KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline G; Guideline E
DIGEST: Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to
the applicant to establish mitigation.  It is reasonable for a judge to expect applicants to present
documentation abot the satisfaction of specific debts.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 09-04036.a1
DATE: 12/08/2010
DATE: December 8, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-04036
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On February 2, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
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of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial
Considerations), Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On September 30, 2010, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Noreen A.
Lynch denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision is
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
erred in finding against him with respect to the debt alleged in SOR paragraph 1.b.  Applicant argues
that the evidence he presented at the hearing establishes that the debt was “in the process of being
paid” but that he had not yet received written confirmation to that effect.  Attached to his brief, he
submits new evidence in the form of documents which delineate the terms of his repayment plan as
to that debt and establish that he has made the first payment in accordance with that plan.  The Board
cannot consider this new evidence on appeal. See Directive ¶ E3.1.29.  Applicant’s remaining
argument does not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
The hearing was held on July 20, 2010.  At Applicant’s request, the Judge held the record
open until August 5, 2010 for the submission of additional documentation.  Prior to the close of the
record, Applicant submitted additional documentation relating to other debts alleged in the SOR,
but nothing with respect to the $10,083 debt alleged in SOR paragraph 1.b.  Decision at 1-2.  The
documentation relating to that debt which was submitted with Applicant’s appeal brief is dated
August 26, 2010—a date well after the close of the record in the case.  In her decision, the Judge
noted that Applicant was arranging for a 36-month payment plan that would begin in September
2010 with respect to the debt alleged in SOR paragraph 1.b and had already had his federal tax
refund applied to the account in February 2010.  Decision at 3.  However, she found against him as
to that debt because with respect to it and the much larger $21,405 debt alleged in SOR paragraph
1.a “. . . he has not started the actual payments.  He did not present evidence that he and the creditors
agreed on a specific payment plan.  His efforts are insufficient to carry his burden in this case.”
Decision at 7.  The Judge’s rationale in that regard is sustainable.  
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  Promises to pay a debt are not a substitute
for a consistent record of timely remedial action.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-31872 at 4 (App. Bd.
May 24, 2005.  Also, it is reasonable for a Judge to expect applicants to present documentation about
the satisfaction of specific debts.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17520 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 20, 2007).
Based on the record that was before her, it was not unreasonable for the Judge to conclude that
Applicant’s financial problems were still ongoing and that he had not met his burden of persuasion
as to mitigation.   See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The Judge
weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the length and seriousness of the
disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant conditions and factors.
She found in favor of Applicant under Guidelines G and E, and as to five of the SOR factual
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allegations under Guideline F.  However, she reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was
insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns.
 The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision under Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan      
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin           
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board