independent reasons to raise a security concern. They are factors to show that he has 
close contact and affection with his family members. I find for Applicant as to SOR 1.f, 
1.g, and 1.h. Applicant has not met his heavy burden to show that his contact with his 
family does not cause a security concern. I conclude Applicant has not mitigated 
security concerns rising from his contact with his family in Afghanistan.  
 
Whole-Person Analysis  
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all 
 
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the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative 
process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which 
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and 
other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance 
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the 
guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
 I considered that Applicant came to the United States as a refugee from the 
hostile forces and conditions in Afghanistan and became a United States citizen at the 
earliest opportunity. However, the majority of his extensive family is located in 
Afghanistan and he has minimal connections to the United States. He has not 
established that his sense of loyalty to the United States outweighs the connection to 
his family in Afghanistan and that he would resolve any conflicts in favor of the United 
States. Applicant failed to present information that his contact with his family in 
Afghanistan does not create a security concern. Access to classified information is 
denied. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.e: Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.f - 1.h: For Applicant 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge